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INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis I attempt to give an account of the experiential 
self: the self of inner experience. I put forward the view that the 
empirical self is the only self there is, and attribute attempts to 
identify a Transcendental Self, a Pure Ego, a Mind, or a Soul, to a 
misunderstanding of the nature of the empirical, experiential self. 
The postulation of a real, or metaphysical, self is put down to the 
fact that philosophers have entertained altogether too simple a view 
of the nature of the empirical self. Their major assumption has been 
that if we have experience of an empirical self, a real self must be 
postulated which does the experiencing of the empirical self. On 
this basis the real self cannot itself become an object of experience 
without this leading to an infinite regress. My contention is, on 
the contrary, that the empirical self can itself perform all the 
functions allotted to the metaphysical self. On this view, the 
notion of a metaphysical self is redundant, and we are saved the 
embarrassment of defending the existence of a peculiarly elusive 
metaphysical entity. 
The position I have just outlined could quite easily be 
mistaken for one leading up to a theory like Strawson's in which a 
self is identified with a man; or Shoemaker's in which a self is 
described as a non -spiritual substance. In fact it will be seen 
to differ radically from these two, essentially coincident, 
approaches. Strawson and Shoemaker, together with most recent 
philosophers dealing with the problem of self- identity, see the 
problem exclusively in terms of the identity of other persons; not 
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in the identity of a person for himself. Even when the question of 
one's own identity arises, this is still taken by them to be a problem 
of the identity of other persons. Thus on their view if I have to 
establish my own identity, I must use precisely the same criteria as 
other people would use if they had to establish my identity. The 
problem I am concerned with, however, is one about which Strawson is 
silent: namely, the problem of explaining in what consists our own 
identity for ourselves. Chapter one opens with a discussion of the 
significance of the fact that we have first -hand knowledge of what 
selves are. The Pure Ego Theory and The Serial Theory are rejected 
for failing to take advantage of the unique position this places us in, 
to describe what selves are. 
While it is true to say that the Serial Theory offers an 
account of the self which is firmly rooted in experience (and in this 
respect meets one of the essential requirements I have laid down for 
a theory of the self), it is shown to be unsatisfactory because it 
rests on acceptance of Hume's introspective account of the empirical 
self as a bundle of perceptions. I argue that in general empiricism 
fails to do justice to the function of attention. In consequence it 
misdescribes the experiential data on which The Serial Theory of The 
Self is based. It is my contention that the 'perceptions" of which 
Hume speaks are one and all elements of experience singled out 
through the operation of attention. As such they represent but a 
fragment of total experience. By identifying the empirical self 
with the perceptions disclosed by introspection (attention) the 
Humean account mistakes the part for the whole. I seek to show that 
once this error is corrected, an account of the empirical self can be 
given that overcomes the traditional objections that have been 
brought against it, and which have been used to justify appeals to 
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non- experiential interpretations of the self. 
Since I dispute the widely held Humean view of the empirical 
self, and since I wish to take cognizance of the fact that we our- 
selves are the selves to be identified, I undertake an analysis of 
consciousness itself. Most of chapter one is devoted to that task. 
The reality of consciousness is defended against arguments denying 
its existence, and an exclusively empirical analysis of consciousness 
is offered. This is to protect my programme from the objection 
that a metaphysical interpretation of the self is only avoided at the 
cost of introducing a metaphysical interpretation of consciousness. 
To this end I defend the proposition that consciousness is nothing 
over and above its several manifestations, and I deny in particular 
that consciousness consists of acts of awareness. Then again 
adherence to the notion of consciousness is defended against the 
reductionist argument that reference to it should be dispensed with, 
in favour of piecemeal references to its manifestations. It is 
maintained that it is erroneous to conceive of consciousness as an 
aggregate of its manifestations. 
As a preliminary to investigating the constitution of 
consciousness two opposing points of view are considered in the form 
put forward by four Nineteenth Century philosophers. The views of 
Hamilton and Ferrier who contend that consciousness exhibits a duality 
between subject and object are contrasted with those of Hodgson and 
James who deny that consciousness has any such "inner duplicity." 
This short survey leads to the conclusion that an independent analysis 
of consciousness is needed, in view of the fact that opposing positions 
are defended by appeals to self -evidence that cancel each other out. 
What is required, and what I undertake, is to give an analysis of 
consciousness that is based on empirical facts and eschews any appeal 
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to intuition or self -evidence. 
Attention is made the subject of study in chapter two, because 
it supplies immediate evidence of the existence of the bifurcation of 
elements within consciousness. This effect of attention is 
investigated in the surmise that it might turn out to be the empirical 
basis to the alleged duality between subject and object. I attempt 
to show that attention is operative in all normal forms of consciousness: 
even when we believe ourselves to be totally inattentive. It trans- 
pires that attention reveals the structure of consciousness. It 
polarizes consciousness into that part of it that is receiving 
attention and a remaining part that is not. The part receiving 
attention I refer to as the object of attention, and the part from 
which attention is withdrawn I refer to as residual consciousness. 
These two aspects of consciousness are dealt with in chapters two and 
three, respectively. Evidence from the psychologists William James, 
and his French contemporary, T.H. Ribot, is adduced to support the 
analysis of the relation between consciousness and attention. 
A central distinction to my enterprise is the distinction I 
draw between what I call "interrogative attention" on the one hand, 
and "non- interrogative attention' on the other. I argue that these 
two forms of attention amount to the different ways in which conscious- 
ness may be structured. In the case of interrogative attention, in 
which attention is bestowed without a problem - solving intelligence 
being brought to bear on the object of attention, the two poles of 
consciousness -- residual consciousness and object of attention - -are 
merely severed from each other. In the case of interrogative 
attention, in which attention is given for the sake of finding some- 
thing out, the two poles of consciousness are in a systematic 
relationship with each other. The investigation suggests that the 
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different forms of attention are just the different ways in which 
consciousness may be structured. There is therefore no suggestion 
that attention may assume the role of an occult cause. Although the 
structure of consciousness will vary according to the form of 
attention, its bi- polarity is a formal feature common to all such 
structures. No matter what the content, the form of consciousness 
remains unchanged. There is nothing static about the content of 
residual consciousness on one side, nor about the object of attention 
on the other. Both, it is maintained, change ceaselessly through the 
continuous interchange of elements from one pole of consciousness to the 
other. An important observation is made to the effect that the 
changing content of the two poles is not noticed equally at both poles. 
The nature of the structure of consciousness is revealed to be one in 
which the changes occurring to the object of attention attract notice, 
while the changes taking place in the content of residual consciousness 
pass largely unnoticed. This is shown to be necessarily the case, 
and the feature of consciousness in question I describe as the 
directionality of consciousness. 
Chapter four is the crucial chapter in the work. The two 
preceding chapters are designed to prepare the ground for the 
denouement which it presents, and much of the significance of the 
earlier discussion can only be fully appreciated in its light. In 
it the view is advanced that the bi -polar structure of consciousness 
accounts for the duality between subject and object which Hamilton had 
asserted to be a self- evident feature of consciousness. The essence 
of the theory is that residual consciousness (which may be said to be, 
metaphorically speaking, the negative pole of consciousness), is the 
empirical self for which we have been searching. It is shown to 
have all the "marks" philosophers have taken to be characteristics 
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of the self. The empirical self is, on this theory, located within 
consciousness, and for this reason its knowability is guaranteed. 
At the same time the empirical self is not identified with the 
content of consciousness, and in this way the difficulty that the 
self is continuously passing away, which besets the Serial Theory of 
the Self, is overcome. From this perspective it can be appreciated 
that the Humean identification of the self with a series of 
perceptions is the very reverse of the truth. It is tantamount to 
the identification of the self with what is essentially not -self: 
viz. the objects of attention (i.e., the wrong pole of consciousness: 
the positive instead of the negative pole, so to speak). 
I contrast this theory with its closest rival --the theory that 
identifies the self with the mass of somatic feeling - -and demonstrate 
its manifest superiority to the latter theory. Objections to the 
plausibility of the proposed identification of the self with residual 
consciousness are considered and answered. It is shown to share the 
merit, which is particularly claimed by the somatic feeling theory, of 
enabling us to maintain that even an isolated perception can be said 
to be the perception of a self, quite independently of its relation to 
other perceptions. In this way it overcomes a major stumbling block 
to theories of the empirical self which in general permit of no such 
claim. At the same tine this feature of the theory destroys the 
basis of one of the strongest arguments in favour of a Pure Ego Theory: 
namely the supposai that only on a Pure Ego Theory could it be main- 
tained that one isolated perception could be the perception of a self. 
Finally the implications of the theory on the question of self - 
consciousness are drawn out, and the limits to complete self - 
objectification are explained. 
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Perhaps the single greatest difficulty for a theory that 
locates the self within experience, is to account for self- identity 
through time: in other words, the problem of the continuity of the 
self. A theory identifying the self with residual consciousness 
must seem particularly vulnerable in this respect, because of the 
fact that residual consciousness has an ever - changing content. This 
problem is taken up in chapter five. The Serial Theory is subjected 
to close examination, because it is offered as a solution to this 
problem. It is shown to be unsatisfactory, because of its dependence 
on the Humean view of consciousness, which, as I have already indicated, 
I dispute. I try to show that my analysis of consciousness escapes 
the atomistic implications of the Serial Theory, and demands instead 
that consciousness be seen as a continuum. 
The argument put forward to establish the fact that conscious- 
ness is continuous, is dependent on a subsidiary thesis that runs 
parallel to the main one throughout the work. It is the contention 
that states of consciousness come into being in conjunction with the 
bodily activities involving the use of our sense- organs. In the 
present context this thesis is brought in to explain the continuity of 
consciousness, in the following manner. I show that states of 
consciousness are sustained by bodily activities, and reason that 
since bodily activities are continuous while they last, the states of 
consciousness they sustain must themselves be continuous for as long 
as the bodily activity continues. The inference is then drawn that 
since residual consciousness is a part of consciousness, the 
continuousness of consciousness must be reflected in residual 
consciousness as well. Thus, on the basis of the identification of 
the self with residual consciousness, the continuity of the self is 
assured. Memory is then brought in to explain our awareness of our 
-8 
self- continuity. 
The thesis concludes with a sketch of some of the wider 
implications of my findings. It is argued that the relation between 
bodily activity and consciousness demands that the self be conceived 
of as embodied. And finally it is suggested that the theory offers 
the prospect of a reconciliation between Realism and Idealism; if not 
in the main, at least in respect of the issue of the active versus the 
passive self in perceptual experience. 
o 0 o 
CHAPTER ONE 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
1. To the question "What is the self ?" it would be apposite to 
reply as St. Augustine did to the question 'What is time ?'': "If no 
one asks me, I know; if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I 
know not." (1) Let us, per impossible, imagine asking ourselves this 
Question on the supposition that we who ask it are not ourselves selves. 
Our first thought might then be: "If only we were selves, we would 
have the answer.' But of course we are selves, and should therefore 
be in the best possible position to know what selves are. It is 
perplexing to realise that we have this advantage, and yet in spite of 
it, are unable to give a satisfactory account of the self. The native 
knowledge we have of ourselves seems to defy every attempt to put it 
into words, and it is this dilemma we find ourselves in which makes St. 
Augustine's despairing cry peculiarly applicable to knowledge of the 
self. 
There is a danger that if we cone to the conclusion that we are 
unable to utilize this native knowledge we have of ourselves, we will 
dismiss it as being of no use anyway, and try to provide a theory of 
the self which ignores the fact altogether. Let me illustrate this 
point. What I have described as our native knowledge of ourselves is 
the knowledge we have of our own being, and this knowledge is not 
propositional in form. It is also the knowledge we have of ourselves 
when we are not asked what the self is. In other words it is pre- 
(1) The Confessions of Saint Augustine (New York, 1949), p.253. 
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reflective knowledge. In view of this fact a request to have this 
knowledge described is self -defeating. As soon as we try to describe 
it, it ceases to be the knowledge we have when we are not asked- -i.e., 
pre -reflective knowledge- -and becomes the knowledge we do not have when 
asked. Let us, then, concede this logical difficulty, just as we 
concede to a mystic the indescribability of his mystical experience, 
before proceeding to read his description; and consider an attempt to 
describe the self of which we have pre -reflective knowledge. 
In the course of his exposition of Hume's theory of self - 
identity, MacNabb presents a view of the self, which, although he does 
not think of it in these terms, corresponds with the self of pre - 
reflective knowledge. I am suggesting, in other words, that a 
description, if one could be given, of the self of which we have pre - 
reflective knowledge, would come remarkably close to this description, 
given by MacNabb: 
I suggest that there is much plausibility in Berkeley's view, 
that we have an experience which we call the self, or soul, 
an experience different in kind from our other experiences, 
more internal than the most personal emotion we feel, and not 
needing or able to be represented in thought by an image, since 
in all thinking it is actually present. (1) 
On this account our selves are, so to speak, with us" the whole time, 
and this gives rise to our feeling of complete familiarity with the 
self, of which MacNabb's passage gives such a distinct impression. 
This is, to be sure, the way we feel about ourselves when we are not 
asked what the self is. But no sooner have we found words to describe 
this experience, than their self -defeating character becomes evident. 
MacNabb, we notice, refers to an experience "which we call the self." 
This means that the self is an experience. And the question at once 
(1) D.G.C. MacNabb, David Hume His Theory of Knowledge and 
Morality (London, 1951), p.147. 
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arises "Who experiences this experience ?" It cannot be the self, 
because the self has been identified with the experience experienced. 
We are left with the feeling that the experiencer who experiences the 
self has been left out of the picture, and the suspicion remains that 
the experiencer in question is after all the self we have all along 
been trying to identify. As the fruit -laden branches receded out of 
reach whenever Tantalus attempted to grasp them, so does the self seem 
to elude us when we attempt to grasp it. Equally, when we do not 
attempt to grasp the self in a self- reflective act, it seems as close 
to us as was the fruit to Tantalus when he made no effort to reach it. 
Many philosophers have resigned themselves to this predicament, 
and have retreated to the view that the self is, in itself, unknowable. 
Our knowledge of the self, on this view, is in principle indirect. 
The self is known only through its manifestations. We know what the 
self experiences and what it accomplishes, but what the entity is in 
itself, remains forever concealed from us. We call it the self, the 
mind, the ego, or the subject, but apart from giving it a name, we 
cannot say what it is. Such a view as this is in effect the particular 
application to the self of the general doctrine of a substance and its 
attributes. On this reasoning, whatever property we ascribe to a 
substance is an attribute of the substance, and what we know of a sub- 
stance is always one of its attributes, never the substance itself. 
The substance becomes an unknowable something in which attributes 
"inhere," and its sole raison d'etre is to be a "support' for a 
collection of attributes. This illustrates the danger we face if we 
try to understand what the self is, without taking into account the 
fact that we are dealing with entities which we ourselves are, and of 
which, in consequence, we have a certain native knowledge. Language 
itself seems to collaborate in turning the self into an unknowable 
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substance without any determinate characteristics. We refer to the 
things which belong to each of us as, for example, "my house," "my 
car," "my shoes" and so on. In these cases the possessive adjective 
of the personal pronoun "I" dissociates me from what is mine. I am 
not my house, my car or my shoes. Now it is easy to believe that 
this is a general logical feature of the word "my," which is true of 
all its uses: whatever I can call "my,' or "mine" must be something 
other than myself. Thus when I speak of "my body," "my consciousness" 
or "my mind," these are items which belong to me, but I am something 
different from them all. I am not my body, my consciousness, or my 
mind. But what then am I? There seems to be only one possibility. 
I am the substance which "possesses' these attributes. The self is 
bereft of all characteristics, and appears as a pure logical subject, 
but one which nevertheless exists. This is the dilemma. 
We do not have to look far to find an example that falsifies 
the analysis of "my" as equivalent to "belongs to me " -- what may be 
called the dissociative analysis. We have after all the word 
"myself ". This word does not agree with the dissociative analysis 
of "my." I cannot say "I am not myself" (except in the non -literal 
sense which means "I am not feeling like, or acting like, myself'') 
without contradicting myself. This exception means that the 
dissociative analysis cannot be given of all uses of "my," and so it 
cannot be true a priori that a given use of "my' is dissociative. 
We cannot tell a priori, for instance, that the use of "my" in "my 
body" is dissociative. And yet it is hard not to believe that the 
assumption that it is has played its part in adding plausibility to 
the theory that the relation between a self and its body is a 
contingent one. 
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The view of the self I have been concerned with is known as 
the Pure Ego Theory. On this theory all we can know of the self is 
the fact that there is a self, and what it does and what it experiences. 
Of the nature of this entity we know nothing. If we describe the 
entity as a substance, it transpires that we know no more about this 
substance than we do about any other. It shares the inaccessibility of 
substance in general. To make this theory come alive, I shall quote a 
passage in which it receives expression: the work of a M. Gatien- 
Arnoult. 
I turn my attention on my being and find that I have organs, 
and that I have thoughts. My body is the complement of my 
organs; am I then my body, or any part of my body? This I 
cannot be. The matter of my body, in all its points, is in 
a perpetual flux, in a perpetual process of renewal. I, --I 
do not pass away, I am not renewed. None probably of the 
molecules which constituted my organs some years ago, form 
any part of the material system which I now call mine. It 
has been made up anew; but I am still what I was of old. 
These organs may be mutilated; one, two, or any number of 
them may be removed; but not the less do I continue to be 
what I was, one and entire. It is even not impossible to 
conceive me existing, deprived of every organ; I, therefore, 
who have these organs, or this body, I am neither an organ 
nor a body. 
Neither am I identical with my thoughts, for they are 
manifold and various. I, on the contrary, am one and the 
same. Each moment they change and succeed each other; this 
change and succession takes place in me, but I neither change 
nor succeed myself in myself. Each moment I am aware or am 
conscious of the existence and change of my thoughts: this 
change is sometimes determined by me, sometimes by something 
different from me; but I always can distinguish myself from 
them; I am a permanent being, an enduring subject, of whose 
existence these thoughts are only so many modes, appearances, 
or phenomena; --I who possess organs and thoughts am, therefore, 
neither these organs nor these thoughts. 
I can conceive myself to exist apart from every organ, 
But if I try to conceive myself existent without a thought,- - 
without some form of consciousness, --I am unable. This or 
that thought may not be perhaps necessary; but of some 
thought it is necessary that I should be conscious, otherwise 
I can no longer conceive myself to be. A suspension of 
thought is thus a suspension of my intellectual existence; 
I am, therefore, essentially a thinking, -- conscious being; 
and my true character is that of an intelligence, - -an 
intelligence served by organs. (1) 
(1) This passage is quoted by Sir William Hamilton, and is to 
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Now there are many objections which one would wish to level 
against the view of substance I have been considering, but it is not 
these which I am interested in at the moment. I an interested in 
the extension of the general doctrine of substance to the self. 
Such an extension is implicit in the passage I have just quoted. 
It seems to me just conceivable that a philosopher could bring himself 
to believe that substance in general was, in Locke's phrase, 'something 
I know not what" in which qualities inhere. But this view is least 
convincing in respect of those particular substances which we our- 
selves are. We might be brought to agree that we knew nothing of 
other substances, but that we are similarly ignorant of the entities 
we ourselves are, is altogether less credible. It seems to fly in 
the face of what I have called our native knowledge of ourselves. 
At the opposite pole to the Pure Ego Theory are the theories 
which C.D. Broad has called "Non -Centre` Theories. (1) As the name 
implies, the self is understood in such theories to be equivalent to 
the set of its manifestations. Theories of this form are better 
known as Serial Theories of the self, and I shall so refer to them. 
If a dialectic process is evident anywhere in philosophy, it is 
surely in the movement from theories of substance to forms of 
phenomenalism. Once a substance is understood to be nothing more 
than an unknowable support or substrate for qualities, it is inevitable 
that some way of accounting for the compresence of a group of qualities 
should be sought, which is free of the intellectual embarrassment of 
be found in F. Bowen, The Metaphysics of Sir William 
Hamilton (Boston, 1881) p. 109 f. This source, to 
which I shall make frequent reference, is a systematic 
arrangement of Sir William Hamilton's philosophical 
works, in an abridged form. 
(1) C.D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature 
(London, 1951), p. 584. 
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an unknown substrate. The simplest alternative is to attribute the 
unity of a group of qualities to nocther fact than the fact that they 
constitute a group. It is because they cohere together, so it is 
argued, and not because they inhere in a substance, that a group of 
qualities is deemed to form a unity. In phenomenalist terms, what is 
called a substance is nothing but a collection of attributes. 
As is well known Hume gave this phenomenalist analysis of the 
one substance which had until then been thought exempt; namely the 
self. Where others had argued that the self or mind could only be 
known through its manifestations, Hume remorselessly asserted that the 
self was identical with its manifestations: the self being nothing 
but a ''bundle of perceptions.' (1) An important implication of Hume's 
analysis, and one for which we are indebted to him, is that he 
brought the self back squarely into the world of experience. However, 
the cost of doing so, it is admitted on all sides, is that the unity 
of the self was destroyed in the process. If the self is a bundle of 
perceptions, it is no ordinary bundle, for it is a bundle which is in 
some way aware of being a bundle. Hume was unable to explain how 
this could be. 
But apart from the difficulties intrinsic to phenomenalist 
theories, of the sort I have pointed out in Hume's account, there is 
the further point that such theories share the defect of the Pure Ego 
Theory of being counter -intuitive. Theories of the self, are theories 
of what we ourselves are, and a theory may be as logically rigorous as 
we please, and yet may fail in that we cannot recognise ourselves in 
the self described in the theory. There is this peculiar difficulty 
about theories of the self, that they, like any other theory, must fit 
(1) David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. I, pt. iv, 
sec. 6. 
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the facts, and yet it is by no means easy to say what the facts are, 
which the theory is required to fit. This brings us back to St. 
Augustine's saying. When no one asks me, I know what I am, but when 
I am asked I do not know. The situation is, I think, rather like 
this: I can tell when a theory of the self does not fit the facts. 
I can say that I know the self is not as you describe. But if you 
ask me what description of the self does fit the facts, I do not 
know. To put it differently, I can test a theory of the self in 
terms of my own experience, and I can judge a theory to be untrue to 
my experience, but I do not judge the suggested theory by comparing it 
with the theory of the self I know to be true. My judgment is not 
based on any theory of the self at all: it is based on experience of 
being a self - -quite another matter. 
When MacNabb says there is much plausibility in Berkeley's 
view, and goes on to describe an experience of the self, he is, I am 
sure, thinking of what experience seems to testify, and he is reacting 
against Hume's account because it seems contrary to what we know to be 
true of ourselves. It is worth dwelling for a moment on the view 
MacNabb attributes to Berkeley, for I believe it is possible to discern 
in his description two features to both of which a theory of the self 
must do justice, if it is to receive the backing of personal experience. 
Interestingly enough, the Pure Ego Theory, and the Humean Theory, each 
do justice to one of the features concerned, but only at the expense 
of the other. The ideal theory would therefore be an amalgam of both 
these two theories, incorporating the half -truth of each and thereby 
presenting the truth about the self as a whole. 
The point about the Pure Ego Theory which convinces us as 
being intuitively right is that it makes it clear that the self is 
a single entity which persists, although its experiences change. 
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When MacNabb identifies the self with an experience in the passage 
quoted on page l0,he implicitly shows his recognition that the self 
is some one thing. This is the lasting attraction of the Pure Ego 
Theory. What makes it unacceptable, as I have suggested, is the 
view that the entity which is identified as the self lies outside all 
experience. This is where the Humean theory in particular, and the 
Serial Theory in general, comes into its own. They stand firmly for 
the position that the self must lie within experience, and it is this 
feature which we feel is intuitively right about the Serial Theory. 
This feature, too, receives recognition in the account given by MacNabb 
when he says of the experience called the self, that it is "more 
internal than the most personal emotion we feel." This description 
places the self quite unequivocally within experience. It is because 
it attempts to do justice to both these features, and because it is at 
the same time self -defeating in the way I have shown, that I take 
MacNabb's account to be a presentation of our intuitive understanding 
of ourselves. 
The problem of the self arises precisely because any such 
account seems to be radically incoherent. Philosophical reflection 
appears to have shown that if the self is a single persisting entity, 
it cannot be found in consciousness, and if the self is found in 
consciousness, it cannot be a single persisting entity. Our 
intuitive account which demands that both features be honoured, wants 
to have things both ways, and the consensus of philosophical opinion 
is that this is impossible. 
2. We have seen that both the Pure Ego Theory, and the Serial 
Theory, are in effect logical extensions to the entities we ourselves 
are of analyses which in the first instance were taken to apply to 
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material objects. To extend such analyses to the self thus takes it 
for granted that we are material objects along with all the others, 
and that what is true of material objects in general must likewise be 
true of us. But this approach really begs the question, and this is 
the major criticism I have to level against these theories. Until we 
identify the entities we call selves, we are in no position to say 
whether or not they are subject to the same analysis as entities which 
are not selves. Futhermore, by making so large an assumption, we deny 
by implication the possibility that we have a special knowledge of what 
selves are, in virtue of the fact that selves are what we ourselves are. 
To put it another way, this is to deny that the best way of finding out 
what a thing is, is to be the thing in question. 
I would like to make this last point clearer, if I can. We 
can identify an argument pattern of the form: "The best way of finding 
out what it is to be an X, is to become an; X." This argument pattern 
is in essence a formal way of describing the appeal to direct experience. 
Now there are many sorts of cases in which we claim that we can only 
gain knowledge of something through personal experience. The argument 
pattern presupposes two conditions, without which it cannot be applied. 
It presupposes (a) that one is not already an X, and (b) that it is 
possible to become an X. Thus if the argument is used in the case of 
a desire for knowledge of what it is to be a racing driver, it reads: 
"The best way of finding out what it is to be a racing driver, is to 
become one." The argument then presupposes that the person to whom 
it applies is (a) not already a racing driver, and (b) is able to 
become one, if he wishes. This argument we can think of as repre- 
senting the paradigm case of finding out what it is to be an X. 
However, very often we are satisfied with less than the best kind of 
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knowledge. We find out what it would be like to be an X, and this we 
do by consulting someone who is an X, and relying on his powers of 
description. It is to be noted that in a sense it is misleading for 
a person who is an X, to claim to know what it is like to be an X. 
If I am a racing driver, and I made the statement "I know what it is 
like to be a racing driver" my statement might give the impression 
that I was not, now, a racing driver. If one is the thing in question, 
one is in a position to make a stronger claim than the claim to know 
what it is like to be the thing in question. Whereas if one is not 
the thing in question, one's only kind of knowledge of it, is the 
knowledge of what it is like to be the thing in question. Furthermore, 
the next best thing to knowing what it is to be an X, because one is an 
X, is knowing what it is like to be an X, because one was at one time 
an X. Thus, we concede most authority to those people who are at the 
moment numbered among the things in question, and we concede the next 
most authority to those people who were some time previously numbered 
among the things in question. Our racing driver is an example of the 
first sort. Knowing what it is like to be a schoolboy, or girl, 
because one was once oneself a schoolboy or girl, is an example of the 
second sort of case. 
The next thing to notice about the argument pattern: The best 
way of finding out what it is to be an X, is to become an X;' is that 
the conditions (a) and (b), above, are not necessarily satisfiable by 
everybody. Take these two instances of the argument for instance. 
The only real way of knowing what it is to be a mother, is to become 
a mother'' and "The only real way of knowing what it is to be a husband, 
is to become a husband." The possibility of everyone knowing what it 
is to be a mother, or a husband, is excluded, for the obvious reason 
that men cannot become mothers, and women cannot become husbands. 
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This leads on to the next possibility I wish to consider, and this is 
the possibility that conditions (a) and (b) might be satisfiable by 
no one. But before going on to consider this, it will be useful to 
be able to refer to someone who makes use of the argument pattern, by 
naming such use. If a person makes a statement of the form: ''I 
know what it is to be an X; you see, I am an X." we shall call such 
a statement the standard reply to the argument pattern. 
I wish now to consider the case mentioned above, which gives 
rise to what I shall call a secondary form of the argument pattern. 
I call it a secondary form, because it is an application of the 
argument pattern even though conditions (a) and (b) are absent. One 
can know what it is to be an X, because one is an X, even though there 
never was a time when one was not an X: i.e., there never was a time 
when one became an X. Such a case is obviously one to which conditions 
(a) and (b) do not apply, as they are concerned solely with the 
conditions which must be satisfied if one is to become an X. Being 
born blind and being a female, fall into this category. Because 
conditions (a) and (b) are not relevant here, the argument pattern 
must be formulated in a different manner. It now reads "One cannot 
really know what it is to be an X, unless one is an X." It should 
be observed that the standard reply retains its identical verbal form 
for the secondary form of the argument pattern as well: "I know what 
it is to be an X; you see, I am an X.'' 
It must not be thought that the difference between the primary 
and secondary argument patterns is without consequence. The primary 
argument pattern points to a much more favoured form of knowledge than 
the secondary argument pattern. When one knows what a thing is, in 
virtue of having become the thing, one knows both what it is to be the 
thing, and what it is not to be the thing. One is in the position of 
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having experience of both sides of the matter: When one knows what 
a thing is, and there never was a time when one was not one of the 
things in question, one lacks the comparative basis to one's knowledge 
which the other sort of case enjoys. 
For instance, suppose we apply the secondary argument to the 
case of someone's being blind from birth (hereafter abbreviated as 
" blind(c)''). We derive the statement "I know what it is to be 
blind(c); you see I am blind(c)." Now this knowledge is of a more 
limited kind than the knowledge a husband has of being a husband. 
The husband will have experience of being a husband and also of being 
a bachelor. His knowledge of the difference between the two states 
is based on direct comparison of one with the other. As a result 
he gains a better appreciation of what it is to be a husband. The 
blind(c) man has no comparable experience of a man with sight. (I 
am not taking into account the possibility of a blind(c) man having 
his sight restored.) This means that his knowledge of what it is 
to be blind(c) is not similarly enlarged and defined by experience 
of what it is to have sight. He can make no direct comparisons, as 
the husband could. It is in this sense that the knowledge pointed 
up by the secondary argument pattern is less favoured than that 
belonging to the primary argument pattern. Now of course it is 
open to the blind(c) man to improve his knowledge somewhat, by 
consulting people with sight on their knowledge of what it is to be 
able to see. In this way the gap between the first sort of knowledge 
and the second can be narrowed. 
I now wish to consider how our knowledge of what it is to be a 
self fits into these argument patterns. We see at once that the 
primary argument pattern is inapplicable, owing to the fact that 
conditions (a) and (b) are not satisfied. It is not possible for us 
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not to be selves, except by our ceasing to exist altogether, and if it 
is logically impossible for us not to be selves, it is logically 
impossible for us, in turn, to become selves. However the reasons 
which rule out the application of the first argument pattern, are the 
very ones which allow the statement "I know what it is to be a self; 
you see I am a self" to satisfy the secondary argument pattern. We 
saw in the case of the blind(c) man that his knowledge could be 
extended by consulting a man with sight. The question arises whether 
we can extend our knowledge of selves in the same way. Obviously it 
is logically impossible for a self to consult anything which is not- 
self (e.g. a material object) in order to find out what it is like not 
to be a self. Moreover any being which could be consulted would ipso 
facto be a self, and hence no contrast with a self would be forthcoming. 
What we have to realise, however, is that we are dealing with the 
selves we ourselves are, and not with the pure logical possibility of 
a self. That is, our concern is with human selves, since these are 
the only selves which we ourselves are, and which we can claim first- 
hand knowledge of. But of course we can contrast human selves with 
other forms of self. Now it to happens that we have come across no 
non -human selves whom we could consult. This is a straightforward 
empirical fact. Thus although on the question of consultability, 
selves are at a disadvantage as compared with blind(c) people, the 
limitation faced by selves is a contingent limitation and not a 
logical one. The next best thing to extending our knowledge of human 
selves by consulting non -human selves is to contrast human selves with 
selves created in our imaginations, such as angels. 
This method of broadening our understanding of ourselves is to 
be found in Kant's well known concept of the Holy Will. A being with 
a Holy Will is a being who is in a sense the antithesis of ourselves 
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in the ethical sphere. What is less well known is that Kant 
employed this method in epistemology as well. Walsh has shown that 
Kant envisaged the possibility of epistemological subjects which were 
at opposite poles to the sort of epistemological subjects we our- 
selves are. These he called an intellectus ectypus and an 
intellectus archetypus, respectively. 
'Neither of these concepts,''explains Walsh,'need be taken as 
being actual, though the first represents the human mind as 
conceived by the pure empiricist, whilst the second, which 
is the idea of a mind which creates objects simply by thinking 
of them, has sometimes been equated with the divine 
intelligence. "(1) 
Kant introduced these possible forms of mind so that by contrast we 
could get a better grasp of the particular form of our own minds. 
This is essentially what I am suggesting is possible in respect of 
knowledge of selves as such. 
I return now to the question of the import of the standard 
reply to the secondary argument pattern as applied to the self; 
viz. "I know what it is to be a self; you see, I am a self.' 
It cannot have escaped notice that the statement "I am a self" which 
appears in the standard reply, is a tautology. Now it might be 
objected that the argument pattern has no meaningful application in 
the cases in which the standard reply takes the form of a tautology. 
If this objection were accepted, it would mean that the argument 
pattern could not be appealed to, in the way I have done, in the case 
of knowledge of what it is to be a self. I have left this objection 
until now, because I believe that the foregoing discussion will 
itself have done much to show that it is really no objection at all. 
Of course the statement "I am a self" is a tautology, but that does 
(1) W.H. Walsh, 'Philosophy and Psychology in Kant's Critique," 
Kant Studien, 57. Jahrgang, Heft 1 -3, 1966. 
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not mean that there is never any philosophical point in asserting a 
tautology. Let me go back to the example of the blind(c) man to 
start with. It will be remembered that a blind(c) man, using the 
standard reply, makes the statement "I am blind(c)." Now let us 
suppose that he makes this statement in the course of a discussion 
in which he is the only one in the company who is blind(c). Let us 
further suppose that the discussion is concerned with the mercy 
killing of extremely malformed infants, and that one of the company 
tactlessly includes sightless infants in this class. It would be 
natural for the blind(c) man to feel constrained to remark "I am 
a blind(c) man myself, don't forget." No one need have overtly 
denied this fact, before it was affirmed. On the contrary, everyone 
in the company, we shall suppose, knew perfectly well that the man 
who made the statement was blind(c). This, we could say, was a fact 
not open to doubt. Thus if one of the company had denied that he 
was blind(c), his denial would be not merely false, but perverse; 
unintelligible. But then is it not equally perverse, or unintell- 
igible, for the blind(c) man to state that he is blind(c) when this 
fact is known to all those present? We would not say so for the 
simple reason that people frequently need reminding of what they know 
to be true. Now although the blind(c) man's statement is not a 
tautology, it is not, for the reasons mentioned, a straight forward 
statement of fact either. Thus the contrast between the statements 
"I am a blind(c) man" and "I am a self" are not nearly as great as 
they appear to be when the first is described as an empirical truth, 
and the second a tautology. If we further take into account the 
fact that it is a contingent truth that there exist no non -human 
selves for us to consult, the statement "I am a self" is seen to 
approximate even more closely the statement "I am blind(c)" in 
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respect of its logical behaviour. 
In practical life there are no situations which would give 
point to the statement "I am a self," in a way which is comparable to 
the point the statement "I am blind(c)' can make in the sort of 
circumstances I have envisaged. But from a philosophical point of 
view the statement "I am a self" made in the context that I am a 
human self as opposed to a non -human self, ceases to be a tautology, 
whether or not there exist non -human selves for us to consult. This 
can be made clearer if we imagine ourselves to be for a moment not 
human selves, but beings who are in some ways the antithesis of our- 
selves- -let us say, angels. As angels we would understand the claim 
of a human self to be a self, in precisely the way we now understand 
the blind(c) man's claim to be blind(c). The human self's statement 
would have point. We angels might then remark: 'The only way to 
know what it is like to be a human self, is to be one.` The human 
self observes: ' ?I know what it is to be a human self; you see, I am 
one. We can now drop the pretence of being angels. If the 
advantage of actually being a human self is evident to us as angels, 
its advantage must also be evident to us as human beings. 
This exercise has been designed to make us see ourselves in 
a way which is not obviously transparent, and this in turn enables us 
to appreciate how favoured our knowledge of ourselves is. The 
argument pattern: "I know what it is to be a self, because I am a 
self" liberates us from too familiar a perspective; and the association 
of the argument pattern with other sorts of knowledge, carries us 
towards new perspectives when we return to knowledge of the self. 
Knowledge of what the self is, which is not based on knowledge we have 
of our own experience of being selves, is less than the most favoured 
form of knowledge open to us. From this we conclude that knowledge 
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of the self which assimilates the self to other sorts of object, and 
which therefore gives a description of a self which is the same type 
of description as is given to other sorts of objects, will also be a 
less favoured form of knowledge. Our first -hand experience, or what 
I have called our native knowledge of ourselves, must be the starting 
point for a theory of the self. Provided we are not asked to explain 
our knowledge, we all know what it is to be a self. 
3. The first fact we need to investigate about ourselves is what 
is involved in our description of ourselves as conscious. I cannot 
know what it is to be a self, if I am not conscious. Equally if I 
do have native knowledge of the self, it must be a self which has its 
locus within the field of consciousness. If consciousness is to be 
made to disclose the putative self of which we claim to have native 
knowledge, consciousness will have to be subjected to analysis before 
it yields up its secret. In the Nineteenth Century, British 
philosophers of note such as Sir William Hamilton, James Ferrier, and 
Shadworth Hodgson, all founded their philosophical systems upon an 
analysis of the structure of consciousness. They believed this to be 
a necessary starting point to a valid philosophy. In contemporary 
Anglo- American philosophical circles, on the other hand, "conscious- 
ness" has not been one of the concepts which has excited the attention 
of philosophers. Frequently the word appears in the contemporary 
literature, but it is assumed to have an ordinary language meaning 
which is understood by everyone, and which there is no need to 
explicate. 
Without going into the historical question of why philosophical 
interests veered away from an interest in `consciousness," there are 
three points to be borne in mind during the course of the examination 
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of consciousness which follows. Firstly, as the Philosophers of 
Consciousness disagreed amongst themselves about the meaning of the 
concept, it came to be felt that the word was too vague and ambiguous 
to carry the weight these philosophers hoped it would carry. 
Secondly, scepticism about the validity of the introspective method 
as a source of philosophical knowledge resulted in a corresponding 
decline of interest in consciousness. And thirdly, the rise of 
Behaviourism in psychology has in turn influenced philosophy and 
challenged the importance of consciousness as a central concept in the 
Philosophy of Mind. These remarks do not apply to the Phenomenological 
Movement, however. 
It never occurred to Philosophers of Consciousness like Hamilton, 
Ferrier, or Hodgson, that the existence of consciousness might be denied. 
To deny its existence seems a greater paradox than to deny the reality 
of Time, or the existence of the External World. And yet more recently 
the existence of consciousness has frequently been questioned, if not 
categorically denied. Ryle, for instance gives short shift to conscious- 
ness when he says of it: 
"The myth of consciousness is a piece of para- optics." (1) 
Faced with the denial of the existence of consciousness, there is the 
temptation to reply that consciousness is a fact; one of those ultimate 
facts about reality which cannot be justified or supported by an appeal 
to any other sort of fact; a fact we must just accept. This sort of 
defence of consciousness carries its own dangers with it. If 
consciousness is a fact, its existence is an empirical matter, and 
this means that the non -existence of consciousness is a contingent 
possibility too. Hence the proposition "There is no such thing as 
(1) G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London, 1951), p. 159. 
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Consciousness" must be a meaningful one. But is it? If we do not 
separate the fact denied, from the fact of its denial, we create the 
paradox that the very denial of the existence of consciousness is 
itself proof of its existence. We meet the same situation when a 
man makes the statement "I am not conscious.' By making the statement 
he demonstrates its falsity. These considerations suggest that the 
existence of consciousness cannot be a fact, and they play into the 
hands of those who deny its existence. It appears, therefore, to be 
paradoxical to deny the existence of consciousness, and paradoxical 
likewise, to affirm its existence. Evidently the notion of conscious- 
ness needs careful scrutiny. 
I shall open this enquiry by considering what philosophers 
might have in mind when they deny the existence of consciousness. 
Very often a first step to determining what a thing is, is to ascertain 
what it is not. To deny the existence of consciousness seems a 
paradox, because it seems to imply that we are all unconscious, or 
Cartesian automatons. It seems to imply that we are incapable of 
feeling, and have no sense experience. Now it would plainly be 
ridiculous to believe any such thing, and we cannot seriously believe 
that this is what the philosopher denying the existence of conscious- 
ness has in mind. When a philosopher's position seems to be out -- 
rageously false, it is wise to consider the possibility that he is 
denying the truth of a particular philosophical account of the 
incontrovertible facts, and not the incontrovertible facts themselves. 
Let us therefore find out what at least one philosopher has 
in mind when he denies the existence of consciousness. I refer to 
William James' famous paper "Does 'Consciousness' exist ? ", (1) which 
is the classical statement of the position. 
(1) William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (London, 1912), 
ch. I. 
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The first point that should strike us, is that William James puts the 
word "consciousness" in inverted commas. This should warn us that he 
is not referring to consciousness as ordinarily understood, but to a 
specific philosophical doctrine of "Consciousness." The word 
"consciousness' had been taken up into the technical terminology of a 
number of philosophical systems, and it was to its employment in these 
systems that he took exception. This the following passage makes 
immediately clear. 
To deny plumply that 'consciousness " exists seems so absurd 
on the face of it --for undeniably "thoughts" do exist --that 
I fear some readers will follow me no farther. Let me 
then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the 
word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically 
that it does stand for a function. There is, I mean, no 
aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that 
of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts 
of them are made; but there is a function in experience which 
thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this 
quality of being is invoked. That function is knowing. (1) 
This passage leaves us in no doubt that what James is denying, is not 
in fact the existence of consciousness, but the correctness of certain 
types of description of consciousness: viz. those which entail its 
being an -entity" or "aboriginal stuff." That is to say, James is 
disputing the truth of the descriptions certain philosophers give of 
consciousness. This is a far less radical challenge than is implied 
in the unqualified statement that consciousness does not exist. 
Other philosophers have not been as meticulous as James in putting 
the word "consciousness' in inverted commas, before denying its 
existence, thus making their position seem needlessly provocative 
and paradoxical. 
I proceed now to the substance of James' objection: his 
claim that consciousness is not an "entity" or "aboriginal stuff.' 
(1) Ibid. p. 3. 
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Although not mentioned by James, a statement made by Hamilton gives a 
good idea of the sort of view he was objecting to: 
Consciousness may be compared to an internal light, by means 
of which, and which alone, what passes in the mind is rendered 
visible. Consciousness is simple, --is not composed of parts, 
either similar or dissimilar. It always resembles itself, 
differing only in the degrees of its intensity; thus, there 
are not various kinds of consciousness, although there are 
various kinds of mental modes, or states, of which we are 
conscious. (1) 
When Ryle referred to 'consciousness' as a piece of para- optics, he no 
doubt had passages such as this in mind. It is also the sort of view 
which is subject to the strictures of William James. But it is in 
G.E. Moore's The Refutation of Idealism," which contains his well - 
known analysis of sensation, that we have the clearest expression of 
the doctrine of "consciousness' which James repudiated. Extracts 
from Moore's article are actually quoted by James as representing the 
view he was objecting to. Moore maintains: 
We have then in every sensation two distinct elements, one 
which I call consciousness, and another which I call the 
object of consciousness. This must be so if the sensation 
of blue and the sensation of green, though different in one 
respect, are alike in another: blue is one object of 
sensation and green is another, and consciousness, which 
both sensations have in common, is different from either. (2) 
If it is doubted that this passage commits Moore to the proposition 
that consciousness is a sort of 'aboriginal stuff,' the next passage 
in which he elaborates his meaning, settles the issue. 
For the element '"consciousness' being common to all 
sensations may be and certainly is regarded as in some sense 
their "substance' ̀ and by the "content' of each is only meant 
that in respect of which one differs from another. (3) 
Although Moore claims that this is only one of two possible ways of 
(1) Bowen, The Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton, p. 120 
(2) G.E. Moore, Philosophical Studies (London, 1960), p. 17. 
(3) Ibid. p. 23. 
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describing the position, he does not give any indication that he is 
opposed to this formulation. 
Now it is quite clear that when philosophers such as James and 
Ryle deny the existence of 'consciousness," they are not denying that 
we are conscious in the ordinary sense of the word. They are denying 
rather views such as those held by Hamilton and Moore as exemplified 
in their contention that all our experiences contain an element in 
common which they, rather confusedly, also name "consciousness." 
The fact that Moore, for instance, means by ''consciousness" something 
entirely different from what is ordinarily meant by consciousness is 
proved beyond a shadow of a doubt in the following passage: 
. . . The moment we try to fix our attention upon conscious- 
ness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: 
it seems as if we d before us a mere emptiness. When we 
try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is 
the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. (1) 
In the ordinary sense of "consciousness' the presence or absence of 
consciousness is not something that we can only detect after taking 
great pains. On the contrary the impact of the presence of 
consciousness is powerful and immediate --if I may be permitted for 
the moment to speak in these terms. Moreover, as ordinarily under- 
stood "consciousness` is not to be conceived of as something over 
and above the occurrence of thoughts and feelings. We are, there- 
fore, free to determine the meaning of consciousness as ordinarily 
understood, without fear that we might be referring to something 
which in no sense exists, and without falling foul of James and 
Ryle. (2) 
Any attempt to discover the meaning of consciousness, as it is 
(1) Ibid. p. 25. 
(2) I resume discussion of James's analysis of conscious- 
ness in section 7 below. 
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ordinarily used, would meet with the immediate objection of Ryle, who 
argues, quite rightly, that the word is ordinarily used in a number of 
different contexts for a variety of purposes. (1) Ryle himself has 
done us the service of distinguishing five different uses to which the 
word "conscious" and its cognate "self- conscious" are put in real life. 
I do not wish to dispute the fact that the word is used in these five 
senses, and indeed I believe I can add a sixth. I would not deny, 
either, that a great deal of confusion has been caused by the fact that 
philosophers who have given the concept of consciousness a prominent 
place in their philosophical systems have failed to keep the various 
senses distinct. One frequently finds a philosopher like Hamilton 
sliding from one sense of the word to another seemingly without being 
aware of doing so. Where I do wish to take issue with Ryle is in 
connection with his unspoken assumption that these several uses are 
all on a par with one another,- -none being more basic than any of the 
others. As against Ryle I shall argue that there is a basic meaning 
of "consciousness" which we may understand philosophers to have in mind 
when they use the word. I shall further argue that a philosopher may 
make use of this basic meaning without this carrying the implication 
that he is using the word in . a special philosophical sense which is 
different from any of its ordinary uses (as we discovered to be true 
of Moore). 
The criterion I shall use in respect of which a particular 
sense to the word "consciousness" is basic, can at once be defined. 
A sense of ''consciousness' is basic if a person's being conscious in 
that sense does not entail his being conscious in any other sense, 
whereas his being conscious in any other sense does entail his being 
(1) Ryle, The Concept of Mind, pp. 156 - 7. 
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conscious in that sense. I propose now to give excerpts of Ryle's 
analysis of the different ways in which the words "conscious'' and 
"consciousness" are used, so that we can consider whether there is 
not a sense of consciousness which is basic in the sense I have 
defined. 
(a)People often speak in this way; they say, "I was 
conscious that the furniture had been rearranged," or, "I 
was conscious that he was less friendly than usual." In 
such contexts the word "conscious' is used instead of words 
like "found out," "realized" and "discovered" to indicate a 
certain noteworthy nebulousness and consequent inarticulate- 
ness of the apprehension. The furniture looked different 
somehow, but the observer could not say what the differences 
were; or the man's attitude was unaccommodating in a number 
of ways, but the speaker could not enumerate or specify 
them. . . 
(b)People often use "conscious" and "self -conscious' in 
describing the embarrassment exhibited by persons, especially 
youthful persons, who are anxious about the opinions held 
by others of their qualities of character or intellect. 
Shyness and affectation are ways in which self -consciousness, 
in this sense, is commonly exhibited. 
(c)Self -conscious' is sometimes used in a more general sense 
to indicate that someone has reached the stage of paying heed 
to his own qualities of character or intellect, irrespective 
of whether or not he is embarrassed about other people's 
estimations of them. . . 
(d)Quite different from the foregoing uses of 'conscious," 
"self-conscious" and 'unconscious,"  is the use in which a 
numbed or anaesthetised person is said to have lost conscious- 
ness from his feet up to his knees. In this use "conscious" 
means "sensitive" or ''sentient' and 'unconscious" means 
anaesthetised or insensitive. We say that a person has 
lost consciousness when he had ceased to be sensitive to any 
slaps, noises, pricks or smells. 
(e)Different from, though closely connected with this last 
use, there is the sense in which a person can be said to be 
unconscious of a sensation, when he pays no heed to it. A 
walker engaged in a heated dispute may be unconscious, in this 
sense, of the sensations in his blistered heel, and the reader 
of these words was, when he began this sentence, probably 
unconscious of the muscular and skin sensations in the back 
of his neck, or in his left knee. A person may also be 
unconscious or unaware that he is frowning, beating time to 
the music, or muttering. 
"Conscious" in this sense means ' heeding'. . . (1) 
(1) Op.cit. pp. 156 - 7. 
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To this list I would like to add: 
(f) "Conscious" is sometimes used synonymously with "distracted 
by." "I couldn't concentrate on Mark Anthony's speech, 
because I was conscious of the actor's American accent all the 
time." 
Of these six senses of consciousness sense (d) is the only one which 
could be considered basic: namely the sense in which "conscious" 
means "sentient." However as it stands, Ryle's description of this 
sense of "consciousness" is not sufficiently clearly drawn. A person 
is "sensitive" or "sentient" while he is fast asleep, and yet no one 
can be conscious in any of the other senses while in a dreamless sleep. 
Before we have a sense of'conscious'which is truly the basic sense, we 
have to rule out this possibility. 
This has been done very clearly by John Wisdom, in an analysis 
which antedates Ryle's analysis by some fifteen years. I shall quote 
the relevant section almost in full, for it cannot be much abridged 
without loss of intelligibility. The interest of this analysis lies 
in the fact that Wisdom is concerned to determine, what is from my 
point of view, the fundamental sense of consciousness. 
I cannot analyse what I mean by "conscious ," but I want to 
make known to you what I attribute to a thing when I call 
it "conscious." When using the word in this special sense 
I will write it conscious. And I will now set down the 
clues to what I mean by conscious. 
(i) Conscious implies either feels or is aware. 
(ii) Consider the change which comes over a man as he comes 
round from chloroform or from dreamless sleep. You know 
quite well the change I mean. That kind of change I call 
"becoming conscious." Of course as you come round from 
chloroform all sorts of bodily changes are taking place- - 
the nerves are recovering from the chemical poison; and as 
you come round from sleep more blood flows to the brain. 
So that, strictly, there is nothing that can be called 
'the change' which takes place when one comes round from 
chloroform and sleep. Nevertheless, these bodily changes 
are not the ones you thought of when I spoke of the change; 
you never thought of blood and brain. That kincof change 
which you immediately thought of when I spoke of the change 
from sleep or chloroform, is the one I express by 'becoming 
conscious." 
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(iii) Conscious does not mean alive. A tree is alive but not 
conscious. An amoeba is certainly alive yet quite likely not 
conscious. 
(iv) Conscious does not mean living and sensitive. A man in 
a dreamless sleep is a living and sensitive being; but he is 
not at that time conscious in my sense, i.e., conscious. Of 
course such a man is conscious compared with a tree or a dead 
man; more accurately there is a sense of "conscious" in which 
it is correct to say that he is a conscious being. He is 
conscious in the derived and hypothetical sense that, if he 
were shaken, he would become conscious (fundamental sense). 
This hypothetical sense of "conscious" is less fundamental 
than that in terms of which mental facts are to be defined, 
that is conscious. For "conscious" (in this hypothetical 
sense) has a meaning derived from, i.e., defined in terms of, 
conscious. In other words, if we split up the meaning of the 
hypothetical sense, we find that one of its elements is 
conscious. . 
(v) S is conscious implies neither (1) that S is conscious of 
his environment nor (2) that S is conscious of himself. As 
to (1), a man is conscious when he is dreaming. . . and there- 
fore when unconscious of his environment. I do not deny, on 
the contrary I assert, that there is a usual and therefore 
perfectly respectable sense in which 7conscious" is used, 
which does imply "conscious of his environment." Thus, when 
we say Is he conscious ?', meaning Has he regained conscious- 
ness?" (after an accident) , we do mean "Is he now again 
conscious of his environment. But it will be seen that this 
third way of using "conscious' is yet another sense derived 
from our first, that is, the sense we write conscious. For 
"conscious' (sense 3) means "conscious of environment." 
As to (2), a man may be conscious and yet be unconscious 
of himself. . . It is important to add clause (2) because 
some psychologists use ''conscious" in a sense which implies 
consciousness of self. Thus they would deny that animals 
are conscious, because, although they would admit that dogs 
smell bones and are therefore conscious, they would deny that 
a dog ever thinks to himself, "I shall do so and so," e.g. 
"take a bone.`' In other words, they deny that an animal is 
ever conscious of itself and they express their view very 
misleadingly by saying that animals are not conscious. .This 
fourth sense of "conscious" is obviously also derived from 
conscious. So we may write: 
(vi) Conscious is the fundamental sense of "conscious'- -that 
is the sense in terms of which all other senses are defined. (1) 
Had Wisdom's analysis been deliberately intended as a 
commentary on sense (d) of Ryle's list of senses of consciousness, it 
could not have been more to the point. Wisdom's analysis brings into 
the open all the ambiguities latent in Ryle's description of sense (d). 
(1) J. Wisdom, Problems of Mind and Matter (Cambridge, 1963), 
pp. 12 -15. This work was first published in 1934. 
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There are two major points of disagreement between Ryle and Wisdom, and 
over both points I am in agreement with Wisdom. Firstly, he accepts, 
as I do, that a fundamental sense of 'conscious " may be distinguished. 
As we have seen Ryle traces no connection between the various senses 
of consciousness he distinguishes, and he denies by omission that there 
is a basic sense of consciousness. Secondly, Wisdom asserts that the 
other senses of consciousness can be defined in terms of the funda- 
mental sense. I, on the other hand, asserted that the other senses 
entailed the basic sense, but were not in turn entailed by it. We 
both therefore, assert a dependence of other senses of consciousness, 
on the fundamental sense, although we see this dependence differently. 
My relation of dependence is weaker than Wisdom's, and it would still 
stand even if his claim that other senses of conscious can be defined 
in terms of "conscious" proved to be false. Ryle of course takes all 
the senses to be logically independent of one another. This is not 
to deny that he sees a close relationship between some of the senses. 
All that is required to bring out the contrast between Wisdom and Ryle 
on this point, is to recognise that on Ryle's view any one of his 
senses of consciousness could exist without any of the others existing, 
and this is impossible on Wisdom's view. 
4. Although Wisdom claims that the derived senses of "conscious" 
can be defined in terms of the fundamental sense of "conscious," it 
is clear from what he says that he does not believe that the funda- 
mental sense -- conscious - -can be defined. For this reason he gives 
us "clues" instead. Wisdom's belief about the indefinability of 
consciousness, is shared by many philosophers, including Hamilton who 
says: 
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Nothing has contributed more to spread obscurity over a very 
transparent matter, than the attempts of philosophers to define 
consciousness. Consciousness cannot be defined; we may be 
ourselves fully aware what consciousness is, but we cannot, 
without confusion, convey to others a definition of what we 
ourselves clearly apprehend. (1) 
Let us consider the question why consciousness should be said 
to be indefinable. The problem of defining consciousness can be 
brought out well by treating Wisdom's first clue, not as a clue to 
consciousness, but a definition. (i) would then become 'Conscious" 
means feels, or is aware. The difficulty is that this proposition 
cannot be offered as a definition without the definition being circular. 
If we define consciousness in terms of feeling or awareness, the 
question must be raised in turn :Uhat is 'feeling" or 'awareness-? 
and the answer to this question is that 'feeling" or ''awareness' are 
modes of consciousness. The definition fails, because all that we 
can do is substitute a synonym for the word "conscious," --or as near 
as we can get to a synonym- -and we are no nearer a definition of what 
"consciousness' itself is. This is not to my mind, however, the only 
reason philosophers have had for saying that consciousness is indefin- 
able. I suggest that the further consideration they have in mind, is 
that it is impossible to give an idea of what it is like to be 
conscious, to communicate the ''raw feel" of consciousness, by means 
of a definition. One feels driven to say that unless consciousness 
is experienced first -hand, it will be impossible to have the faintest 
idea of what it is like to be conscious. This parallels the 
situation I maintained to be true of the self, in as much as the 
knowledge we have of selves is similarly first -hand. 
The position is essentially the same as the one we meet 
(1) Bowen, The Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton, p. 125. 
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in bbore's discussion on the indefinability of yellow. (1) It is 
clear that when Moore claims that yellow is indefinable, what he has 
in mind is the fact that no form of words can help us, if what we 
want is to know what the experience is which we call "seeing yellow." 
If what we are after is the actual experience of yellow, obviously a 
definition is no help. It is tautologically true that the only way 
to acquaint oneself with an experience, is to have the experience. 
Now when the visual experience we call "seeing yellow" is alleged to 
be indefinable, the implication is that having the experience is not 
the only method of being acquainted with the experience, but that 
defining the experience is conceivably an alternative method of 
acquainting ourselves with it. When, therefore, an experience, such 
as the experience of yellow, is alleged to be indefinable, it is made 
to seem a contingent fact that on this occasion the alternative method 
is not open to us. We are then supposed to be pointing out a fact 
about ''yellow' when we point out that it is indefinable. But, as I 
have made clear, there could be no conceivable alternative channel to 
an acquaintance with experience, apart from having the experience 
itself. It is therefore entirely misleading to express this point 
by claiming that yellow is indefinable. For this suggests that the 
ingenuity of philosophers has failed, and leaves the impression that 
they have abandoned the attempt to find a definition, when it was 
sensible to ask for one. But I have argued that it was not. 
Where the very idea of giving a definition makes no logical 
sense, the idea of indefinability likewise makes no logical sense. 
The same must be said for the alleged indefinability of consciousness, 
except that the idea of defining consciousness is even more absurd 
(1) G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1954), ch. 1. 
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than the idea of defining yellow. In the case of yellow there may 
exist people who have never seen anything yellow, and for whom the 
question "What does yellow look like ?' is a real question. 
Now in the light of this let us go back to what I claimed 
philosophers might feel driven to say about consciousness - -and indeed 
to what Hamilton was driven to say. I said that one was driven to 
say that no one could know what consciousness was unless it were 
experienced first -hand. We can now see the embarrassment of this 
position. No one can possibly have failed to have had first -hand 
experience of consciousness, in the way in which some people may have 
failed to have had first -hand experience of yellow. No one could 
therefore possibly be ignorant of what consciousness is, in the 
way some people may be ignorant of what yellow is. We must 
therefore raise the question of who it is to whom we are trying to 
convey the idea of what it is like to be conscious. We must imagine 
it to be someone who asks, or might ask, the question, "What is 
consciousness ?" Our particular sense of loss with which we greet 
this question is due to the fact that no -one who asks it can himself 
fail to have had first -hand knowledge of consciousness. Before he 
can himself address his question to us, he must have seen or heard 
us - -he must be aware of our presence --and this entails his being 
conscious in Wisdom's basic sense. He presumably is not unaware of 
putting his question to us, and in that sense too, he is already 
conscious. In view of all this, it is utterly unintelligible to 
reply to the question someone has addressed to us: 'What is 
consciousness ?' by saying You cannot have any idea of what conscious- 
ness is, unless you have first -hand experience of it." For it is 
logically impossible for the questioner to lack this first -hand 
knowledge. One can't seriously say to someone else 'Until you have 
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experienced consciousness you won't know what it is." I would not be 
saying this to him, if I thought he could not hear me; was not conscious. 
So, to make the statement I must presuppose what I then go on to deny 
in the statement itself, a form of self- contradiction. 
Those who deny that consciousness is definable on the basis 
that personal acquaintance affords our only access to it, are faced 
with a further embarrassment. If we describe someone as being 
acquainted with something, or experiencing it, we describe in effect 
the manner in which he is conscious. To talk of experiencing 
consciousness, being acquainted with it, or even of having first -hand 
knowledge of it, is therefore quite anomalous. It suggests the 
possibility of their being immediate knowledge, or experience, without 
consciousness, and this is absurd. 
Quite clearly, the claim that consciousness is indefinable, is 
incoherent. Certainly no definition can capture the flavour of being 
conscious, but how odd to think that this is what a definition should 
be able to do. The doctrine of the indefinability of consciousness, 
has,I feel convinced, had a harmful effect on philosophers. 
Philosophers, quite rightly, shy clear of indefinable terms whenever 
they can, and when they are told that consciousness is indefinable, 
their instinct is to try to manage without it. A request for a 
definition of consciousness cannot be the self -contradictory sort of 
request I have been considering. It can, therefore, only be a 
request by someone to whom the meaning of the word "consciousness" 
is unknown, to be told what its meaning is. This we must be able 
to do with the word ''conscious," just as we must be able to do it 
with any other word that belongs to language. We need not be as 
cautious as was Wisdom, when he would commit himself to no more than 
giving "clues.' If a definition is to be successful, the definiens 
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must consist of terms which are understood by the person to whom the 
definition is being given. If we can appeal to no words which are 
known to the person concerned, we are precluded from giving the 
definition. Thus these "verbal" definitions (i.e., non -ostensive 
definitions) can only be given to a practiced language -user. This 
means that if a person asks the question "What is consciousness ?" 
we are entitled to take it for granted that he understands other 
words- -words no language -user could properly speaking be said to 
lack --which we are not going to be asked to define in turn. Given 
this condition, we can give the meaning of "conscious" as follows: 
A person is said to be conscious, if, at the time, he has any thoughts, 
feelings, mental images, perceptions, desires, intentions, and so 
forth. When used indifferently to refer to any of these items at the 
time of their occurrence, the word "consciousness" is used in its 
generic sense. Consciousness is understood in this sense by James 
Mill who writes: 
It is easy to see what is the nature of the terms Conscious 
and Consciousness, and what is the marking function which 
they are destined to perform. It was of great importance 
for the purpose of naming, that we should not only have 
names to distinguish the different classes of our feelings, 
but also a name applicable equally to all those classes. 
This purpose is answered by the concrete term Conscious; 
and the abstract of it, Consciousness. Thus, if we are in 
any way sentient; that is, have any of the feelings whatso- 
ever of a living creature; the word Conscious is applicable 
to the feeler, and Consciousness to the feeling: that is 
to say, the words are Generical marks, under which all the 
names of the subordinate classes of the feelings of a 
sentient creature are included. When I smell a rose, I 
am conscious, when I have the idea of a fire, I am conscious; 
when I remember, I am conscious, when I reason, and when I 
believe, I am conscious; but believing, and being conscious 
of belief, are not two things, they are just the same thing: 
though this same thing I can name at one time without the 
aid of the generical mark, while at another time it suits 
me to employ the generical mark. (1) 
(1) James Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 
ed. by J.S. Mill (London, 1869), I, pp. 225 -6. 
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If we take Mill's definition of consciousness, and qualify it 
along the lines Wisdom's account suggests to us, we have the account 
of consciousness I have been trying to reach. We ought not to be 
dissuaded from accepting Mill's account because of the faulty example 
at the end of the passage. It is certainly false to claim as he 
does, that believing, and being conscious of belief, are just the 
same thing. I believe many things which have not recently crossed 
my mind. Nevertheless this slip does not interfere with Mill's 
general argument, which is sound. 
We may usefully compare the function of the word "conscious" 
with the function of the word "colour." Often we are simply 
interested in the fact that something is coloured, or has colour, 
without being interested in which determinate colour it has. And 
yet we do not, on that account imagine, that an object can be coloured 
without being of a particular shade of one of the colours, or contain 
a combination of individual colours. Nothing can be coloured without 
being either white, or black, or red, etc. But this is to labour an 
obvious point. What is true of the word ''colour" is also true of the 
word ''conscious.' A person cannot be conscious, without either having 
some thoughts, or sense experiences, etc. In this sense 'conscious" 
and "consciousness" are, as Mill says, generic terms. 
I wish now to offer an explanation of the advantage of this 
generic term, which to my knowledge has not been fully appreciated. 
In the passage of James Mill's which I have just quoted, he said in 
this regard "It was of great importance, for the purpose of naming, 
that we should not only have names to distinguish the different 
classes of our feelings, but also a name applicable equally to all 
those classes." He does not, however tell us what its importance 
is. Perhaps he took its importance to be obvious, perhaps it is. 
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There is, however, one respect in which the importance of having the 
generic term "conscious" is not obvious, and this respect is of 
philosophical importance. It can best be brought out by returning 
to the comparison of the generic term 'conscious" with the generic 
term 'colour." 
When we say that an area has colour, we imply that it has this 
that and the other colour, and that if we instanced the particular 
colours of the area, we would have exhausted the colour of the area. 
We cannot say of any part of the area that it is coloured, but that 
it cannot be broken down into specific shades of particular colours 
(I am not here thinking of breaking up colour into primary colours). 
Now we may wrongly, I think, take it for granted that the same is true 
in the case of consciousness. If to be conscious a person must be 
conscious in determinate ways, then on this assumption when we have 
specified the determinate ways in which he is conscious, we have 
exhausted the description we give of him when we say he is conscious. 
In other words to say he is conscious is just an abbreviation for 
saying that he is either seeing such - and -such, or hearing such -and- 
such, or thinking such - and -such and so on through all the "particular 
classes of our feelings' as Mill describes them. Now it is also 
clear that we are conscious in many such ways at once. I am seeing 
what I am writing, hearing the typewriter, thinking what to say, 
feeling the strain in my back, and so on. At any one time my 
consciousness consists of a great number of these 'feelings " --to 
use another short -hand word: thus proving the usefulness of short- 
hand generic concepts in this discipline. If we describe the matter 
in this way we are entitled to draw the inference that if we take a 
time span of short duration we can specify all the individual "feel- 
ings" that together make up some individual's consciousness in that 
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span of time. If "consciousness "is the name of a class of particulars, 
then it must be possible to define the class extensionally by denoting 
all the members belonging to the class. It should be noted that this 
precisely describes the classical Atomistic Theory of Consciousness. 
Such would be the position if there were complete logical parity 
between the generic terms "conscious" and "colour." 
I wish to argue that the atomistic account is false, and that 
the assumption of parity between "conscious" and "colour" breaks down. 
Let us imagine setting out to draw up a list of all the "feelings" of 
which a person's consciousness is made up during a time -span of a few 
seconds, -- cashing the consciousness for the real coin of thoughts, 
feelings, perceptions, and desires. The job would be completed when 
we had entered the very last perception on our list. I will use 
visual consciousness as an example. At the moment a number of objects 
are in my visual field: I see various things, each of which must be 
entered in my list as a particular perception. I at once notice a 
disconcerting development. The more one looks, the more one sees. 
When the separable objects seem to have been exhausted, I can pass on 
to noticing irregularities in the surfaces of the objects, marks, 
shadows, and other details. It will soon be realized that my 
description of what I see can go on indefinitely. I cannot exhaust 
all there is to see in my visual field. It is the source of an 
infinite number of perceptions. But if this is true of one form of 
consciousness, it is true of all the others too. Accordingly it is 
impossible for consciousness to be equivalent to a finite set of 
constituents. 
Now it may be argued that under normal circumstances we are 
not busy probing our visual fields to discover how many different 
things and aspects and properties of things we can spot. Normally 
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there are just a few things which hold our attention, and these are 
what we see, and these are finite in number. This I concede, but it 
does not save the position. I will see a few objects in the centre 
of my visual field discretely and separately, and no doubt they will 
be the first to go down in my list. But what of the remainder of 
my visual field? Can I be sure that it is also furnished with 
equally distinct and separate objects? Is it not more probable that 
towards the borders of my visual field there is a penumbra within 
which it is impossible to distinguish separate objects? Could I not 
find out by having a look? It is logically impossible to do so for 
two reasons: (a) because if I focus my eyes on the borders of my 
visual field, I of necessity alter my visual field, thus destroying 
one of the conditions of the experiment, and (b) because the question 
is to discover whether what we see and to which we are not paying 
attention, breaks up into discrete objects in the same way as the 
visual area to which we are paying attention does. Here too, it is 
logically impossible to verify the claim that the objects to which 
we are not attending are as clear and distinct as those to which we 
are, because to do so we have to attend to the parts of the visual 
field which were previously unattended to. But then they become 
objects which are attended to, and they cease to be the objects we 
wanted to find out about: i.e., objects which were not being 
attended to. 
I have gone far enough, I feel sure, to demonstrate the 
completely unrealistic nature of the assumption that consciousness 
is made up of a distinct and separable set of constituent experiences. 
When an item is picked out of the field of consciousness and described 
in some such statement as "I see the moon" we must realise that at the 
same time we always see vastly more than we describe. What we 
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describe is little better than the top of the iceberg as compared with 
what we experience but do not describe. I shall have much more to 
say on this subject in succeeding chapters, however; for the present 
purpose I hopeit is clear that there is a complete disparity between 
the generic terms 'conscious' and "colour,' and that it is the 
peculiar merit of the terms 'conscious" and "consciousness" that they 
convey the true impression that our lives are at every moment packed 
with a dense amorphous conglomeration of experiences, or ''feelings" 
as Mill called them. No matter how full we make our description of 
what we are conscious of at any one time, this will always be the 
merest sample of the mass of feelings, which go to make up conscious- 
ness at that time. Anyone wishing to focus attention on this 
particular aspect of the matter, will find himself seriously handi- 
capped if he tries to dispense with the term "consciousness." 
I have argued that Mill's definition of consciousness in terms 
of what we see, hear, feel, think, imagine, and desire (to name but 
some of the relevant phenomena), is the right one. The view that 
these concepts all refer to conscious phenomena is the lowest common 
denominator of all theories of consciousness. But few philosophers 
have taken the course I am advocating of drawing the line here, and 
insisting that consciousness is nothing over and above a congeries of 
experiences or feelings. Many of them have gone on to argue that if 
the one word ''consciousness' can be used to cover such a variety of 
mental manifestations, it must be in virtue of the fact that all these 
manifestations have some property in common, and until we have 
identified that property, we have not reached the heart of the matter. 
Hamilton, who by and large successfully resists the temptation of 
taking consciousness to be a special faculty, reveals nevertheless, in 
this passage, to what extent he is in the grip of the idea of a common 
-47- 
property: - 
But before proceeding to show in detail what the act of 
consciousness comprises, it may be proper, in the first place, 
to recall in general what kind of act the word is employed to 
denote. I know, I feel, I desire, etc. What is it that is 
necessarily involved in all these? It requires only to be 
stated to be admitted, that when I know, I must know that I 
know,- -when I feel, I must know that I feel, - -when I desire, 
I must know that I desire. The knowledge, the feeling, the 
desire, are possible only under the condition of being known, 
and being known by me. For if I did not know that I knew, 
I would not know, --if I did not know that I felt, I would 
not feel, --if I did not know that I desired, I would not 
desire. Now, this knowledge, which I, the subject, have of 
these modifications of my being, and through which knowledge 
alone these modifications are possible, is what we call 
consciousness. (1) 
Leaving aside the soundness, or otherwise, of the view 
expressed in this passage, we see at work in it the assumption of the 
existence of a property common to all the "manifestations" of conscious- 
ness, in virtue of which the word 'consciousness " can be applied to 
them. The same assumption was operative in Moore's analysis of 
sensation, where consciousness was held to be the element which several 
sensations had in common. Now we have every reason to be suspicious 
of this assumption as it applies to consciousness. For we are 
entitled to ask for the evidence on which is based the claim that 
consciousness is a common property. The answer, I suspect- -for none 
is explicitly forthcoming --is that it must stand for a common property, 
for otherwise so heterogeneous a collection of instances (manifest- 
ations) could not be subsumed under the concept of consciousness. 
That is to say, the evidence for the existence of a common property is 
none other than the fact that the one word 'consciousness" is used to 
cover these diverse instances. Thus the existence of a common 
property is arrived at by deduction from the existence of the concept 
(1) Bowen, The Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton, p. 126. 
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for which it is assumed to stand. If my suspicion is well founded, 
it would enable us to understand why philosophers have insisted that 
there is such a common property in spite of the difficulty they have 
experienced in producing evidence of its existence. It would also 
throw light on Moore's famous observation that consciousness "is as 
it were diaphanous." We can take this observation to be a sign of 
how tenuous the evidence for the existence of the common property is. 
Alternatively we could treat it as evidence of the fact that the 
putative common property is a myth. On either interpretation we 
have seen enough of the difficulties faced by the common property 
view for the basic assumption to be challenged. Moreover it 
scarcely needs to be said at the present time that the assumption 
that every general term stands for a common property is untenable. 
The way is left open for the position taken up by James Mill 
and John Wisdom. Consciousness is a concept which covers reference 
to thoughts, feelings, perceptions, images, dreams, and so forth. 
It enables us to refer to any of these occurrences, and is an 
abbreviation for them. We have no need to commit ourselves to the 
view that consciousness is something over and above them all. I 
shall be using the word 'consciousness' in their sense throughout 
this work. But I would just add the qualification that when I use 
the term I do so on the understanding that I reject the view that 
consciousness can be exhaustively specified in terms of any finite 
set of referents of which it is the abbreviation. 
5. We can now return to the broader issue of whether or not the 
existence of consciousness is an empirical question. It is certainly 
a contingent fact that there exist beings who have thoughts, feelings, 
desires, etc. No one could intelligibly deny the existence of 
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consciousness in this sense. No one could deny that he had thoughts, 
feelings, desires, etc. without thereby contradicting himself. The 
universe could have been devoid of consciousness, but, for each one 
of us, the existence of our own thoughts, feelings, and desires, is 
conclusive evidence that the universe is not devoid of conscious- 
ness. On the other hand, for each one of us, our own consciousness 
is not an empirical issue. I cannot set about finding out whether 
I am conscious. There is, however, no inconsistency at all between 
the fact that my own consciousness is not an empirical issue for me, 
and the fact that the existence of consciousness as such is an 
empirical issue. The apparent inconsistency is cleared up once we 
see these facts in their proper relation. That something is 
conscious is contingent. But if I am that something, that I am 
conscious is not contingent. Ny existence entails the existence of 
at least one consciousness: my own. However my existence is itself 
contingent. Therefore the existence of that consciousness, because 
it is contingent upon my existence, must also be contingent. 
If it be granted that I have demonstrated the existence of 
consciousness, it cannot be granted that the point has yet been 
reached at which we can deduce the nature of the self from a study of 
consciousness. It has yet to be shown that consciousness is a 
possible datum for a theory of the self. On the contrary, it could 
be strongly argued that such a programme is radically misconceived. 
According to this way of thinking, the existence of consciousness 
presupposes the existence of a self who is conscious. Now it must 
at once be conceded that my attempt to explain the meaning of 
consciousness in terms of thoughts, feelings, perceptions, etc., took 
it for granted that everyone knows what it is to have a thought, a 
feeling, or a perception. And it may be argued that we each have in 
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mind, our own thoughts, feelings, perceptions, etc., when we assent to 
the proposition that we know what it is to have thoughts, etc. The 
attempt, therefore, to define consciousness in terms of thoughts, 
feelings, perceptions, etc., is one which implicitly depends on having 
the concept of a self, and this concept has not been defined. So the 
definition of consciousness implicitly relies on the undefined concept 
of a self. If this is so, any reasoning which attempted to base the 
concept of a self on the concept of consciousness, would be viciously 
circular. It would amount to a case of first defining consciousness 
in terms of the undefined concept of a self, and then defining the 
concept of a self in terms of the concept of consciousness: a classical 
case of petitio principii. 
The position we need to find ourselves in is the very reverse 
of this. We want consciousness to be the basic notion, such that we 
can take its existence to be a starting point for an analysis of the 
self. Let me illustrate how such a position may be conceived. 
There is a standard objection to Descartes' Cogito argument which runs 
as follows: "Descartes establishes the fact of his own existence in 
the Cogito argument, but his reasoning is fallacious on the ground 
that the first "I' which thinks cannot be identified with the second 
"I" which exists. The first "I' refers to that which is thinking, 
at the moment the thinking occurs. This "I" might cease to exist as 
soon as the particular act of thinking which is attributed to it, 
itself ceases to exist. But the second '"I' refers to a persisting 
self which retains its identity and continues to exist through a 
great many successive acts of thinking. In taking for granted the 
identity between the first momentary ''I" and the second permanent 
'I', Descartes begs the whole question. A possible momentary 
existent, cannot itself demonstrate the existence of a permanent 
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thinking substance. All that Descartes' argument really proves is 
that something exists for as long as thinking goes on, not that it is 
a continuously existing self doing the thinking." Now if we imagine 
ourselves adopting this objection to Descartes, we put ourselves in 
the position to appreciate what it means to suggest that thinking 
takes place without this implying that it is a self which thinks. 
If we now substitute "consciousness" for 'thinking" in the above line 
of thought (and it is quite in harmony with Descartes' ideas to do so), 
we will arrive at an understanding of what it means to maintain that 
consciousness be treated as a datum without having to presuppose that 
it is a self which is conscious. The proposition "Something is 
conscious' may be used to express this idea. This would leave it an 
open question whether the something which is conscious is to be 
identified with a self. That, it seems to me, is one way of conceiving 
consciousness without presupposing the self. 
Another possibility would be to exploit the idea of metaphysical 
solipsism. According to solipsism as a metaphysical theory, all 
consciousness is my consciousness, and the world has no reality outside 
of my consciousness. Here too there is a standard argument against 
this solipsistic position which goes like this: 'If the postulate 
of the solipsist were true, and his was the only consciousness, he 
could not know that his was the only consciousness. He would be 
precluded from claiming that the consciousness was his because no 
meaning could attach to the proposition that it was not his. He 
could form no concept of his being a self, since the concept of self- 
hood could not be contrasted with a not -self against which it could 
gain purchase. Therefore the solipsist would be unable to make the 
claim 'All consciousness is my consciousness., 
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Let us, for the sake of argument, grant the success of this 
refutation of solipsism, and consider a possibility that seems to be 
left open by the argument. That is the possibility that there might 
exist a single all- encompassing consciousness, but a consciousness 
necessarily ignorant of its uniqueness, or of its selfhood. The 
solipsist would have a consciousness but he would have no concept of 
himself: he would not be self -conscious. Such a possibility could 
be described by saying "There is consciousness," but that the conscious- 
ness would not in anyway presuppose a self. That would be another 
way of envisaging consciousness as a basic datum. 
6. I have done no more than indicate possible ways of conceiving 
of consciousness, without presupposing the concept of a self. Before 
arguing for the coherence of the position which posits consciousness 
as just such a basic datum, it will be illuminating to see how the 
problem has been handled by some of the philosophers I mentioned 
earlier. I shall give a brief survey of the views of Hamilton, 
Ferrier, Hodgson and James, in that order, on the relation of conscious- 
ness to the self. Hamilton's position is implicit in the passage 
quoted on page 47, which seems to suggest that all consciousness is 
self -consciousness. The following passage sets out his view more 
definitely. 
I. I shall commence with that great fact to which I have 
already alluded, --that we are immediately conscious in 
perception of an Ego and a Non -ego, known together, and 
known in contrast to each other. This is the fact of 
the Duality of Consciousness. It is clear and manifest. 
When I concentrate my attention in the simplest act of 
perception, I return from my observation with the most 
irresistible conviction of two facts, or rather two 
branches of the same fact; - -that I am, - -and that some- 
thing different from me exists. In this act, I am 
conscious of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an 
external reality as the object perceived; and I am 
conscious of both existences in the same indivisible 
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moment of intuition. The knowledge of the subject does 
not precede, nor follow, the knowledge of the object;- - 
neither determines, neither is determined by, the other. (1) 
Lest it be thought that it is only in perception that the ego 
presents itself in this way, let me hasten to add that this duality is 
present, in Hamilton's view, in every act of consciousness. This is 
made clear in another place, where he tells us: 
II. We may lay it down as the most general characteristic of 
consciousness, that it is the recognition by the thinking 
subject of its own acts or affections. (2) 
I suggested that Hamilton's view is one in which no distinction can be 
drawn between consciousness and self -consciousness. Unfortunately 
none of his statements of his position make it quite clear which of 
three possible interpretations of his words is the right one. (a) He 
could mean that in all consciousness we know that it is a self which 
is conscious, but we do not have any acquaintance with the self which 
is conscious. To put it slightly differently, in every conscious act 
there is the recognition of the fact that a self is conscious, but 
apart from knowledge of this bare fact, nothing about the self is 
known. (b) He could mean that in all consciousness it is not only a 
fact that a self is conscious, but that there is a genuine acquaintance 
with the self which is presented along with the act of consciousness. 
(b) would differ from (a) in affirming that we both know that a self 
is conscious, and have a direct intuition of the self. (c) He could 
mean that in all consciousness the self knows not only the content or 
object of consciousness, but its mode of presentation. Thus I know, 
not only that I am conscious of a visual object, but at the same time 
that this visual object is one I am perceiving, and not imagining. 
The position is made more complicated for us, because Hamilton 
(1) Bowen, The Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton, p. 195. 
(2) Ibid. p. 131. 
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would not describe any of these three possibilities as self- conscious- 
ness, which term he reserves for an altogether different distinction. 
It will be useful to explain what this latter distinction is, but 
before doing so we need to make up our minds on the question of which 
of the three positions listed as (a), (b), and (c) represents Hamilton's 
position. Passage I seems to support (a), while passage II points to 
(c). On the other hand, a third passage seems to favour inter- 
pretation (b):- 
III. The various modifications of which the thinking subject, 
Ego, is conscious, are accompanied with the feeling, or 
intuition, or belief, - -or by whatever name the conviction 
may be called,- -that I, the thinking subject, exist. 
This feeling has been called by philosophers the 
apperception, or consciousness, of our own existence; but, 
as it is a simple and ultimate fact of consciousness, 
though it be clearly given, it cannot be defined or 
described. (1) 
This passage undoubtedly lends support to (b), but it might just as well 
be taken to be an unhappy way of stating (a). 
Perhaps the following passage will be allowed to have settled 
the issue in favour of (a). 
IV. In so far as mind is the common name for the states of 
knowing, willing, feeling, desiring, etc., of which I am 
conscious, it is only the name for a certain series of 
connected phenomena or qualities, and consequently expresses 
only what is known. But in so far as it denotes that 
subject or substance in which the phenomena of knowing, 
willing etc., inhere -- something behind or under these 
phenomena --it expresses what, in itself, or in its absolute 
existence, is unknown. (2) 
In passage IV we recognise the Pure Ego Theory in all its starkness. 
According to it we have some special indefinable sort of knowledge of 
the sheer fact of the existence of the self, but what this self is we 
still do not know. It lies outside experience. Hamilton's 
(1) Ibid. p. 254. 
(2) W. Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, i. 138. 
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description of the Duality of Consciousness thus reduces itself to the 
assertion that every act of consciousness is presented as the conscious- 
ness of a subject, or self. Self and consciousness exemplify the 
logical behaviour of correlatives. 
In view of the unapproachability of the self in Hamilton's 
Philosophy, we may well wonder what for him passes as self- conscious- 
ness. His solution is rather neat. 
V. Perception is the power by which we are made aware of the 
phenomena of the External world; Self- consciousness, the 
power by which we apprehend the phenomena of the 
Internal. (1) 
I think we may take this conception of self -consciousness to be 
negatively defined: viz. An internal phenomenon is any phenomenon 
which does not belong to the External world. It would then be 
possible to maintain that self -consciousness is one of the subspecies 
of consciousness; to be contrasted with perception, and memory, which 
are two other forms of the 'Presentative Faculty" of consciousness. 
Such a proposal may be criticised on the ground that self -consciousness 
is made a rag -bag for all instances of presentative consciousness which 
cannot be classed either as perceptions or as memories. It lacks the 
character of a coherent category in its own right. Furthermore it is 
open to a serious objection. Not all memories are memories of events 
in the external world, and those which are not are eligible for 
classification under the heading of self -consciousness. And then 
again perceptive acts themselves would seem to qualify for description 
as "phenomena of the Internal." I have quoted Hamilton's theory that 
I cannot perceive without knowing that I perceive, and this should be 
enough for the act of perceiving to be classed along with the other 
`phenomena of the Internal. 
(1) Op. cit. p. 396. 
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A more promising interpretation can be put on proposition V 
than the one we have just seen to be unsatisfactory. When Hamilton 
refers to the 'phenomena of the Internal" he could be interpreted to 
mean those cases of consciousness in which we ourselves are the 
objects of our states of consciousness. On this interpretation the 
facts I know about myself through consciousness, as distinct from the 
facts I know about objects through consciousness, are what I know 
through self -consciousness. This interpretation would fit in more 
happily with the meaning the term "self -consciousness' is often taken 
to have in ordinary usage. It approximates to Ryle's sense (c) of 
`self- conscious." (1) The most favourable example in support of this 
interpretation is provided by such statements as "I am in pain," "I am 
feeling angry," "I feel thirsty." These statements may be under- 
stood as descriptions of states of consciousness, in which the object 
of consciousness is me myself. 
Unfortunately there are many examples which do not fall into 
this pattern so tidily. For instance if I say "I fear him," who is 
the object of my consciousness; I or he? There are, therefore, 
difficulties for this interpretation as well. I do not believe we 
can appraise these alternative interpretations of self -consciousness 
without a detailed analysis of consciousness of the sort I propose 
to undertake, and for this reason I do no more than note these two 
interpretations of Hamilton's conception of self -consciousness. Both 
alternatives agree in this, that in self -consciousness there is no 
direct awareness of the self as such, and self -consciousness is not 
thought of as a sort of second -order awareness: an awareness of 
awareness. This cannot be said with equal certainty of the next 
philosopher we come to: James Ferrier. 
(1) See p. 33, above. 
- 57 - 
In Hamilton's Philosophy the self and consciousness are 
coeval, but the manner in which the self discloses itself in conscious- 
ness is left ambiguous. This is not true of Ferrier, who, in his 
Institutes of Metaphysics propounds the thesis that all consciousness 
is self -consciousness. The first metaphysical proposition of his 
system states: 
Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the 
ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance 
of itself. (1) 
This proposition contains the same ambiguity that Hamilton's description 
of the relation between consciousness and the self suffered from. We 
are left unsure whether (a) an intelligence can be described as having 
some cognisance of itself because it knows the bare fact of its 
existence, or (b) it has some cognisance of the nature of the existent 
which is known in (a). The following passage seems to establish 
alternative (b). 
. . . That which we call "I" is the object of intellect alone. 
We are never objects of sense to ourselves. A man can see and 
touch his body, but he cannot see and touch himself. (2) 
For in it Ferrier goes beyond the point of maintaining that we know in 
consciousness that there is a self, but not what it is. Whereas 
Hamilton thought of the self as an unknowable thing -in- itself, Ferrier 
asserts the self to be an object which discloses itself in an 
'intellectual experience.- The self therefore falls within the ambit 
of experience, but only of an experience which transcends sense - 
experience. It must, however, be clearly understood that Ferrier 
does not suggest that we ever have a pure intuition of the self. 
For on his theory if all consciousness is self- consciousness, the 
opposite side of the coin is that all self -consciousness is also 
(1) James F. Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysics 
(Edinburgh, 1854), p. 75. 
(2) Ibid. p. 80. 
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consciousness of the not -self. The self is only known cognitively 
in its involvement in the operations of the mind. According to 
proposition IX, 
The ego, or self, or mind, per se, is, of necessity, 
absolutely unknowable. By itself --that is, in a purely 
indeterminate state, or separated from all things, and 
divested of all thoughts --it is no possible object of 
cognition. It can know itself only in some particular 
state, or in union with some non -ego; that is, with some 
element contradistinguished from itself. (1) 
In defence of this claim, Ferrier argues: - 
To suppose that any intelligence can know itself in no 
particular state, is contradictory; for this would be 
equivalent to supposing that it could know itself in no 
state at all, which again would be equivalent to the 
supposition that it could know itself without knowing 
itself. (2) 
This, he points out,entirely agrees with Hume's observation: - "I 
never catch myself at any time without a perception. (3) 
Ferrier insists that we make a distinction between the ego 
knowing itself as any one particular state, and the ego knowing itself 
in a particular state, 
Because if the ego could know itself as any one particular 
state, it could never know itself in any other particular 
state. (4) 
We find, in addition, Ferrier arguing like Moore and Hamilton that the 
self is a common element in every `cognition," and he describes this 
fact by saying that the self is universal as contradistinguished from 
the content of consciousness which is particular. 
These passages reveal that Ferrier shared Hamilton's belief 
(1) Ibid. p. 235. 
(2) Ibid. p. 240. 
(3) D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. I, pt. iv, 
sec. 5. 
(4) Op. cit. pp. 240 - 41. 
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in the Duality of Consciousness. On the other hand, he came closer 
than did Hamilton to maintaining that the self was itself an object 
of some sort of intellectual intuition. He founded consciousness in 
self -consciousness in an unequivocal fashion and the same cannot be 
said of Hamilton. 
7. In Shadworth Hodgson we meet a philosopher with a very different 
view of the relation between the self and consciousness. He mentions 
Ferrier's thesis that all consciousness is self -consciousness for the 
explicit purpose of rejecting it. By implication he rejects Hamilton's 
weaker thesis as well. His thinking is the same in this connection as 
John Stuart Mill's. Mill attacked Hamilton for maintaining that the 
distinction between subject and object was an ultimate deliverance of 
consciousness which could not be doubted. (1) Mill conceded that to 
the adult intelligence introspection certainly reveals the Duality of 
Consciousness which Hamilton had identified, and he also admitted that 
to such a mind any other possibility was inconceivable. But the 
essence of his criticism of Hamilton is that he mistakes acquired 
characteristics of consciousness for original ones. (2) Mill argues 
that it comes to seem inconceivable to us that the distinction between 
ego and non -ego might not be a necessary condition of consciousness, 
because the habit of so regarding it has been ingrained from our 
earliest years. He sums up the position as follows: 
These philosophers, therefore, and among them Sir W. Hamilton, 
mistake altogether the true conditions of psychological 
investigation, when, instead of proving a belief to be an 
original fact of consciousness by showing that it could not 
(1) J.S. Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's 
Philosophy (London, 1865), ch. 9, 11, & 12. Mill's 
views are not found in one place but have to be pieced 
together from scattered statements. 
(2) Ibid. pp. 149-50. 
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have been acquired, they conclude that it was not acquired, 
for the reason, often false, and never sufficiently sub- 
stantiated, that our consciousness cannot get rid of it 
now. (1) 
Hodgson sides with Mill in denying that consciousness in its 
original form was polarized into subject and object. He 
distinguishes three distinct modes of consciousness, which he calls 
primary consciousness, reflective conciousness, and direct conscious- 
ness, in that chronological order. Primary consciousness is a 
preconceptual stage of consciousness, which corresponds with what 
Mill calls "original consciousness," and both of them ascribe this 
form of consciousness to the consciousness of infants prior to the 
commencement of conceptualization. Primary consciousness is 
characterized by the absence of any reference to the self, on the one 
hand, and the absence of any reference to "things" on the other hand. 
In support of the claim that primary consciousness contains no 
testimony of the self, Hodgson has this to say: 
Now it is a well attested fact of observation, that infants 
have feelings and thoughts without having the perception of 
themselves as persons. There may be a series of feelings 
and thoughts in what is afterwards perceived as a person, 
which are not referred by the subject of them to himself as 
their possessor. A series of feelings and thoughts is there- 
fore a condition of the perception of self, and can exist 
independently of that perception. (2) 
In other words having a thought or feeling must precede any description 
of the thought or feeling as mine. I cannot describe a thought or . 
feeling as mine without a conception of myself, but I can have the 
thought or feeling without having any conception of myself. 
The next stage in the development of consciousness on 
Hodgson's theory is for the objects we perceive to be distinguished 
(1) Ibid. pp. 150 -51. 
(2) Shadworth H. Hodgson, The Philosophy of Reflection 
(London, 1878), I, 108. 
i 
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from our awareness of them: 
. . . We can clearly represent to ourselves a series of feelings 
and thoughts existing without their being referred to objects 
at the time, by the sentient being; although he may afterwards 
perceive that objects were their condition of existing. (1) 
The distinction between the self and objects of knowledge is one, which, 
according to Hodgson, grows out of primary consciousness. This process 
of differentiation first takes place when the feelings and thoughts 
which constitute primary consciousness are recognised to be feelings and 
thoughts of things. This recognition Hodgson sees as the initial 
exercise of reflective consciousness. It is the first act of thinking, 
or conception. 
Our consciousness of things is the perception that the feelings 
and thoughts composing them are felt; our consciousness of self . 
is the perception that those feelings and thoughts are feelings 
and thoughts. The same perception, about the same states of 
consciousness, is at once a perception of the existence of 
things and of the existence of feelings and thoughts. In 
primary consciousness there were thoughts and feelings, but 
there was not the perception either that they were things, or 
that they were thoughts and feelings. (2) 
We notice in this passage that reflection still has not articulated 
the distinction between feeling and thing felt into the fully fledged 
distinction between subject and object. When that point is reached, 
we have reached the third stage of consciousness which Hodgson calls 
direct consciousness. Hence when Hamilton and Ferrier report their 
finding of the Duality of Consciousness, it is direct consciousness 
they are describing. Direct consciousness is the consciousness of 
the Common Sense view of the world, according to which the world 
consists of Persons and Things. Strawson's descriptive metaphysics, 
is, thus, the metaphysics of direct consciousness. (3) 
(1) Ibid. p. 109. 
(2) Ibid. pp. 111 -12. 
(3) See, P.F. Strawson, Individuals (London, 1959), pt. 1. 
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I shall take the liberty of quoting a sizeable extract of 
Hodgson's description of the advance from reflective to direct 
consciousness, because it contains a number of important ideas. 
Let us now endeavour to trace the method by which this 
direct and separative perception springs from the distinction 
of aspects drawn by reflection. Primary consciousness 
suffices to separate groups or bundles of percepts, existing 
simply as states of consciousness, from one another, and the 
body of the observer is one of these groups. It is that 
group round which the rest seem to cluster, which is present 
when any of the rest are, and which is also present when 
feelings are experienced which have no visible and tangible 
existence outside the body, or at any rate only an imagined one; 
I mean such as heat and cold, internal bodily sensations, 
appetites, desires, and emotions. Upon this state of 
perception reflection supervenes, whereby feelings and thoughts 
are distinguished as being at once feelings and thoughts as well 
as what we afterwards call "things." Two analyses have then 
to be combined, that given by primary consciousness into 
separate groups, and that given by reflection of every group 
into inseparable aspects. Some hypothesis has to be found 
which will render easy the holding together of these two 
analyses. This takes place inevitably, in obedience to the 
Law of Parcimony, which is the ultimate practical law, or 
motive, of all reasoning, the universal tendency to simplify 
different facts or theories by reducing them to a single 
common fact or theory. The hypothesis adopted is, that all 
feelings belong to the body, and that this "thing," which is 
already separate from other "things," is different in kind 
from them, inasmuch as it is the abode and source of feelings; 
in other words, the body becomes a "person." The objective 
and subjective aspects are thus separated as well as 
distinguished; and this state of the matter is that which is 
expressed by the earliest post -reflective language. This 
separation of the aspects is complete, when even the "me" 
is analysed, the body, which was part of it, again classed 
with "things," and an immaterial substance, the soul or mind, 
imagined as the subject of the feelings and the bond of their 
union. 
We have, then, the separation between groups of percepts, 
given by primary consciousness; and we have the distinction 
between percepts and things, given by the first exercise of 
reflection. The attempt to combine these two kinds of 
perception, to put together the distinction between percepts 
and things and the separation between groups of percepts, 
results in the grouping of percepts together in the 
immaterial soul, and the grouping of things together in the 
external world; that is, results in direct or separative 
consciousness. (1) 
(1) Hodgson, Philosophy of Reflection, I, 114. 
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Hodgson draws the conclusion from his analysis that Persons 
and Things are not themselves absolute existences." By this he means 
that they have no ontological independence from consciousness. They 
have an existence only within consciousness itself, and are the 
conceptual creation of a reflective consciousness. In primary 
consciousness they are indistinguishable. Now there is one step in 
this acute analysis which is left less clear than it might have been. 
Hodgson claims that what he calls 'direct" consciousness, is the form 
of consciousness we all take for granted in our workaday lives, and is 
also the form of consciousness taken for granted in science. He 
would be perfectly right, therefore, if he claimed that direct 
consciousness displayed a duality which polarizes into Persons on the 
one side and Things on the other. In this, his view coincides with 
that of Strawson. In his analysis, however, Hodgson detects a move- 
ment in thought, from a position in which the self is identified with 
the body, to one in which the self is separated from the body, when, 
as he says, the process is "completed." His analysis follows the 
process of thought all the way to its termination in a Pure Ego Theory 
of the self such as was held by Hamilton. But the Pure Ego Theory is 
a philosophical theory based on the fact of the duality of conscious- 
ness: the duality of Persons and Things. Qua philosophical theory, 
it is not identical with the common sense ideas of the non -philosopher. 
A11 he assumes is the existence of Persons and Things, not the further 
proposition that the Person is a Pure Ego. It seems, therefore, that 
it would be wrong to follow Hodgson to the point of maintaining that 
the Pure Ego Theory is the deliverance of direct consciousness itself: 
i.e., the view we unreflectively adopt. (1) 
(1) A persuasive attempt has been made to show that the 
concept of a Person does not presuppose the Pure Ego 
Theory, by S. Shoemaker, in Self- Knowledge and Self - 
Identity (Ithaca, 1963). 
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I return now to the views expressed by William James in his 
article "Does Consciousness Exist ?" They will be seen to have a 
close resemblance to Hodgson's ideas, and this raises the possibility 
of a direct influence of Hodgson on James: a possibility strengthened 
by the fact that many references to Hodgson of a favourable sort are 
to be found in James's work. Let me recapitulate the position as we 
left it on page 31. James, it was found, rejected any analysis of 
consciousness which took it to be a common element remaining invariant 
throughout a series of changing experiences. We found in particular 
that he rejected Moore's analysis of sensation, with its claim that 
consciousness was a single unchanging element common to every sensation. 
It must now be said that this point was subsidiary to his main purpose, 
which was to reject in principle any analysis of experience (conscious- 
ness) which sought to prove that consciousness could be broken up into 
a self, ego, or subject, on the one hand, and a not -self, non -ego, or 
object, on the other hand. In other words, his aim was to refute what 
Hamilton had called the fact of the Duality of Consciousness. James's 
own contention is that: 
Experience . . . has no such inner duplicity; and the separation 
of it into consciousness and content comes, not by way of sub- 
traction, but by way of addition. (1) 
If one needs evidence of the thinkers who maintain that conscious- 
ness has such an 'inner duplicity" of which James complains, one could 
not do better than point to Hamilton and Ferrier. James is on the side 
of J.S. Mill and Hodgson in their denial that consciousness in its 
pristine state has any inner articulation into a self and that which is 
presented to the self. Those who, like Mill, Hodgson and James, deny 
the existence of any sort of independent entity which we can identify 
(1) James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 9. 
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as the self, have the responsibility of explaining how we come to have 
a conception of self, and precisely what this conception amounts to. 
Sheer denial is not enough. This fact is acknowledged by the three 
philosophers I have just mentioned. 
We have had a look at the way Hodgson tried to handle the 
matter and now we shall briefly consider James's opinion. In the 
passage just quoted James said of any dichotomy within consciousness 
that it comes "not by way of subtraction, but by way of addition." 
This is just the description it would be fair to give of Hodgson's 
theory too. How then, in James's opinion, is this "addition" 
effected? He explains: - 
A given undivided portion of experience, taken in one context 
of associates, play(s) the part of a knower, of a state of mind, 
of 'consciousness;" while in a different context the same 
undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known, 
of an objective "content." In a word, in one group it figures 
as a thought, in another group as a thing. And, since it can 
figure in both groups simultaneously we have every right to 
speak of it as subjective and objective both at once. (1) 
Alongside this passage let me place one from Hodgson making essentially 
the same point: 
These thoughts and feelings are not only thoughts and feelings, 
but bundles of constantly connected thoughts and feelings, that 
is, 'things." The connection between them belongs to them. 
Therefore they are things, as well as, and without ceasing to 
be, states of consciousness. They have a double aspect; 
that which was undistinguished has, I now see, a distinction 
into consciousness and object of consciousness. (2) 
The point, I think it is true to say, is the one Wittgenstein had in 
mind when he said "I am my world." (3) 
(1) Ibid. pp. 9 -10 
(2) Hodgson, Philosophy of Reflection, I, 111. 
(3) L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
ed. C.K. Ogden, (London, 1922), 5.631. 
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8. Certain conclusions may be drawn from this review of a number 
of philosophical theories on the relation between the self and 
consciousness. The first fact to strike us, is that philosophers 
have taken up widely divergent and incompatible positions on the 
question. Moreover all the philosophers have given the impression 
that their own views were so evidently true, that they could not be 
backed up by evidence more compelling than the bare statement of each 
position itself would be. Some philosophers regard the Duality of 
Consciousness as one of those ultimate facts which it would be meaning- 
less to wish to ground in some facts still more ultimate. Others, 
again, state with equal conviction the view that the facts give no 
support to the claim that the self is anything apart from a particular 
aspect of consciousness itself. There is complete disagreement. 
These conflicting claims confront us as assertions of brute fact. The 
positions are stated rather than argued for. It is not surprising 
therefore, that later philosophers should have become suspicious of a 
form of enquiry which seemed to reduce itself to the making of 
pronouncements because of the alleged indefinability of the concepts 
concerned; especially as the pronouncements contradicted one another. 
This eventuality, one suspects, had much to do with the increasing 
unpopularity among philosophers of appeals to the testimony of 
consciousness. It led to a stale -mate. 
This eventuality can only be avoided if the study of conscious- 
ness is put on a new footing. This is what I shall attempt to do. 
do not propose to give a formal description of a new approach to 
consciousness, but prefer this to emerge from the analysis itself. It 
is sufficient to say that extensive use is to be made of the working 
distinctions we all make, and which no one would deny our right to 
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employ, in the descriptions we give of our experiences. 
The issue between the Dualists and the non -Dualists can only be 
resolved by going back to the beginning, and making a close study of 
consciousness itself, without presupposing one or another of the 
theories of the self we have examined. This means approaching conscious- 
ness as a basic datum. We assume no more than that something is 
conscious or that there is consciousness. To express the position in 
these terms might perhaps suggest that the argument is over before it 
has started, and that I have found in favour of the anti -Dualists. It 
will be discovered, however, that this is not so. 
There is one last matter I wish to clarify before proceeding to 
the positive side of the programme, and this concerns a remark I made 
to the effect that if consciousness is defined in terms of what you or 
I experience, it ceases to be an open question whether consciousness is 
to be ascribed to selves. It is clear from the way I have defined 
consciousness that I had in mind each of us referring to his own 
consciousness, and not the consciousness we ascribe to others. I assume, 
in other words, an ego- centric interpretation of consciousness. Thus 
the truth of the proposition `Something is conscious' directly follows 
from the fact that I am at the time conscious. Each one of us will 
thus assent to the proposition "Something is conscious" on the ground of 
his own individual consciousness. It would be a pointless subterfuge 
to pretend that this was not so. I shall therefore continue to refer 
to instances of consciousness in the first, second and third persons. 
What has to be understood is that this is an expository device. 
That is to say, references to my consciousness, or your consciousness, 
must not be accorded ontological significance. They must be read as 
grammatical devices to enable reference to be made to a consciousness 
with which the reader is acquainted. This must be understood as a 
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concession to exposition and not as a concession to a philosophical 
premise. As one philosopher protested, if he were forbidden the use 
of the pronouns "I" and ''you" he would be unable to communicate to 
others his views about consciousness. I have made the suggestion 
that we imagine at this stage that we are dealing with a solipsistic 
consciousness. Now if we entertain the thesis of solipsism, each of 
us will naturally believe that his is the unique solipsistic conscious- 
ness. It is impossible for any of us to entertain the thought that it 
is not our own consciousness which is the sole reality. This being so, 
I am asking for the same concession that we make to the solipsist when 
we examine his position. 
o 0 o 
CHAPTER TWO 
A'1"l'ENTION 
1. The object of this chapter is to reveal the structure of 
consciousness by a study of the operation of attention. After certain 
preliminaries of a terminological nature, and a section on conscious- 
ness and change, I argue in support of Ward's doctrine that attention 
is a universal feature of consciousness. I give reasons for believing 
that the sign of the presence of attention in consciousness is the 
polarization of consciousness into elements occupying its foreground 
relative to others which recede into the background. The hypothesis 
that all normal forms of consciousness have this structure is examined 
in the case of two of its forms which give least promise of supporting 
it. It is shown that even in such conditions of seeming non -attention 
the hypothesis is confirmed. Finally, distinctions between different 
forms of consciousness, proposed by Hamilton and Ribot, are examined 
and rejected in favour of a distinction between "interrogative" and 
non -interrogative" attention. 
In the first chapter I argued that although "consciousness" was 
a collective name for our several experiences, it could not be 
eliminated in favour of direct reference to individual experiences, 
because no meaning could be attached to the assertion that at any one 
time an individual had a finite number of experiences which could be 
exhaustively specified. Nevertheless it will be necessary to refer 
in a topic -neutral way to the experiences of which consciousness is 
comprised. I shall use the expression "element(s) of consciousness"- - 
"element(s)" for short - -for this purpose. Unfortunately no designation 
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which could be chosen entirely avoids misrepresentation of the 
position. Even the term "element of consciousness' suggests a 
certain atomistic independence of one element from the next, and this 
could give rise to the idea that consciousness is an aggregate of such 
elements. This is an idea I want to resist, and so when I refer to 
the elements of consciousness, it should be borne in mind that I do so 
with the reservation that I completely endorse the view expressed in 
this passage by William James: 
The traditional psychology talks like one should say a river 
consists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, barrelsful, and 
other moulded forms of water. Even were the pails and the 
pots all actually standing in the stream, still between them 
the free water would continue to flow. It is just this free 
water of consciousness that psychologists resolutely overlook. 
Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the 
free water that flows round it. With it goes the sense of its 
relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to 
us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. The 
significance, the value, of the image is all in this halo or 
penumbra that surrounds and escorts it. . . (1) 
Besides needing to refer to the elements of consciousness, it 
is also necessary to be able to refer to their temporal relations to 
one another. James's metaphor of a stream has a graphic value in 
this connection. He describes consciousness as a "stream of thought," 
This creates the image of elements of consciousness floating along in 
the current of time. For the breadth of the stream we can conceive of 
all those elements which are compresent at a particular moment, and for 
the length of the stream we can conceive of a series made up of a 
succession of such compresent elements. Philosophers have referred to 
this twofold organization of consciousness in different ways. Broad 
has described the counterpart of the breadth of the stream as the 
"transverse unity of a cross -section of the history of a mind," and the 
(1) William James, Principles of Psychology (London, 1891), 
I, 255. 
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counterpart of the length of the stream as the "longitudinal unity" 
of a mind. (1) Grice has referred to the contemporaneous elements as 
a "total temporary state" of consciousness. The succession of 
elements -- Broad's "longitudinal unity" of the mind - -Grice refers to as 
a series of total temporary states. (2) Now I shall use Grice's 
terminology, not because I think it superior, but because I shall later 
be examining Grice's views in detail, and it will save time if we are 
already conversant with his terminology. For the present we shall 
sufficiently understand what is meant by a total temporary state from 
the following explanation offered by Grice. 
A total temporary state is composed of all the experiences any 
one person is having at any given time. Thus if I am now 
thinking of Hitler and feeling a pain, and having no other 
experiences, there will be occurring now a total temporary 
state containing as elements a thought of Hitler and a feeling 
of pain. Now since total temporary states may be said to 
occur at various times, they may be said to form temporal 
series. (3) 
It is evident from the above account of a total temporary state 
that it is a theoretical possibility for a total temporary state to 
contain but a single element. It would represent the logical limit 
to consciousness in one direction. A total temporary state which 
lacked even one element would not be a state of consciousness at all. 
Now when in the course of my enquiry I have spoken of normal forms of 
consciousness, the qualification was intended to rule out precisely 
this possibility of a consciousness a total temporary state of which 
contained no more than one element. Special significance is 
(1) C.D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature (London, 1951), 
p. 560. 
(2) H.P. Grice, 'Personal Identity,' Mind, L. (1941) 
(3) Ibid. pp. 341 -2. Grice attempts to give a definition of 
a total temporary state, but since its purpose is not 
relevant at the present level of generality of the 
discussion, consideration of it is postponed until 
chapter 5, where it is examined in detail. 
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attached to this possibility but the matter is left to succeeding 
chapters. The normal state of affairs, I maintain, is one in which 
total temporary states have a plurality of. elements. A notable 
French psychologist, Ribot--a contemporary of William James -- confirms 
this fact. He states quite categorically: 
The normal condition is plurality of states of consciousness, 
or-- according to the expression employed by certain authors- - 
polyideism. (1) 
2. The proposition that a total temporary state normally contains a 
plurality of elements is indisputable. We do not cease to have 
visual impressions when we hear a sound; we do not necessarily cease to 
hear things when we have thoughts; we do not cease to be aware of any 
of these things when we have tactile sensations, and so on. Of course 
our absorption in any of these experiences might diminish our awareness 
of the others, but this I am not denying. When all our senses are 
working we receive impressions from them simultaneously, provided of 
course that the necessary stimuli are present. But even if it be 
granted that a total temporary state normally consists of more than 
one element, it is theoretically possible for there to be a series of 
identical total temporary states. This would constitute a perfectly 
static consciousness in which no existing element perished and no new 
element appeared. Accordingly, it also needs to be shown that this 
is not the case: that a series of total temporary states will be a 
series of changing elements, in which, although some elements will 
persist from one state to the next, others will be new. It may be 
thought that the truth of this proposition goes without saying. 
Strawson, in his essay on the Critique of Pure Reason, reveals his 
(1) TH. Ribot, The Psychology of Attention (London, 1890), 
p. 10. 
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concurrence with Kant's acceptance of it. Speaking of Kant's thesis 
"that experience essentially exhibits temporal succession," he says, 
The thesis is treated by Kant throughout as an unquestionable 
datum to which we cannot comprehend the possibility of any 
alternative; and as such we may be content to regard it. (1) 
Nevertheless a certain elaboration will be given by way of introducing 
one of the themes which will figure prominently in later portions of 
the thesis. 
Changes in the elements in consciousness may be directly 
inferred from the existence of changing events in the world of which 
we are aware. On this possibility changes taking place outside 
consciousness are reflected within consciousness. It implies that 
changes within consciousness are contingent upon the existence of 
changes outside consciousness, and that it is not essential to the 
nature of consciousness that its elements should be undergoing change. 
The latter and more radical doctrine is put forward by some 
psychologists who have maintained that we are never aware of sensations 
as such, but only of changes of sensation. This is certainly true of 
some sorts of sensation but it is questionable whether it is true of 
all forms of awareness. It is true of our sensing of hot and cold. 
We do not feel our own temperature, but we feel changes in our bodily 
temperature. I say 'I feel cold' and this statement presupposes a 
change from a condition in which I did not feel cold - -did not for that 
matter necessarily feel hot either, but perhaps did not feel my bodily 
temperature at all. On the other hand the theory that we are only 
aware of changes of sensation is less plausible if we consider the 
case of looking at an object. The object is not visible only when it 
changes its appearance. Its appearance may remain unchanged without 
(1) P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London, 1966), 
p. 25. 
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this impairing its visibility. Nevertheless it is germane to point 
out that lack of movement (change) is a most successful form of 
camouflage. (1) 
However, from my point of view there is a far more significant 
manner in which consciousness is dependent on change. We must not 
forget, although philosophers often speak in a way which suggests that 
they do forget, that our own bodies are the source of a vast number of 
the elements of our consciousness. Each movement we make gives rise 
to a shower of sensations. The movement itself is experienced as 
kinaesthetic sensation, and it will more often than not be accompanied 
by tactile sensations caused either by contact with external objects, 
or by the friction of clothing against the skin, but mostly by both at 
once. Nor must we forget such factors as the feeling of our heart 
beat during strenous movement; the sensations in our nose and diaphragm 
connected with breathing; the noise our own movements make (we can 
often hear ourselves breathing); the sight of our own movements; and 
finally the reciprocal feeling of one part of our body in touch with 
another of its parts. Our oral sensations are a case in point. 
There are the muscular sensations we get from moving our jaws, our 
tongue, our lips. There is the feeling of contact between our teeth, 
and the tactile sensations produced by the exploratory movements of 
the tongue. In addition there are the auditory sensations produced 
by oral manipulations. We are inclined to overlook the rich source 
of elements of consciousness which the movements of our bodies provide. 
That we do overlook them is no accident, as we shall discover in due 
course. Nevertheless the fact that we take them for granted should 
(1) It might just be mentioned that this position receives 
some support from the fact that sensations of uniform 
quality, if monotonously continued, tend to pass out 
of consciousness, provided of course that they are of 
no concern to the organism. 
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not make us impervious to their existence. 
There is a further extremely important way in which bodily 
movement determines the occurrence of elements of consciousness. An 
example of this further form of dependence of elements of consciousness 
on movement has already been given above. In movement we normally 
make contact with objects external to our bodies. When I walk, I feel 
the ground under me. But if I am sitting with my legs up, I do not 
feel the ground. This means that by making a certain set of movements- - 
i.e., walking --I bring it about that my awareness of the ground enters 
my consciousness. Alternatively, when I sit in a chair instead of 
walking, I put myself in physical contact with the chair, and the feel 
of the chair against me is a new element of consciousness which I would 
not have had, had it not been for a movement I made. Once in the 
chair I shift my position, thereby altering my consciousness in respect 
of the chair yet again. When we come to the case of visual conscious- 
ness, the effect of movement is of even greater moment. The movement 
made in closing and opening our eyes alters our visual experience from 
one of not- seeing to one of seeing. Furthermore every move made by 
the eyes alters their owner's visual experience -- whether the movement 
be due to the eyes themselves, the head, the body, or all three 
together. 
Ribot has stressed in the strongest possible terms the 
dependence of elements of consciousness on bodily movement. Thus: 
All our organs of perception are at the same time sensorial 
and motor. To perceive with our eyes, ears, hands, feet, 
tongue, nostrils, movements are needed. The more mobile 
the parts of our body, the more exquisite is their sensibility; 
the less perfect their motile power, the more obtuse their 
sensibility. Nor is this all; without motor elements, 
perception is impossible. We will call to mind a previous 
statement that if the eye be kept fixed upon a given object 
without moving, perception after a while grows dim, and then 
disappears. Rest the tips of the fingers upon a table 
without pressing, and the contact at the end of a few minutes 
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will no longer be felt. But a motion of the eye, or of the 
finger, be it ever so light, will re- arouse perception. 
Consciousness is only possible through change: change is 
not possible save through movement. It would be easy to 
expatiate at great length upon this subject;ïfor although 
the facts are very manifest and of common experience, 
psychology has nevertheless so neglected the role sustained 
by movements, that it actually forgot at last that they are 
the fundamental condition of cognition in that they are the 
instrument of the fundamental law of consciousness, which is 
relativity, change. Enough has now been said to warrant 
the unconditional statement, that where there is no movement 
there is no perception. (1) 
It must not be thought that the movement which gives rise to 
an element of consciousness is necessarily reflected in it. For 
example, by running my hand over the surface of a carpet I can feel 
the pile, and this feeling will be a fairly sustained uniform feeling. 
The feeling of the carpet need not reflect the movement of my hand. 
It would be all the same if my hand were stationary and the carpet 
were drawn under it. However the actual movement of my hand would be 
reflected in one or more of the other modes of awareness: either 
kinaesthetic, or visual. Thus we must not fall into the error of 
assuming that if a bodily movement is the prerequisite of a certain 
element of consciousness, thaf that element must itself manifest 
change. In spite of this qualification, in the majority of cases 
the elements of consciousness will change as the bodily movement which 
is their condition, changes. We can therefore conclude that in the 
numerous cases in which the element of consciousness directly reflects 
the physical movement which is its condition, the fact that the 
element of consciousness itself changes is not a contingent state of 
affairs. 
In the foregoing I sought to show that a total temporary 
state contained a number of elements, and that successive total 
(1) Ribot, The Psychology of Attention, p. 52. 
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temporary states in a series would differ from one another in that in 
normal circumstances each would contain some elements not shared by 
the others. On this basis I proceed to an examination of the precise 
relationship between consciousness and attention. 
3. ''Attention" is no less complex a concept than is "conscious- 
ness." Just as the word "conscious" is used in a variety of senses, 
so too is "attention.' I shall not begin, however, by making all the 
distinctions which have to be made, before a true understanding of 
attention can be reached. Instead I shall only make the distinctions 
that have to be made at the level of generality at which the discussion 
is proceeding; working from the simple to the complex. I should also 
make it clear, that while it is true to say that the distinctions I 
introduce are ones which, I believe, are justified on introspective 
grounds, I try wherever possible to avoid depending exclusively on 
introspective evidence. 
The weakness of introspective evidence is that it is quite 
undiscriminating between what is subjectively true for the individual 
introspecting, and what is necessarily true for everybody. This 
shortcoming can be overcome if introspective evidence is supplemented 
with an appeal to standard descriptions of states of mind. The 
descriptions, if standard, must be generally understood, and if 
generally understood, the distinctions they mark must also be under- 
stood. For example I may claim on introspective grounds that I 
cannot decide whether or not to do something. If I restrict myself 
to introspection I am not in a position to convince anyone else that 
other people too, find themselves in that position. However, I can 
also describe the situation by saying "I am in two minds about it." 
Anyone understanding that description can be presumed to know what it 
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is to be in two minds about something. For this reason an intro - 
spectable state of mind cannot be written off as idiosyncratic if it 
carries a standard description. On the contrary the experience is 
elevated to the inter -personal plane. Before proceeding with the 
analysis it is necessary to exclude one of the meanings of "attend," 
which is not the one with which this enquiry is concerned. This is 
the meaning it has when someone says ''I have some business to attend 
to." "Attend' in this sense is synonymous with `deal with." The 
sense of "attend" which is the subject of this discussion is the 
sense it has when by saying '1 am attending' ̀ I mean "I am paying 
attention.' 
An extreme position on the relation between attention and 
consciousness is taken up by James Ward, who maintains that attention 
and consciousness are identical. (1) On this view we cannot be aware 
of anything without attending to it, for the simple reason that to be 
aware of it is to attend to it. Ward, for reasons which do not 
concern us, states his preference for treating "attention' as the most 
suitable word to use, and suggests that the word "consciousness" should 
be dispensed with entirely. The disadvantage to this suggestion is 
that "attention" is a term with a contrary, and if it is equated with 
consciousness, this feature has to be sacrificed. In ordinary language 
it makes sense to say of a person that he is not paying attention to 
anything, but on Ward's interpretation this would be tantamount to 
saying that the person concerned was not aware of anything, and this 
is hardly what we would mean to imply. Having denied that a state of 
sheer inattention was possible, Ward was obliged to substitute the 
idea of degrees of attention. 
(1) James Ward, Psychological Principles (Cambridge, 1918), 
ch. III, sec. 1 & 2. 
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A state that we might wish to describe as one of sheer 
inattention, would, in his terminology, be a state of a minimal 
degree of attention, but a state of attention nonetheless. Now it 
would be as well to consider Ward's suggestion, as we might find that 
he is correct in maintaining that some degree of attention is present 
in all forms of consciousness. But this should not stop us from 
taking issue with him in regard to the implication that if we employ 
his terminology it is at once necessarily true- -i.e., a matter of 
logic --that there is no consciousness without attention. His position, 
in fact, tends to blur altogether the distinction between attention and 
consciousness, and as will emerge, it is important not to equate the 
two. 
It is a merit of Ward's position that the recognition of degrees 
of attention is so central to it. Our vocabulary is rich in expressions 
which discriminate between the varying degrees of attention which 
objects of attention may enjoy. Something may have my complete 
attention, and then I may be described as wholly absorbed. On the 
other hand I could be only half attending, or perhaps, not paying much 
attention. Certainly it is indisputable that we use the comparison 
of more or less, when describing attention. Ward is not embarrassed, 
either, by the fact that on his view `attention" has no contrary 
"inattention.' The fact that a concept operates on a sliding scale 
of degree, does not in itself disqualify it from possessing a contrary. 
We need only think of 'pleasure` with its contrary "pain" to realize 
that the claim that there are degrees of pleasure is not incompatible 
with its having a contrary. Ward's recognition of degrees of 
attention is not the factor which forces him to deny to attention a 
contrary. It is his identification of attention and consciousness 
which forces him to do that, as I pointed out above. 
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Ward is perfectly well able to handle the case of not paying 
any attention at all. For him this does not indicate an absence of 
all attention, but a case of paying attention to other things than the 
thing one is supposed to be paying attention to. The inattentive 
schoolboy is not a schoolboy devoid of all attention, but a schoolboy 
who instead of giving his attention to his lessons, gives it to some- 
thing else which ought not to be occupying his attention. The obvious 
sorts of fact seem therefore to be covered on his account. 
The crucial test -case for Ward's theory, however, is the 
circumstance best described as a state of sheer inattention, rather 
than the state of affairs in which there are competing objects of 
attention. If it can be held that even in the case of so- called sheer 
inattention some degree of attention must nevertheless be present, 
Ward's claim that there is no consciousness without attention is 
established - -at least at the empirical level. This state of sheer 
inattention is brilliantly described by James, who puts forward a 
theory of attention which contradicts Ward's, by maintaining that there 
is a condition of consciousness free of any trace of attention 
whatsoever:- 
Every one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession 
by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem 
several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. 
Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its 
essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to 
deal effectively with others, and is a condition which has a 
real opposite in the confused, dazed, scatter -brained state 
which in French is called distraction, and Zerstreutheit in 
German. 
We all know this latter state, even in its extreme degree. 
Most people probably fall several times a day into a fit of 
something like this: The eyes are fixed on vacancy, the 
sounds of the world melt into confused unity, the attention is 
dispersed so that the whole body is felt, as it were, at once, 
and the foreground of consciousness is filled, if by anything, 
by a sort of solemn sense of surrender to the empty passing of 
time. In the dim background of our mind we know meanwhile 
what we ought to be doing: getting up, dressing ourselves, 
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answering the person who has spoken to us, trying to make the 
next step in our reasoning. But somehow we cannot start; the 
pensee de derriere la tête fails to pierce the shell of lethargy 
that wraps our state about. Every moment we expect the spell 
to break, for we know no reason why it should continue. But 
it does continue, pulse after pulse, and we float with it, 
until- -also without reason that we can discover - -an energy is 
given, something - -we know not what -- enables us to gather our- 
selves together, we wink our eyes, we shake our heads, the 
background -ideas become effective, and the wheels of life go 
round again. (1) 
Now certainly on his own description of attention, James is 
quite right when he avers that anyone in this condition is not paying 
attention. Nevertheless, it seems to me that he lays himself open to 
attack from Ward's quarter by equating attention with the highest 
degree of attention. When James describes attention as the mind's 
taking possession of an object "in (a) clear and vivid form," we are 
given a description that best suits optimal attention. If therefore, 
in conformity with Ward's position, we look for traces of minimal 
attention in the state of distraction so vividly described in the 
above passage, we should not be altogether surprised to find what we 
are looking for. The clue is given in James's reference to the "fore- 
ground" and "background" of consciousness. In the state of ennui 
described, consciousness is still differentiated, according to James, 
into a foreground and a background. Ward would no doubt argue, and 
I see no reason to disagree with him, that the division of conscious- 
ness into a foreground and a background is the hallmark of attention. 
Indeed these are the very words frequently used for the precise 
purpose of describing the effect attention has on consciousness. What 
is more, the picture of a foreground against a background is implicit 
in the description James himself gives of attention when he says of it: 
Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence." 
(1) William James, Principles of Psychology, I, 403 -4. 
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James's passage is introspective writing at its best, but I 
question his belief that attention is entirely lacking even in as 
"distracted" a condition of consciousness as the one described. 
There is a possible confusion in his thought on this question. As we 
have seen, in his description of attention he refers to the mind taking 
possession of an object in a clear and vivid form, but this is open to 
two interpretations. 
On the one hand, attention may take a clear and vivid form 
because the object of attention is itself clear and vivid: clarity 
and vividness in this sense being intrinsic to the object itself. 
On the other hand, the object may itself be vague and amorphous, and 
the more clearly and vividly attention is given the object, the more 
vague and amorphous it is seen to be. Thus in the first case, even if 
a less than optimal degree of attention were given to the object, the 
object would still be clear and vivid. While in the second case, 
even if optimal attention were given to the object, it would remain 
vague and amorphous. These constitute two distinct senses in which 
the mind can take possession 'in a clear and vivid form,' and it is 
apparent that James's description is ambiguous as between them. 
If we now bear in mind these two possibilities, and return to 
the passage we are examining, we notice that James describes the 
foreground of consciousness as filled "by a sort of solemn sense of 
surrender to the empty passing of time.' Now if anyone senses any- 
thing of the sort, he certainly would not want to describe what he 
sensed as "clear and vivid. But this does not preclude the person 
from trying to give his whole attention to such an experience. It 
may be that the more he attends to the experience the more convinced 
he becomes of its essential vagueness and indeterminateness. The 
same may be said for the experience James allies with it, in which 
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"the whole body is felt." He has no right to conclude, therefore, 
that if the foreground of consciousness consists of elements which 
are not clear and vivid, attention has not been brought to bear. I 
conclude that although James's view of attention is inconsistent with 
Ward's, the example he has given of a condition of consciousness 
lacking all attention, fails of its purpose. Nevertheless the 
failure is a lesson in itself. If such a state of distraction as 
the one described exhibits signs of the operation of attention, this 
is itself strong evidence for the conclusion that no consciousness 
will be found without the presence of at least a dim flicker of 
attention. 
The condition of consciousness in question would be better 
described as one characterized by the diffusion of attention, rather 
than by its total absence. However the notion of a diffused 
attention runs directly counter to the description James gives of 
attention, when he says of it that "Focalization, concentration, of 
consciousness are of its essence." This assertion seems to express 
the orthodox opinion on the subject. Hamilton, too, says of 
attention, "It is consciousness concentrated." (1) In view of the 
importance of this contention, it must be given closer scrutiny to 
determine whether it really is at odds with Ward's claim that some 
degree of attention is present under all conditions of consciousness. 
4. William James resorts to visual metaphor when he speaks of 
the "focalization of attention, and we shall see in a moment that 
Hamilton uses an elaborate visual analogy to describe attention. 
It is in fact difficult to avoid talking about attention in visual 
(1) Bowen, The Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton, 
p. 160. 
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terms, nor do I think we should refrain from so portraying it. 
Visual descriptions, and visual distinctions, are far richer, and 
have a greater degree of subtlety than their alternatives, and it 
would be foolish for us to handicap ourselves by avoiding their use. 
But we must be watchful not to be deceived by the analogy into 
thinking that what is true of the analogue is true generally; for it 
might be that we are unwittingly dealing with a non - analogous feature 
of the analogue. 
When James talks of "focalizing'; attention, and the "fore- 
ground` and'background" of consciousness, he is using ideas which find 
their natural home in visual perception. Hamilton quite unabashedly 
takes the analogy with vision to the limit when he says, 
Consciousness may be compared to a telescope, attention to 
the pulling out or in of the tubes in accommodating the 
focus to the object. (1) 
Now the idea of focusing, and the idea of concentrating, carry with 
them the idea of something being focussed, and the concentration 
taking place around a centre. Both ideas point to a "centre of 
attention. Furthermore, once we have the picture of a centre, we 
think of the centre as standing out from its surroundings, and we 
can describe the centre as in the foreground as contrasted with what 
is outside the centre, which is relegated to the background. (2) 
The usefulness of the visual model is enhanced because it so easily 
accommodates the idea of degrees of attention. The structural 
relationship between foreground and background will be determined by 
the nature of the centre. On the one hand there could be a large 
centre with ill- defined edges which imperceptibly merge into the 
(1) Ibid. p. 160. 
(2) Gestalt Psychology furnishes plenty of evidence of the 
fact that anything seen as a centre automatically seems 
to stand out from a background. 
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background; on the other hand there could be a highly concentrated 
centre which stands out in sharp contrast against the background. 
We may think of the operation of a spot -light to give us a picture of 
one sort of centre passing into the other. If a spot -light is 
completely out of focus for a certain distance, it will throw a wide, 
diffuse, beam with a low degree of illumination. As we correct the 
focus, the circumference of the beam contracts, and the intensity of 
illumination correspondingly increases, until the point is reached at 
which the spot -light is fully in focus, and we have a pin -point of 
light of maximum intensity with a sharply defined circumference. 
It is important to realize that both the badly focussed beam, and the 
sharply focussed one may be described as consisting of a centre 
occupying the foreground and a complementing background. (1) 
By analogy, the centre of attention could have a low degree 
of concentration (corresponding to the badly focussed beam), or a 
high degree of concentration (corresponding to the sharply focussed 
beam). Moreover any distinction at all between a foreground and a 
background would entail the existence of some degree of attention, 
no matter how little (corresponding to a beam of some degree of 
concentration). Hence, when James distinguishes between a foreground 
(1) It is no accident that we describe an object in focus 
as being situated in the centre of the field of vision. 
It is based on a fact in physiology. 'In the centre 
of the retina, in the fovea centralis (the pit in the 
middle of the so- called yellow spot) there are only 
cones, and no rods at all. From there toward the 
periphery of the retina the number of cones decreases 
and the rods become more and more numerous. The fovea 
centralis is of paramount importance in our vision. 
This tiny spot is the only place where you see a sharp 
image. If you see something in the lateral field of 
your retina and want to investigate it more thoroughly, 
you turn your eye so as to cause the image of that 
object to be projected exactly onto your fovea centralis." 
W. von Buddenbrock, The Senses (The Univ. of Michigan 
Press, 1958), p. 80. 
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to consciousness and a background in the case of a "distracted" 
consciousness, he ipso facto describes a consciousness differentiated 
by attention. 
That which is at the centre of attention is frequently 
described as the object of attention. This description, too, we owe 
to a visual analogy, since objects are among the things we are said to 
see. In view of the fact that there is no standard description of 
that on which attention may be said to be centred, I shall employ the 
term "object of attention" specifically for that purpose. An object 
of attention is thus, by definition, anything on which attention is 
focussed. It must be understood that the visual connotations of the 
word "object" have no relevance to the defined term "object of 
attention." A thought, a sensation, or an imaginary object are as 
properly called "objects of attention" as is a material object. 
The discussion of James's point of view has served two 
purposes. Firstly, it has suggested the idea that consciousness may 
be organized into a foreground and a background. Secondly, it has 
introduced the idea of an attention -free consciousness. Both of 
these ideas are important for the hypothesis I now wish to advance. 
The hypothesis is that the differentiation of consciousness into a 
foreground and background is a feature of all normal forms of 
consciousness. Now I have already shown the appropriateness of 
describing the operation of attention in visual terms. In particular 
I have discussed the applicability to attention of the model of a 
foreground marked off from a background through the presence of a 
'centre' on which attention is focussed. From that discussion it 
becomes obvious that we would experience no difficulty in showing 
that those forms of consciousness that exhibit a high degree of 
attention, could be appropriately described in terms of a foreground 
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and a background. The object of attention would function as the 
"centre" marking off foreground from background. The crucial test 
of the hypothesis would be to see whether a seemingly attention -free 
consciousness also displayed this distinction between foreground and 
background. I have pointed out that the hypothesis seems true in 
the case of the "distracted' consciousness described by James. I now 
wish to offer more detailed support for the hypothesis by showing that 
it is borne out in the case of two forms of consciousness. These are, 
firstly, a pure sensuous consciousness, and, secondly, a state of 
reverie. If the hypothesis were false, these two forms of conscious- 
ness would show it. If, however, the hypothesis is confirmed for 
such prima facie unpromising forms of consciousness, we can take it to 
have been established. It should be noted that the first form of 
consciousness can be satisfied by a single total temporary state, and 
it, therefore, tests the hypothesis in the one dimension of conscious- 
ness. The second form of consciousness is only satisfied by a series 
of total temporary states, and it, therefore, tests the hypothesis in 
the other dimension of consciousness. 
I begin with the case of a pure sensuous consciousness. I 
should make it clear immediately that I do not believe that an adult 
ever attains a pure sensuous consciousness. It is a theoretical 
limit to which a human consciousness approximates under certain 
conditions. What I am calling a pure sensuous consciousness can best 
be explained through an example. We have all had the experience of 
being asked out of the blue what we are thinking about. On occasion 
we say that we have not been thinking about anything in particular, 
not because we wish to be secretive about our thoughts, but because it 
seems the truthful answer to give. It might be the case that the 
question was put at a time when we were not having thoughts about any- 
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thing, but were simply enjoying our present sensations. Lying on a 
beach sunbathing could be a circumstance in which this would be true. 
I might be conscious of the sun burning into me, the lapping of the 
waves, the light coming through my eyelids, the indistinct sound of 
voices, and so on. Naturally if asked what I was thinking about I 
would not take the question to be aimed at discovering what I was 
conscious of. I would take it to be directed at anything I was 
thinking about which I took to be relevant or interesting to the 
questioner, and, from that point of view, it is often honest to say: 
'Nothing.' Often in a state of euphoria one says, "My mind is in a 
complete blank.' It is just such a state in which we give ourselves 
up to our sensations, and allow our minds to go blank that I describe 
as a state of pure sensuous consciousness. 
What I wish to argue, is that a total temporary state of a 
pure sensuous consciousness does not contain a number of elements 
which are all equally submerged in the background, but, on the 
contrary, that at each moment some one element has the ascendency 
over the rest. If we try to check this by introspection, we run into 
several difficulties. In the first place it is not easy to make one's 
mind go blank. And secondly it is not easy to find out what takes 
place when one is in a state of pure sensuous consciousness without 
thereby destroying the state. For these reasons we are forced to 
rely on memory of such states, and base our findings on what we seem 
to remember. We may not, even in retrospect, be able to tell just 
which element was more to the fore than the rest at a particular time. 
The reason for this is that we are dealing with a fluid situation, 
with the elements engaging in a game of musical chairs, with one 
ousting another from the foremost position in consciousness, in a 
never - ending round of competition. The faster the pace of the game, 
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the more difficult it is to decide that any single element occupied 
the position in the foreground. Furthermore, when in a state of 
non -attention, we are not bothered by the question of which element 
is at a particular time at the head of the queue. Naturally, too, 
any element which is in the foreground will possess a poorly 
differentiated character. The foreground, as in the case of a 
badly focussed spot -light, will be large and obscure, and this means 
that the element occupying this position will be similarily inchoate 
and ill- defined. For instance a general sensation of heat may 
occupy the central position for a brief period, and then be replaced 
by an undifferentiated auditory experience, which itself might be 
followed by the visual sensation of seeing the sunlight through the 
eye -lids. 
I am not suggesting that these elements are not present all at 
once --they are. What I am suggesting is that at any one time, one 
element is insinuating its presence more insistently than the others. 
In other words, I am maintaining that James was right to divide 
consciousness into a foreground and a background, even in a situation 
which approximates as closely as experience seems to allow to one of 
absolute non -attention. 
5. I have offered purely introspective evidence to back up the 
claim that consciousness, even in cases of extreme non -attention, 
seems to be structured into a foreground and a background. But even 
if it is agreed that introspection bears me out, it is not necessary 
to rest the case on the evidence of introspection alone. An 
explanation can, I believe, be offered for the phenomenon, which may 
well be convincing to those who remain unmoved by the introspective 
evidence. 
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It is Ribot's thesis that attention is grounded in the 
emotional nature of the organism, and in support of this view he uses 
the following argument: 
Any animal so organized that the impressions of the external 
world were all of equal significance to it, in whose conscious- 
ness all impressions stood upon the same level, without any 
single one predominating or inducing an appropriate motory 
adaptation - -were exceedingly ill- equipped for its own 
preservation. I shall overlook the extreme case, in which 
predominance and adaptation would favour detrimental 
impressions; for an animal thus constituted must perish, being 
an illogical organism --a kind of incorporate contradiction. 
The usual case remains, viz: the predominance of useful 
sensations, that is, of those connected with nutrition, self - 
defence, and the propagation of the species. The impressions 
of prey to be caught, of an enemy to be avoided, and from time 
to time, of a female to be fecundated, become settled in the 
consciousness of the animal with their adapted movements. 
Attention, thus, is at the service of and dependent upon 
necessities; always connected with the sense most perfectly 
developed, the sense of touch, of sight, of hearing, of 
smelling, according to the species. Here attention is seen:: 
in all its simplicity, and here it affords the most instruction. 
It was necessary to descend to those rudimentary forms, in 
order to grasp the reason of its power: -- attention is a 
condition of life; . . . (1) 
We may agree with Ribot that if, per impossible, an organism could be 
absolutely indifferent to its environment, there would be no reason 
for it to pay attention to changes which took place in the environment 
of which it was aware. 
We might in fact go one step further than Ribot, and question 
whether an organism could continue to be conscious, if its awareness 
of its environment ceased to matter to it. In any event it is 
possible that Ribot has overstated his case. We find him saying, 
for instance, that, "Man, like animals, lends his attention spon- 
taneously only to what concerns and interests him. (2) This view 
lends itself to the overstatement that man, as well as animal, can 
only have his attention attracted by something which has an emotional 
(1) Ribot, The Psychology of Attention, p. 33. 
(2) Ibid, pp. 12 -13. 
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significance for him. Indeed Ribot himself says, '`spontaneous 
attention without an anterior emotional state would be an effect with- 
out a cause.' (1) The danger in this position is, that it becomes 
true by definition, that if a man or animal spontaneously attends, 
that which holds the attention must be of concern or interest to that 
man or animal. 
We may therefore agree with Ribot that spontaneous attention 
is grounded in emotional states, without following him to the point of 
saying that every instance of spontaneous attention is caused by an 
emotional state. But would this, as Ribot thinks, be an event without 
a cause? It would not, for what the emotional state does, is give 
the organism a propensity to have its attention elicited by changes in 
the intensity of stimuli. The position as I see it is this. The 
organism, whether it be man or animal, is not indifferent to its 
environment. So far I am in agreement with Ribot. But because the 
environment is of interest and concern, every sign of change in it -- 
any form of novelty- -must alert the organism. The organism is alerted 
when its sense -organs, responding in a quite mechanical fashion, are 
arrested by the novel stimuli. This can best be understood in terms 
of one or two examples. We are all familiar with the experience in 
which a sudden movement, or flash of light, catches the eye. As 
soon as the movement, or light, is seen, the eye is held by the novel 
stimulus. The eye comes to rest on the moving or flashing object 
before it is recognised, or there is time for its relevance to be 
evaluated. As we say, the object has caught our attention. A 
similar experience occurs when an unexpected sound strikes the ear. 
The sound itself excites our attention, in advance of any inter- 
(1) Ibid. p. 13. 
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pretation of its significance for us. In other words the response of 
the sense -organ to a novel stimulus is very much like a reflex action, 
and an unconditioned reflex at that. 
The objection that many quite startling stimuli do not arrest 
the attention of the sense -organ concerned, can be quite easily disposed 
of. To a newly born organism every stimulus is novel and startling. 
As the organism accommodates itself to its environment it finds 
progressively fewer stimuli novel. Stimuli which startle the newborn 
organism because of their novelty, cease to do so after a number of 
repetitions of the stimuli are found to have no consequences for the 
organism. Thus, a newborn lamb may be frightened by a clap of 
thunder while its mother takes no notice. As the organism matures, 
it learns to inhibit the reflex -like response of the sense- organs to 
certain types of stimuli. But what is inhibited cannot be the 
initial arrest of the sense -organ- -the stimulus is still 'kicked up." 
The sheep undoubtedly hears the thunderclap. That is inhibited is 
any further reaction beyond that point such as the assumption of a 
posture of attention. 
I have suggested this alternative to Ribot's theory, because 
it seems to me the only way to make intelligible, facts which on 
Ribot's theory remain a mystery. He tells us that only an organism 
with an emotional involvement in its environment can exhibit attention, 
but he does not explain how the environment is to have a repercussion 
on the organism in the first instance. This my alternative attempts 
to clarify. 
The dispute between Ribot and myself has certain interesting 
implications. It is one of his basic contentions that the normal 
state of an organism is one of non -attention, and it follows that 
attention is for him an exceptional phenomenon. As he explains, 
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Attention . is an exceptional, abnormal state, which cannot 
last a long time, for the reason that it is in contradiction to 
the basic condition of psychic life; namely, change. Attention 
is a state that is fixed. If it is prolonged beyond a reason- 
able time, particularly under unfavourable conditions, every- 
body knows from individual experience, that there results a 
constantly increasing cloudiness of the mind, finally a kind 
of intellectual vacuity, frequently accompanied by vertigo. 
These light, transient perturbations denote the radical 
antagonism of attention and the normal psychical life. The 
progress toward unity of consciousness, which is the very basis 
of attention, manifests itself still better in clearly morbid 
cases, which we shall study later under their chronic form, 
namely, the "fixed idea," and in their acute form, which is 
ecstasy. (1) 
In contrast to this theory, I have been arguing that without an inbuilt 
tendency to have their attention caught by stimuli, the sense -organs 
cannot do their proper job. That is to say, if we accept Ribot's 
theory that change is a necessary condition of consciousness, then 
there must be some inbuilt mechanism which attracts the sense -organs 
to the stimuli through which change is presented. In other words, if 
it is natural for our sense -organs to perform a scanning function by 
being more or less always moved about, it is as natural for them to 
be arrested by certain sorts of stimuli: i.e., those stimuli which 
are still novel to the organism. Those stimuli, as I have said, 
which do not arrest the movement of the sense -organ, have been 
inhibited from so doing. The arrest of the movement of the sense- 
organ, which I shall call "sense -organ attention," is therefore, 
contrary to what Ribot says, an entirely normal feature of conscious- 
ness. 
The difference between my position and Ribot's is not as 
great as would appear, and with a little qualification the two can be 
brought into harmony. What we need to realize is that in the above 
passage Ribot is clearly referring to maximal attention. Now I would 
(1) Ribot, The Psychology of Attention, pp. 8 -9. 
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certainly be prepared to follow him in his claim that maximal attention 
is an abnormal state, which cannot be sustained for very long periods, 
but this is a far cry from the claim that even minimal attention is 
abnormal. I think it is true to say that Ribot was misled, in just 
the way that James was misled, by thinking exclusively of maximal 
attention, and assuming that what is true of maximal attention is true 
of all attention. He in fact points out at the very beginning of his 
study, that he intends to confine himself to cases of attention that 
are "marked and typical.' 
It is a matter of much greater difficulty to know at what point 
attention begins, and where it ends; for it embraces all degrees 
from the transient instant accorded to the buzzing of a fly, to 
the state of complete absorption. It will be conformable to 
the rule of sound method only to study cases that are marked 
and typical; that is to say, those which present at least one 
of the following two characteristics: intensity and duration. (1) 
It is evident that whereas my discussion of a pure sensuous 
consciousness concentrates on the end of the scale at which attention 
is minimal, Ribot is concerned with the end of the scale at which 
attention is maximal. Moreover, Ribot, who distinguishes two forms 
of attention, spontaneous attention and voluntary attention, (2) 
makes it equally true of both forms of attention that they are 
'antagonistic' to the `normal psychical life.' This, I shall try to 
show, is an error even on Ribot's own theory. 
We are now in a position to understand why it is that in a 
state of non -attention, consciousness is nevertheless structured into 
a part which is in the foreground, and a remainder which fills the 
background. My example of a person lying on the beach sunbathing 
(1) Ibid. p. 7. 
(2) I have deliberately avoided discussing the question of 
the different forms of attention until this became 
unavoidable. My intention is to avoid obscuring the 
argument by introducing too many considerations at 
once. The subject is discussed in secs. 7 -9. 
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probably comes as close as is possible in normal conditions to a person 
having a pure sensuous consciousness (assuming as my example made clear 
that the sunbather would later claim that his mind was a blank). I 
maintained, on introspective grounds, that there would always be some 
sense experience in the foreground of the sunbather's consciousness. 
Why this should be so, can now be explained in terms of what I have 
called sense -organ attention. As I explained, our sense -organs are 
always arrested by the most novel stimulus in the environment. Thus 
if the increasing intensity of the heat of the sun on his back, is the 
most novel feature of the environment for the sunbather, the sensation 
in his back will spontaneously occupy the foreground of his conscious- 
ness. This it will continue to do, unless another stimulus occurs 
which is now more novel than the sensation of heat. It might be the 
sudden break of a wave, or the shrill call of a seagull. Attention 
will then spontaneously transfer to the sound, and the sound will take 
the place of the previous sensation, and itself occupy the foremost 
position in consciousness. As the sound is usually a transitory 
stimulus, after it has ceased, the next relatively most novel stimulus 
will arrest the sense -organs and so place yet another element in the 
foreground. It may be that a cloud hides the sun, and then immediately 
even with eyes closed, the sudden darkening sensation to the sun- 
bather's eyes leaps to the foreground of consciousness. The fact 
therefore that consciousness seems always to be differentiated into a 
foreground and a background, even in the condition of non -attention, 
must be attributed to the way our sense -organs function in relation 
to changes in stimuli. If what Ward means when he contends that 
attention is exhibited in all consciousness, is that consciousness is 
always differentiated into a foreground and a background, we have 
found good reason to agree with him. 
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6. The examination of a pure sensuous consciousness has shown that 
it is indeed a form of consciousness manifesting a structure which can 
be described as taking the form of some of its elements appearing in 
the foreground relative to which others are in the background. 
Furthermore I attempted to offer an explanation of this structure in 
terms of sense -organ attention. I come now to the second form of 
consciousness with which I wish to test the hypothesis that all 
consciousness is thus structured. This is the state of reverie: 
sometimes described as "being in a Brown study.' In such a condition 
the mind wanders from one thought to another in a course dictated by 
the purely accidental association of ideas. Thoughts are interrupted 
by perceptions, and perceptions are in turn interrupted by thoughts. 
Our minds seem to be free -wheeling. 
Writers like William James and Ribot clearly regard such a 
condition of consciousness as a paradigm case of the absence of 
attention. Ribot, for instance, referring to scatter -brained people, 
gives a description of their condition which applies equally to 
reverie generally. 
We call "distracted" people whose intelligence is unable to 
fix itself with any degree of persistence, and who pass 
incessantly from one idea to another, at the mercy of their 
most transient whims, or of any trifling events in their 
surroundings. It is a perpetual state of mobility and 
dispersion, which is the very reverse of attention. It is 
frequently met with in children and women. (1) 
We may note, before continuing, that Ribot cannot mean that these 
"distracted" people are unable to attend spontaneously in the way in 
which he says animals attend to their sense experiences in the struggle 
for survival. They must at least be capable of what he has called "spon- 
taneous attention," and yet in this passage we are led to believe that 
(1) Ribot, The Psychology of Attention, p. 78. 
-97- 
''distracted people" are incapable of any attention whatever. He must 
mean that they are incapable of what he has called "voluntary attention." 
Once again we see Ribot saying of attention as such, things 
that are true only of a particular forni of attention. This is the 
penalty he pays for generalizing unqualifiedly from instances of 
attention which are "marked and typical.' Nevertheless, apart from 
a theoretical description of the matter, Ribot is undoubtedly staying 
close to ordinary usage when he describes ''distracted" people as 
people incapable of attention. And it is certainly the case that a 
person in a state of reverie would ordinarily be described as a person 
in a state of non -attention. Ribot's own words fit such a state 
perfectly: "It is a perpetual state of mobility and dispersion, which 
is the very reverse of attention.' 
Now insofar as some of the elements of consciousness found in 
a state of reverie will correspond with those belonging to a pure 
sensuous consciousness, they have already been shown to fall into the 
pattern of foreground and background. This leaves the other elements 
comprising a state of reverie: viz. recollections, mental images, and 
thoughts. Probably no one would dispute the testimony of intro- 
spection, which supports the claim that consciousness exhibits the 
typical structure of foreground and background in the state of reverie. 
In reverie there is always some element in the centre of consciousness. 
Nevertheless there is no need to rely on introspection alone. The 
very expressions we use to describe reverie tell the same story. We 
speak of a succession of ideas crossing the mind, and I do not think 
it would be going too far to say that we imagine them crossing in 
single file. We certainly are unlikely to think of the ideas crossing 
the mind in regimental formation. We also use the expression 'a 
train of thought' and in reverie the train of thought would be described 
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as aimless. Whether we speak of ideas 'crossing" the mind, or a 
"train" of ideas, in each case the metaphor suggests that at any one 
time some idea must be in the middle of its passage, and that idea 
is then said to be `before: the mind. Now it will be recalled that 
I have argued that a total temporary state of consciousness will 
normally reveal the presence of a plurality of elements. It must 
follow that if one element in a total temporary state has the 
position we describe as being 'before' the mind, there will be other 
elements in the state of which this is not true. We may conclude from 
these premisses that when in reverie some idea is before the mind, it 
is not the only element existing in consciousness at the time. This 
state of affairs can be described without misrepresentation as one in 
which the element in question occupies the foreground to a conscious- 
ness which must also have other elements in the background. 
It is possible for a person to interrupt a state of reverie, and 
try to recall all the ideas that have passed before his mind. The task 
will not be easy, because it is difficult to remember events which one 
is not attending to, and a state of reverie is a state of diminished 
attention; if not a state of absolute non -attention. Nevertheless, 
because of the propinquity of the ideas to be recalled, we can expect 
a fair measure of success. Now it is not necessary to my argument 
that we be able to recall with any great fidelity what transpired in 
an immediately preceding state of reverie. All I require is the 
concession that some of the state be recalled. A description of what 
is recalled will take the form of mentioning one idea, which gives 
rise to another, suggests a third, recalls a fourth, and so on. In 
other words the description will suggest a linear pattern in which we 
advance from one idea to the next. No matter how fragmentary each 
individual thought is, it will for a fleeting second occupy the focal 
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position in consciousness, and it is for this reason that it should 
seem entirely fitting for a description of what happens, to mention 
one idea after another. In other words, we do not protest that 
language cannot capture the true nature of reverie owing to the fact 
that in language we are forced to describe ideas one at a time, 
whereas in reverie there is no such linear pattern. Quite the 
contrary. The sequential nature of description of ideas in language 
accurately captures the impression of their order in the mind. The 
position is very different from the one we meet when we describe a 
visual scene for instance. For there we see a number of things at 
once, but have to describe them one after the other. 
This point can best be substantiated by quoting a piece of 
writing describing a state of reverie. In James Joyce's Ulysses 
we find Bloom in a carriage on the way to a funeral, lost in 
reverie: 
BRONZE BY GOLD HEARD THL IIOOFIRONS, STEELY. 
riving 
Imperthnthn thnthnthn. 
Chips, picking chips off rocky thumbnail, chips. 
Horrid : And gold flushed more. 
A husky fifenote blew. 
Blew. Blue bloom is on the 
Gold pinnacled hair. 
A jumping rose on satiny breasts of satin, rose of Castille. 
Trilling, trilling: Idolores. 
Peep : Who's in the . . . peepofgold ? 
Tink cried to bronze in pity. 
And a call, pure, long and throbbing. Longindying call. 
Decoy. Soft word. But look : The bright stars fade. 0 rose 
Notes chirruping answer. Castille. The morn is breaking. 
Jingle jingle jaunted jingling. 
Coin rang. Clock clacked. 
Avowal. Sonnez. I could. Rebound of garter, Not leave thee. 
Smack. La cloche : Thigh smack. Avowal. Warm. 
Sweetheart, goodbye. 
Jingle. Bloo. 
Boomed crashing chords. When love absorbs. War : War 
The tympanum. 
A sail : A veil awave upon the waves. 
Lost. Throstle fluted. All is lost now. 
Horn. Hawhorn. 
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When first he saw. Alas! 
Full tup. Full throb. 
Warbling. Ah, lure! Alluring. 
Martha: Come! 
Clapclop. Clipclap. Clappyclap. 
Goodgod heneverheard inall. 
Deaf bald Pat brought pad knife took up. 
A moonlight nightcall: far: far. 
I feel so sad. P.S. So lonely blooming. 
Listen 
The spiked and winding cold seahorn. Have you the ? Each 
and for other plash and silent roar. 
Pearls: when she. Liszt's rhapsodies. Hisss. (1) 
Bloom's musings consist of a jumble of ideas which mostly originate in 
experiences he had earlier in the day, held together in a mental dance 
of the mind's own making. What is of particular interest from my 
point of view is the literary form Joyce gives to Bloom's stream of 
thoughts: short; abbreviated; consecutive. Each one seems to stand 
by itself -- isolated. By laying out the words one below another Joyce 
conveys the idea of the thoughts coming one after another. 
For the fleeting moment each thought lives, it is in the fore- 
front of consciousness. The mind is drawn towards it; it has our 
attention. The pattern of consciousness here, in reverie, is no 
different from its pattern in pure sensuous consciousness: it is 
articulated as foreground against background. 
It is particularly true of the thoughts we have, as opposed 
to our sensuous elements of consciousness, that they insist on having 
pride of place in the foreground. I concede that we do sometimes 
say of a thought "It has been in the back of my mind," but any such 
reference to a thought seems to imply that the back of the mind is not 
the natural place for thoughts to reside. It is often the cause of 
frustration that a thought is in the back of the mind, just as it is 
frustrating to have something on the tip of the tongue. In a state 
of pure reverie, no thoughts will be in the back of the mind, just as 
(1) James Joyce, Ulysses (Hamburg, 1935), I, 264. 
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in the same state we have no words on the tips of our tongue. 
In arguing that consciousness is structured even in conditions 
of non -attention, I have deliberately described the form this 
structuring takes, in the vaguest possible way, in terms of foreground 
and background. The minimum possible claim was all my argument 
needed. Nevertheless it might be helpful if I were to give some more 
definite idea of the manner in which I conceive a thought or an 
element of consciousness to occupy the foreground of consciousness. 
This can only be done by analogy. When speaking to another person 
about an object which is in the vicinity, it is usually possible to 
point out the object which one is referring to. The visual field, 
the auditory field, or whatever sense -field it is, then organises 
itself about the object of reference. It is then the centre of 
our attention. Very much a parallel situation is found, I suggest, 
in consciousness generally (it must not be overlooked that the example 
of the object just given, is also an example drawn from consciousness). 
When I have a thought, for instance, the thought becomes the cognitive 
referent around which consciousness organizes itself. It is as though, 
when I had a thought, I had to point out to myself which thought I was 
having. Now of course I do no such thing. But it is as if the 
reason I do not need to point it out to myself, is that it already 
occupies precisely the position it would have, had I pointed it out. 
In this way it presents itself. 
The point can perhaps be grasped by comparing the situation 
with an imaginary game. In this game there is a table which is 
called "the referring table. Participants are not allowed to refer 
to an object, unless it is on the referring table, and only one object 
is allowed on the table at a time. In this game the very idea of 
referring to an object which is not on the table is without sense: 
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it is not a move in the game. On the other hand no reference ever 
need be made to the object one is speaking about. It is uniquely 
identified by the fact that it lies on the referring table. The 
participants are free to make what remarks they like, but all the 
remarks are understood to apply to what is at the time on the table. 
It is a meaningless move in the game to suggest that they apply to 
something else. (If this game sounds far -fetched, let me suggest 
that it is not so very unlike what happens at an auction of valuables). 
Now, to draw the analogy, consciousness is the game itself, only this 
time there is only one player. The referring table is the foreground 
to consciousness, and the object lying on the table is the thought; 
the cognitive referent. The thought is the focal point of the fore- 
ground. Just as the object on the table is a referent although there 
is no question of the possibility of misidentification, so too the 
thought, or the state of consciousness, in the foreground of conscious- 
ness is, as it were, the referent of consciousness, although there is 
no question of misidentification, or therefore of the need to identify. 
7. I have found reason to agree with Ward that some degree of 
attention is to be found in even the most distracted conditions of 
consciousness, whether it be pure sensuous consciousness or a state of 
reverie. In both forms of consciousness the need was found to 
differentiate consciousness into a foreground and background. 
Provided this feature of consciousness is recognised, it matters little 
whether it is called a rudimentary form of attention, or whether the 
word "attention`' is reserved for a less distracted condition of 
consciousness; for what James and Hamilton call "consciousness 
concentrated." If a feature of attention, which seems intrinsic to 
its 'marked and typical" forms, is also found to be present in non- 
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attentive consciousness, this is worth pointing out. It might after 
all provide the link between non -attentive consciousness and fully 
attentive consciousness, and this in turn might explain how a 
condition of inattention could pass into a state of full attention. 
It is a quite proper theoretical procedure to extend the scope of a 
concept to a phenomenon not previously falling under it, in order to 
uncover a resemblance between such a phenomenon and the phenomena to 
which the concept was previously restricted. This, it seems to me, 
is what Ward has done when he alleges that some degree of attention 
is to be found even in conditions of consciousness normally believed 
to be antipathetic to its existence. If we have succeeded in tracing 
attention back to its earliest beginnings in consciousness, it would 
be churlish to object to our describing what we have found, as 
"rudimentary attention." 
If we consent to follow Ward in talking of degrees of attention, 
there is no reason why we should not take a leaf out of Mill's book, 
and claim that attention may differ in quality as well as in quantity. 
I shall now take up this idea, and consider the question of whether 
there are different kinds of attention. Of course, in a sense, an 
affirmative answer has already been conceded as soon as it is agreed 
that "rudimentary attention' is found in states of distraction. 
Ribot too, as we have noticed in passing, makes a clear -cut distinction 
between two different forms of attention, which he calls spontaneous 
attention, and voluntary attention. The discussion has, however, so 
far, been restricted to cases which would fall under the heading of 
spontaneous attention. It is now time to investigate these 
distinctions, discover their basis, and explore their extent. 
Ribot sets out the contrast between spontaneous attention and 
voluntary attention, as he sees it, as follows: 
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There are two well- defined forms of attention the one 
spontaneous, natural; the other voluntary, artificial. The 
former -- neglected by most psychologists --is the true, primitive, 
and fundamental form of attention. The second --the only one 
investigated by most psychologists --is but an imitation, a 
result of education, of training, and of impulsion. Precarious 
and vacillating in nature, it derives its whole being from 
spontaneous attention, and finds only in the latter a point 
of support. It is merely an apparatus formed by cultivation, 
and a product of civilization. (1) 
I have already drawn attention to Ribot's view that attention is an 
abnormal phenomenon which cannot be prolonged too long, "for the 
reason that it is in contradiction to the basic condition of psychic 
life.' This point of view is strongly evident in what he here says 
about voluntary attention. A further distinction between the two 
forms, which he takes to be quite definitive, is that spontaneous 
attention is entirely effortless, while on the other hand voluntary 
attention is always an effort. 
William James shares Ribot's views, as is evident from the 
following passage: 
Voluntary attention is always derived; we never make an effort 
to attend to an object except for the sake of some remote 
interest which the effort will serve. (2) 
Ribot would endorse that statement without qualification. And the 
next statement of James's is also one which would fit in with Ribot's 
position: 
There is no such thing as voluntary attention sustained for 
more than a few seconds at a time. (3) 
James's contention is that if we seem to be voluntarily attending for 
more than a few seconds this is only because there is in fact "a 
repetition of successive efforts which bring back the topic to the 
mind.' 
(1) Ribot, The Psychology of Attention, p. 8. 
(2) William James, The Principles of Psychology, I, 416. 
(3) Ibid. p. 416. 
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There is no doubt a distinction to be made between what Ribot 
calls spontaneous attention and voluntary attention, but it cannot be 
said that he has clarified it. In the first place if we suppose 
that all attention which is learned attention, is voluntary 
attention --and this seems to be Ribot's criterion for voluntary 
attention --there is no reason to believe that learned attention will 
always be accompanied by a feeling of effort. Ribot himself states 
that in people who have been successfully taught, attention of the 
sort in question ultimately becomes a habit. Now surely it must be 
conceded that when we do something out of habit, we do it without 
feeling any effort in what we are doing? We can go a step further 
and affirm that when something has become a habit, we are frequently 
unaware of having acted on the habit until the act has been completed. 
Bearing this in mind, I can only suggest that Ribot has convinced 
himself of the ubiquity of the sense of effort in voluntary attention, 
because he has confined himself to the learning- situation. If a 
child is being taught to pay attention, he is being taught to do 
something he cannot yet do, and this must inevitably cost him an 
effort. But once the task is learned, it can be performed without 
any conscious sense of effort. From this point of view the sense 
of effort can be seen as incidental to the learning process, and not 
as intrinsic to the nature of voluntary attention. Secondly, we 
frequently meet with the experience in which an initial attempt to 
attend to a subject costs a great deal of effort, but that after a 
while, the subject begins to engross us, we become absorbed, and all 
sense of effort disappears. In the light of these two circumstances 
Ribot would seem constrained to say that what began as voluntary 
attention became transformed into spontaneous attention. This would 
account for the disappearance of the sense of effort. 
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Unfortunately this move is not open to him, for, on Ribot's 
own theory, spontaneous attention is by definition unlearned 
attention, (1) and, neither voluntary attention which has become a 
habit, nor voluntary attention which has become absorption, can be 
described as unlearned attention. On the other hand, Ribot could 
not drop the requirement that a sense of effort always accompanies 
voluntary attention, without surrendering his claim that there is a 
felt basis to the distinction between spontaneous and voluntary 
attention. Manifestly his two -fold distinction is insufficient for 
his purpose. 
William James makes a more comprehensive set of distinctions, 
(2) but I prefer to turn to Hamilton's views on the subject. 
Hamilton, like Ribot, denies that all attention is of the voluntary 
kind. Under the heading Attention possible without an act of free- 
will, he says, 
I think Reid and Stewart incorrect in asserting that attention 
is only a voluntary act, meaning, by the expression voluntary, 
an act of free -will. . 
Attention of three degrees or kinds. --It, therefore, 
appears to me the more correct doctrine to hold that there is 
no consciousness without attention, -- without concentration,- - 
but that attention is of three degrees or kinds. The first, 
a mere vital and irresistible act; the second, an act deter- 
mined by desire, which though involuntary, may be resisted 
by our will; the third, an act determined by a deliberate 
volition. An act of attention, --that is, an act of 
concentration, --seems thus necessary to every exertion of 
consciousness, as a certain contraction of the pupil is 
requisite to every exercise of vision. We have formerly 
noticed, that discrimination is a condition of conscious- 
ness; and a discrimination is only possible by a concen- 
(1) See, Ribot, The Psychology of Attention, ch. 2. Thus: 
'Voluntary or artificial attention is a product of art, 
of education, of direction, and of training. It is 
grafted, as it were, upon spontaneous or natural 
attention, and finds in the latter its conditions of 
existence, as the graft does in the stock, into which 
it has been inserted.' p. 35. 
(2) Op cit. I, 416. 
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trative act, or act of attention. This, however, which 
corresponds to the lowest degree, --to the mere vital or 
automatic act of attention, has been refused the name; and 
attention, in contradistinction to this mere automatic 
contraction, given to the two other degrees, of which, 
however, Reid only recognises the third. (1) 
This passage is interesting on a number of counts. Hamilton is in 
agreement with Ribot in maintaining that voluntary attention is not 
the only kind of attention. He recognises the existence of what I 
have referred to as rudimentary attention, even though he refuses it 
the name. He contends that there is no consciousness without 
attention. And he offers a more flexible classification than the 
twofold system adopted by Ribot. It is not possible to identify 
either of Ribot's two forms of attention with any of Hamilton's 
threefold schema. Ribot's spontaneous attention is not Hamilton's 
mere vital attention, because his is based on desire, and the vital 
attention mentioned by Hamilton is not. It cannot be identified 
with Hamilton's second variety, because although this is based on 
desire, it can be suspended by an act of will, which Ribot's 
spontaneous attention cannot. Finally, Ribot's voluntary attention 
is not identical with Hamilton's attention determined by deliberate 
volition, because Hamilton contrasts attention based on volition 
with attention based on desire, and Ribot does not. As far as Ribot 
is concerned voluntary attention is as much based on desire, or 
emotional factors, as he calls them, as is spontaneous attention. 
Even if we follow Hamilton and subdivide Ribot's `spontaneous 
attention," we do not arrive at a satisfactory position. 
Both thinkers endeavour to distinguish forms of attention 
through tracing differences in their origins. They thus reduce 
the issue to one of motivation i.e., to the question of the various 
(1) Bowen, The Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton 
pp. 165 -6. 
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possible types of cause of an instance of attention. For instance, 
spontaneous or vital attention is caused by processes in the organism, 
a second form of attention is caused by desire, and a third form is 
caused by an act of volition. Ín opposition to this approach, I 
wish to argue that the type of attention is not determined by the 
circumstances of its motivation. On the contrary I hope to show 
that each form of attention could equally well be motivated by any 
of the causes Hamilton has identified. I hold that whether the 
attention demanded an effort, or not; whether it was spontaneous or 
enforced; and whether it was voluntary or not, are not factors that 
are intrinsic to specific types of attention. These considerations 
are incidental. I shall argue, in other words, that if, for the 
sake of argument, there are three forms of attention --A, B, and C -- 
it will be true on some occasions that A demanded effort, B was due 
to an act of will, and C the result of a desire, and it will be 
equally true on other occasions that A was effortless, B the result 
of desire, and C due to an act of will. And so on for the other 
permutations. Where I think it is easy to be misled, and where 
perhaps Ribot and Hamilton were misled, is in the assumption that if 
a certain form of attention must originally have had a certain 
motivation, it must thereafter always retain the same motivation. 
This assumption commits the genetic fallacy according to which the 
meaning of a phenomenon is determined entirely by its origin. 
This point can best be illustrated in connection with the 
form of attention Hamilton describes as mere vital attention." 
It is evident that the kind of attention he has in mind is identical 
with what I called "sense- organ' attention, and which I have dis- 
cussed at some length. Now we have seen that this kind of 
attention can be attributed to animals, and this makes it seem 
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entirely reasonable to assume that when it is met with in man, it 
must operate in the same way as it does in animals. But this 
ignores the fact that we also ascribe to man "higher' forms of 
attention, which are not found in animals. Voluntary attention is 
the obvious example. Once this is admitted the whole picture alters 
radically. There exists at least the possibility that a man may be 
able to disengage his 'mere vital attention" in virtue of his 
possession of the abilities intrinsic to his higher forms of 
attention. But if ''mere vital attention" can be disengaged, it has 
an altogether different significance from --is a different form of 
attention from - -a 'mere vital attention which cannot be disengaged 
by an act of will. The 'higher forms of attention may conceivably 
invade the 'lower' forms, and completely alter their character. 
Furthermore, in an organism in which the higher forms of attention 
are found, it may prove impossible to isolate the lower forms in the 
purity they possess in those organisms which do not possess the higher 
forms. Just as in man it is alleged that there are no instances of 
his behaviour being determined by ''pure`' motives; all his motives 
being mixed; so too it may be the case that in man there are no cases 
of pure instances of a single kind of attention; all attention being 
a resultant of a number of different kinds. 
These, I suggest, are possibilities. It is only necessary 
to admit that they are possibilities for it to be realized that the 
assumption that forms of attention are determined by their origins 
is questionable. On these grounds we would be advised to be 
extremely wary of quasi-evolutionary accounts of the stages of 
attention, such as Ribot gives us, and such as is implicit in 
Hamilton's theory. 
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8. Let us descend from abstract possibilities to concrete cases, 
and find out just what does take place. 'Mere vital attention" from 
its very description must be supposed to take place without the 
attender willing it. It is compulsive in the sense that the attender 
has no control over its occurrence. Moreover it must also be effortless, 
since by calling something an effort it is implied that an easier 
alternative exists, and in the present case there is, by definition, no 
alternative. An example of such attention would be the case of a 
sudden movement catching an eye. When that happens one's eyes are 
drawn to the spot at which the movement was observed, and they fixate 
it. The event has our attention. This is a common experience. 
When it happens, often the first thing we know about it is that we 
have noticed the movement. That is to say, we may have our attention 
drawn by a movement without realizing that this has happened. It 
often happens that it is only after we have been attending for some 
time that we become aware of the fact that our attention is held by 
something. It may be that what we notice as a result of attending, 
itself makes us aware of the fact that we have been attending. 
Another possibility is for us not to realise at all that we are 
attending. A friend, for example, may say to me, "Don't stare,' 
and until he reprimands me, I most likely have been completely unaware 
of the fact that I was staring, although I would not be unaware of 
the person I was staring at. It is important to recognise that it 
is quite normal in the above sort of situation for a person to desist 
from giving his 'mere vital attention,` either as soon as he realizes 
that he has been giving it, or as soon as he is told to desist. I 
may find myself staring at a spastic, and after a while it might 
suddenly dawn on me that I am doing so. I will then immediately look 
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away, feeling guilty about what I had inadvertently done. The case 
is even more obvious if someone admonishes me for staring at a 
spastic. I immediately desist if I have any respect for other 
people's feelings. 
Such experiences are not confined to visual attention. One 
often has the experience of overhearing someone else's conversation 
and discovering that one has been listening intently to hear what is 
being said. The fact that this is often inadvertent is indicated by 
the fact that we stop ourselves from doing it as soon as we realise 
this is what we are doing. These very common sorts of case make it 
quite clear that on many occasions we do actually disengage our 
"mere vital attention," The fact that such attention begins 
spontaneously, does not mean that it must end spontaneously. And 
yet if we allowed ourselves to be guided entirely by the concept of a 
"mere vital attention' we would conclude that the process was from 
beginning to end outside the control of the attender. What the 
examples teach us, is that by our being able to attend to our 
attending, either through our own realization, or through having our 
attention drawn to it by someone else, we alter the entire nature of 
the attention we give to an object. What may begin as "mere vital 
attention' may in this way end as voluntary attention. 
Not all the occasions on which we find ourselves engaging in 
"mere vital attention' are ones of which we need feel ashamed. We 
may, therefore, realise that we have been attending, and not on that 
account feel any obligation to disengage our attention. It is not 
difficult to think of examples. I may by chance have my attention 
drawn by a fireworks display, and automatically stop to watch it. 
After a while the thought occurs to me that I am allowing myself to 
be distracted from my purpose which was to visit a friend. When 
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I realise this I may react by deciding to continue to watch the fire- 
works instead of visiting my friend. In this manner what begins as 
spontaneous attention may be converted into explicit voluntary 
attention. I might mention that it costs me no effort to continue 
watching the fireworks, even though I am now attending voluntarily. 
The example belies the claim that voluntary attention is always 
attention accompanied by a sense of effort. In cases such as these, 
we describe ourselves as having become interested in the object of 
attention. 
The connection between attention and interest has often been 
noted. William James, for instance, says quite flatly, "The things 
to which we attend are said to interest us. (1) It does not seem 
to me, however, that the relation between attention and interest is 
always understood. It is usually taken for granted that it is 
necessarily true that if I am giving something my attention, I must 
have an interest in it. The interest is viewed as the cause of my 
attention. But the example of watching the fireworks does not bear 
out this hypothesis. I may stop to watch the fireworks without ever 
having had an interest in fireworks before, and there would be nothing 
inconsistent in my announcing that I will never be interested in fire- 
work displays again. In other words the interest may neither precede 
nor outlast the particular occasion of its single manifestation. By 
describing the object of attention as holding my interest, the idea 
is conveyed that I could disengage my attention if I wanted to, and 
it is implied that the reason that I am not disengaging my attention 
is that I am enjoying the experience I am having. It would be quite 
wrong, therefore, to associate the interest a man exhibits in some 
(1) James, The Principles of Psychology, I, 416. See also 
A.R. White, Attention (Oxford, 1964), ch. 7. 
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instances of attention, with the interests a man has when he is said 
to have certain political or economic interests. The two kinds of 
interest are quite different. 
If we wish to be sensitive to the subtleties of words, it 
might be pointed out that it would be not quite accurate to describe 
my attention to the fireworks by saying I an interested in the 
fireworks.` For this statement carries with it the idea that there 
is something about the fireworks that I wish to know more about. 
It suggests that I am bringing to the subject an analytical 
intelligence, which is not what my example implied. We avoid reading 
such implications into the situation by describing the attention as 
enjoyment, as opposed to interest. If I describe myself as enjoying 
the fireworks, my description does not carry any such intellectual 
baggage with it. Out of my enjoyment may grow an interest, but if 
that happens my future attention to firework displays will be on an 
altogether different level. 
So far I have considered a case in which attention to an 
object begins as a "mere vital attention" and ends up as something 
different. There is also a different sort of case involving 'mere 
vital attention`' and this is the case in which we exercise our "mere 
vital attention" by a voluntary act. This possibility is still more 
at variance with the positions of Ribot and Hamilton. For surely, 
it may be objected, if the attention does not Arleast start as an 
automatic process outside our control, in what sense is it "merely 
vital ?" I am thinking of the situation in which a person enjoys 
the experience of certain sorts of "mere vital attention' and 
deliberately places himself in surroundings conducive to its 
exercise: the circus for example. A circus is full of unexpected 
events all of which we are prepared to have arouse our 'mere vital 
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attention." It is a nice point whether our attention engaged in such 
circumstances could be described as quite involuntary; something we 
could not help. If we were not in a deliberately created state of 
readiness; a state of anticipation, some of the events which evoked 
our 'mere vital attention's would no doubt not have done so. 
Most human beings take a delight, at one time or another, in 
exercising the functions which it is natural for them to have as 
human beings. We take a delight in various forms of exercise, we 
take a delight in certain universal experiences, and I suggest, we 
take a delight in 'mere vital attention.' An object of attention 
does not have to be traced back to a desire, an interest, or a 
problem, in order for us to enjoy the experience of having our 
attention held. I may enjoy watching waves from a beach, and enjoy 
their sound as they break, for no other reason than that I find this 
soothing. To have my attention held in this way is enjoyable in 
itself. Whether I just happened to be on the beach and had my 
attention attracted by the waves, or whether I went to the beach 
specially to be soothed by the waves, does not alter the fact that my 
enjoyment comes from my abandoning my attention to the lure of the 
sea. 
Of course the more we enjoy such an experience, the more 
difficult it becomes for us to disengage attention. It is no effort 
to continue in a state one enjoys, but it is an effort to break away 
from it. When the effort becomes too strong for us, we are said to 
be in a state of fascination. Fascination is therefore a form of 
attention which we are unable to disengage from at will. This 
should warn us that the word "involuntary` is insufficient to 
distinguish the variety of cases in which it is true to say 'I could 
not help but attend." The sense of`involuntary'in which a quite 
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unintended instance of "mere vital attention" is said to be 
involuntary, is entirely different from the sense in which an 
instance of attention which has become fascination, may be said to be 
involuntary. 
There are yet further varieties of attention which we cannot 
help but give, and which are therefore involuntary, Ribot has most 
perceptively observed that surprise is a manifestation of attention. (1) 
And from surprise, we pass through degrees to fright, to shock, and to 
terror. Attention in all these cases is unavoidable, and they have 
the further peculiarity that they cannot, logically, be brought under 
voluntary control. Furthermore, in these cases it would not. be 
appropriate to describe the attention as either demanding effort, or 
effortless. 
What Hamilton has to say about the relation of attention to 
desire is also open to dispute. 'An act determined by desire,' he 
said, "Though involuntary, may be resisted by our will." We can, 
no doubt, think of cases in which this is true. I may be watching 
a television programme because I desire to watch it. The programme 
has my attention as a consequence of my desire to see it. All the 
same, with sufficient will -power, I can tear myself away from the 
screen. On the other hand, the desire to attend may be irresistible; 
in which case it could not be disengaged by an act of will. Plato's 
story about Leontius may be mentioned to illustrate this state of 
affairs. 
On his way up from the Piraeus outside the north wall, he 
noticed the bodies of some criminals lying on the ground, 
with the executioner standing by them. He wanted to go 
and look at them, but at the same time he was disgusted 
and tried to turn away. He struggled for some time and 
(1) Ribot, The Psychology of Attention, p. 30 ff. 
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covered his eyes, but at last the desire was too much for 
him. Opening his eyes wide, he ran up to the bodies and 
cried, "There you are, curse you; feast yourselves on this 
lovely sight:" (1) 
There is little doubt that Leontius would have disputed Hamilton's 
belief that it is always possible by an act of will to disengage 
attention determined by desire. If we allow that men do experience 
uncontrollable desires, we must admit the possibility that a desire 
determining attention could be one of them. If such a possibility 
were realized, the attention would be compulsive. 
This brings me to the last point I wish to make in this 
connection. Voluntary attention may be defined either as attention 
someone could have paid if he had chosen, or as attention someone 
could have avoided paying, if he had chosen. Thus the situation 
with respect to voluntary attention is analogous to the situation in 
which we find ourselves as moral agents. If a certain act is my 
duty, then I am in a sense obliged to do it. I could also say that 
I was compelled to do it. But this does not mean that my act would 
cease to be a voluntary one. On the contrary it presupposes that it 
is voluntary. In the same way I can also be obliged to pay attention, 
or compelled to pay attention. But this does not mean that my 
attention is no longer voluntarily given. On the contrary I can be 
ordered to pay attention only if the attention demanded of me is 
voluntary. If, for instance, I were ordered to be surprised, I 
could not carry out the order, because surprise is not a voluntary 
form of attention. I shall call this form of compulsive attention, 
which presupposes that it is voluntary, `enforced attention." 
With it I contrast automatic, spontaneous, and compulsive attention, 
(1) Plato, The Republic, Ed. F.M. Cornford (Oxford, 
1951), p. 134, (439 -440). 
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all of which imply that the attender could not help attending. 
When the schoolmaster orders his class to pay attention, and his 
class obeys, their attention is enforced attention. Because the 
class can be punished for not attending, this form of attention is 
voluntary. 
This survey has shown quite clearly that any attempt to 
distinguish between different forms of attention in terms of the 
presence or absence of effort, the presence or absence of automatic 
processes, the presence or absence of desires, and the presence or 
absence of acts of will, must fail. The framework within which 
attention is paid is almost always too complicated to admit of such 
compartmentalization. It remains true, nonetheless, that if we 
want to assess the circumstances in which attention is paid to an 
object on a particular occasion it is essential to go into all the 
factors I have just been considering. 
9. In this section I propose a different way of making a 
distinction between types of attention, and I show that this 
alternative is vaguely foreshadowed in the theories of Ribot and 
Hamilton. In the chapter as a whole the discussion has concentrated 
on attention as it is exhibited in its most diffuse forms. I am 
referring, of course, to pure sensuous consciousness, and the state 
of reverie. Now these forms of consciousness share the character- 
istic that in them our intelligence seems to be at its least active. 
Accordingly, in these states our attention is, in a sense, idle. 
It is not attention directed towards an increase in knowledge. 
Sometimes, it is true, knowledge is increased in the course of 
attending in this idle manner, but it would be no misrepresentation 
- 118 - 
to say in such cases that the acquisition of knowledge was accidental. 
It could certainly not be regarded as the purpose of the exercise. 
Now in order to distinguish between those instances of attention 
which are not directed towards the enlargement of knowledge, and 
those which are, I shall use a special term. I shall call all those 
forms of attention, which are not aimed at finding something out, 
non - interrogative attention; and all those forms of attention which are 
aimed at finding something out, interrogative attention. 
Interrogative attention is the attention of a probing 
intelligence in search of the answer to some question, or the solution 
to some problem. It is the attention characteristically exhibited 
by the knowing mind. (1) Non- interrogative attention, on the other 
hand, characteristically does not bring an enquiring intelligence to 
bear on its object. It does not find the object of attention 
puzzling, challenging, or the source of a question. In respect of 
the object, the mind seems quite passive and receptive. The presence 
of the object is no more than noted. No attempt is made to under- 
stand the object of attention in its meaningful relation to other 
objects. If it is to be found anywhere, a purely atomistic conscious- 
ness is to be found in a consciousness exhibiting non -interrogative 
attention. 
There are two species of non - interrogative attention. One 
species, to which I have already alluded, I described as idle attention. 
The other species is not at all idle. It is best introduced through 
an example. A tight -rope walker doing a complicated routine on the 
tight -rope has to give the performance his whole attention if he is 
(1) It could be called `cognitive attention, except that 
even the other variety, non -interrogative attention, 
is to a certain extent cognitive as well, and for 
this reason the word ' 'cognitive' ̀ is not quite 
suitable. 
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to succeed. However, if he knows the routine by heart, he does not 
have to think out what he is doing. He only has to make sure that 
every movement is executed with the most sensitive adjustments. 
Now the attention the tight -rope walker pays to his act involves him 
in no pursuit of knowledge. He is not primarily trying to find out 
anything (although in doing his act, he may come across a better way 
of executing a move. But this is not essential to it). He is not 
putting the object of attention to question. It would be in- 
appropriate to ask the tight -rope walker What did you notice while 
you were giving your attention to your tight -rope act ?" If he had 
noticed anything, it may rightly have been taken as a sign of 
incomplete concentration. This example makes it clear that there 
is a form of non - interrogative attention which involves the maximum 
of concentration, but which is entirely non -propositional in form. 
Compared with it the other forms of non -interrogative attention are, 
so to speak, scattered. This is an important point, because it 
stops us from thinking that non - interrogative attention is essentially 
attention of a very low degree which may be expected to occur when 
the mind is at its most disorganised. 
Attention may begin by being non -interrogative, and later be 
transformed into interrogative attention. When this happens our 
curiosity is said to be aroused. We then view the object of 
attention in a completely different light. By bringing our under- 
standing to bear on the subject we start noticing aspects of the 
object of attention which would otherwise have gone unnoticed. 
I wish, now to draw attention to the close resemblance between 
Ribot's spontaneous attention, and non -interrogative attention. The 
following example given by Ribot makes this apparent. 
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Thus we may observe how spontaneous attention is natural and 
devoid of effort. The idler, who loafs around in the street, 
will stare with gaping mouth at a procession or passing 
masquerade, and preserve perfect imperturbability as long as 
the procession lasts. If at any time effort appears, it is 
a sign that attention changes in character, that it becomes 
voluntary, artificial. (1) 
As is plain from Ribot's description, the man gawking at the procession, 
exhibits what I have called non - interrogative attention. The above 
description would not lead us to expect the idler to be asking 
himself where the procession had come from, what it was all about, 
how it was organised, or, indeed, any set of questions which displayed 
an intellectual curiosity. But, as I have indicated, it is possible 
for non - interrogative attention to turn into interrogative attention, 
and this it would do as soon as any of the above questions arose for 
the spectator. This change, however, need not involve any feeling 
of effort, and there would be no point in calling it voluntary. 
Nevertheless there is reason to believe that Ribot has in mind the 
very transition to interrogative attention I have been describing. 
He speaks of spontaneous attention changing into voluntary attention. 
Now a typical case of voluntary attention is attention deliberately 
given; that is, attention we give because there is something the 
subject has decided to find out about. In other words when we do 
something because our intelligence has been engaged, it is natural to 
describe our act as voluntary. When Hamilton refers to voluntary 
attention, (2) he describes it as an act ''determined by deliberate 
volition.' What makes the attention deliberate, I am suggesting, 
is precisely the fact that the understanding has become engaged in 
the attention. If understanding is interpreted as the product of a 
free intelligence, it is reasonable that an act of attention prompted 
(1) Ribot, The Psychology of Attention, p. 14. 
(2) See above, p. 106 
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by rational considerations should be thought to be a voluntary act, 
or an act determined by deliberation. From this point of view, 
attention which is guided by thought -- interrogative attention - -could 
easily come to be identified with voluntary attention. Moreover, 
should a thinker believe attention proper to be attention in the 
service of thought, he may be expected to deny that any seeming form 
of attention, which is not in the service of thought, really deserves 
the name. This, as we saw, was just the opinion Hamilton had about 
the matter. This makes it reasonable to conclude that when these 
writers speak of voluntary attention, what they really mean to refer 
to, is interrogative attention: the attention displayed by a mind 
in search of knowledge. It will generally be true that while non- 
interrogative attention is spontaneous and effortless, interrogative 
attention is voluntary and taxing. But, as I have endeavoured to 
make clear, the essence of the distinction between the two forms of 
attention is not dependent on these factors, but on their relation 
to the cognitive disposition of the attender. 
The examination of attention I have undertaken has up to this 
point concentrated on the object of attention itself. Wherever 
attention was present, consciousness was seen to divide into a fore- 
ground and background. It has been the foreground that I have 
associated with attention. The background has been left in the 
background as seemingly irrelevant to the operation of attention. 
I have deliberately kept it out of the way, so that a number of 
observations could be made about attention, without the picture 
being obscured by premature over -complication. The point has now 
been reached, however, at which a further understanding of attention 
can only be had by an investigation of the role of the background of 
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consciousness in attention. Moreover the notion of a background of 
consciousness is to play a crucial role, not only in the analysis 
of attention, but also in the view of the self developed in chapter 
four. An understanding of the significance of the background of 
consciousness, and in particular an appreciation that it plays an 
active role in attention, is, accordingly, vital to my whole enter- 
prise. It is the subject of the next chapter. 




1. I give the name "residual consciousness" to those elements 
of consciousness that together make up the background of consciousness 
when attention is paid to an object. IIy aim in this chapter is to 
discover the relationship between the object of attention and resid- 
ual consciousness. An initial thought is likely to be that there is 
no connection between the two. Residual consciousness is then looked 
upon as a residue: something left over - redundant. My contention 
is that this is the very opposite of the truth. I shall argue that 
residual consciousness is as indispensable to the existence of 
attention as is the existence of the object of attention itself. If 
attention is one side of the coin, residual consciousness is the 
other side of the coin. Neither can exist without the other. 
Furthermore the relation between them will be shown to be dynamic. 
Attention is always attention to something or other. It is an 
absurdity to claim to be attending but not attending to anything. I 
do not have to know what it is that I am attending to, in order to 
attend to it, but I do have to know that there is something I am 
attending to, even if I cannot make out what it is. The question, 
"What has your attention ?" is always a valid question which cannot 
be answered in the negative, once one has conceded that one is 
attending. From the fact that I am attending to something, it 
follows that there are other things which I am not attending to. 
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To attend, is to attend to this, rather than that.(1) Even if I am 
spontaneously attending to something, and it is impossible for me 
to disengage my attention, I must at least know what it means not 
to be attending to the thing in question, but attending to something 
else, or perhaps not attending to anything in particular at all. 
Attention, as I mentioned earlier, is a term with a contrary, 
and as such, it only has a meaning when it can meaningfully be 
contrasted with inattention. If our consciousness were such that 
we were never aware of anything except the objects of attention, we 
could not know that we were attending: we would have no contrast 
between attention and inattention. Let us imagine the possibility 
of a consciousness the total temporary state of which consisted of 
but a single element. The question could then be raised whether it 
would be meaningful to talk of that element of consciousness holding 
the attention of the person who experienced it. If it could, we 
should have to be prepared to explain in what respect attending to 
that element of consciousness differed from simply having it. 
Let us suppose that an excruciating toothache constituted an 
example of a total temporary state containing one element. We 
should have to imagine the toothache invading the whole of con- 
sciousness, thereby blotting out all other elements. If this was 
possible, it would be an entirely homogeneous consciousness. What 
(1) James and Collingwood both describe attention as 
'selective'. This description is unfortunate in that it 
suggests that all attention is deliberate: i.e., con- 
sciously selected. But it does convey the idea that I am 
trying to get across, that there is always more to con- 
sciousness than what has my immediate attention. See, 
James, Prinniples of Psychology, I, 402, and 
R.G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan (Oxford, 1947) p. 22. 
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I wish to point out is that it would be impossible on logical 
grounds to distinguish between attending to the toothache, and 
having it, in those circumstances. The sufferer could only distin- 
guish the two possibilities, if attending to the toothache were 
something over and above having it. This might consist in his 
belief that the toothache now felt worse than it did a minute ago. 
But as soon as some feature is specified which is the basis of the 
distinction between having and attending, the attending entails the 
presence of some element of consciousness in addition to the tooth- 
ache: viz., in the present instance, the belief that it is getting 
worse. This example makes it clear that the normal case is one in 
which our knowledge that we are attending to A is determined by our 
concomitant knowledge that we are not attending to B, C, or D. It 
is in this sense that the existence of elements of consciousness to 
which we are not attending, provides a foil to those elements to 
which we are attending. Of course I do not deny that we often have 
our attention attracted by something, without realizing that we are 
attending, and then obviously we cannot be said to know that we are 
attending. Nevertheless, the fact remains, that if we are capable 
of realizing that we are attending - as we are - we only have this 
capability in virtue of the fact that we are aware of other things 
besides the object engrossing our attention. 
It is frequently the case that we are first made to realize 
that our attention has been engrossed by an object, upon being 
distracted from it by one of the elements of consciousness that 
erstwhile belonged to residual consciousness. That is to say, we 
realize we have been attending, as soon as we have ceased to attend 
to the object in question. 
To revert to the example of the homogeneous consciousness, in 
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which there is by definition no residual consciousness, nothing 
could correspond to that element's ceasing to receive attention 
apart from the disappearance of the state of consciousness itself. 
But where nothing would count as failing to attend, nothing could 
count as attending. Such circmastances would render the concept of 
attention vacuous. It would be like claiming that a picture could 
have a foreground without a background, and this is a manifest 
absurdity. Residual consciousness is, therefore, not something 
which could be destroyed without attention, too, being destroyed. 
It would be quite wrong to think that the existence of a plurality 
of elements of residual consciousness is quite accidental and irrel- 
evant to the operation of attention. 
Attention is a process in which consciousness is polarized 
into an object of attention and a residual consciousness: described 
in the last chapter as a foreground and a background. When an 
element of consciousness becomes the object of attention it is, as 
it were, detached from residual consciousness (the previous object of 
attention once more rejoining residual consciousness), and set apart 
from it. We may use the image of the elements of residual con- 
sciousness "receding" into the background; by comparison the object 
of attention stands out in the foreground. The image of "receding" 
invokes the idea of a "distance" between residual consciousness and 
the object of attention, and we may look at the process of polariza- 
tion as one in which there is a distance separating the object of 
attention and residual consciousness. If I may elaborate the spatial 
metaphor, the distance must be conceived in such a way that the 
object of attention is situated at the closest point, and residual 
consciousness is located some distance behind it. The opposite way 
of viewing the matter would completely misrepresent the position: 
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namely, the one in which the object of attention would be seen at a 
distance - further away than residual consciousness. 
Residual consciousness must not be thought of as a solid 
unchanging mass of elements. The elements that at the time do not 
engage our attention, may nevertheless change, or vanish, or be 
replaced by new ones. If we follow Ribot in taking change to be 
essential to consciousness, we would expect the elements of residual 
consciousness to be continually undergoing change. However, the very 
significant fact can be inferred, that the subject's awareness of the 
changes taking place in residual consciousness must be minimal. The 
reason for the lack of awareness of these changes is the fact that, 
ex hypothesi, the elements comprising residual consciousness cannot 
receive attention. As soon as a change in residual consciousness is 
noticed, the relevant element is ipso facto detached, and becomes an 
object of attention. 
2. The objection might be made that on the theory being developed 
I am not entitled to say that any change could be noticed to take 
place in residual consciousness, for the reason that nothing could be 
noticed without having received some degree of attention, and the 
elements of residual consciousness are debarred from receiving any 
attention. This objection I shall try to meet on two different 
counts. I shall argue that (a) we are aware of things that have not 
received our attention, and that (b) the sharp separation between 
residual consciousness and object of attention, which my account 
suggests, is only a limiting case, the modification of which will 
overcome the objection. As far as (b) is concerned, I should say 
that I am introducing the theory in a very bald and simple form for 
purposes of exposition. Once the essentials are grasped, complicating 
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factors will be taken into account. 
Are we, then, ever aware of things that have not received our 
attention? The question is phrased in a way that excludes the 
possibility that I am aware of X, because I gave it my attention a 
short time ago. That possibility would be consistent with the claim 
that we are aware of nothing that has not at some time in the past 
had our attention. An instance of my having an awareness of some- 
thing without its having my attention, would be the following. At 
the time my attention is engrossed in something, I am asked a ques- 
tion. I fail to reply, because the question has not registered. 
When challenged I realize that I had been asked a question, but can- 
not tell what it was. In retrospect I seem to have been aware of 
little more of the episode than that I had heard a voice with a 
questioning tone to it. Such a case could be described as one in 
which I notice a change in residual consciousness, from a state in 
which the sound of a voice was absent, to one in which it was present, 
in spite of the fact that no attention is paid to the voice. Now of 
course the retort will be made that the voice must have been given 
just that degree of attention which was necessary for it to have been 
recognised to be a voice (or even a questioning voice). My reply to 
that is: "Why must it have been ?" I may deny that my attention was 
in any way interrupted by the question. I may claim that in ret- 
rospect I could remember nothing that corresponded to my giving a 
small degree of attention to the voice. What is more, even if, for 
the sake of argument, it is conceded that my attention might have 
been partially engaged by the voice, the equally baffling question 
arises: "Why was my attention engaged only just sufficiently for me 
to be aware that I was being spoken to, but not sufficiently for me 
to be aware of what the question was ?" 
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It is perhaps worth reminding ourselves that every element of 
consciousness, whether it be the object of attention, or part of 
residual consciousness, is just that - an element of consciousness. 
It is all too easy to fall into the way of thinking that elements of 
consciousness have an independent existence of their own, such that 
they can exist unexperienced. We must be on our guard against 
forgetting the fact that their esse is percipi. There is no more an 
element of consciousness of which we are totally unaware, than there 
are pains that are totally unfelt. (1) 
When a person is said to be lost in thought, he is usually 
impervious to certain aspects of his surroundings. He may not, as 
in my example, hear what is said to him. We often use the degree of 
difficulty we have in attracting the attention of a person, as a 
measure of the degree of his absorption in what he is doing. Never- 
theless, even in these maximal instances of attention, we do not 
suppose that the attender becomes totally unaware of his surroundings. 
Provided his eyes are open, we do not believe that the person lost in 
thought ceases to have any visual experiences, neither do we believe 
that he ceases to hear any sounds. We know he may fail to respond to 
these things, but that does not mean he has lost all awareness of 
them. If the condition of being lost in thought were one in which 
external awareness was, as it were, completely shut out, it would not 
be possible to explain how such a person could have his attention 
(1) It is strictly speaking an anomaly to talk of being aware 
of an element of consciousness, because this favours the 
idea that it is possible to be completely unaware of an 
element of consciousness. The truth is that an element 
of consciousness just is an awareness of something. 
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disturbed. Attention would be completely lacking- any possible source 
of interference. But as we know only too well our attention is liable 
to be distracted by our awareness of the things going on round about 
us. If this state of affairs were taken to mean that each thing that 
we had some awareness of, must have taken up at least a small degree 
of attention, there would be no such thing as undivided attention. 
Attention would in such circumstances be systematically scattered, 
and it would be difficult to see how attention could be narrowed, 
focussed, or concentrated. 
Unfortunately the occasions on which our attention is fully 
absorbed by some matter are very infrequent. It is much more usual 
for our attention to dart hither and thither, encompassing a bewilder- 
ing number of things in a very short space of time. This fact makes 
it extremely difficult to substantiate theory by an appeal to expe- 
rience. In this field the lesson to be learned from experience is 
open to a number of conflicting interpretations. Given this reserva- 
tion, let me present an argument for the existence of residual con- 
sciousness based on what it would be legitimate to say in certain 
attending -situations. Let us imagine the following episode. An eye- 
witness to a crime, after having given his account of what happened, 
is asked if he can remember any further details about it. He protests 
that he has described everything that caught his attention. It is 
then suggested to him that he try to recall anything of which he had 
been aware that had not held his attention. Eventually he adds that 
he vaguely remembers having heard the radio on at the time. What the 
eye- witness has at last recalled, may be something of which he had 
been aware at the time, but which had not received any attention, or 
it may have been something which had in fact momentarily caught his 
attention. It would be impossible to say which was true. But that 
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is not the point. The point is that the eye -witness would understand 
what was required of him when he was asked to think back and try to 
discover anything he was aware of that had not had his attention. 
The request would not be meaningless. Thus even if he could not do 
it, he would know what he was being asked to do. And he would only 
know what he was being asked to do, because he recognised that the 
possibility put to him was meaningful in terms of his own experience: 
i.e., he knew what it was, to be aware of things that had not been 
objects of attention. Thus, if the eye- witness agrees to try to 
recall elements of consciousness which had not been objects of atten- 
tion, this entails his belief that such elements exist. It is log- 
ically impossible to try to recall something which one knows could not 
possibly have occurred. Alternatively, it is logically impossible to 
try to recall something when one does not understand what it is one is 
being asked to recall. If it makes sense to say to our eye -witness 
"I know you weren't paying any attention to the man's clothes, but 
haven't you got some idea of what they were like ?" it is presupposed 
that we are aware of more than we attend to, and this is equivalent 
to presupposing the existence of residual consciousness. 
I shall employ one more brief example to support my thesis that 
there is such a thing as residual consciousness. Imagine a man with a 
phenomenally good memory of the elements of his consciousness which 
had received his attention. Suppose we get him to go through every- 
thing he paid attention to within a certain span of time. Let this 
person be myself. When it was true to say that I had remembered every 
object that had my attention, it would still not be true to say that I 
was unaware of anything else. Thus in addition to objects of atten- 
tion, there must be a residual consciousness. 
The argument to this point has concentrated on showing that the 
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mere existence of a residual consciousness is a sine qua non of 
attention. But as far as the nature of the residual consciousness 
is concerned, this has been taken to be irrelevant. As a foil, 
residual consciousness is merely other; there being no connection at 
all between the elements belonging to residual consciousness, and 
the elements of consciousness commanding attention. This assumption 
must now be investigated. 
3. In the last chapter I distinguished two different kinds of 
attention, which I called non -interrogative attention, and interrog- 
ative attention. I also accepted the contention that there were 
degrees of attention. I now wish to argue that such distinctions_ 
within attention are determined by the nature of its relationship 
with residual consciousness. The different possibilities of rela- 
tionship between these poles determines, I shall argue, the possible 
forms attention takes. 
The species of non -interrogative attention that I called 
"sense -organ attention" defines the lower limit of attention. 
Hamilton, it will be remembered, even doubted whether it deserved 
the name of attention. It is the attention we bestow when a movement 
catches our eye for instance. Now it does not need any argument to 
show that in the case of something catching my eye, the question of 
which elements make up my residual consciousness at the time would 
be irrelevant. If my eye being caught by a movement was a pure case 
of sense -organ attention, it would be explicable without any ref- 
erence to the particular content of residual consciousness. Sense - 
organ attention is therefore a form of attention that corresponds to 
a complete separation between the object of attention and residual 
consciousness. The elements belonging to residual consciousness 
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would throw no light on the question of why I came to be paying 
attention to the movement. Had my residual consciousness been 
different at the time, this would have made no difference to my eyes 
being arrested by the movement. It may be added that in such a case 
as this of casual short -lived attention, although there is a 
complete absence of connection between residual consciousness and 
object of attention, the distancing aspect of attention will manifest 
itself only in a very incipient form. I mean that the object of 
attention will not stand out so sharply from my awareness of other 
things to which I am not paying attention. Why this should be so, 
will become clear when it is seen how the distancing factor operates 
in cases of attention at the opposite end of the scale from the one 
we have been considering. 
We get a very different picture when we come to interrogative 
attention. In this form of attention we are always on the qui vive 
for something. Some forms of non- interrogative attention are ones 
in which attention is idle. Quite the opposite is true of interrog- 
ative attention. Whenever it is engaged, it is in the setting of a 
task to be accomplished. It is attention disciplined and directed 
by intelligence: attention in the service of intellectual curiosity. 
Unlike non -interrogative attention, interrogative attention has a 
natural point of termination. Attention of this sort comes to an end 
when it has done its job: when the task is accomplished, or curiosity: 
is satisfied. For attention to be interrogative, the attender must 
have some idea, however vague, of what he is looking for. It is not 
necessary for him to be able to say, in so many words, just what he 
is looking for, but even if he cannot do that, he must still be able 
to recognise what he has been looking for when he comes across it. 
When this happens he might say "Ahi that is what I was looking for." 
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Now if we consider the implications of this aspect of interrogative 
attention, we realize that the attender must have some form of 
awareness of the purpose of his attention. However, if he were 
attending to the purpose for which he was attending, he would not be 
directing his attention to the matter which could satisfy that purpose. 
The purpose itself could not be the object of attention without 
frustrating itself. The awareness of the purpose must therefore 
exhibit itself in residual consciousness. Let us see how this can 
happen. 
It is a familiar fact that our observations are often coloured 
by our preconceived ideas of what is there to be observed. In con- 
sequence of this, an investigator will often completely overlook the 
most striking of facts. The answer he is searching for might be 
staring him in the face, but if he does not expect the answer to 
come from that direction, he will miss it. It is true of many discov- 
eries that they lie waiting to be discovered long before they are 
made. The discoverer often feels in retrospect that he must have 
been blind to miss the solution, and is apt to upbraid himself for 
his stupidity. In reality, this has nothing to do with stupidity, 
or blindness. We overlook things that are staring us in the face, 
precisely because we do not expect them to be staring us in the 
face. We think we are looking for something frightfully obscure, and 
this thought regulates our attention accordingly. There is no real 
need for me to draw on examples of important discoveries to bear me 
out. We come across hundreds of trivial cases in our daily lives. 
I look for a book on my shelves, and pass it by, because I am look- 
ing for a book with a slightly different cover to the one it actually 
has. Men have a reputation of not being able to find things. When 
this is true, it is because we manage to convince ourselves even 
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before we start looking, that we are not going to find what we are 
looking for. When we give up looking, ten to one the woman in the 
house will look in the same spot, and find it. "You see," we hear, 
"It was there all the time." It is as though our attention is pre - 
tuned, and if it is pre -tuned correctly we find what we are looking 
for, but if it is pre -tuned to the wrong wave -length, we fail. 
Examples of this sort make it clear that our attention is determined 
by our expectations, anticipations, beliefs, and hypotheses; partic- 
ularly when it is interrogative attention. There may be cases in 
which we have no knowledge of the fact that an expectation is 
exerting a controlling influence on our attention, but it is at 
least as normal for us to be aware of their presence. The latter 
state of affairs is the one relevant to my argument. 
These ideas - whether they be expectations, suggestions, or 
beliefs - belong to residual consciousness. They are not in the 
forefront of consciousness. It is not they which we attend to when 
our attention is conditioned by them. They are not ideas which 
occurred some time before, and which have since passed out of the 
mind. They are still "in the back of the mind ", and because of this, 
they are able to determine the direction of attention. The ideas 
determining the direction of attention can be conceived to have been 
explicit objects of attention themselves, before they passed into 
residual consciousness to perform their directing role. For example, 
I formulate the idea that I am to look for a book with a certain 
green cover. When it first arises - perhaps as an instruction I give 
myself - the idea itself is the object of my attention. But as soon 
as I start looking along the bookshelves, my attention switches to 
the perceptual task. Nevertheless I do not (unless I am absent- 
minded) forget the idea that took me to the bookshelf. Neither do I 
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need continually to recall the idea to keep it alive. The idea is 
retained in residual consciousness until it has done its job. 
This process, whereby ideas are first thought of explicitly and then 
withdrawn into residual consciousness, has its obvious analogue in 
computer programming. It is as though residual consciousness is . 
programmed to direct attention in a certain way, by the ideas that 
are permitted to filter through to it. The ideas I have been speak- 
ing of determine the composition of residual consciousness. Thus, 
when the composition of residual consciousness is altered, the 
programme is altered, and, when the programme is altered, the direc- 
tion of attention is altered. I maintain, therefore, that in 
interrogative attention the significance the object of attention has 
for the attender, it acquires because of its relation to residual 
consciousness. Thus, when an object of non -interrogative attention 
is transformed into an object of interrogative attention, it ceases 
to be the de facto existent it was, and is immediately given a context 
by residual consciousness. In this way it gains a meaning. It may 
be inferred that if through sense -organ attention my eyes light upon 
an object that cannot be related to residual consciousness, it will 
be completely without significance for me. Such an object must, so 
to speak, first gain an answering call from residual consciousness, 
before it becomes meaningful. The object of attention only has a 
meaning through its connection with other elements of consciousness. 
When there is such an involvement of residual consciousness in the 
process of attention, the attention at once becomes meaningful: it 
becomes interrogative attention. 
This conclusion makes it clear why non -interrogative attention 
is not absolutely non -cognitive, and why a pure sensuous consciousness 
is an abstraction. Both possibilities entail a complete separation 
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between residual consciousness and object of attention. They entail, 
in other words, the existence of experiences completely without mean- 
ing. This possibility is inimical to the conditions of consciousness 
of a being possessing a memory. 
I observed that in non -interrogative attention we could detect 
little of the phenomenon I have called "distancing ", in which residual 
consciousness seems to recede from the object of attention. This 
phenomenon, I have reason to believe, is confined to interrogative 
attention, and arises in virtue of the fact that in this mode of 
attention there is a meaningful relation between the object of 
attention and residual consciousness. As soon as we deal with the 
meaningful relationship between things, the question of the rel- 
evance of one thing for another comes into operation. One element 
in residual consciousness may be quite unconnected with the object 
of attention, while another may be connected with it. From this 
point of view, those elements belonging to residual consciousness 
that have no relevance to the instance of attention, will, in virtue 
of that fact, give the impression of receding into the background. 
The more the object engrosses attention, the further into the back- 
ground will the elements recede, that are irrelevant to it. There 
need be no abrupt ending to this "distancing ", and some elements of 
consciousness may shade off into unconsciousness. On the other 
hand, those elements that are relevant to the object of attention, 
will not similarly give the impression of "distancing" themselves 
from the object. They will be on the borderline between residual 
consciousness and the object of attention. Their precise position 
can only be determined after we have sorted out the question of 
whether there can be two or more objects of attention. 
To this subject I will turn next, but before doing 
soy I would 
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like to give an example to illustrate some of the points arising 
out of my analysis. I have in mind Sartre's example of looking in 
a cafe for a man who isn't there, which, quite apart from its 
attempt to portray the reality of nothingness, is a remarkable 
phenomenological analysis of attention. 
I have an appointment with Pierre at four o'clock. I arrive 
at the café a quarter of an hour late. Pierre is always 
punctual. Will he have waited for me? I look at the room, 
the patrons, and I say, "He is not here." Is there an 
intuition of Pierre's absence, or does negation indeed enter 
in only with judgement? At first sight it seems absurd to 
speak here of intuition since to be exact there could not be 
an intuition of nothing and since the absence of Pierre is 
this nothing. Popular consciousness, however, bears witness 
to this intuition. Do we not say, for example, "I suddenly 
saw that he was not there." Is this just a matter of mis- 
placing the negation? Let us look a little closer. 
It is certain that the café by itself with its patrons, 
its tables, its booths, its mirrors, its light, its smoky 
atmosphere, and the sounds of voices, rattling saucers, 
and footsteps which fill it - the café is a fullness of 
being. And all the intuitions of detail which I can have 
are filled by these odours, these sounds, these colors, all 
phenomena which have a transphenomenal being. Similarily 
Pierre's actual presence in a place which I do not know is 
also a plenitude of being. We seem to have found fullness 
everywhere. But we must observe that in perception there 
is always the construction of a figure on a ground. No one 
object., no group of objects is especially designed to be 
organized as specifically either ground or figure; all 
depends on the direction of my attention. When I enter this 
café to search for Pierre, there is formed a synthetic 
organization of all the objects in the café, on the ground 
of which Pierre is given as about to appear. This organization 
of the café as the ground is an original nihilation. Each 
element of the setting, a person, a table, a chair, attempts 
to isolate itself, to lift itself upon the ground constituted 
by the totality of the other objects, only to fall back once 
more into the undifferentiation of this ground; it melts 
into the ground. For the ground is that which is seen only in 
addition, that which is the object of a purely marginal 
attention. Thus the original nihilation of all the figures 
which appear and are swallowed up in the total neutrality of 
a ground is the necessary condition for the appearance of 
the principal figure, which is here the person of Pierre. 
This nihilation is given to my intuition; I am witness to the 
successive disappearances of all the objects which I look 
at - in particular of the faces, which detain me for an 
instant (Could this be Pierre ?) and which as quickly decompose 
precisely because they "are not" the face of Pierre. Never- 
theless if I should finally discover Pierre, my intuition 
would be filled by a solid element, I should be suddenly 
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arrested by his face and the whole café would organize itself 
around him as a discrete presence. 
But now Pierre is not here. This does not mean that I 
discover his absence in some precise spot in the establishment. 
In fact Pierre is absent from the whole café; his absence 
fixes the café in its evanescence; the café remains ground; 
it persists in offering itself as an undifferentiated 
totality to my only marginal attention; it slips into the 
background; it pursues its nihilation. Only it makes itself 
ground for a determined figure; it carries the figure every- 
where in front of it, presents the figure everywhere to me. 
This figure which slips constantly between my look and the 
solid, real objects of the café is precisely a perpetual 
disappearance; it is Pierre raising himself as nothingness 
on the ground of the nihilation of the café. So that what 
is offered to intuition is a flickering of nothingness; it is 
the nothingness of the ground, the nihilation of which summons_ 
and demands the appearance of the figure, and it is the 
figure - the nothingness which slips as a nothing to the 
surface of the ground. It serves as a foundation for the 
judgment - "Pierre is not here." It is in fact the intuitive 
apprehension of a double nihilation. To be sure, Pierre's 
absence supposes an original relation between me and this 
café; there is an infinity of people who are without any 
relation with this café for want of a real expectation which 
establishes their absence. But, to be exact, I myself 
expected to see Pierre, and my expectation has caused the 
absence of Pierre to happen as a real event concerning this 
café. It is an objective fact at present that I have discovered 
this absence, and it presents itself as a synthetic relation 
between Pierre and the setting in which I am looking for him. 
Pierre absent haunts this café and is the condition of its 
self- nihilating organization as ground. (1) 
This example brings out very well the point that the manner in which 
Sartre pays attention to the café is determined by his objective, 
which is to find Pierre. Everything in the cafe assumes the char- 
acter of a background to a non -existent foreground. Nothing in the 
café is seen in its own right with a being of its own. How 
completely different this is from the attention the café scene 
would have received, had Sartre not been looking for 
someone. The 
thought of Pierre lies in residual consciousness, 
and attention is 
(1) Jean -Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 
tr. H.E. Barnes 
(London, 1957), pp. 9 - 10. 
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"directed" by this thought. When Sartre describes the figure of 
Pierre as a "nothingness", he describes quite precisely the way in 
which the idea of Pierre is in residual consciousness. The idea 
of Pierre is not an image of Pierre. If it were, it would not be 
a "perpetual disappearance ". Yet it is a real element in residual 
consciousness. Sartre's description is a faithful portrayal of the 
precise nature of the presence (or absence) of Pierre, in residual 
consciousness. Another point to be noted, is that Sartre's account 
backs up my contention that it is the nature of attention to polarize 
consciousness into a foreground and a background. When attention is 
frustrated, as in the above example, an incipient process of divis- 
ion of the field of consciousness into figure and ground irresistibly 
occurs, but it breaks up before it forms. 
A final point to be noted is the ambiguity of the position 
occupied by the thought of Pierre. As Sartre observes, it slips_ 
constantly between the "look and the solid, real objects of the 
café ". In other words, it seems to hover on the borderline between 
residual consciousness and the object of attention - the cafe. 
4. I come now to the question of whether it is only possible 
to attend to one object at a time. We have seen how Hamilton, 
Ribot, and James agree that the natural tendency of attention is to 
"narrow" or "concentrate" the area of awareness. It is natural, 
and acceptable, for a person to excuse his failure to pay attention, 
on the ground that he was forced to pay attention to too many diff- 
erent things at once. No one could excuse this failure to pay 
attention, by saying that the reason for the failure was 
the fact 
that he had only the one thing to pay attention to. If it were 
not 
true that the restriction of attention was vital to its 
successful 
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operation, we would not be able to explain how it was possible to 
have our attention distracted. For if we could equally well increase 
the number of things we attend to, without our attention to any of 
the things suffering as a result, we would not be "distracted" by 
the new things that had been drawn into attention. The facts of the 
matter seem plain enough, and I shall follow Hamilton in describing 
the systematization of these facts as "the law of limitation ". 
This law is, that the greater the number of objects to which 
our consciousness is simultaneously extended, the smaller is 
the intensity with which it is able to consider each, and 
consequently, the less vivid and distinct will be the 
information it obtains of the several subjects. (1) 
Hamilton's law rests on the assumption that it is possible to 
pay attention to more than one thing at a time, and this enables a 
plausible explanation to be given of the existence of degrees of 
attention: the larger the number of things holding attention which 
are not connected, the smaller the degree of attention which is 
given to each. Quite apart from these aspects of the matter, how- 
ever, Hamilton's law of limitation expresses well the fact that the 
more restricted, or narrowed, attention is, the more efficient it 
is. Logically, of course, the limit of such restriction is the case 
in which only one object has attention at a time. Those philosophers 
who, like Stewart, have argued that it is not possible to attend to 
more than one object at a time, have no doubt been impressed by this 
fact. It has led to the belief that paying attention to a single 
thing is a paradigmatic case of paying attention. This belief has 
(1) Bowen, The Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton, p. 159. 
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persuaded Stewart and others that if, in two instances, attention 
were narrowed down to a single object, the instances could not be 
concurrent: i.e., it would be impossible, by definition, to attend 
to both objects at once. 
Many examples seem to bear out this contention. There is the 
well -known experience of trying to follow two separate conversations_ 
at once. What happens is that our attention "jumps" from one 
conversation to the other, and we catch a phrase from this discussion 
and a point from that. We also find a tendency for attention to 
settle on one of the conversations at the expense of the other, so 
that we follow and understand more of the one than the other. Here 
we have an example of conflicting claims upon attention, and there is 
no doubt that it is a common occurrence to find claims on attention 
conflicting with one another in this way. But it is one thing for 
Stewart and others to be right in claiming that there are some cases 
of conflict of attention, and quite another matter for them to claim 
that all cases of attending to more than one thing at once are cases 
of a conflict of attention. 
At first sight it looks as though the controversy could be 
settled by empirical means. It soon becomes_ obvious, however, that 
any counter -examples to the hypothesis that we only attend to one 
thing at a time, can be nullified by the claim that even though we 
are not aware of the fact, our attention nevertheless switches (too 
rapidly to notice), from the one object to the other. The rapidity 
of the movement from one object to the other, would create the 
illusion that both objects were receiving continuous 
simultaneous 
attention; much as a disc of different coloured 
segments gives the 
illusion of having one uniform colour, when 
spun. As this argument 
could be brought against any conceivable counter example, 
it is a 
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classical case of a conceptual difference being mistaken for an 
empirical difference. 
The dispute is, I believe, a conceptual one, but it is also a 
sterile dispute. It cannot be settled unless and until we know 
what it means "to attend to one thing at a time ". We need to know 
what "one thing" is, before we know what the disagreement is about. 
And, I maintain, as soon as we know what constitutes "one thing" we 
shall find that there is nothing left to dispute. Let us, therefore, 
enquire what it means to talk about an object of attention. How do 
we know that we are attending to one object and not several? The 
artificiality of this question can be brought out most forceably by 
considering Sartre's example, in which the object of attention is 
the interior of a café. We can think of the café as one object, but 
the café in fact comprises a very large number of isolable objects. 
As Sartre makes quite explicit, the attender is aware of "its 
patrons, its tables, its booths, its mirrors, its light, its smoky 
atmosphere, and the sound of voices, rattling saucers, and footsteps 
which fill it ". Because the attender is paying attention, all these 
things are "taken in ". But in a sense none of them are objects of 
attention. If, afterwards, the attender were asked to say what had 
been going on in the café, he might have only a hazy idea. He had 
been paying attention to the café, but not paying attention to 
everything he saw or heard in the oafs. He was not, in fact, paying 
attention to anything in the café at all: As Sartre correctly 
observes, it was as though the café scene were a "ground" for a non- 
existent figure. That is, it is as though attention were in search 
of its object of attention. Sartre makes this clear too. He 
says, 
"if I should finally discover Pierre, my intuition would 
be filled 
by a solid element, I should be suddenly arrested by his face and the 
144. 
whole café would organize itself around him as a discrete presence." 
Were that to happen, we would be in no doubt as to what the object of 
attention was - Pierre. 
Sartre's statement that everything in the café would "organize 
around" the object of attention, is most important. Whatever it be 
that our consciousness "organizes around", is that which we are said 
to be attending to. But even if Pierre had become the object of 
attention, what constitutes "Pierre" would be a number of different 
things. Pierre is still a complex object. Would that preclude him 
from being the object of attention? Surely it would be quite 
unrealistic to claim that Pierre could not be an object of attention, 
on the ground that only the "ultimate simples" of which he is 
composed (whatever that might mean) could be so regarded. There 
might be a variety of things I notice about Pierre as soon as I spot 
him. Are these features, and not Pierre the object of my attention? 
And if they are, must I have noticed them one after another? We only 
need raise these questions to see that they presuppose putting a 
false precision on the whole matter. 
A simpler example than Sartre's clinches the argument. Suppose 
we were asked what our several objects of attention are in relation 
to the appearance of the printed page before our eyes. Can we attend 
to several words simultaneously, or are we limited to one word, or 
perhaps one letter, at a time? If we can take in several words at a 
glance, would they be our object of attention? If so, would that mean 
that we had paid attention to only one thing, or several things at 
once? Or would it mean that we had successively attended to each 
individual letter? These artificial questions presuppose, I suggest, 
that there are such things as atomic objects, such that we could make 
decisions as to what is one object or another, quite irrespective of 
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the purposes of the attender. We need only remind ourselves, how- 
ever, how different the situation must appear to an attender who is 
a proof- reader looking for misprints, from its appearance to the 
average reader trying to follow the sense of the argument. The 
proof -reader might treat syllables as the objects of attention, while 
the ordinary reader might treat meaningful groups of words as 
objects of attention. Unless we know the purpose behind the atten- 
tion, we cannot say what should be taken as the object of attention. 
The object of attention is attender- relative. 
Interrogative attention is typically the attention manifested 
in problem -solving. In a problem -solving context there may be a 
number of factors that are thought to be relevant to the solution of 
the problem. When a number of factors demand the attention of the 
problem -solver, he will not feel that he is distracted from his_task 
if he attends to these factors, provided he believes them to be rel- 
evant to the solution of the problem. If what holds his attention 
seems to him to relate to the purpose for which he is giving his 
attention according to some scheme of coherence, he will not say that 
he is distracted. An attender is distracted when his attention is_ . 
held by some object, which he believes has nothing to do with the 
task facing him. We are distracted, not when more than one object 
engages our attention, but when the objects engaging our attention 
do not belong to the same "meaning system ". I use the expression 
"meaning system" to refer to the set of factors that are judged rel- 
evant to the solution of a problem. 
I now suggest that when we have a conflict of attention, the 
reason is that the conflicting objects of attention are not both 
part of the reigning meaning system. An object of attention may 
only become such within a particular meaning system. When this_ 
146. 
happens, by calling X an object of attention, we tac tly presuppose 
a certain meaning system. Now if another object of attention Y, pre- 
supposes the same meaning system, it may engage attention simulta- 
neously with X. In fact it may be purely a matter of terminology 
whether we call X and Y separate objects of attention, or X cum Y a 
single complex object of attention. By contrast if X belongs to one 
meaning system and Z belongs to another, then attending to X entails_ 
excluding the meaning system of Z, and vice versa. To put the point 
another way, ifs when we pay attention to X, consciousness of necess- 
ity "organizes around" X, then we can only pay attention to Y, by 
consciousness "organizing around" Y. But it can only do that by 
destroying its organization around X. We can see, therefore, that 
the question whether we can attend to more than one object at a time, 
will depend entirely on whether or not we define "object of attention" 
in such a way that each object of attention has its own exclusive 
meaning system. Whatever we say will be arbitrary, soy to suit our- 
selves, let us use the expression "object of attention ", so as not 
to entail the proposition that it is impossible to pay attention to 
more than one object at a time. 
I have throughout the discussion made references to the object 
of attention; taking it for granted that the object of attention was 
always sharp and distinct. It can now be appreciated that this 
assumption is an oversimplification. In the case of the search for 
Pierre, for instance, it is as true to say that the café is the 
object of attention, as it would be to say of anything else that it 
was the object of attention. Nevertheless_, as I have already 
observed, if we call the café the object of attention, we 
still do 
not imply that our awareness of it stands out sharply 
and distinctly. 
If it did, it would not have been correct to describe it as a 
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"ground ". Whether or not the object of attention stands out sharply 
in hard detail must depend on the nature of the context within which 
attention is given. We are entitled to say no more than that the 
object of attention will be relatively dominant and "hard- edged ". 
These considerations have important implications far the 
distinction I have drawn between the object of attention on the one 
hand, and residual consciousness on the other. They reveal that we 
can never be certain where the object of attention ends and residual 
consciousness begins. The distinction between the two parts of con- 
sciousness is a conceptual one, and not a descriptive or phenomenolog- 
ical one. There will be a penumbra between residual consciousness 
and object of attention at which the borders cannot be accurately 
defined. An attempt to do so would necessitate focussing attention 
on the elements in the penumbra, and ex hypothesi they would no 
longer be in the penumbra. 
In view of the complexity of the relationship between residual 
consciousness and object of attention in interrogative attention, it 
is possible to give a more satisfactory interpretation of Hamilton's 
law of limitation than the one he gives. The degree of intensity of 
attention must no longer be correlated in simple inverse proportion 
to the number of objects receiving attention. We must not take it 
that attention to one object will be n times greater than attention 
to n objects. The argument of this chapter points to the conclusion 
that the greater the connectedness between residual consciousness and 
attention, the greater the degree of attention. Interrogative atten- 
tion is at its maximum when residual consciousness and object of 
attention are united within a single meaning system. From this point 
of view, the complexity of the meaning system is no distraction 
to 
attention. On the contrary the greater the coherence between 
residual 
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consciousness and object of attention in the meaning system, the 
greater the concentration of attention. On this interpretation we 
would expect to find a man's attention most fully absorbed in a 
single complex issue, in which, as we might say, his whole con- 
sciousness has been brought to bear. A man in such a state of 
absorption will not have his attention drawn by irrelevant states of 
residual consciousness, precisely because residual consciousness has 
become so fully engaged in the meaning system holding attention. 
Irrelevant stimuli in such cases recede so far into the background 
of residual consciousness that they are unable to distract attention. 
This is borne out by experience. A man with his attention fully 
absorbed fails to notice many of the things_ going on around him, 
which, if he were not completely engrossed, he would immediately 
have noticed. It is significant that one of the expressions_ we use 
to describe a high degree of interrogative attention is that of 
having one's whole mind on the subject. 
5. If my reasoning is on the right lines, we are in a position 
to correct a certain weakness in Ribot'a theory of attention.(1) 
He, it will be remembered, held that attention was a condition inim- 
ical to the normal life of consciousness. The reason for his belief 
is not far to seek. He identifies normal consciousness with 
polyideism - plurality of states of consciousness. By contrast, he 
identifies attention with "unity of consciousness" - monoideism. 
In attention, Ribot believes, the plurality of elements_ia narrowed 
down to a single element of consciousness. But the existence of a 
consciousness with but a single element in it contradicts 
his picture 
(1) See above, p. 92 ff. 
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of consciousness: viz., its dependence upon change. Accordingly, 
attention must be thought of as an interruption to the continuity 
of change, and if carried on too long it must threaten the survival 
of consciousness. As against this position I have been arguing that 
attention has nothing to do with reducing consciousness to a single 
element. On the contrary, in maximal attention there is a great 
diversity of elements of consciousness. These diverse elements 
however, become, under maximal attention, united in so far as they 
become coherent elements of a single meaning system. But this does 
not mean that change must be suspended. A meaning system may in 
fact operate through changes in the elements of consciousness. 
From this point of view there is no danger that by paying attention 
all change is suspended. On the contrary, if it were possible for 
change to be suspended, it might well turn out that we would want to 
say "X has ceased to pay attention ". 
Ribot in fact made a qualification to his theory, which showed 
his unease about maintaining that attention was a state of monoideism, 
and this qualification is certainly in the direction favouring the 
position I have suggested. "Is attention a reduction to a sole and 
single state of consciousness ?" he asks., 
No; for inward observation teaches us, that it is only a 
relative monoideism; that is, it supposes the existence 
of a master -idea, drawing to itself all that relates to 
it, and nothing else, allowing associations to produce 
themselves only within very narrow limits, and on condition 
that they converge toward a common point. It drains_ for 
its own use - at least in the proportion possible - the 
entire cerebral activity.(1) 
This passage exhibits in embryonic form the relation between residual 
consciousness and object of attention that I have called a meaning 
(1) Ribot, The Psychology of Attention, p. 
10. 
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system. But I cannot see that it has anything to do with reducing 
the number of states of consciousness. It is neither monoideism nor 
relative monoideism. 
Possibly Ribot thought that attention did produce a state of 
monoideism, because he failed to distinguish, as I have done, 
between a single meaning system, and a single object of attention. 
have already shown how easily one can be driven to the conclusion 
that maximal attention is achieved when only a single object engages 
attention. I have also argued that we should resist being driven in 
this direction. Ribot's position nicely illustrates the embarr- 
assments of the position. There is, indeed, a unity of consciousness 
when attention is engaged, but the unity is the unity of a system, 
and not the unity of sheer identity, as Ribot seems to believe. The 
unity is achieved when, as Sartre puts it, consciousness "organizes 
itself around" the object of attention; or as Ribot himself rec- 
ognises, when attention is determined by a "master- idea ". These two 
ideas are not merely alternative ways of expressing the same thought. 
The object of attention around which consciousness organizes itself, 
is not itself the "master- idea ". The position is rather the reverse: 
the master -idea organizes consciousness around an object of attention. 
It is evident that the master -idea is none other than that idea in 
residual consciousness directing the particular instance of interrog- 
ative attention, in a way that has already been explained. 
This is a natural point at which to stop and summarize the 
conclusions that have been reached so far. I first used a form of 
transcendental argument to prove that we could not make sense of any 
form of attention without presupposing the existence of a residual 
consciousness that was not itself engaging attention. I then 
attempted to show that in the non -intellectual forms of attention, 
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which I have called non -interrogative attention, there is relative 
separation between residual consciousness and object of attention. 
By contrast the discussion showed that interrogative attention was 
characterized by a functional inter -relation between residual con- 
sciousness and object of attention. It has been shown that the 
concept of "an object of attention" must not be thought to have the 
implications of precision and freedom from vagueness. which, in the 
literature, is taken for granted. In consequence of this I have 
argued that the boundary between residual consciousness and object(s) 
of attention can often be drawn only arbitrarily. Finally I have 
contended that the connectedness or relatedness between the elements 
comprising residual consciousness and the Object of attention, must 
be looked upon as constituting a meaning -system. Attention is con- 
centrated, on this view, when the elements of consciousness are 
ordered in a single meaning -system. Attention is diffused when an 
object cannot be integrated within the reigning meaning -system. 
A major implication of the argument is the conclusion that 
residual consciousness is cognitive as well as sensory. This follows 
from the assertion that residual consciousness may contain elements 
which I have referred to as master -ideas, and that in interrogative 
attention a number of its elementa form a meaning system together 
with the elements forming the object of attention. It can thus be 
appreciated how wrong it would be to look upon residual consciousness 
as. a residue of unattended sensory experience. 
Some of the ideas advanced in this chapter receive support 
from a passage quoted in James's. Principles of Psychology. I quote 
the passage because it is in harmony with much that I have said. 
At every instant of conscious thought there is a certain sum 
of perceptions, or reflections, or both together, present, 
and together constituting one whole state of apprehension. 
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Of this some definite portion may be far more distinct than 
all the rest; and the rest be in consequence proportionably 
vague, even to the limit of obliteration. But still, within 
this limit, the most dim shade of perception enters into, 
and in some infinitesimal degree modifies, the whole existing 
state. This state, will thus be in some way modified by any 
sensation or emotion, or act of distinct attention, that may 
give prominence to any part of it; so that the actual result 
is capable of the utmost variation, according to the person 
or the occasion.... To any portion of the entire scope here 
described there may be a special direction of the attention, 
and this special direction is recognized as strictly what is 
recognized as the idea present to the mind. This_ idea is 
evidently not commensurate with the entire state of apprehension, 
and much perplexity has arisen from not observing this fact. 
However deeply we may suppose the attention to be engaged by 
any thought, any considerable alteration of the surrounding 
phenomena would still be perceived; the most abstruse demonstra- 
tion in this room would not prevent a listener, however 
absorbed, from noticing the sudden extinction of the lights. 
Our mental states have always an essential unity, such that 
each state of apprehension, however variously compounded, is 
a single whole, of which every component is, therefore, 
strictly apprehended (so far as it is apprehended) as a part. 
Such is the elementary basis from which all our intellectual 
operations commence. (1) 
6. In this section I vary my approach, and consider the relation- 
ship between residual consciousness and attention from a different 
direction. I argue that we control the direction of our attention 
through bodily movements. It is then pointed out that the proper 
execution of these bodily movements is dependent upon kinaesthetic 
sensation. I argue that such kinaesthetic sensation must reside in 
residual consciousness if it is to perform its function properly. 
In this way I show that the operation of attention itself produces 
some of the elements comprising residual consciousness. In other 
words, it is shown that even if there were no independently existing 
residual consciousness to act as a foil to attention, the operation 
of attention creates its own residual consciousness. I try to 
(1) Jas. Wills, 'Accidental Association', Transactions of 
the Royal Irish Academy, vol. XXI. part 1 (1846). 
also quoted in: James, Principles of Psychology, I, 241. 
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establish this thesis, firstly, in the case of sensorial attention, 
and secondly, in the case of reflection. 
I begin by considering the part muscular activity plays in 
the mechanism of attention. Ribot raises this question, and it will 
be convenient to base the discussion on his views. He sets out his 
position as follows: 
Are the movements of the face, the body, and the limbs, and 
the respiratory modifications that accompany attention, simply 
effects, outward marks, as is usually supposed? Or, are they, 
on the contrary, the necessary conditions, the constituent 
elements, the indispensable factors of attention? Without 
hesitation we accept the second thesis. Totally suppress 
movements, and you totally suppress attention. 
The fundamental role of the movements in attention is, to 
maintain the appropriate state of consciousness and to 
reinforce it. (1) 
The muscles perform their function in attention through the mechanism 
of inhibition. "Attention, accordingly, means concentration and 
inhibition of movements. Distraction means diffusion of movements. "(2) 
The applicability of this theory will be considered in the course of 
an investigation into sensorial attention. 
Sensorial attention can be either interrogative or non - 
interrogative. In dealing with this form of attention in the pre- 
vious chapter I restricted myself to the non -interrogative variety, 
and, to prevent confusion, I called it "sense- organ" attention, 
instead of sensorial attention. As there explained, (3), in a non - 
attentive state, the sense -organs tend to be in a state of movement: 
a sort of exploratory condition. (A good illustration of this is 
the way our eyes rove when we are not occupied.) These are 
characteristic bodily activities, and they occur quite spontaneously, 
(1) Ribot, The Psychology of Attention, p. 25. 
(2) Ibid. p. 53. 
(3) See above, p. 93. 
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without the person making the movements., necessarily having any 
reason for making them. If I am asked why my eyes are roving, I may 
be unable to produce any reason for the phenomenon. They just are. 
Nevertheless if I am asked why my eyes are roving, the question 
might presuppose that they ought not to be: i.e., I am failing to 
pay attention. When an infant waves its arms about, or kicks with 
its legs, we do not ask why it is doing so. 
To ask for a reason for such bodily activities presupposes 
that it is more natural for a creature to be completely inert. But, 
as Ribot has argued, movement is the basis of consciousness, and 
from this point of view it is normal for a conscious creature to be 
engaging in bodily activities. Alexander Bain makes this. point 
emphatically, and calls these bodily activities "spontaneous activ- 
ities". By calling them "spontaneous" he means that they occur 
without prior stimulation from sense experience. As he puts it: 
"Movement precedes sensation, and is at the outset independent of 
any stimulus from without. "(1) There are, then, a number of sponta- 
neous bodily activities through which our sense- organs are brought 
into operation. Now as soon as the movement of (or muscular activity 
connected with) a sense -organ is. "arrested" and fixates on an object 
of attention, this spontaneous bodily activity of the sense -organ 
concerned must of necessity come to a halt: that is what it means 
for the sense -organ to be fixated. This happens when the muscles 
hold the sense -organ in a static position. This muscular activity, 
without which the sense -organ could not remain fixated on the object 
of attention, is what Ribot refers to as "inhibition ". The muscles 
inhibit the movement which the bodily activities connected with the 
(1) A. Bain, The Senses and the Intellect (London, 1855), 
p. 67. 
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sense- organs naturally display. Attention, according to Ribot, is 
therefore, an inhibition of bodily movement. 
It is extremely important to realize, in this connection, that 
muscular energy is expended, not only when a bodily movement occurs, 
but also when a bodily movement is inhibited. If anyone doubts this, 
let him try to keep his eyes stationary for several minutes. He will 
soon become conscious of muscular strain. When Ribot maintain that 
attention is an unnatural state, we can understand what he is driving 
at in the case of sense -organ attention. His reasoning is evidently 
based on the proposition that the natural state for the bodily 
activities connected with the sense -organs, is one of activation. 
It is easier to be moving about, to however small an extent, than it 
is to keep absolutely still. From this point of view the muscular 
strain involved in suspending bodily movement may be greater than 
the strain of engaging in mild bodily movements. It follows that 
the organism is likely to break off attention and return to the 
"easier" condition of spontaneous bodily activity, when it can. 
The picture Ribot's theory points to is one in which an organism is 
in a state of equilibrium when it is engaging in spontaneous bodily 
movements, and a state of disequilibrium when the organism's move- 
ments are suspended by the mechanism of attention. IIy disagreement 
with Ribot, on the question of the unnaturalness_ of attention, 
prevents me from accepting this picture for attention as a whole, 
but I agree with Ribot to the extent of accepting its accuracy in 
the case of non -interrogative sense -organ attention. The question 
is, of course, whether we are entitled to generalize from this one 
case. 
We certainly cannot disagree with Ribot that muscular activity 
must of necessity be exhibited in sense -organ attention. We have 
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seen this in the case of attention to a visual object. What is 
true of sight is true of all the other sense- organs. This John 
Stuart Mill recognised, when, in a note to his father's Analysis of 
the Human Mind, he writes: 
... In the exercise of the senses,... a muscular element is 
almost always combined. This is conspicuous in Touch, which 
is most frequently accompanied with movements of the hand, 
or other parts touched: it is also the case with Sight, 
there being six muscles constantly engaged in moving the 
eye -ball. There is least muscularity in Hearing and Smell, 
but in neither is it wholly absent. Thus in Hearing, there 
are certain small muscles for adjusting the tightness of the 
membrane of the tympanum; apart from which, there are move- 
ments of the head in conjunction with hearing. So in Smell; 
the sniffing action with the breath is muscular.(1) 
Even if it is possible to attend to visual objects without furrowed 
brow, (2), it is not possible to arrest the movement of the eyes 
without certain other muscles coming into play. We have special 
concepts to describe visual attention and auditory attention - that 
is, attention connected with our two most important senses: the 
long -range ones. When we are looking attentively we are said to be 
"watching ''. When we are using our ears attentively we are said to be 
"listening ". Watching entails paying some degree of attention. I 
cannot be described as "watching" if I am completely inattentive. 
The same is true of "listening ". Listening entails paying some degree 
of attention. These two concepts are both concepts of attention, and 
both of them demand the innervation of specific groups of muscles. 
Hence, even if we wished to maintain, against Ribot, that the use of 
the facial muscle, the occipitio- frontalis, is quite accidental in 
visual attention, we could not argue that the use of the muscles 
(1) Mill, Analysis of the Human Mind, I, 4. 
(2) See above, p. 152. 
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which kept the eyes fixated on their object, was also dispensable. 
This is true, mutatis mutandis, of hearing, too. 
Having established the fact that muscular activity is a nec- 
essary condition of sense -organ attention, we can infer from this 
fact that muscular activity is a necessary condition of all sensorial 
attention; including interrogative sensorial attention. We can now 
see what bearing this fact has on the question of the relation 
between residual consciousness and the object of attention. As we 
know, muscles themselves have sensations connected with their activa- 
tion: kinaesthetic sensations. This means, that since in most 
instances of sensorial attention a combination of many muscles are 
likely to be activated, sensorial attention will be accompanied by 
a variety of kinaesthetic sensations. However, these kinaesthetic 
sensations are, by definition, not the objects of sensorial attention. 
They must therefore belong to residual consciousness. In sensorial 
attention we have the very special case that the attentive process 
itself brings it about that certain elements enter residual con- 
sciousness. 
This finding has the following significance. The argument has 
until this point taken it for granted that in sense -organ attention 
a simple separation existed between residual consciousness and the 
object of attention. On that assumption the existence of residual 
consciousness was a de facto state of affairs, which had nothing to 
do with the other pole of consciousness: the object of attention. 
I argued that both poles were necessary, but it seemed just a contin- 
gent state of affairs that there was a residual consciousness to be a 
foil to attention. We now see that even if residual consciousness 
had not existed, sensorial attention would still bring its own resid- 
ual consciousness along with it. This means that attention not only 
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produces a residual consciousness by the negative method of excluding 
certain elements of consciousness from attention, but also produces 
residual consciousness in a positive manner through the nature of 
the attentive mechanism itself. Whereas so far the line of depend- 
ence has appeared to be running from residual consciousness to 
attention, we now have evidence of its running in the reverse direc- 
tion as well - from attending back to residual consciousness. The 
interdependence of residual consciousness and attention is now 
complete. 
The function of kinaesthetic sensation is to give the organism 
control over its bodily movements. A telling experiment which 
illustrates this point consists in anaesthetising a subject's legs, 
blindfolding him, and asking him to separate his legs so that the 
space between them is about a foot. The subject does what he is 
told, but instead of placing his feet approximately the required 
distance apart, he will separate them to their maximum arc of separa- 
tion. When the blindfold is removed the subject will be surprised 
to see where his legs are, not expecting them to be so wide apart.(1) 
Another illustration of the controlling function of kinaesthetic 
sensation can be drawn from an experience everyone is familiar with. 
We have all had the experience of picking up an object that turned 
out to be lighter than we thought it would. The object shoots up 
because we exert a greater force than is necessary. Because we have 
kinaesthetic sensations we are able to adjust the amount of muscular 
effort we give to what we judge the task to require. Our kinaesthetic 
sensations "advise us" of the positions of our limbs, without our 
(1) Unfortunately I have been unable to trace the source of 
this experiment, although I know I came across it in a 
reputable work on psychology. 
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looking for them. The importance they have in both these respects 
can be appreciated when we imagine ourselves in the situation of 
trying to find our way about a strange room in the dark. If we did 
not possess kinaesthetic sensations, we would be unable to move 
about the room with any degree of delicacy, and we would be liable 
to make very forceful contact with obstacles, which, even if we were 
unable to feel anything, could bring harm to ourselves, and damage 
to the objects we barge into. Our ability to perform tasks which 
required fine muscular control would be thrown entirely on visual 
direction, if we lacked kinaesthetic sensations. Moreover it is 
doubtful whether we would have control over our eye movements, and 
we certainly would not have proper control over our head movements, 
if we lacked kinaesthetic sensations. So even muscle control under 
visual supervision is unlikely, in the total absence of kinaesthetic 
sensation. 
All of this is important in the present context, because 
sensorial attention mostly depends on precisely that fine control 
over muscular activity which we owe to kinaesthetic sensation. All 
those tasks which require the utmost delicacy of movement would be 
beyond us, were it not for the existence of kinaesthetic sensation. 
The sort of attention demanded in the performance of such tasks 
would, a fortiori, be non -existent. It is, however, difficult to 
conceive of a life devoid of kinaesthetic sensation. As far as our 
movements are concerned it might be likened to a condition of per- 
manent inebriation. Not only would our delicate movements_ suffer, 
but our grosser ones would also be impaired. The relation between 
kinaesthetic sensation and muscular activity may therefore be viewed 
as a special case of the influence of residual consciousness on 
attention, although we are dealing here with a connection between 
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residual consciousness and attention at a very different level to 
the one discussed in section 3. 
In order to avoid possible confusion, I feel I had better make 
a few remarks about the physiological aspects of attention in gen- 
eral. The study of attention from the physiological point of view 
has revealed other bodily changes besides the changes in muscular 
activity with which I have been dealing. It is claimed, for 
instance, that during attention the blood supply to the brain 
increases. It has also been suggested that the mysterious alpha - 
waves have a connection with attention.(1) Putative changes of this 
sort must be distinguished from the changes that take place in 
muscle activity, because the latter sort of changes are subject to 
voluntary control, while the former are not (except indirectly). 
Those bodily changes, the occurrence of which are not directly 
subject to the control of our will, I shall call processes. By 
contrast the bodily changes that are subject to the control of our 
will, I shall call activities. It must be appreciated that bodily 
changes are activities even though they have not been brought about 
by an act of will. They are activities in virtue of the fact that 
they can be willed. If not actually willed, they are at least 
capable of being willed. 
A minor difficulty exists in that it can legitimately be 
claimed that the ability to contract muscles at will is a sophist- 
icated performance, and that what we normally will are movements of 
our bodies, and not contractions of our muscles. I will that my arm 
(1) The EEG record of the electrical activity of 
the brain 
reveals a characteristic alpha -rhythm while the 
subject 
is not paying attention to anything, but as 
soon as he 
attends the alpha -wave disappears. See, W.G. Walter, 
The Living Brain (Pelican, 1963). 
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should go up, for instance: I do not will the contraction of the 
muscles which must occur if my arm is to go up. I, in all probabil- 
ity, do not even know what these muscles are. That is to say, I 
know how to move parts of my body, but I do not necessarily know 
how to move the relevant muscles. I know how to move my eyes about, 
but I need know nothing of the existence of the six muscles by 
means of which the eye movements are effected. This point can be 
admitted without further ado.(1) We need only remember that when 
muscle activity is said to be voluntary, what is meant is that 
certain movements can be performed at will with the cooperation of 
the relevant striated muscles. Those muscular changes which cannot 
be innervated by willing are to be excluded from the class of vol- 
untary muscular activities. The muscles for increasing the tension 
of the tympanum in the ear, referred to by Mill, belong to this 
latter category. The "smooth" muscles of the body, and the cardiac 
muscle are the main types of muscle over which we cannot (normally) 
exert direct control. 
What I call bodily processes are such things as the beat of 
the heart, digestive action, &c. These processes are governed by the 
autonomous nervous system, and they go on whether we are conscious_ of 
them or not. Although it is possible to exercise some degree of 
voluntary control over some of these processes, this can only be done 
indirectly. I can, for instance, make my heart beat faster, but I 
cannot do it by simply willing my heart to beat faster. I have to 
use my knowledge that exertion makes the heart beat faster, and first 
exert myself by making a movement I can will. My heart will then 
beat faster. The difference between the way I raise my arm on 
(1) For an argument to the effect that 
we will certain mus- 
cular movements primarily and not our limbs, 
see, C.A. 
Campbell 'Self Activity and Its Modes', Contemporary 
British Philosophy, ed. H.D. Lewis 
(London, 1956). 
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willing it, and the way I make my heart beat faster, is the measure 
of the difference between my control over my bodily activities, and 
my control over bodily processes. What is of philosophical interest 
is the connection between bodily activity and attention, and this is 
of interest only because we seem to have discovered a conceptual 
link between the two. The connection between attention and bodily 
process, on the other hand, is contingent. We would not be obliged 
to alter our concept of attention if it were found that there was no 
increase of blood to the brain during attention, or that alpha waves 
had nothing to do with it either. 
7. Ribot's theory that attention is effected by muscular 
inhibition is not confined to sensorial attention. He claims that 
the theory is equally true of the other form of attention - inner 
directed attention - which he calls "reflection ". Now the dependence 
of sensorial attention on muscular activity has been pretty conclu- 
sively established. But the idea of muscular activity being the 
"indispensable factor" in non -sensorial attention is much more 
debatable - not to say paradoxical. How, one might ask, is muscular 
activity going to help a person to think attentively, or recall a 
name? It might, admittedly, help to lower the superior orbicular 
muscle (the muscle of reflection), but we would not deny that a 
person had thought, or recalled a name, on the ground that he had 
not lowered his brow at the time. After all a man may get into the 
habit of scratching his head before he thinks, and the point could 
well be reached at which he is incapable of thinking if he is 
prevented from scratching his head. Nevertheless we 
would not on 
that account assert there to be a necessary connection 
between think- 
ing and head -scratching. Even if it became universally true that 
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head -scratching had to precede thinking, we would still concede that 
it was at least conceivable that a person could think without first 
having scratched his head. Quite clearly if the theory of the 
dependence of reflection on muscular activity is to have any 
respectability, it must have more to offer than the above would 
suggest. 
Of "reflection" Ribot says "Images and ideas constitute its 
subject matter." What he has to do, therefore, is establish a 
connection between muscular activity and the occurrence of images and 
ideas. His method of procedure is to use perception as a "middle 
term" through which this connection is made. The link between mus- 
cular activity and perception has already been established. Ribot's 
theory hinges, therefore, on the nature of the connection that he 
tries to establish between perception and ideas and images. It has 
to be a special kind of connection such that, if perception entails 
muscular activity, the relation between ideas and images on the one 
hand and perception on the other, must be of such a nature that the 
former entails_ the muscular activity of the latter. An attempt to 
establish the existence of such a connection was made by Alexander 
Bain, and Ribot quotes him in support of his position: 
"It does not seem plain, at first," wrote Bain, as early as 
the year 1855, "that the retention of an idea, an image, in 
the mind is the work of our voluntary muscles. What are the 
movements produced, when I conceive to myself. a circle, or 
think of St. Paul's? We can answer this question only by 
supposing that the mental image occupies in the brain and 
the other parts of the nervous system the same place as the 
original sensation. As there is a muscular element in our 
sensations, particularly in those of the highest order - 
in touch, sight, and hearing - this element must, in 
some 
way or other, find its place in ideal sensation - recollection." 
Since the time that this passage was written, the question of 
the nature of images has been closely and profitably 
studied, 
and solved exactly as therein indicated. Whereas, to the 
earlier psychologists, an image or idea was a kind of phantom, 
without definite seat, existing "within the 
soul ", differing 
from perception not in degree but in nature, resembling it 
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"at most only as a portrait resembles its original ", to 
physiological psychology, on the contrary, there is between 
perception and image identity of nature, identity of seat, 
and only a difference of degree. The image is not a 
photograph but a revival of the sensorial and motory 
elements that have built up the perception. In proportion 
as its intensity increases, it approaches more and more to 
the condition of its origination, and so tends to become 
an hallucination.(1) 
Such a passage clearly invites attack. Its assumption that 
sensations and images are located in the brain could be challenged; 
as could the assertion that there is only a difference of degree 
between perception and image. But that is not the point. The point 
is whether, in virtue of the alleged connection between mental 
imagery and perception, muscular activity plays the same part in 
both. Now in perception, muscular activity is concomitant with the 
perceiving. If the perception consists in my feeling the quality of 
a rug by rubbing my hand over it, the muscular activity bringing 
about the hand movement and the tactile sensations are concomitant. 
The theory that voluntary attention works through control of our 
muscular activity only makes sense on the assumption that perception 
and muscular activity are simultaneous. Unfortunately Ribot has not 
established that the connection, if any, between mental imagery and 
muscular activity is likewise simultaneous. To make matters, worse 
the examples he gives suggest that on his view the muscular activity 
is subsequent to the existence of the image! He cites.. the examples 
of "people who plunge head foremost into yawning chasms., through 
fear of falling into them" and of "people who cut themselves with 
razors, through the very fear of cutting themselves." Now these 
seem to me very bad examples indeed, for it can be debated whether 
(1) Ribot, The Psychology of Attention, 
pp. 53 -4. 
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any image need be present at all in the case of such fears, and 
furthermore if a person does throw himself from a height as a result 
of having the image of throwing himself from a height, the muscular 
activity bringing about the fall must occur after the image had 
occurred. Thus even if we grant Ribot his "motory element" in 
imagery, this by itself does not establish that image and muscular 
activity are concurrent, and yet this step is crucial to his argument. 
Unless it can be demonstrated, it cannot be maintained that attention 
works through muscular activity in reflection, as it does in percep- 
tion. It must be said that Ribot's argument simply lets us down at 
this point. 
I shall in due course offer an alternative argument to support 
Ribot's thesis that muscular activity is a necessary condition of 
the occurrence of imagery. But that is only half the picture. 
Ribot also has to demonstrate the presence of motor elements in 
general ideas or concepts. For this purpose he advances an image 
theory of thinking. The reason for this is obvious. Having to his 
own satisfaction shown the motory basis of imagery, if ideas them- 
selves can be reduced to images, it must follow that they too have 
a motory basis. I shall not follow Ribot through his discussion of 
generic imagery, however, for I believe there is an easier way of 
making the connection between muscular activity and ideas. 
8. I shall begin by contrasting the view I am about to put 
forward, with another view with which I am in sharp disagreement. 
It has been argued recently that one of the facts Ryle had 
over- 
looked in The Concept of Mind was the existence 
of thoughts.(1) 
(1) W.J. Ginnane, 'Thoughts', Mind, LXIX, 275 (1960). 
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The writer, Ginnane, first identifies a thought with what we nat- 
urally describe when we use such expressions as "it occurred to me ", 
"it crossed my mind ", and "it dawned on me that..." Thoughts in 
this sense are events. They can always be assigned a time and 
place. Thus far I am in agreement. It is the following contention 
that I dispute: 
How can we reconcile the fact that thoughts are occurrences 
with the fact that they do not involve the alteration of 
any stuff at all, not even shadow -stuff such as mental 
imagery? The answer is vexing but inevitable: we just have 
to learn to live with the mystery: thoughts are sui generis. 
Thoughts just cannot be 'explained' by equating them with 
something else of a more familiar kind - something we can 
get our teeth into - and that is all there is to it.(1) 
My objection to this view is based on the argument (a) that all the 
facts mentioned by Ginnane can be adequately explained without its 
being true that thoughts are sui generic; and (b) that the admittance 
of sui generis thoughts into consciousness offends against the Law of 
Parsimony. It is instructive to compare this passage of Ginnane's 
with the following one from Price's Thinking and Experience. 
In the last two chapters the term 'symbol' has been used in 
a very wide sense, to mean roughly.'whatever we think with'. 
It would seem that there is no such -thing as pure or naked 
thinking; or if conceivably there could be, it is beyond the 
reach of human frailty, even though superhuman intelligences 
may be capable of it. The human mind, it seems, must always 
have sensible or quasi -sensible media 'in' which we think.(2) 
Now it seems to me that this passage is intended to rule out 
precisely the sort of view put forward by Ginnane. Thoughts which 
are sui generis, are "naked!' thoughts_ which only a 
superhuman intell- 
igence might be capable of. Price goes on to identify 
the media in 
which we think: 
(1) W.J.Ginnane, 'Thoughts', Mind, 
LXIX, 388 (1960). 
(2) H.H. Price, Thinking and Experience 
(London, 1953), 
PP. 237 -8. 
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In free thinking we think 'in' all sorts of sensible and 
quasi -sensible particulars, and indeed in principle there 
is no limit to their variety. We think in words, in 
images, in gestures or incipient gestures, in pantomimic 
actions, with models or sketches or other sensible replicas.(1) 
The symbols "with" which we think are either particulars that 
happen to exist and which we just make use of, or particulars that 
we ourselves produce. In both cases the existence of the symbol 
may be called an occurrence, and it is this fact, I think, that 
accounts for the belief that thoughts are occurrences. When Ginnane 
claims that thoughts are datable as to the time and place of their 
occurrence, what we really date is the time and place of the occurr- 
ence of the symbol by means of which the thought is expressed; 
whether it be word, image, or gesture. 
It must be admitted that after considering this alternative, 
Ginnane rejects it as "patently false ". In fact however he does the 
Image Theory scant justice, and he would I am sure have taken it 
far more seriously had he taken into account Price's analysis of the 
Imagist Theory of Thinking. Ginnane'a argument amounts to this: 
thoughts are not identical with images, therefore the occurrence of 
thoughts has nothing to do with the occurrence of images.: 
This view, though easily refuted, still has its adherents. 
It is patently false because there is no self -contradiction 
involved in someone saying that it occurred to him at a 
particular time that such -and -such, whilst at the same time 
steadfastly denying that he had any mental images whatsoever 
at the time in question. In fact not only could such a claim 
be made without self -contradiction, it could very often be 
made quite truly. In any case, no collection of images, 
however complicated, could ever fully correspond to 
a thought. 
No images could, of themselves, amount to, or 
constitute, 
the thought that I report when I say, for example, 
"It 
occurred to me that Peter might drop in today 
for a drink ". 
The images are equivocal in a way in which the 
thought is 
quite definite. Images can never be anything 
more than 
illustrations of my thoughts, just as 
pictures in a book can 
never be more than illustrations of the text.(2) 
(1) Loc. cit. 
(2) Ginnane, op. cit. p. 387. 
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In this argument the premisses are true, but the conclusion is_ 
false. It is a non -sequitur from beginning to end. Price has 
shown quite conclusively that a visual image is usually very much 
more than an "illustration" of a thought. It is one of the more 
successful symbols of thoughts. The flaw in Ginnane's argument is 
his failure to deal with the possibility that on those occasions 
on which he has a thought without having "any mental images what- 
soever at the time ", his thought can only occur because it is 
expressed in some other form of symbol. It cannot be argued that a 
mental image is never a symbol because it is not always a symbol; 
but that seems to be the assumption behind Ginnane's conclusion 
that "images can never be anything more than illustrations of... 
thoughts." As I shall show this error vitiates his entire position. 
Something first needs to be said about the alternative sorts. 
of particular by means of which thoughts can be symbolized. Undue 
confusion is caused by an ambiguity in the use of the word "image ". 
As Price says., 
The Imagists, we have seen, draw a sharp distinction between 
image thinking and verbal thinking. But is there not a sense 
in which some verbal thinking is itself image thinking? 
Certainly we do often think in or with verbal images - visual, 
or auditory, or kinaesthetic. 
But these are not the sort of images with which the 
Imagist is concerned, and this sort of thinking is not what 
he means by 'Image thinking'.(1) 
But the Image Theorists are wrong to think that non -verbal visual 
imagery is the only true source of the symbols in which we think. 
We can just as well use as symbols the auditory images of the sounds 
of words, or the kinaesthetic images associated with the articula- 
tion of words. In fact we need not use images as symbols at all. 
To placate the Anti -Image philosophers, we now turn to an 
important point which the Imagists have completely overlooked. 
(1) Op. cit. pp. 243-4. 
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Although mental images are quasi -instantiative particulars, 
they are not the only ones. Perfectly good perceptible 
objects, denizens of the public material world in which the 
Anti -Imagists feel so much at home, may have this quasi - 
instantiative function, and may cash our words in absence, 
or approximate to cashing them, in very much the same way 
as mental images do.(1) 
It can now be appreciated that Ginnane's thesis that thoughts 
are sui generis, is not established by his denial that thoughts are 
embodied in mental images. The view he attempts to refute specifies 
that a thought is embodied in either a visual image, or a non -visual 
image, or a perceptible object, or a gesture. It can only be 
refuted if it is shown that a thought could occur which was not 
embodied in any of these forms. In other words, the refutation must 
consist in a denial of all the disjuncts. A denial of just one of 
them is ineffective. It cannot be said that Ginnane even begins to 
satisfy this condition. 
So far from being successful is Ginnane's attempt to refute 
the view opposing his own, that it undermines the very premiss on 
which his claim that thoughts are sui generis is based. If we 
accept Price's account, according to which the symbols "in" which a 
thought is expressed are drawn either from mental images, or from 
perceptible objects, we have an argument for denying that thoughts 
are sui generis. For the symbols mentioned above are themselves 
particulars. It follows that the occurrence of a thought entails 
the occurrence of a particular. Thus we already have a datable and 
locatable particular when a thought is said to occur: namely, the 
symbol. Consequently there is no need to look elsewhere for some- 
thing which can be located and dated when a thought occurs. 
A fortiori there is no need to postulate an ostensibly purely spir- 
itual element of consciousness as the occurrence in question. 
(1) Ibid. p. 256. 
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Image consciousness and perceptual consciousness cover the situation 
quite adequately. 
9. It can now be seen that Ribot had no need to try to show that 
ideas themselves had to have a "motor element ", apart from showing 
that images had a "motor element ". If all ideas have to have their 
symbols, then the motor element will enter through their symbols. 
But Ribot has already argued that the motor element is to be found 
in the two sorts of particular which can be used as symbols: viz., 
perceptible objects, and images. No separate provision need be made, 
therefore, for ideas. In this way Ribot can be freed from the nec- 
essity of giving an Imagist Theory of Thinking. In fact he does 
offer us an Imagist Theory of Thinking, but it must be remarked that 
he emphatically dissents from the view that the only relevant images 
are non -verbal visual images. On the contrary, as a psychologist, 
he endorses Galton's work on image thinking, and he lays stress on 
the fact that many people think in non -visual images. Some are 
visual imagists, some auditory imagists, some kinaesthetic imagists, 
&c. If, therefore, the mechanism of attention operates in reflection 
in the same way that it does in sensorial attention, it must operate 
through the motor element in mental imagery (that is, when it is not 
operating directly through sensorial attention, when the symbol of 
the idea is a perceptible object). We are free now to come back to 
this question. 
My sympathy lies with psychologists such as Ribot and Bain, 
not to mention philosophers such as Hobbes and Hume, who stress the 
intimate connection between mental image and perception. Ribot is 
right, I believe, to reject the idea that the image is "a kind of 
phantom without definite seat ", but it would be wrong to follow him 
171. 
to the point of claiming that "there is between perception and image 
identity of nature, identity of seat, and only difference of degree." 
I shall contrast these two approaches to imagery by calling the 
former the "phantom approach" and the latter the "sentient approach ". 
(By the sentient approach I mean the view that there is an intimate 
connection between perception and image, and not Ribot's view that 
there is identity with difference in degree only.) What I wish to 
argue is that the sentient approach makes better sense than the 
phantom approach. It accommodates and renders intelligible the 
empirical facts in a way the phantom approach cannot match. 
The phantom approach is the name I give to the view that it is 
logically possible that a man may have a visual image, in spite of 
the fact that he is blind. This view applies mutatis mutandis to 
the mental images corresponding to the other sense modalities as 
well. Now if it were logically possible for a blind man to have 
visual imagery, it would follow that the formation of the image 
would be completely independent of the muscular activity connected 
with the organ of sight. On the phantom approach it is a straight- 
forward empirical question whether or not visual sense experience 
must exist before visual imagea can make their appearance. It is of 
course the fundamental tenet of classical Empiricism that all mental 
imagery is derived from sense experience.(1) It is not at all 
clear, however, that the relation between visual imagery and visual 
experience is contingent. First of all when a description is given 
of a visual image, it is not described as image. That is described 
is the thing which the image is an image of. The description is 
(1) An Empiricist like Hume is enmeshed in the difficulties 
over this tenet which beset Logical Positivists over the 
Verification Principle. Is it a generalization based on 
experience that no image occurs in the mind without its 
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given, in other words, in material- object language. But material - 
object language presupposes that its user enjoys sense experience. 
It rests on such concepts as "look ", "perspective ", "colour" and 
"shape ". Now although a description of a visual image is a descrip- 
tion of what the image is an image of, this does not mean that the 
description bypasses the image altogether. The description of the 
object images, is still "read off ", so to speak, from the image 
itself. So the description is not merely a description of a material 
object, but the description of how that material object is imaged. 
What I am saying amounts to this. The descriptions we give 
of our visual images of necessity make use of visual concepts. Now 
let us suppose that a blip cman claims to have a visual image. How 
can we ascertain whether his claim is true? Suppose we ask him to 
describe the image. There are two possibilities: (a) he may try 
but fail to give a description, or (b) he may in fact produce a 
description making use of visual concepts. If he cannot give a 
description, it seems to me we have every right to be sceptical about 
his claim that his image is visual. What, we may ask, makes him call 
it visual? What does he understand the word "visual" to mean here? 
If (b) is the case, the position is different. Blind people can 
come to learn to use visual words correctly. A man blind from birth 
will use a word like "red" correctly for instance. But correct use 
of a visual concept does not entail that the user can see. We have 
no guarantee, therefore, that when a blind man uses a visual concept 
having been preceded by a corresponding impression? If it 
is, then it is only probably true, and cannot be known to be 
true. On the other hand if it is known to be true, then it is 
not an empirical generalization, but an instance of a priori 
knowledge which is inconsistent with the presuppositions of 
Empiricism. 
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to describe his image, it must be a visual image he is describing. 
For instance it is reported that a blind man likened the colour 
purple to the sound of a trombone. Of necessity he had to employ 
auditory, or other kinds of, analogy to cash the concept "purple ". 
But if he had said that his image was of something purple, we would 
not be inclined to say that he was describing a visual colour image. 
The retort might be made that these are no more than diff- 
iculties of verification. We know that blinddpeople who have their 
sight restored cannot at first distinguish one geometrical shape 
from another by sight, in spite of being able to recognise them by 
feel. Bearing this in mind, we are not entitled to transfer our 
doubts about the blindcmants_ description of his image, into doubts 
about the possibility of his having a visual image. It is theoret- 
ically possible, according to this reasoning, for the blinddman to 
have a visual image without he or anyone else knowing that his image 
is visual. Even if this point be conceded, the claim that a blinde 
man could conceivably have a visual image, is much reduced. For it 
turns out to be an image which no one knows to be visual, and that 
is a different matter altogether. The normal case from which we 
started was that of a man not only having a visual image, but know- 
ing it to be visual. I feel therefore that my argument still carries 
some force. This is just one of the considerations to be weighed. 
Perceptual concepts such as "seeing" and "hearing ", entail the 
existence of the concepts of "an organ of sight" and "an organ of 
hearing ".(1) Let us continue to confine ourselves to sight. When 
we look at an object, the object of necessity appears from a certain 
perspective, determined by the location of our eyes. We see objects 
in a particular direction, and at a certain distance from our eyes. 
(1) See S. Shoemaker, Self -Knowledge and Self -Identity, 
(Ithaca, 1963) ch. 5, where this point is convincingly 
argued. 
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We see only an aspect of the object, visible from our particular 
perspective. We do not see, as it were, the object "in the round" 
all at once. In other words we cannot see an object from every 
perspective at once. These limitations are imposed upon sight 
because of our unavoidable reliance on one kind of sense -organ. 
Now it is true also of a visual image, that the description we give 
of it, is logically similar to the description we give when we are 
seeing rather than imaging. As I have said, we describe the 
object of which the image is an image, and that means that we 
describe the object as though it were being seen. We would describe 
the object as though it were being seen from a certain perspective, 
and this entails the object's presenting a certain aspect, and 
being at a certain distance.(1) Not even in visual imagery can we 
escape the limitations of perspectival appearance. We cannot, for 
instance, have an image of every side of a house united in one. 
Our visual images_, therefore, are subject to the same conditions of 
being an appearance from a position, in a direction, at a distance, 
as are found in the case of seeing. 
The question arises "Can a blind man satisfy these conditions 
for visual imagery ?" Or to put it another way "Would he be able to 
make sense of them ?" He certainly would have no experience of these 
perspectival characteristics, which visual perception and visual 
imagery have in common. Nor is it conceivable that a visual image 
could lack these perspectival characteristics. A visual image that 
did not present an aspect of the object of which it was an image, 
(1) The question of the perspectival quality of the visual 
image must not be confused with the question of the 
location of the visual image itself within the visual 
field. This is a separate question, which I will come 
to. 
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would lack precisely the characteristic that makes it essentially 
visual. It is, of course, a known empirical fact that the blindcdo 
not have visual images. The above argument, however, raises a doubt 
whether this is an empirical matter at all. It suggests that it is 
logically impossible for the blindcto form visual images. Our very 
concept of a visual image is fashioned out of our experience of see- 
ing objects. If a person were unable to form any idea of what it 
was like to see an object, he must also be unable to form any idea 
of what it would be like to have a visual image. We have here 
another consideration weighing against the phantom approach. 
If the phantom approach were true, it would be difficult to 
understand why there are the same number of forms of mental image as 
there are forms of sense experience. Why should there not be ten or 
eleven types of mental image, perhaps including X -ray images, and 
radio wave images? Furthermore, if the connection between a sense- 
modality and an image is contingent, why should the image be named 
after the sense modality? Why should the images be described as 
visual, auditory, tactile, and olfactory, instead of being given 
some other description, unless the imager believed them to be 
derived from the sense modalities.? 
10. There is another respect in which the connection between 
sense -organ and image is not straightforwardly contingent. From the 
phenomenological point of view mental images have their "seat" in 
the appropriate sense- organ. It is not easy to make this clear 
without seeming to claim altogether more than is intended. Let me 
begin by pointing out an obviously contingent fact, which we usually 
take for granted. All our superior sense -organs: are clustered 
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together in our heads. It is for this reason, I suggest, that 
mental images are often said to be situated in our heads. But it 
is certainly a contingent fact, although a biologically intelligible 
one, that our main sense- organs are grouped together. However, let 
us imagine that they were all placed at opposite extremities from 
one another: for instance, our eyes on our hands, and our ears on 
our feet. Let the remaining senses remain where they are. In such 
circumstances we would without doubt take our visual images to 
emanate from the region of our hands, and our auditory images to 
emanate from the region of our feet, as. we at present take them to 
emanate from the region of our eyes and ears, respectively. Now 
obviously it would be misleading to say that we see our visual 
images with our eyes, and hear our auditory images with our ears. 
We do not see or hear images.; we have them, or form them. Neverthe- 
less the point I wish to bring out is that just as in seeing and 
hearing the point of reference is the eyes and the ears, respectively, 
so too in visual and auditory imagery, the point of reference is_ 
the eyes and the ears, respectively. We already have some experience 
of this. If I have a kinaesthetic, or a tactile image of my toe 
wagging, the image is not "in" my head, but "in" my toe. If the 
phantom approach were true, there would be no reason to think that 
if the sense -organs were banished to the extremities of bodies, the 
corresponding images would follow them there. On the contrary they 
could be expected to stay stubbornly at home in the head. If, as I 
maintain, this is not what we would expect to happen, we have 
further reasons for thinking the sentient approach more coherent 
than the phantom approach. 
I would like to dwell a little longer on this matter. When I 
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allege that an image "emanates" from the region in which the 
sense -organ is situated I am using a metaphor to describe some- 
thing which it is difficult to describe more directly. Neverthe- 
less I shall make the attempt. Images do not exist in public 
space, but they do have spatial features. These spatial features 
are not, however, confined to the "world" of the image; i.e., it 
is not only the relations of one element of an image to another 
that can be described in spatial terms. There is, in addition, a 
seeming spatial relation between the imager himself and his image. 
This is particularly evident in the case of visual imagery. 
Psychological subjects have reported on introspective grounds that 
when their eyes are closed their visual images appear to be about 
two inches in front of their eyes. The imager, therefore, 
orientates the image in relation to regions of his body. Thus we 
could say that auditory images are "in" the ear -drums, olfactory 
images "in" the nose, gustatory images. "in" the mouth, and so on. 
If I am right about this, when an imager is presented with an image, 
he will make a spatial distinction between the place he occupies 
and the place the image "occupies ". Moreover he will use the 
regions of his body as the frame of reference for the location of 
his images, in his private space. The point can now be made that 
if his eyes were on his hands, the imager's visual imagery would 
appear to be projected from his hands. By the same reasoning if 
the imager's ears were on his feet, the position of his auditory 
images in private space would be projected from his feet. If we 
now go back to the phantom approach and consider the possibility 
of an imager without sense -organs, we can say at once that this 
emanation of the image from the region of the sense -organ must be 
absent. There is no sense -organ from which the emanation can take 
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place. Moreover, if it were suggested that the spatial differentia- 
tion between imager and image could still be postulated, and 
orientated in relation to regions of the body, it would be quite 
inexplicable why this should be so. Such a suggestion would be in 
effect an attempt to get the best of both worlds without making 
any concessions to either. We are left with the position that an 
imager without the relevant sense -organ would lack the element of 
spatiality between himself and his image, which I have used the 
metaphor of an emanation from the sense -organ to describe. But 
that would mean that his image would lack one of the essential 
features of images. We would not be able to conceive what such a 
putative image would be like. I draw the conclusion that not only 
is it not possible for a person born without the relevant sense- 
organ to have an image as we understand it, but also that any 
quasi -image he might have, would be outside our experience. 
The intimate connection between the possession of sense -organs 
and the existence of mental imagery can be shown at a more obvious 
level. I might just mention the easily overlooked fact that when 
we form mental images, the related sense -organ "comes into play ". 
When we try to recall the smell of something, we give a sniff, just 
as we do when we are actually smelling. (As an experiment it is 
worth trying to form an olfactory image while uniformly exhaling. 
Just as we cannot smell while exhaling, we cannot have an image of 
a smell while exhaling.) When we try to form a visual image, our 
eyes go vacant. When we try to form an image of the taste of some- 
thing, we tend to draw saliva. In each case the attempt to form 
an image gives rise to an activation of the corresponding sense- 
organ. On the phantom approach the assumption would be that this 
179. 
sense -organ activity was irrelevant to the existence of the image. 
This assumption is questionable, as I shall show in the case of 
visual imagery. Ribot quotes two authorities on the existence of 
eye movements during visual imagery. 
Czermak, and after him Stricker, have pointed out, that if 
after having inwardly contemplated the image of an object 
supposed to be very near, we abruptly pass to the mental 
vision of a very distant object, we will feel a marked 
change in the state of innervation of the eyes. In real 
vision, in such a case as this, one must pass from the 
state of convergence to the state of parallelism of the 
visual axes, that is, one must innerve the motor muscles 
of the eye in a different manner. The same operation, 
though weaker and in a nascent stage, takes place in that 
internal vision which accompanies reflection.(1) 
That we use our eyes in visual imagery can very easily be shown by 
a simple experiment. The test consists in shutting the eyes, 
rotating them upwards to their limit, and, keeping them in that 
position, trying to form an image of what one would see if one were 
looking down from the top of a tall building. A strain will be 
felt if one tries to prevent one2seyes from falling. I am in some 
doubt as to whether in fact the required image can be formed - 
with one's eyes in the wrong position, so to speak. 
But these facts speak of no more than an empirical connection 
between the use of the eyes and the formation of visual images. 
And, although the empirical facts should not be dismissed out of 
hand, the phantom approach can only be shaken by establishing log- 
ical connections between visualizing and looking. This I shall now 
try to do. Ryle has quite rightly pointed out that when we are 
said to have an image of something, we fancy ourselves to be in the 
(1) Ribot, The Psychology of Attention, p. 71. 
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very situation we would need to be in, if we were not having an 
image, but actually seeing the imaged scene.(1) When, for instance, 
I have an image of my house, I imagine myself to be standing in 
front of the house looking at it. In this way the visual image 
has the identical perspectival characteristic that the perception 
itself would have had. Furthermore, if in order to see the whole 
of the front of the house I would need to scan it with my eyes, I 
would obtain my image of the full extent of the front of the house 
by likewise scanning with my eyes. Thus, just as I see the house 
from my eyes, from a perspectival point of view, so too I project 
my visual image from my eyes. And if.I have to move my eyes to 
change the visual scene, I also have to move my eyes to change the 
corresponding image of that visual scene. (Unless, that is, I 
imagine the scene to be physically displaced for me.) In other 
words, in the case of visual perception there is a necessary 
connection between looking and seeing,(2), and if the visual image 
is the counterpart to seeing, there is also a counterpart to look- 
ing. Although the word "visualising" has a wider meaning, it does 
capture some of the character of this counterpart to looking. The 
word "imaging" is often used in this context, and although it 
conveys the idea that this is something we do - an activity - it 
suggests merely that we produce images. Not being confined to the 
description of the production of visual imagery, it cannot suggest 
the involvement of the eyes, in the way "visualising" does. Now 
(1) Ryle, The Concept of 1iind, ch. 8. We may accept Ryle's 
point about fancying that we are observer -situated when we 
claim to be having a mental image of an object, without 
agreeing with him that there is no such thing as a mental 
image: i.e., that pretending to be present, is all there 
is to claiming to have an image. 
(2) I attempt to substantiate this proposition in detail in 
ch. 5. 
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much of our seeing comes about as a result of active looking: 
scanning, running over things with our eyes, looking out of the 
corner of the eye, and so forth. It follows that much of our 
visual imagery must have the stamp of such active looking about it. 
Thus the image in one case might be one that could only be 
described in this way: "It is as if my eyes are running over the 
object." Or in anather case: "It is as if I am seeing it out of 
the corner of my eye." Such images may be called "dynamic" images 
as opposed to "static" ones. What I wish to stress is that dynamic. 
images will have the same perspectival characteristics in relation 
to my eyes, that their perceptual counterparts have. Moreover 
dynamic images can only be described in terms of their perceptual 
analogues. 
My contention is, therefore, that descriptions of dynamic 
visual images would be quite incomprehensible to blindo people. 
They would not be able to understand what was meant by an image 
that gave the appearance of coming out of the corner of the eye, 
because they have no experience of seeing things out of the corner 
of their eyes. Similarly, and for the same reason, they would not 
be able to understand what it was for an image to have the appear- 
ance of being produced by running one's. eyes over an object. 
Having no experience of visual perspective, the blindc person could 
have no idea of the meaning of the description of dynamic images in 
terms of visual perspective. It should be pointed out that although 
a blind person may be able to move his eyes about, such movement 
of the eyes will be merely physical movement, not perceptual movement. 
From the conceptual point of view these two movements are of 
entirely different types. The blindc man's physical 
movement of 
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his eyes would not be related to the quality of any putative visual 
image, as would the eye movements of a man with sight. For the 
blindc man the relation between eye movement and putative visual 
image is indeed entirely contingent; for the man with sight it is 
not. 
I conclude that there are logical reasons for denying the 
validity of the phantom approach. It is not merely a contingent 
truth that we only have images when we possess the relevant sense - 
organ. I have tried to show that dynamic visual images would not 
be what they are, if their relation with the sense -organ were 
severed. The argument for rejecting the phantom approach is at 
the same time an argument in favour of the sentient approach, 
which comes unscathed out of the investigation. 
Before considering the implications of the sentient approach 
I wish to say something about sub -vocal speech. We all know that 
we have to learn to speak aloud before we can speak silently to 
ourselves. Next we learn to speak in whispers, and lastly we 
form words inaudibly. Sub -vocal speech is therefore an instance 
of muscular inhibition. Sometimes we forget to inhibit this 
muscular activity, and it is when this happens we can get caught 
talking to ourselves. 
Psychologists have studied the question whether muscular 
inhibition in sub -vocal speech is complete, and a numiaer have come 
to the conclusion that we never entirely suppress movements in the 
glottis. This alleged fact is the basis of William Jamests famous 
claim that thinking consists of making glottal movements. Now I 
am not particularly concerned with whether or not this claim is 
true. What concerns me is what happens if all 
muscular activity 
is inhibited. Sub -vocal speech is as real a phenomenon 
as is the 
occurrence of mental imagery. The question is, what 
is it, if it 
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is not minimal word articulation? The answer is that it must be 
either kinaesthetic imagery of the kinaesthetic sensations of 
overt verbal utterance, or visual imagery of the appearance of the 
written word, or auditory imagery of the sound of the overt spoken 
word. In other words if sub -vocal speech is not actual glottal 
articulation, it is itself image formation. 
The most likely of these alternatives is that it is either 
auditory imagery, or kinaesthetic imagery. It is, however, often 
difficult to tell these two possibilities apart. The reason for 
this is none other than the spatial proximity of the ear and the 
vocal chords. If, as was earlier supposed, our ears were situated 
in our feet, we would very easily be able to tell whether our sub - 
vocal speech took place in our feet or our heads, and then we would 
know for certain whether it consisted of auditory imagery or 
kinaesthetic imagery. We all know of the joke of a man complaining 
that he can't hear himself think for the noise. This joke has a 
greater element of truth in it than might be thought. If a person' s 
sub -vocal speech, and consequently his verbal thinking, consists of 
auditory imagery, it might well be the case that a great amount of 
external noise smothers his auditory imagery. Our ears have to be 
tuned to auditory imagery, just as our eyes have to be tuned to be 
visual imagery. In both cases sensory stimuli are a distraction. 
It is not, of course, necessary for sub -vocal speech to utilize 
only a single type of imagery. There is nothing to stop it consist- 
ing of two concordant forms of imagery. When we speak aloud we both 
produce the sounds and hear them. There is no reason why both the 
auditory and the kinaesthetic elements should not be reflected in 
the imagery of which sub -vocal speech consists. As. I 
say, whether 
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this happens we would be more confident of asserting had our ears 
not been so closely situated to our vocal chords. For my part, I 
think my own sub -vocal speech is muscular - and not composed of 
kinaesthetic imagery of muscular activity - and at the same time is 
supplemented with auditory imagery. In other words my sub -vocal 
speech has a distinct auditory feel about it, and yet I do not hear 
it. It is as if my silent speech echoes in my ears. Sub -vocal 
speech - thinking to ourselves - if it is not actually a case of 
glottal movement, depends on imagery of one kind or another. It 
can therefore be inferred that the connection holding between the 
sense -organs and mental imagery, must also hold between our thoughts 
and our organs of sense and speech. 
If, as I have argued, the existence of the sense- organ, and 
the muscular movements belonging to it, is a necessary condition of 
the existence of the corresponding imagery, a great simplification 
in the theory of attention can be effected. Ribot, as I said, put 
forward the theory that attention always works. through muscular 
activity. This was amply demonstrated in the case of sense percep- 
tion. Ribot sought to show that it was equally true in the case of 
images and ideas. Unfortunately, he failed to make a satisfactory 
transition from a description of the function of muscular activity 
in the case of sensorial attention, to its function in image forma- 
tion. I have tried to make good this omission in the case of visual 
imagery, by showing that eye adjustments- necessarily take place in 
visual imagery as they do in ordinary looking. If I have succeeded 
in establishing the connection between muscular activity and imagery 
for one key type of image, the probability is strengthened that 
Ribot's theory may be generalized to cover other forms_ 
of mental 
image as well. The advantage of his theory would 
be the gain in 
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simplicity which would accrue from the fact that a single mechanism 
of attention applied throughout. Moreover, this theory would offer 
an explanation of how we come to have the ability to voluntarily 
apply our attention. We accept that we have voluntary control over 
the muscles of the bodily frame. If it is through this muscular 
control that we can bestow attention, we are released from the nec- 
essity of looking for some other mechanism of control in virtue of 
which we can voluntarily engage our attention. 
On the basis of the theory that sense -organ activity is a nec- 
essary condition of the existence of mental imagery, we can deduce 
the following: (a) Since our private thoughts are conducted through 
the symbolism of mental imagery, sense -organ activity must be a nec- 
essary condition of the occurrence of private thoughts too. (b) Since 
all sense -organ activity has its attendant kinaesthetic sensation, 
and since such kinaesthetic sensation has been shown to form a 
residual consciousness, the occurrence of private thoughts must also 
have its attendant kinaesthetic sensation which, in turn, forms a 
residual consciousness for it. We are, however, for the most part 
unaware of the existence of such kinaesthetic sensation during our 
attending to an object, but many psychologists have tried to identify 
them. One of them was James.. Speaking of his own experiences, he 
reports: 
In the first place, the acts of attending, assenting, negating, 
making an effort, are felt as movements of something in the 
head. In many cases it is possible to describe these move- 
ments quite exactly. In attending to either an idea or a 
sensation belonging to a particular sense- sphere, the move- 
ment is the adjustment of the sense -organ, felt as it occurs. 
I cannot think in visual terms, for example, without feeling 
a fluctuating play of pressures, convergencies, divergences, 
and accommodations in my eyeballs. The direction in which the 
object is conceived to lie determines the character of these 
movements, the feeling of which becomes, for my consciousness, 
identified with the manner in which I make myself ready to 
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receive the visible thing...(1) 
In essence I have been arguing for the view that the functional 
dependence between sensorial attention and residual consciousness 
is also to be found between reflection and residual consciousness. 
Ribot is not as clear as he might be on the connection between 
the cognitive aspect of attention and its basis in muscular activity. 
He describes attention as a "predominant intellectual state" but it 
is not immediately clear how it can be at once an intellectual 
state and a muscular activity. My own treatment of the question of 
the nature of the relation between residual consciousness and 
attention reveals how these two aspects of Ribot's theory can be 
reconciled. In section 3 of this chapter I explained the cognitive 
relationship between residual consciousness and attention. This 
covers the intellectual aspect. In section 6 I investigated the 
mechanism of attention, and this investigation showed how at the 
physical level, residual consciousness is related to attention 
through the reflection of muscular activity in consciousness in the 
form of kinaesthetic sensation. It ought to be pointed out that if 
Ribot is wrong to generalize the function of muscular activity to 
cover mental images, and I have been wrong to support him in this, 
the general thesis concerning the relation of residual consciousness 
to attention is not overthrown. In one area it will operate differ- 
ently in its details, that is all. 
The discussion of the last three chapters forms the groundwork 
for the direct enquiry into the nature of the knowable self which 
follows in chapter four. The theory of the self I there advance is 
(1) James, Principles of Psychology, 300. 
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an interpretation of the conclusions already reached, and is based 
on the distinctions for which I have argued. No substantive 
propositions of major significance are introduced for the first 
time in the chapters that follow. From this point of view we 
have reached a natural turning point in the enquiry, and I now 
proceed to consider the implications of what has gone before, for 
our understanding of the experiential self. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE KNOWABLE SELF 
1. In chapter one I set myself the task of examining con- 
sciousness in order to determine its structure. I argued that this 
was a necessary preliminary to determining whether Hamilton and 
Ferrier were justified in affirming the "Duality of Consciousness", 
or whether Hodgson and James were right to deny it. The question 
of the relationship between consciousness and the self was delib- 
erately left in abeyance until this prior question was settled. We 
are now in a position to see that Hamilton was right in thinking 
that consciousness displayed a duality, but wrong in thinking that 
the duality was a duality between one element lying outside con- 
sciousness, and another element lying within consciousness. Both 
elements in the duality, it has been found, lie within consciousness. 
The results of the analysis of consciousness show, similarly, that 
James was right in thinking that there was no duality between an 
element lying outside consciousness and another lying within it, 
but wrong in thinking that there was no duality within consciousness 
itself. James denied that consciousness had an "inner duplicity ". 
We may concede that no evidence has been found of its "duplicity ", 
but much evidence has been assembled pointing to its polarization 
into opposite spheres. 
On the basis of this conclusion, in this chapter I take up the 
question of the self, and advance a theory that attempts to do 
justice to the findings of the two preceding chapters. My thesis is 
that residual consciousness and the self are one and the same thing. 
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If I am able to sustain this thesis, it will follow that Hamilton 
was right to interpret the "Duality of Consciousness" as a duality 
between self and not -self (subject and object), although, once 
again, he was wrong to identify the self with an entity external 
to consciousness. On this theory, James., and those who agree with 
him, are right, too, when they maintain that the self must lie 
within experience. To put the position more generally, the theory 
I am proposing overcomes the difficulties that we saw to lie in 
the way of accepting both the Pure Ego Theory, and the Serial 
Theory.(l) Unlike those two theories, mine is based on an analysis 
of experience itself_, and is not inferred from an analysis of 
entities that are not selves. That is to say, the analysis has 
abided strictly by the caveat that we look for the solution exclu- 
sively in terms of what we ourselves are. 
Some support for the identification of the self with residual 
consciousness comes from the analysis of that notion given in the 
chapter devoted to it. In particular, it will be remembered that I 
spoke of the phenomenon of "distance ", which was found to exist 
between residual consciousness and the object of attention. This 
was especially noticeable in the case of interrogative attention. 
DIoreover, it was established that residual consciousness can itself 
direct the attentive process through a "master idea ". That is, 
residual consciousness can influence the direction of attention. 
We thus_ have two ideas - that of distance, and that of directional- 
ity - which describe functions of residual consciousness, which 
have also been associated with descriptions given of the self. 
(1) See above, p.13 ff. 
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The self has been traditionally conceived to lie behind its 
experiences and apart from them (we have ample evidence of this. 
in views considered in the first chapter), and this feature of the 
self's behaviour can accurately be described by saying that the 
self puts a distance between itself and its object of cognition. 
In addition to this, the self is frequently described as "direct- 
ing attention" this way and that: precisely as we have found 
residual consciousness to do. In sum, most of the observations 
made in the last chapter on the relation between residual con- 
sciousness and attention, would stand, if in each case the expres- 
sion "the self" were substituted for the expression "residual con- 
sciousness". 
I would like to draw attention to some further characteris- 
tics that the self shares with residual consciousness, to add 
substance to the view that they are identical. 
Some theologians maintain that we cannot know God, because 
to know God would be to make Him an object of our knowledge, and 
God is essentially a subject and not an object. This argument is 
based on the premise that a subject cannot be treated as an object 
without its essential subjecthood being destroyed.(1) The valid- 
ity of this theological reasoning is not, however, my concern. I 
mention it to bring out an essential parallel it has with a 
certain view of the self. This is the view that we cannot have 
knowledge of the self, because such knowledge would entail treat- 
ing the self as object, and once it becomes an object, it ceases 
to be a self. On this view it was in vain for Hume to look into 
(1) One of the earliest expressions of this view is to be 
found in Martin Buber's I and Thou, tr. R.G. Smith 
(Edinburgh 1937). 
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himself for some impression of himself, for if by chance he had 
come across anything with the required specifications_, it would 
be an object and not a subject. If the self is essentially a 
subject, it cannot - on this line of thinking - be made an 
object, without losing its essential character as subject: without 
losing, that is, precisely that characteristic we are searching 
for. Just as it is logically impossible for God to disclose 
Himself by allowing Himself to be an object of experience 
(because whatever was an object of experience could not be God), 
so too it is logically impossible for the self to be an object of 
experience for the reason that it ceases to be a subject. 
The view that the self is essentially subject, can be traced 
back to Kant's distinction between the transcendental self and 
the empirical self. "I have no knowledge of myself as I am," he 
says, "but merely as I appear to myself. "(1) Kant's views .. on the 
nature of the transcendental self are obscure, but it is not nec- 
essary for us to pursue them in order to appreciate the relevance 
of his distinction to the approach to the self I am now consider- 
ing. However, in the very next sentence, he says "The con- 
sciousness of self is thus very far from being a knowledge of the 
self..." suggesting that I know that I am a self, even though I 
do not know what the self is. The reason Kant gives for our 
inability to know ourselves as we are, as Kant explains in the 
footnote to the passage from which I have been quoting, is that 
(1) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. N. Kemp Smith 
(London, 1953), B 158. At A 107, Kant says: "Con- 
sciousness of self according to the determinations of 
our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and 
always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present 
itself in this flux of inner appearances." 
192. 
any intuition I have of myself as object, must of necessity be 
subject to the condition under which all appearances are given: 
namely that they are conditioned by time. In his view this is a 
sufficient condition of any experience of the self being merely an 
appearance of the self, and not the real self. But even had Kant 
not used this particular argument, his view nevertheless lends . 
itself to the idea that the real self can never be met with in 
experience.(1) In the passage I quoted, Kant describes the 
empirical self as appearing to myself. This cannot be a reference 
to the empirical self, but must be a reference to the real self: 
i.e., the subject of the experience of the empirical self. Now 
if, as Kant does., one makes the assumption that every experience 
entails an experiencer, it will follow that whatever experience 
of a self I have, there must still exist a self which has that 
experience, which is not itself the object of the experience. It 
follows that we can never experience the self qua subject, because 
as soon as we attempt to grasp the subject -self we find that 
another subject -self has taken its place. If. therefore the sub- 
ject-self is identified as the real self, the real self forever 
lies just behind experience. It is always the experiencer, never 
the experience itself. 
Ryle has referred to this peculiarity of the self in always. 
seeming to be one jump ahead of us in our efforts to experience it, 
(1) I use the expression "real self" to stand for what Kant 
calls "the self as I am ", in contrast to "the self as I 
appear ", in order to avoid embroilment in the doctrine 
of the Transcendental Ego. It must not be thought, 
however, that I am thinking of "the real self" of later 
British Idealists. 
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as "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I' ".(1) He describes the 
apparent dilemma most evocatively: 
Even if the person is, for special speculative purposes.., 
momentarily concentrating on the Problem of the Self, he 
has failed and knows that he has failed to catch more 
than the flying coat -tails of that which he was pursuing. 
His quarry was the hunter. 
In Ryle's view it is logically impossible for the "I" which is the 
subject of experience to be at the same time its own object. Now, 
as I suggest, Kant did not himself adopt the position that it was 
logically impossible for the self to be its. own object, although 
it would not have been difficult for him to have done so. He 
appears to have thought that another sort of being could conceiv- 
ably intuit its real self: 
Such an intelligence [as is ours], therefore, can know 
itself only as it appears to itself in respect of an 
intuition which is not intellectual and cannot be given 
by the understanding itself, not as it would know itself 
if its intuition were intellectual.(2) 
But it could be argued that even a being with such a creative 
intelligence might be forced to admit the distinction between the 
self that has the intellectual intuition, and the self experienced 
in the intellectual intuition. If he were, the systematic elu- 
siveness_ of "I" would recur to plague the creative intelligence 
as well. In any event the mere concept of a non -discursive 
intelligence knowing itself through an intellectual intuition does 
not of itself rule out the dis.tinction_in question. I am, 
(1) Concept of Mind, ch. VI, sec. 7. 
(2) B 159. I might just mention that this is an example 
of the strategy employed by Kant, referred to on 
p. 23, above. 
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therefore, inclined to side with Ryle and against Kant as far as 
the explanation of the systematic elusiveness of "I" is concerned. 
To hope to have an experience of the experiencer, if it makes 
sense at all, sets going an infinite regress. No matter how 
many manifestations of the self are experienced, there will 
always be one left over which has not yet been experienced, and 
that one is the subject of the last experience. Experience of the 
self, is, in Ryle's words, "logically condemned to eternal 
penultimacy." 
Now in the previous chapter it was explained that residual 
consciousness .could not itself become the object of attention 
without thereby ceasing to be residual consciousness. In other 
words, it was shown to be logically impossible for residual con- 
sciousness qua residual consciousness to become the object of 
attention. In this respect residual consciousness refers to that 
which we experience, but which we cannot experience as object of 
attention. The attempt to experience as object of attention that 
which can only be experienced as background is frustrated in the 
same way, and for the same reason, as is the attempt to make of 
the subject -self its own object. From this point of view residual 
consciousness is systematically elusive. It is systematically 
elusive to attention. There is a parallel with the "I" which, as 
Ryle has argued, is systematically elusive, too, in the sense that 
the "I" cannot be objectified by attention. 
If we now identify residual consciousness and the self, we 
explain at once how it happens that they both exhibit the same 
logical behaviour, and what is more, we provide ourselves with an 
explanation of the systematic elusiveness of "I ". If the 
self 
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is residual consciousness, then the self can no more become its 
own object of attention, than residual consciousness can become 
its own object of attention, and for the identical reason. Resid- 
ual consciousness is, by definition, not the object of attention. 
Nevertheless, there is nothing to stop the elements at any one 
time forming residual consciousness from becoming at another time 
objects of attention. If it were possible for all the elements of 
residual consciousness at one instant to become the whole object 
of attention at the next instant, we would have a situation in 
which an empirical self had become the object of attention.(i) 
But, as I have tried to make clear, there would still have to be 
a residual consciousness in its place, and that would be the 
subject -self. We can therefore envisage, as a theoretical 
possibility, a succession of attempts to objectify the subject - 
self. Each time a new subject-self takes the place of the one 
just objectified, becoming its experiencer. The theory I am 
advocating explains why this must be so, not on the purely formal 
ground that an experience requires an experiencer, but on the 
material ground that a self could not be an object of attention 
unless residual consciousness, with which I have identified the 
subject -self, existed. 
The great attraction of the theory I am proposing can now 
be explained. In the first place it enables us to resist the 
logic of the argument according to which the phenomenon of the 
systematic elusiveness of "I" drives us back to a Pure Ego. A 
(1) This possibility will be considered when I come to 
the question of self- consciousness. See below, sec. 
5. 
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Pure Ego, moreover, that lies outside all experience. According 
to this logic, if every attempt to grasp the real self in expe- 
rience fails, this must mean that the self must be something 
that cannot be experienced. Moreover, it follows that we can gain 
no knowledge of this self, for such knowledge would imply that we 
had some experience of it. Therefore, all we know of the self 
is that it is the subject of every experience. Hence its 
designation: The Pure Ego. In the second place, and in contrast 
with this reasoning, I am suggesting that it is indeed true that 
the subject -self can never itself become an object of experience, 
but that this has nothing to do with the nature of the self - 
transcendental or empirical. It is put down to nothing other than 
the way attention operates. This enables it to be asserted in all 
consistency, both that the self as subject is e.xperiental, and 
that it is never presented as an object of experience. Thus, far 
from it being the case that the self is unknown in itself, it is 
knowable through experience, and exists as experience. 
The theory overcomes the paradox that the self, although 
knowable by empirical means, is never an object of experience, and 
in the process removes the main prop holding up The Pure Ego 
Theory of the Self. The essence of the matter is, on my view, 
that the self is "experienced" (i.e., is composed of elements of 
experience), but is never known contemporaneously as an object of 
knowledge. It is for this reason that the self is regarded as 
lying behind its experiences, "distancing" itself from them. It 
also explains why we have such a lively sense of the presence of 
the self, and are nonplussed by denials of its existence. 
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2. Further support for the identification of residual con- 
sciousness and the self can be drawn from an altogether different 
quarter. I shall argue that the theory is corroborated by certain 
of its deductive consequences. These give rise to expectations 
which appear to be borne out by experience. In the previous 
chapter I mentioned the logical possibility of a form of con- 
sciousness that I described as a homogeneous consciousness. A 
homogeneous consciousness was said to be one in which a total 
temporary state of consciousness consisted of one element and one 
element only. I spoke of such an element invading the whole of 
consciousness, and blotting out all other elements. In that 
chapter I did not commit myself on the question whether such a 
form of consciousness ever actually occurred, and it is not nec- 
essary to my argument that I do so now. My argument is based on 
the fact that people have claimed to experience a homogeneous 
consciousness. I shall attempt to show that the descriptions that 
are given of alleged experiences of a homogeneous consciousness 
are the descriptions we would expect to receive if my theory were 
true. In other words, they can be deduced from the theory. 
A homogeneous consciousness would, by definition, be a con- 
sciousness without a residual consciousness, i.e. it would not be 
polarized, as a normal consciousness is. It follows from the theory 
that the single element of a homogeneous consciousness could not be 
the object of attention. It can further be inferred that if there 
were such a homogeneous consciousness it would be characterized as 
a form of consciousness from which the presence of the self had 
entirely vanished. This inference follows logically from the 
identification of residual consciousness and the self: if no 
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residual consciousness, then no self. Were such a homogeneous con- 
sciousness to exist, its existence could not be reported first- 
hand at the time, for to report the occurrence of the state would 
of necessity mean that a self must be aware concurrently of the 
state, and this would entail the existence of residual con- 
sciousness, which, ex hypothesi, does not exist. The only first- 
hand evidence of the existence of a homogeneous consciousness 
would come from someone's memory of having passed through such a 
state. 
My theory would lead us to expect such a person to say that 
he remembered being in a state of consciousness characterized by 
a lack of any consciousness of being a self. That is, the state 
of consciousness would be remembered as one in which there was 
complete loss of self- identity. Now it so happens that Ribot 
raises the question of the possible existence of a homogeneous 
consciousness, and concludes that it is realized in some rare 
types of mystical experience: 
Do there really exist cases of absolute monoideism, in 
which consciousness is reduced to a sole and single state 
entirely occupying it, and in which the mechanism of 
association is totally arrested? In our opinion, this 
we meet in only a few, very rare cases of ecstasy,...(1) 
Furthermore, the example Ribot instances, as a case of such 
ecstasy, is St Theresa's mystical union with God. He traces the 
seven stations of prayer, or meditation, through which St Theresa 
says we must pass before we reach the highest stage of ecstasy, 
which is union with God, and points out that each stage advances 
to a greater concentration of consciousness than the preceding 
(1) Ribot, The Psychology of Attention, p. 10. 
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stage, until ultimately consciousness reaches a single homogeneous 
state, which he calls "absolute monoideism". As he says, "God 
has now descended into the substance of the soul, and become one 
with it. "(1) But it is precisely when the soul has attained this 
union with God, that mystics claim that all consciousness of self 
is lost. Indeed some mystics carry their claim to the point of 
paradox and say that they become God during their mystical 
encounter. 
Ribot points out that such supreme mystical consummations 
happen extremely rarely. "The greatest mystics alone," he says 
"have attained, by a still stronger effort, to absolute monoideism." 
There is reason to believe, therefore, that those instances of 
mystical experience that reach the state of absolute monoideism 
are also the ones in which the mystic is likely to claim that his 
self was annihilated in the encounter. In so far as this result 
is precisely the one that my theory would lead us to expect, it 
offers some corroboration of it. 
A view similar to the one I am advocating was put forward by 
Dawes Hicks in an article he wrote in 1913.(2) His three basic 
ideas are these: (a) Attention is said to operate in all forms of 
consciousness; (b) It brings about "a certain selection or limita- 
tion within the field of what is apprehended of some features. and 
the relative neglect or disregard of the rest." (c) In its 
higher, voluntary form it is responsible for the distinction 
(1) Ribot:_Thé Psychology of Attention, P. 100. 
(2) G. Dawes Hicks, 'The Nature and Development of Atten- 
tion', The British Journal of Psychology, VI, 1, (1913). 
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between self and not -self. I shall pass over (a) and (b) which do 
no more than endorse the approach of the earlier chapters. The 
important consideration is (c), and, referring to the distinctions 
which attention discloses by operating on its material, Dawes 
Hicks. has this to say: 
One such important distinction - it is not too much to say, 
the most important distinction - which thus comes gradually 
to recognition is that indicated by the terms self and 
not -self. By degrees in the development of intelligence 
there is effected a definitely recognised separation between_ 
the trains of thoughts, sentiments., feelings and sense - 
presentations which are more or less constant and habitual, 
and which thus come to be regarded as constituting the 
prevailing centre or background of individual personality, 
and the relatively transient presentations and apprehended 
contents which come and go, and which the subject learns 
to contrast with and to distinguish from the totality of 
the former. The contents_ of our knowledge or experience, 
or rather certain of them, tend more and more to wear the 
aspect of an inward possession, and to become the instrument, 
as it were, by which we apprehend the world of objective 
fact. So soon as this distinction has attained any prominence 
in consciousness, it must of necessity influence in a very 
decided manner the direction, as we may put it metaphorically, 
of attention. For it will then become possible for the subject 
to differentiate between the cases where attention comes about 
through a presented object being connected with the contents 
of representations or ideas that are not specially included 
in the consciousness of self, and the cases where the activity 
of comparing and relating is carried on through means of those 
ideas and feelings which are included.(1) 
There area of course, certain differences between the position 
expressed in this passage, and the one I have been developing. 
Nevertheless. Dawes Hicks's account decidedly corroborates the theory 
I am advancing. 
3. As I see it, the theory is at this point faced with 
three 
crucial difficulties. Firstly, it seems not to be reconcilable 
with the view of the self as something persisting in 
time. A 
theory of the self must be deemed a failure if 
it rules out the 
(1) G._Dawes Hicks, 'The Nature 
and Development of Atten- 
tion', The British Journal 
of Psychology, VI, 22, (1913). 
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possibility of my being able to say that I am the same self 
today that I was yesterday. And yet, it could be suggested, 
by implication my theory does precisely that. For if the self 
is identical with residual consciousness, every reconstitution 
of residual consciousness would entail the existence of a 
different self. But residual consciousness is reconstituted 
every time attention shifts to a new object. Therefore every 
new object of attention entails the existence of a new self. 
The requirement of persistence is not met. Secondly, to be 
successful, a theory of the self must be able to offer an intell- 
igible analysis of such sentences as 'I have a pain in my arm'. 
But if the self is equated with residual consciousness, this 
would amount to saying that one sphere of consciousness could 
"have" another sphere of consciousness: i.e., the elements of 
residual consciousness "have" the pain in the arm. But this is 
absurd. Consequently the theory fails, since it does not 
permit us to say that a self "has" experiences, or that they 
belong to it. Thirdly, the theory is incoherent in that resid- 
ual consciousness is itself said to be composed of elements, 
and they too would require a self whose elements they were. 
But, on the theory, no self exists to which the elements 
comprising residual consciousness could be "ascribed ". 
I shall now endeavour to defend the theory against these 
objections. Philosophers who hold some form of Serial Theory 
of the Self have primarily been interested in explaining the 
longitudinal unity of consciousness: i.e., the series of 
successive total temporary states. If successive states of 
consciousness belonged to a subject, this would mean that the 
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subject had to persist through time itself in order for it to 
function as the subject of such states. 
Now it was precisely this idea of an enduring subject 
that Serialists such as Russell,(1), Ayer,(2), and Grice (3), 
wished to avoid. They all suggest that when we refer to a 
self, what we refer to is revealed on proper analysis to be a 
relation between total temporary states. As Ayer explains, 
We know that a self, if it is not to be treated as a 
metaphysical entity, must be held to be a logical 
construction out of the sense -experiences... And, 
accordingly, if we ask what is the nature of the self, 
we are asking what is the relationship that must 
obtain between sense -experiences for them to belong to 
the sense -history of the same self.(4) 
In contradistinction to this approach, it has been pointed out 
by J.R. Jones that there is still room for a subject of expe- 
riences, without such a subject being thought of as a persist- 
ing entity.(5) What Jones has in mind are the elements that 
exist simultaneously in each total temporary state. In other 
words, he draws attention to that other aspect of consciousness 
that Serialists have tended to overlook. We are asked to 
envisage the possibility that each experience has its own 
subject, and that no two experiences separated in time have the 
same subject. Such a subject would be transient, since it 
would not outlast the experience of which it was the owner. As 
we have seen, this suggestion is reminiscent of the position to 
which critics have claimed that Descartes is committed. 
(1) B. Russell, Analysis of Mind (London, 1933). 
(2) A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 2nd ed. 
(London, 1953). 
(3) H.P. Grice, 'Personal Identity', Mind, 1 (1941). 
(4) Op. cit. p. 125. 
(5) J.R. Jones, 'The Self in Sensory Cognition', Mind, 
LVII (1949). 
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What is of particular interest is the reason Jones gives 
for wishing to reintroduce this vestigial subject. He points 
out that it is needlessly paradoxical to deny, as Russell does, 
that there could be experiences without a subject. Jones 
recalls the insistence of James Ward that it does not make sense 
to call something an experience, if there is no one whose expe- 
rience it is. Similarly, on this argument, there can be no 
presentation without the presentation presenting itself to a 
subject. But the main point he makes against Russell's no- subject 
theory is just that it unnecessarily rules out the possibility of 
ascribing a single experience to a subject. According to the 
Serialist position, a statement, such asp "I am seeing this 
coloured patch ", must be analysed in such a way that the state- 
ment is really a statement of the relation of the experience of 
seeing a coloured patch to the experiences which come before and 
after it. But, Jones's objection is that he finds it meaningful 
to say "I am seeing this coloured patch" irrespective of whether 
any other experiences came before or after it. Thus: 
But surely a person never says "I am seeing this coloured 
patch" or "I am hearing this noise" merely as an expression 
of the fact that this seeing and this hearing are related 
to other non -contemporaneous mental events in certain 
characteristic ways. I at any rate am perfectly certain 
that there is something contemporaneous with my seeing 
the coloured patch or my hearing the noise to which I 
mean to relate these objects when I say that it is "I" 
who am seeing the coloured patch or hearing the noise... 
The "I" of which I am thinking seems to be involved in any 
one of the cognitive events which may be combined in the 
unity of the same total temporary state..(i) 
He proposes, therefore, that we consider the possibility that 
the "I" in sentences describing such experiences refers to some- 
thing contemporaneous with the experience, which could then be 
(1) Op. cit. p. 43. 
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said to "have" the experience. Some other contemporaneous mental 
event (element of consciousness) could be assigned this function. 
This would have that advantage that, provided that the mental 
event selected was always present, there would be a sense in 
which every experience had a subject, irrespective of its relation 
to experiences that come before or after it. At the same time it 
would avoid the myth of a substantival ego, which Russell was 
anxious to repudiate. It would avoid it without running into 
Russell's paradoxical position in which it is denied that expe- 
riences have subjects. Jones develops his theory by proposing 
that the subject should be identified with a somatic field, which 
for each subject becomes. "this somatic field ". 
This suggestion he derives from Gallie.(1) Jones does 
indeed make a minor modification to Gallie's theory, but as the 
change is not relevant to the present discussion, I shall confine 
myself to Jones's account of the position. He gives Gallie's_ 
definition of the somatic field as_, 
A voluminous spatial whole, extended in three dimensions 
which has, in normal circumstances, a continuous outer 
surface which can be said to be... coincident with the 
surface of one's own skin and an internal, though dis- 
continuous, filling... On occasion particular areas on 
the surface are pervaded or volumes inside are filled, 
by specific qualities which stand out from the undifferen- 
tiated background.(2) 
Jones next proceeds to give a summary of Gallie's position, as 
follows: 
When I say that I am experiencing a certain somatic 
sensation, for example, that I am having a pain in my 
arm, the fact I am recording is "simply the fact that 
some region of this somatic field is pervaded or occupied 
by a certain sensible quality. "(3) 
(1) I. Gallie, 'Mental Facts', Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, N.S. XXXVII (1936- 1937). 
(2) Ibid. p. 198. 
(3) Op. cit. p. 52. 
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The somatic field is defined in such a way that it excludes the 
sense experiences given us by our "outer senses ". It thus . 
excludes the visual and the auditory fields. Because of their 
exclusion from the somatic field, the visual and auditory fields 
can be said to "belong" to the somatic field to which they are 
(even if indirectly) spatially related. Neither Jones nor Gallie 
attempts to make out in any detail the claim that a spatial 
relation exists between the somatic field and other sense fields, 
but in view of the lengthy examination of the connection between 
a sense field and the corresponding sense -organ, given in the 
last chapter, we may, for the sake of argument, allow that such 
a connection could be made out. The theory depends on the not 
unreasonable assumption that provided we are conscious there will 
be a somatic field. There will therefore always be some mental 
event contemporaneous with a given experience which can function 
as the subject of that experience. Now it is a formal consequence 
of this theory that, while the self can be said to have visual, 
auditory, and other outer -sense, experiences, the self cannot be 
said to have somatic experiences. The reason for this is the 
obvious one that the self is identical with the mass of somatic 
feelings, and somatic feelings cannot "have" themselves.(l) On 
this view the statement "This somatic field is my somatic 
field" is a tautology. But the statement "This visual field is 
my visual field" is a contingent truth.(2) 
4. Let us now compare the theory put forward by Jones with 
(1) IIore will be said about this subject shortly. 
(2) See Shoemaker, Self- Knowledge and Self- Identity, 
p. 112. 
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the one I have proposed. In the first place it can be seen that 
my theory satisfies the condition that the self must be identical 
with something which is contemporaneous with the experience it is 
said to have, just as does Jones's theory. In this respect they 
both meet the objection raised by Jones against Serial Theories, 
that when we refer to the subject of an experience, we are not 
merely referring to the relation between that experience and 
those which come before and after it. But it is also true that 
my theory satisfies this condition more strictly than Jones's 
does. On Jones's theory it remains a coincidence that there are 
somatic feelings that exist contemporaneously with a given expe- 
rience. It is, therefore, purely a contingent fact that there 
is some mental event (or class of mental events) that could 
perform the function of being the subject of the experience. By 
contrast, on my theory this is no coincidence. As I have sought 
to show, there is a necessary connection between an experience 
(the object of attention) and residual consciousness. It is not 
merely a fact that there is something contemporaneous with the 
experience, which, as it happens, can conveniently perform the 
function of subject. What appears as an arbitrary assumption on 
Jones's theory, is on mine a conceptual necessity. In sum, a 
theory that identifies the self with residual consciousness is a 
theory that does the same job as one which identifies the self 
with the somatic field, only it does it better. 
But its superiority can be demonstrated in another direction 
as well. On Jones's theory a self cannot be said to have a 
somatic field, because the self is a certain somatic field. Now 
this is certainly a paradox, which if not serious, at least 
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affords some embarrassment to its proponents. If, on the other 
hand, the self is identified with residual consciousness, there 
is in theory no limitation to the type of experience the self 
may be said to have. In particular the subject will have 
somatic experiences as well as visual experiences, auditory 
experiences, etc. An object of attention, no matter what it is, 
will at the same time be an experience that the self may be 
described as having. 
It will be instructive to find out why Gallie and Jones 
chose the somatic field as the subject. Could not the visual 
field have served just as well? This question brings out the 
arbitrariness about the selection of the somatic field as the 
"contemporaneous mental event" to a given experience, with which 
to identify the subject. There are, however, obvious reasons 
for the choice of the somatic field for this role. First of all 
the sense -data associated with the other sense fields are 
intermittent. We have visual experiences when our eyes are open, 
but we may not have after -images and visual images when they are 
shut. If, therefore, the visual field were selected to play the 
rôle of the self, there would arise the state of affairs that a 
given experience was occurring although no visual experience was 
occurring concurrently. This would produce the highly paradoxical 
situation that on some occasions experiences occur that are not 
the experiences of a self. For the same reason other sense fields_ 
are ruled out as well. The somatic field, on the other hand, is 
exceptional in this respect. It is not intermittent as are the 
others. As long as we are conscious, somatic sensations will be 
elements of consciousness. Consequently the identification of 
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the self with the somatic field escapes the embarrassment just 
remarked. 
But an even more important reason for selecting the somatic 
field for this purpose comes to light when we take into considera- 
tion the longitudinal unity of consciousness (the series of total 
temporary states). On Jones's theory the subject of one expe- 
rience will not be identical with the subject of a non- simulta- 
neous experience. The belief that a self persists through time, 
and because it does so, is one and the same subject of a number 
of successive experiences, has thus to be explained. Now Jones 
agrees with the Serialists that this belief cannot be grounded 
in the truth of the claim that the self is a persisting subject. 
As he himself puts it: 
Thus, "I" in the analysis of "I see" stands for an event 
contemporaneous with the event of seeing. As such it 
may act as the Centre to which this and other contemporaneous 
events which are differentiations of the same total temporary 
state are asymmetrically related. But, as a perishing event, 
it cannot bind together successive total temporary states 
in the unity of the same biography.(1) 
On the view in question, belief in the persistence of the subject 
is delusory.(2) The Serialists are, therefore, obliged to explain 
how we come to have this delusion. This they attempt to do by 
appealing to the fact that two qualitatively indistinguishable 
experiences following each other are often mistaken for one 
continuous experience. On this basis the idea is advanced that 
each self will mistakenly believe that it is identical with the 
immediately preceding self if it is qualitatively indistinguish- 
able from it. Now this idea has only to be made explicit for its 
incoherence to be manifest. A self could not discover another 
(1) Jones, 'The Self in Sensory Cognition', p. 54. 
(2) Ibid., p. 43. 
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self to be qualitatively indistinguishable from it, without at 
the same time being aware of the other self as a different self. 
Nevertheless my purpose is not to be critical of the idea, but 
to explain how Serialists have come to favour selection of the 
somatic field to fulfil the function of the self. Accordingly, 
if we put ourselves in the position of Gallie and Jones, and 
look for a class of mental event, which satisfies the require- 
ment that it displays the minimum discriminable difference 
between its successive members, we can understand how, inevitably, 
they had to select the class of somatic feelings. Of all our 
sense experiences, our bodily sensations come nearest of all to 
being a constant in our lives. In normal circumstances these 
bodily sensations seldom attract attention, and, as a result, 
our degree of discrimination between them is low. Mostly we find 
it difficult to tell in what respect the somatic sensations of 
one moment differ from those of the preceding moment (especially 
en masse). Bodily sensations are, therefore, uniquely suitable 
for the role in which they are cast by Gallie and Jones. Jones 
cites Broad in support of his identification of the self with 
its somatic field. This is what Broad says: 
I think that the most plausible form of this theory would 
be to identify the Central Event [i.e. the self] at any 
moment with a mass of bodily feeling. The longitudinal 
unity of a self through a period of time would then depend 
on the fact that there is a mass of bodily feeling which 
goes on continuously throughout this period and varies in 
quality not at all or very slowly. At any moment there 
are many such masses of bodily feeling, which are numer- 
ically different however much they may be alike in quality. 
These form the Centres of a number of different contemporary 
total states of mind. Each of them is a thin slice of a 
long and highly uniform strand of bodily feeling; and each 
of these strands of bodily feeling accounts for the longit- 
udinal unity of one mind.(1) 
(1) C.D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature (London, 
1925) p. 566. 
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Once again, the comparison between the theories proposed by 
Jones and myself is instructive. On Jonests theory, it is 
another happy accident that there exists a mass of sensations 
that are qualitatively uniform, and, as such, possess precisely 
the characteristic he was looking for. If we turn to the theory 
that identifies the self with residual consciousness, we recognise 
that residual consciousness also possesses the characteristic 
Jones's was looking for. Because residual consciousness is 
composed of those experiential elements that are outside the 
field of attention, they too will be relatively undifferentiated. 
Residual consciousness will also, therefore, give the impression 
of remaining unchanged amidst the flux of successive experiences. 
But it will give the impression of remaining unchanged, not 
because its content is unchanging - as in the case of somatic 
feelings - but for the formal reason that it is residual con- 
sciousness: i.e. , it comprises those elements in respect of 
which we are not looking out for change. Thus it is a deductive 
consequence of my theory that there will be a qualitative similar- 
ity between the subjects of a series of total temporary states; 
on Jones's theory this is but an ad hoc fact. 
However, unlike Jones, I do not rely on the idea of qual- 
itative identity to explain the longitudinal unity of a series 
of total temporary states. In chapter five I give reason for 
rejecting the whole notion that the persistence of the self can 
be explained in terms of some feature of total temporary states, 
in virtue of which a series of such states can be said to form 
the biography of one person. All that I am prepared to allow is 
that the qualitative similarity of residual consciousness from 
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one moment to the next gives rise to the impression that we have 
not changed from an earlier moment to a later moment. 
A fascinating twist is given to the relation between these 
two theories, when it is realized that in fact, on my theory, 
residual consciousness will contain bodily feelings as an 
important part of its content. It will be remembered that I 
argued that in respect of sense experience at least, and perhaps 
also in the case of mental imagery, the presence of certain 
kinaesthetic sensations in residual consciousness was a pre- 
requisite of certain forms of attention. I tried to show that, 
in such cases, part of the content of residual consciousness 
was, necessarily, composed of kinaesthetic sensations. I also 
pointed out that for kinaesthetic sensation to perform its proper 
function in the mechanism of attention, it had to remain outside 
the area of attention itself; in other words, it had to belong 
to residual consciousness. In view of this, it is no accident 
that somatic feelings keep themselves in the background, and 
remain relatively undifferentiated: no accident that they seem 
to be qualitatively uniform. The successful performance of their 
proper function depends on their unobtrusiveness. Thus, in this 
respect too, the theory I advance reveals a greater coherence 
than Jones's. The lack of differentiation and qualitative 
uniformity of the mass of bodily feeling is a deductive con- 
sequence of my theory, whereas it is one more isolated fact on 
Jones's theory. Furthermore it provides a rational basis for the 
belief shared by Broad, Gallie and Jones that the self can more 
plausibly be identified with the class of bodily sensations, than 
with any other class of sense elements. 
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It should be clear, however, that I do not equate residual 
consciousness with the mass of bodily sensation. Residual con- 
sciousness has been shown to comprise much else besides bodily 
sensations. By identifying the self and residual consciousness, 
I do not by implication follow Jones in his identification of 
the self with the somatic field. His position relative to mine 
is that what he takes to be the whole I take to be a part. This 
in itself is of considerable importance. If the self is ident- 
ified with bodily sensations, we create the paradox that bodily 
sensations are invested with qualities of selfhood - such as, 
intellectual ability, emotional response, aesthetic and religious 
attitudes, and personal qualities. The self thinks, wills, 
enjoys, and suffers. Can bodily sensations do these things? 
Obviously not. If, however, it is wrong, on Jones's theory, to 
think of the somatic field as having such human attributes, 
clearly the theory needs to make clear the relation between the 
subject (the somatic field) of experience, and the self which is 
endowed with the above mentioned human qualities. But no mention 
is made of the existence of this problem, let alone any solution 
proposed. 
One is reminded here of a parallel in the theological field. 
It is often said that the God of the philosophers, by which is 
meant the Being who is First Cause, bears no resemblance to the 
God of Christianity. From this point of view, it is believed 
that the failure to prove the existence of the God of the philos- 
ophers is irrelevant to questions about the God of Biblical 
Revelation. Now while I do not subscribe to this reasoning, the 
attempt to drive a wedge between the God of the 
philosophers and 
213. 
the God of christians has its parallel in criticisms of theories 
of the self. Thus, it could be argued, what the philosophers 
call the self bears no resemblance to what we ordinarily think 
of as ourselves. To think even of a Pure Ego as sad or happy, or 
in the grip of a passionate desire, is ludicrous. Clearly it is 
incumbent on every theory of the self to guard against the 
possibility of driving a wedge between the conception of the 
self it presents, and the non - philosophical conception of the 
self. That is to say, the self identified in the theory must be 
a fitting subject for the ascription of human qualities. 
It is evident that Jones's identification of the self and 
a sensory field is particularly exposed to the wedge argument. 
While the enquiry is confined to the abstract level, in which a 
search is made for a possible subject of experiences, no partic- 
ular incongruity arises whatever the answer proposed. But if we 
breathe life into the experience, and think of a concrete expe- 
rience, instead of experience -in- general, the picture changes 
completely. An experience might conceivably belong to a somatic 
field; my feeling of jealousy cannot belong to a somatic field. 
As long as we take it for granted that the experiences for which 
we have to find a subject, are sensory experiences, we shield 
ourselves from the absurdity of our position, taken generally. 
The self, on Jones's theory, could not be a perceiver, or a 
knower, or an agent. It is, so to speak, quite dumb. A self 
lacking in all form of activity, and in any form of cognitive 
capacity, could not even be the subject of sense experience. It 
is obvious, I think, that a self cannot be a mere 
subject, an 
abstract bearer or owner of sense experiences. And yet this is 
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just what Jones's self is. 
From this point of view, the identification of the self 
with residual consciousness has an unquestionable advantage over 
its identification with the somatic field. I have shown the nec- 
essity of conceiving residual consciousness as cognitive, and I 
have shown how, in the operation of attention, it is cognitive. 
I have, it is true, said that part of its content is bodily 
sensation. But I have not made the mistake of asserting that it 
is exclusively composed of bodily sensation. On the contrary I 
have claimed that it must also exhibit the occurrence of thoughts, 
and this is the crucial factor placing residual consciousness on 
an entirely superior plane to the mass of bodily feeling. This 
does not mean that my theory is immune to the strictures I have 
brought against Jones's theory - that still has to be shown - 
but it does mean that it escapes the immediate disqualification 
which, on the above reasoning, must be the fate of his theory. 
There is a final point of comparison I would like to make 
between Jones's theory and mine. I mentioned the limitation to 
Jones's theory that it turns the statement "I have bodily feel- 
ings" into a tautology. Jones, following Gallie, tries to over- 
come this difficulty in the following way. He recognises that we 
make such statements as "I have a pain in my arm ", and that in 
doing so we seem to be attributing the pain to ourselves in just 
the way we attribute the seeing of a tree to ourselves, when we 
make the statement "I see a tree ". And yet, since the pain in 
my arm is part of my somatic field, it cannot be owned by the 
somatic field. He offers this solution: the pain is said to be 
mine in that it is referred to the vague totality of 
somatic 
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experiences. But, argues Jones, the somatic field as a whole 
cannot be sensed by me. Speaking of individual somatic expe- 
riences like the pain in my arm, he says, 
And however many of them I may put forth from myself 
in a given inspection, in order again to relatelto 
'myself' as qualities of which I am sensible, there 
must always be some core of unobjectified somatic 
content if I am to have a 'self' to which I can relate 
the ones which I notice as being 'sensed by me'.(1) 
In support of his position Jones quotes the following passage from 
Bradley: 
We are able in our internal mass of feeling to distinguish 
and to recognise a number of elements; and we are able, 
on the other side, to decide that our feeling contains . 
beyond these an unexhausted margin.(2) 
These two passages approach the thesis I am maintaining, 
without quite reaching it. Jones, it will be noticed, even goes 
so far as to talk of "inspecting" a somatic sensation. His line 
of argument presupposes, in other words, the operation of atten- 
tion on the mass of somatic feeling. It is also a striking fact 
that the somatic sensation to be inspected, is described by him 
as something "put forth" from the self. Here we have the very 
idea I have been describing, when I said that attention "detaches" 
an element from residual consciousness, and "distances" the one 
from the other. Bradley's description, too, is one of a state 
of affairs in which attention is at work. Gallie and Jones did 
not realize that the phenomenon they were describing could be put 
down quite simply to the operation of attention. As a result 
they were unable to free themselves from the belief that the 
(1) Jones, 'The Self in Sensory Cognition', pp. 54 -5. 
(2) F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 2nd ed. 
(London, 1925), p. 93. 
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"core of unobjectified content" could be anything but somatic. 
It seems to me that Jones's passage cries out for a different 
interpretation from the one he gives: the pain, or whatever, is 
the pain of a self, not because it comes from a mass of somatic 
feeling, but because it has been "put forth" from the self by an 
instance of attention. This would have been true whatever the 
composition of the consciousness from which the pain had been 
"put forth ". It is not peculiarly due to the fact that it was 
put forth from a mass of bodily feeling. 
If my reasoning is accepted, this will mean that it is 
theoretically possible, as Jones argues, to make the totality of 
somatic experience itself the object of attention, without 
leaving even a portion of it behind to represent the self. Let 
to envisage what would were made to 
turn the whole mass of bodily feeling into an object of attention. 
As Jones saw, something would have to take its place, otherwise 
the self itself would disappear. But ex hypothesi it will not be 
"a core of unobjectified somatic content ". There is only one 
possibility left. The elements of consciousness normally belong- 
ing to the object of attention must now pass into residual con- 
sciousness. In other words, the direction of attention must be 
reversed. The elements in question will be those brought into 
being through the "outer" senses. Thus, when the mass of somatic 
feeling becomes the object of attention, my visual, auditory, and 
other outer -sense experiences, become the residual consciousness 
to the new object of attention - the totality of somatic feeling. 
It would be very much like turning oneself inside out. 
Bradley's thinking is so much in line with this conclusion, 
217. 
that it is interesting to see what he says. 
Let us now, passing to the other side of both these 
relations, ask if the not -self contains anything which 
belongs to it exclusively. It will not be easy to 
discover many such elements. In the theoretical 
relation it is quite clear that not everything can be 
an object, all together and at once. At any one moment 
that which is in any sense before me must be limited. 
What are we to say then becomes of that remainder of the 
not -self which clearly has not, even for the time, passed 
wholly from my mind? I do not mean those features of the 
environment to which I fail to attend specially, but 
which I still go on perceiving as something before me. 
I refer to the features which have now sunk below this 
level. These are not even a setting or a fringe to the 
object of my mind. They have passed lower into the 
general background of feeling, from which that distinct 
object with its indistinct setting is detached. But 
this means that for the time they have passed into the 
self.(1) 
What I am suggesting is that when we make the self the object of 
attention, this can only be done if the erstwhile not -self 
passes into the general background of feeling, as Bradley 
(1) F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 2nd ed. 
(London, 1925), pp. 91 -2. Bradley's. whole discussion 
of the subject is highly relevant. The above passage 
clearly contains the view that the polarization of 
consciousness into self and not -self is the work of 
attention. This would make it appear that the theory 
I am putting forward is identical with Bradley's. 
This is not the case, however much the above passage 
may make it seem so. For Bradley the distinction 
between self and not -self is one that emerges from a 
more primitive condition of consciousness called 
"immediate experience ". As I understand it, this is 
a pre- attentive phase of consciousness, and it is 
certainly a phase devoid of any reference to a self. 
Bradley's view that immediate experience does not 
command even a minimal degree of attention is in sharp 
conflict with the conclusions I reached in the chapter 
on attention. For Bradley the existence of a self is 
dependent upon the operation of thought upon experience. 
For me the existence of experience cannot be indepen- 
dent of the existence of the self that enjoys the 
experience. In this matter I side with James Ward in 
his great debate.with Bradley on the question. On 
the other hand Ward propounded a Pure Ego Theory, 
and I think Bradley was quite right to attack him on 
that. My position may be viewed as the reconciliation 
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expresses it, where it becomes a new residual consciousness. 
Thus, as a theoretical possibility, I am in entire agreement with 
Bradley, when he says of the elements that compose self and not - 
self, "The main bulk of the elements on each side is interchange- 
able." 
5. By speaking of the theoretical possibility of making 
normal residual consciousness the object of attention, I have 
intimated the existence of practical difficulties in the way of 
its actualization. I shall now deal with some of these diff- 
iculties. The discussion will be more meaningful if the 
possibility in question is described in more familiar terms. 
What it amounts to is a form of self -consciousness in which the 
self posits itself as its own object of attention. Now to 
become self- conscious in this sense demands of the self that it 
"put forth" from itself the entire content of what normally 
belongs to residual consciousness. Such a performance, if accom- 
plished, would constitute a reversal of the normal direction of 
attention, which is outward from the self. The normal outward 
direction of attention is sustained even in those cases in which 
overcoming Ward's thesis and Bradley's antithesis. 
I identify the self with something found within 
experience, and in this way I escape Bradley's 
strictures against a Pure Ego. At the same time I 
escape Ward's strictures against Bradley, by making 
the self basic to all experience. The adoption of my 
theory entails the abandonment of the most unaccept- 
able aspects of Bradley's and Ward's positions respect- 
ively. See R. Wollheim, F.H. Bradley (London, 1959) 
p. 132 ff. Had Bradley made the distinction I have 
elaborated between interrogative and non -interrogative 
attention, he might have found it possible to have 
accepted the idea that immediate experience exhibited 
the presence of non -interrogative attention. This 
would have removed many of the obstacles to his accept- 
ing the sort of solution I am proposing. 
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we reflect on our inward states. When I pay heed to a pain, 
the pain is put forth from me like anything else, and in this 
way dissociated from myself. Thus even in reflection I am not 
usually reversing the direction of attention. In such cases 
the attention is as much directed from myself as in any other: 
it is not directed to myself as a whole. 
Were such reversal of attention to occur it would follow, 
on the theory being developed, that the attender would have 
difficulty in recognising his objectified self as himself. The 
reason for this would be that the usual content of residual con- 
sciousness would be displaced in the reversal, and an unfamiliar 
content would take its place. The implication of this is that 
the self would not recognise his objectified self as himself on 
two counts. Firstly, none of the usual elements of residual 
consciousness, which have become familiar to him and in virtue 
of which he always "feels himself ", remain. They are replaced 
by elements that do not, as a whole, belong to residual con- 
sciousness. From this it can be inferred that the subject -self 
would feel that he was, in a sense, not himself. To use a 
metaphor, he would feel that he was looking at himself through 
the eyes of a stranger. Secondly, the objectified self would 
consist of the totality of elements, which, as a totality, do 
not normally occupy the position of the object of attention. 
When the self apprehends them in this new position, they will 
seem unfamiliar precisely because they are apprehended in a 
totally new context. From this point of view, the objectified 
self will not seem familiar either. We might expect the 
attender to follow his attempted self- objectification by saying 
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"That is not me." Thus if such self- consciousness were attain- 
able, it would at the same time be a form of self -estrangement. 
These implications of the theory are interesting in that 
they establish a connection between a philosophical conception 
of self -consciousness, and an ordinary conception of self- 
consciousness, since a connection between the two is not usually 
made. In ordinary discourse a person is often said to be self- 
conscious, when through shyness or nervousness he shows embarr- 
assment about his performance. In this form of self -consciousness, 
I suggest, the person gives his attention to precisely those 
aspects of his performance that he normally takes for granted. 
But in so doing, he debars himself from performing fluently, 
when fluent performance depends precisely on his not attending 
to those aspects of the performance that now hold his attention. 
Thus when the person performs awkwardly, clumsily, or unsuccess- 
fully, as a result of giving his attention to aspects of his 
performance he should not be attending toy he is said to be 
showing self- consciousness.(1) The self- conscious person acts 
in a way which is strange to himself, and he could excuse his 
uncharacteristic performance by saying that he was too self - 
conscious to be himself, or to act like himself. 
On the theory I am advocating, the connection between 
social self -consciousness and the systematic self -consciousness 
which the philosopher might try to achieve, consists in the fact 
that social self- consciousness is only a partial form of 
philosophical self -consciousness. That is, a socially self- 
(1) Self -consciousness in this sense corresponds to 
sense (b) of the senses of "conscious" given by 
Ryles and listed on p. 33 above. 
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conscious person gives his attention to some elements ordinarily 
belonging to residual consciousness, instead of to the proper 
object of attention. Now I have shown how necessary it is, if 
certain forms of attention are to take place, that certain 
contributing elements remain in residual consciousness. If 
such elements of residual consciousness distract attention, and 
themselves become the object of attention, the performance 
engaging attention is marred. This is what happens, I suggest, 
when a poor performance is put down to self -consciousness. In 
such self -consciousness we see the beginning of what in a 
thorough -going form constitutes the entire self being made the 
object of attention. When philosophical self -consciousness is 
attained, it is not merely some of the elements of residual 
consciousness which are put forth; it is the entire lot. 
The theory identifying the self with residual consciousness 
enables use not only to see a close connection between one of 
the philosophical senses of "self -consciousness" and an ordinary 
sense of "self -consciousness", but in addition it gives us a 
possible explanation of the phenomenon which I have called 
"social self -consciousness ". 
If the theory leads us to expect that we confront ourselves 
as strangers when we become objects to ourselves, it also 
suggests to us that we are most truly ourselves when we are 
least self -conscious: that is, when we are not in any sense an 
object to ourselves. This state of affairs is realized when we 
allow ourselves to be totally absorbed by some activity. When a 
person immerses himself in an activity, he loses all awareness 
of himself, in the sense that he is not in any way thinking of 
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himself, or trying to be self -conscious. His self, in this way, 
recedes out of view. In such circumstances the person is often 
said to "lose himself ". I shall now suggest how these observa- 
tions tie in with the theory. 
It will be remembered that in the discussion of residual 
consciousness and object of attention, it was argued that these 
were found to be more or less on the same plane in the case of 
non -interrogative attention: that is to say, the distancing 
aspect of attention was not much in evidence. However, in the 
case of interrogative attention, the differentiation between 
residual consciousness and object of attention took on the 
character of an organized system. It was also pointed out that 
within such a meaning -system some elements of residual con- 
sciousness would of necessity be less relevant to the object of 
attention, than others. I described this state of affairs by 
saying that such elements could be thought of as receding into 
the background, and suggested that in this way was created the 
distancing effect that we recognise to be characteristic of the 
relation between subject and object. Now in the light of the 
identification of residual consciousness with the self, it 
follows that the polarization of consciousness into self and 
not -self is most pronounced in interrogative attention. Thus 
the self is in its most differentiated state during interrog- 
ative attention. At the same time it is as far as it ever is 
from itself being the object of attention. 
I have been discussing what would happen if the self 
were made the object of attention, and argued that the results 
strengthened my case. I now want to suggest that there is 
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reason to doubt whether we can systematically reverse attention in 
the way described. The first difficulty to arise is this. Resid- 
ual consciousness - because it is residual consciousness - is 
indistinctive. We could not, for instance, enumerate all the 
elements of which it is composed. If, therefore, I tried to put 
forth from myself and attend to the content of residual consciousness 
in its totality, how could I know that I had succeeded in objectify- 
ing the totality? How could I know that I had not overlooked some 
elements, which, as a result, were left behind? I do not see how I 
could know this because I could only have this knowledge if I knew 
of the existence of every single element comprising residual con- 
sciousness. But as I tried to make clear in chapter three, resid- 
ual consciousness, although heterogeneous and diverse, is not 
composed of discrete, atomistic elements. To claim that we could 
know that we were attending to the totality would thus depend on 
our taking residual consciousness to possess precisely that type 
of aggregative character which we have seen it to lack. We could, 
therefore, never know that we were making the whole self the 
object of attention, and, if we tried, we would have every reason 
to doubt that we were. For this reason we may agree with Bradley 
when he says, 
In my opinion it is not only possible, but most probable, 
that in every man there are elements in the internal felt 
core which are never made objects, and which practically 
cannot be. There may well be features in our Coenesthesia 
which lie so deep that we never succeed in detaching them; 
and these cannot properly be said to be ever our not -self. 
Even in the past we cannot distinguish their speciality. 
But I presume that even here the obstacle may be said to 
be practical, and to consist in the obscurity, and not 
otherwise in the essence, of these sensations.(1) 
The second reason for doubting that we can make of our- 
(l) Bradley, Appearance and Reality, pp. 92 -3. 
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selves our own objects of attention in a thorough -going way, 
I attribute to the nature of residual consciousness itself. 
The heterogeneous nature of residual consciousness has already 
been sufficiently stressed. Now if residual consciousness 
were made the object of attention, it would have to be the 
object of interrogative, as opposed to non -interrogative, atten- 
tion. The attention would be directed by the idea that the 
whole self was to become the object of attention, and such a 
task is an intellectual exercise of a high order. We do not, 
for instance, simply catch ourselves attending to ourselves as 
a whole. The very fact that the direction of attention is 
reversed in such cases suggests that the process will not occur 
spontaneously. This is reason enough for maintaining that such 
self -consciousness could only be the product of interrogative 
attention. But, as we know, interrogative attention requires 
of us that we unite elements of consciousness within a single 
meaning -system, before it is possible for them to be simulta- 
neously attended to.(1) We could not, therefore attend to all 
our antecedent elements of residual consciousness at once, in 
their several particularities. Only to the extent that they can 
be related in one meaning -system can they be jointly attended 
to. 
In this regard, the desire to make oneself the object of 
attention cannot by itself constitute such a meaning- system. 
We cannot integrate a number of objects of attention simply by 
having the desire to attend to them all simultaneously. If we 
(1) See above p. 145 f. 
225. 
could do this, there need never be any limit to the number of 
A 
objects which we might make objects of our simultaneous. atten- 
tion. Thus, the desire to attend to several things at once is 
not a sufficient condition of our being able to do so. 
Clearly, a meaning -system in a more material sense than 
this, is required. Now the question arises, 11What sort of 
meaning -system could there be that could integrate the heteroge- 
neous elements found in residual consciousness ?11 Just to raise 
this question is sufficient to cast doubt on the feasibility of 
its receiving a positive answer. If we were to imagine that 
residual consciousness was made up exclusively of bodily sensa- 
tion, we might believe some system of coherence capable of 
uniting them. But we have to remember that residual consciousness 
has a cognitive side as well, and it is difficult to see how this 
can be taken into account, without the very complexity of resid- 
ual consciousness defeating every attempt to incorporate it in 
some one meaning -system. We are led to conclude that its 
diversity, its obscurity, and its complexity, stand in the way 
of residual consciousness becoming a single coherent object of 
attention. Because of these difficulties, we can say with some 
confidence that an attempt to make oneself one's own object can 
meet with but partial success. It is most unlikely that a 
thoroughgoing self -consciousness can ever be achieved. 
There is, finally, a third reason for believing in the 
impossibility of achieving complete self- objectification. If 
Ribot is correct in his claim that attention is always effected 
through muscular activity of the body, then we can deduce that 
there will be in residual consciousness those kinaesthetic 
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sensations produced by the particular act of attending. Those 
kinaesthetic sensations could not themselves be the object of 
attention at the same time as they were supporting that act of 
attention. For this would mean that they were in residual con- 
sciousness and formed part of the object of attention at one 
and the same time, which is self -contradictory. There must, if 
Ribot is right, always remain behind some kinaesthetic sensa- 
tions in residual consciousness, as a condition of the exist- 
ence of attention. A fortiori some kinaesthetic sensations 
must remain behind, when an attempt is made to make residual 
consciousness en masse the object of attention. In the very 
nature of the case, they make it impossible for the totality of 
residual consciousness to be objectified, and stand as a 
guarantee that we can only attain partial self -objectification. 
This completes the explicit elaboration of the theory. 
I have argued that by asserting the identity between residual 
consciousness and the self, we are in a position to explain how 
it is that a self can at once be experiential itself, and the 
subject of experiences. Furthermore, I sought to show that the 
theory offered an intelligible explanation of the fact that the 
self must be thought of as lying behind its experiences. It 
was explained, in addition, why the attempt to make of the self 
its own object appeared to generate an infinite regress. 
Finally the implications of the theory for self -consciousness 
have been discussed. I argued that the theory precluded the 
possibility of total self- objectification. I propose now to deal 
with certain objections facing the theory, which immediately 
threaten to overwhelm it. 
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6. I begin with the objection that it does not make sense 
to analyse a statement of the form "I have an experience" as 
"Residual consciousness has an experience." This raises the 
question of what it means for one thing to have something else. 
Now in the context of theories of the self, philosophers 
usually think of "having" in the sense of "owning ". The ques- 
tion of the relation between a self and experiences is then 
expressed in terms of whether experiences have owners, or are 
ownerless. It must be conceded that we frequently use the word 
"have" in a way that entails that what we have we own. But 
this is far from being the only use of the word "have ". It 
hardly needs pointing out that the verb "have" is one of the 
most general verbs in existence, which, for that very reason, is 
put to a multitude of uses. It will be helpful if some of these 
uses are brought out. When I say "I have X" I could mean 
(a) I have X in my possession, or on my person. (I have your 
book.) 
(b) I have X by right. (I have the book - I own it.) 
(c) X is a constituent of me. (I have eyes.) 
(d) I am related to X. (I have a child.) 
(e) I am experiencing X. (I have a headache.) 
(f) I am undergoing X. (I have a cold.) 
No doubt many more uses of "have" could be distinguished, 
but we have sufficient to go on. The question I wish to raise 
in respect of these uses of "have" is whether they are all 
irreducible or whether some of the senses be reduced to others? 
This question is especially relevant in respect of sense (e) of 
"have ". Difficulties about the relation between a self and its 
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experiences can arise, I shall argue, either because sense (e) 
of "have" is reduced to some other sense of "have ", or because 
there is a failure to distinguish between the different senses 
of "have ",and moves that are permissible in respect of some of 
the senses of "have" are made in the case of other senses of the 
word, where they are not permissible. 
The first point to be noticed about the listed senses of 
"have ", is the rarity with which the move from "I have X" to 
"X belongs to me" is sanctioned. (I treat the move from "I have 
X" to "X is mine" as the same move: in other words I take the 
expressions "X belongs to me" and "X is mine" to be synonymous.) 
Hart has drawn attention to the fact that sentences like "X 
belongs to me" and "X is mine" are ascriptive sentences and not 
. descriptive ones: that is to say, their job is not one of 
describing what is the case, but one of making claims and 
announcing entitlements.(1) If we take this point into account, 
and consider in which of the senses of "have ", "I have X" 
entails "X is mine ", we find that senses (a), (c), and (f) are 
at once ruled out. Sense (c) might not seem clearly excluded, 
but the matter can be clarified if we transpose the sentence 
from one about a person to one about an object. The statement 
"The chair has leather upholstery" asserts that the leather 
upholstery is one of its constituents. If the statement were 
made "This leather upholstery belongs to that chair ", it would 
only make sense if the upholstery and the chair were separated 
and there was a question of which upholstery went with which 
chair. The statement could not mean that the chair owned the 
(1) H.Z.A. Hart, 'The Ascription of Responsibility and 
Rights', Logic and Language, Series 1, 
ed. A.G.N. 
Flew (Oxford, 1951). 
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leather upholstery, or was entitled to it. 
We are left with senses (b), (d), and (e), of "have ". 
Sense (b) is the paradigmatic sense in which "I have X" entails 
"X belongs to me ", or "X is mine ". This means that sense (b) 
of "have" is an ascriptive sense of "have ". Can we pass from 
"I have X" to "X is mine" in the case of sense (d) of "have "? 
The answer would seem to be in the affirmative in the case of 
the sentence "I have a child ". We would agree that we can make 
the step to the sentence "The child belongs to me ". But, I 
suggest, we have here a case in which the move can only be made 
contingently. When the child comes of age, can I say, "The 
child belongs to me ?" Surely he ought then to belong to no 
one? If the example were "I have a friend" this would not 
entail "That friend belongs to me ". 
We now arrive at the crucial question. Is it true of 
sense (e) of "have" that "I have X" entails "X is mine "? In 
other words, do I ever claim that an experience belongs to men 
or that I am entitled to it? There is one sort of circumstance 
in which we might seem to want to say this, but it is not a 
true case. I may overhear someone relating a nasty experience, 
and claim that it was I who had had the experience. But here 
I would be claiming that the description that was given was a 
description of my experience. I would not be laying claim to 
the experience itself, but to be the one who had it. That sort 
of case apart, there are strong reasons for rejecting the claim 
that in sense (e) of "have ", "I have X" entails "X is 
mine ". 
The first statement, "I have X ", is a contingent statement: 
I 
may have a headache, and I may equally well not have 
a headache. 
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But the statement "X is mine" or "X belongs to me" is not 
similarly contingent. It makes no sense to say "X is not mine ". 
I cannot say of an experience, "This experience is not mine" 
without contradicting myself, for this would amount to saying 
"The experience I am having is not an experience I am having" 
and this is self -contradictory. If we insist that the entail- 
ment holds, therefore, we are committed to asserting that a 
contingent proposition entails a necessary proposition. 
Now, whatever we make of this state of affairs, it has 
no parallel with the entailment relation between "I have X" and 
"X is mine" in the case of the other senses of "have" which we 
have been considering. In the one sense of "have" in which the 
entailment was always seen to hold - sense (b) - both sentences 
are contingent. It is a contingent fact that I have a certain 
book, and it is also a contingent fact that the book is mine. 
In view of the fact that there is this non -parallelism between 
the entailment in the case of senses (b) and (e) of "have ", the 
question arises of why we should think of making the step from 
"I have X" to "X is mine" in the case of sense (e) of "have ". 
The negative point can be made that outside of philosophical 
discussion no one ever says, mentioning a particular experience, 
"This experience is mine ". We may well ask, therefore, why we 
should think the entailment works in the case of sense (e) of 
"have ". The possibility exists that we are led to make this 
move either because we have by implication reduced sense (e) of 
"have "'to sense (b), or because we make the unexamined assump- 
tion that an entailment that holds in the case of sense (b) 
holds also of other senses. of "have ". In either case we are 
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misled by a false analogy. 
The fact that so many philosophers discuss the connection 
between the self and its experiences in terms of the experiences 
"belonging to" the self, or the self "owning" the experiences, 
makes it difficult to believe that they are not taking sense 
(b) of "having" as their standard. It is after all, only true 
of "having" in its ascriptive sense (sense b) that questions of 
ownership, and belongingness, necessarily arise. Furthermore, 
if sense (e) of "having" is similarly interpreted in an ascrip- 
tive sense it soon becomes apparent that it is not ascriptive in 
the straightforward sense in which sense (b) is ascriptive. I 
can transfer my ownership of a book by giving it to someone 
else; I cannot transfer my ownership of my headache by giving 
it to someone else. Philosophers like Strawson show their 
recognition of the asymmetry between sense (b) and sense (e) of 
"have ", which I have been discussing, by saying of their ascrip- 
tive interpretation of sense (e) of "have" that it is a logically 
non -transferable form of ownership.(1) This it would have to be 
because any statement of the form "This experience is mine" is 
not a contingent statement. 
A doubt may be raised whether a logically non -transferable 
form of ownership is a form of ownership at all. It is difficult 
to see the point of voicing a claim or an entitlement when it is 
logically impossible to challenge the claim or entitlement. 
According to the normal circumstances in which it is legitimate 
to talk of claims and entitlements, an essential feature of the 
situation is the contestability of the claims and entitlements. 
(1) P.F. Strawson, Individuals, 
p. 97. 
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I claim that X belongs to me, because my ownership is either 
explicitly or implicitly contested. When the contestability 
condition is absent, we may if we wish go on talking about 
ownership, but then we have ownership in name only; the sub- 
stance has gone. From this point of view coupling ownership 
with non -transferability amounts to a concession that sense (e) 
of "have" has nothing whatever to do with ownership; that it is 
not an ascriptive use of "have ". 
We are then free to consider the possibility that sense 
(e) of "have" has closer logical affinities -with some of the 
other senses of "have" than it has with sense (b) of "have ". 
Sense (c) might appear to be more promising: i.e. one thing 
may be said to "have" another thing if the latter is a constit- 
uent of sense (e) were to sense (c) the position 
would be that an experience would be interpreted as one of the 
constituents of consciousness. There would be nothing logically 
odd in that suggestion. Nevertheless it fails for the following 
reason. It is not consciousness, but residual consciousness 
that is to be interpreted as "having" experiences. Now I have 
already argued that if the subject asserts that he has an expe- 
rience, the experience is an object of attention for him. To 
interpret "has" in the sense of "is a constituent of" would have 
the consequence that an object of attention would be alleged to 
be a constituent of residual consciousness. But this is 
inconsistent with the theory. Therefore sense (e) of "have" 
cannot meaningfully be reduced to sense (c). Sense (d) of 
"having ", the sense of relatedness, comes nearer the mark. 
Residual consciousness can certainly be described as having 
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experiences, in the sense of being related to them. It is 
nevertheless inadequate, both in respect of the fact that the 
nature of the relation is left unspecified, and in respect of 
the fact that it fails to make clear that in sense (e) of 
"have" we imply the existence of an occurrence - an event. In 
the latter respect, but only in the latter respect, sense (f) 
of "have" would give a better reflection of the position. 
Now from a strictly methodological point of view we are 
not entitled to conclude that a reductive analysis of sense 
(e) of "leave" cannot be given, until all the possible senses of 
"have" have been examined. I have only examined five, and the 
possibility cannot be ruled out that there might be a sixth 
sense of "have" in the case of which the reductive analysis 
would be found to be successful. This must be conceded, but 
it is legitimate to ask whether we are thereby making allowance 
for a real possibility. It is not without significance that 
five attempts at a reduction have failed. But there is a more 
powerful argument than that, for calling in question the 
possibility that some further sense of "have" (let it be called 
sense (x) of "have ") might be discovered, to which sense (e) 
could be reduced. If there were such a sense (x) of "have ", 
it, in turn would have to be a sui generis sense of "have ". 
(For, if it were not, it itself could be reduced to one of the 
existing senses, and a fortiori, so could sense (e).) But this 
would mean denying that sense (e) of "have" was 
sui generis, 
and following the denial with the assertion that 
sense (e) 
could be reduced to sense (x) of "have ", which 
was sui generis. 
Now unless sense (x) of "have" could be identified 
independently 
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of being identified as the sense of "have" to which sense (e) 
could be reduced, we are entitled to apply Occam's razor, and 
maintain that sense (e) of "have" is itself sui generis. In the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, therefore, it is. most 
reasonable to conclude that sense (e) of "have" is sui generis. 
As it happens, there is a concept that has the same meaning as 
"having" in sense (e), and that concept is "experiencing ". 
Thus, "having" in sense (e) means "experiencing ". 
I have argued that sense (e) of "have" is irreducible, 
and that it is not to be identified with the ascriptive sense of 
"have ". This means that the relation between subject and object 
can be conceived in other terms, than in terms of ownership. 
I +lore positively, the argument suggests that it should not be 
conceived of in terms of an ascriptive relationship. Thus the 
objection, from the ascriptive point of view, that it is sense- 
less to describe residual consciousness as having or owning 
experiences, can be dismissed. If residual consciousness is 
described as "having" an experience, this means, not that it 
owns the experience, but that an irreducible relation obtains 
between residual consciousness and an object of attention, 
called "experiencing ". 
The ascriptive interpretation of "have" may be criticised 
in the light of Samuel Alexander's view of the relation between 
experiencer and experience.(1) He discerns two elements in an 
experience, which he calls "an act of mind" and "the appearance 
of a thing ". Characterizing the two elements further, he says, 
(1) S. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity (London, 1920), 
p. 11 ff. 
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"The act of mind is an enjoyment; the object is contemplated." 
Alternatively, he says that experience can be broken down into 
an experiencing and an experienced. The relation between these 
two elements is said to be one of "togetherness" or 
"compresence ". One of Alexander's central ideas is that minds 
themselves are never contemplated; they are never their own 
objects of knowledge. In his own words, "Thus my own mind is 
never an object to myself in the sense in which the tree or 
table is." However, minds and objects "are distinct and 
relatively independent existences compresent with each other." 
Now if we think of minds and their objects as alongside one 
another, we do so by adopting what Alexander calls "the angel's 
view ". To an angel possessed of intuitive knowledge of other 
minds, a mind and its object would be seen "as the compresence 
of two objects". But the angel's view is not open to use 
except as an idea. We can have no experience of the external 
compresence of our minds and their objects. 
The relevance of "the angel's view" to the present context, 
is immediately evident, when the fact is added that Alexander 
identifies minds with selves. "I am my mind" he states, 
"And am conscious of the object." Now my purpose in introducing 
these ideas of Alexander's, is to suggest that the ascriptive 
interpretation of "have" presupposes the adoption of the angel's 
view of the relation between the subject and his experiences. 
The self as owner is considered as one object over against the 
experience which is another object which it is said to possess. 
There can be no doubt that we are tempted to think of the owner 
of experiencesas something apart from them, which can exist 
independently of them. Nevertheless Alexander is incontrovertibly 
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right to deny that the angel's view of the relation between 
our experiences and ourselves is the one we enjoy. We may 
draw the moral that any description of the relation between 
residual consciousness and object of attention which carries 
the implication that they are related as two objects external 
to each other, is completely misconceived. It follows that 
any analysis of the idea of a residual consciousness "having" 
an experience in the sense of owning it, is to be repudiated. 
In short, we must avoid analysing "having" in sense (e), in 
a way that presupposes the angel's view. 
The next objection with which I wish to deal is contained 
in the question, "Must not a residual consciousness itself be 
ascribed to a subject ?" Obviously if residual consciousness 
is identical with a self, it becomes senseless to assert that 
a self has a residual consciousness. 
In chapter one I pointed out that there was a use of the 
word "my ", which I called its dissociative use, in which it 
was implied that a noun qualified by the word "my" referred to 
something other than myself. I then maintained that this 
dissociative use of "my" was not its only use. Consequently 
if I refer to my mind, this need not be taken to entail the 
proposition that I am something apart from my mind. The same 
distinction, I suggest, is called for in the case of the word 
"have ". There is a dissociative use of "have" according to 
which, what I am said to have, is other than myself. Plainly 
if I have a new car, I am not myself a new car. On the other 
hand, I may also say that I have a mind, or a soul, or a 
residual consciousness, and yet this need not be taken to 
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entail the proposition that I am something apart from my mind, 
my soul, or my residual consciousness. It was concluded that if 
I make a reference to "EL residual consciousness" it may not be 
inferred that I am not that residual consciousness. It may 
likewise be stated that if a person is said to "have" a residual 
consciousness, it may not be inferred that he is not that resid- 
ual consciousness. Now the retort might be made that this 
answer to the objection is more formal than substantial. I 
shall, therefore, make a further observation in this connection. 
It is one thing to have a certain experience, and another 
thing to make the statement "I have such -and -such an experience." 
When a person asserts that he has an experience he draws atten- 
tion to the experience. He might either intend to draw his own 
attention to it, or draw someone else's to expe- 
rience. Now if his assertion is directed at himself, it will 
obviously have the effect of directing his attention to the 
experience. Thus the statement will be a statement about an 
object of attention. It can also be shown that if the expe- 
riencer's intention is to direct someone else's attention to the 
e.xperiencer's experience, it nevertheless remains true that it 
will have the experiencer's attention as well. Two reasons may 
be given in support of this claim. In the first place if the 
very purpose of a form of words is to direct attention to what 
they describe, it would be difficult for the person using 
those 
words not to be affected by them himself in the 
calculated 
manner. Thus it would be difficult for me to 
make a bona fide 
assertion that I have a headache without giving 
the headache my 
attention. In the second place, the person 
to whom the assertion 
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was addressed would be entitled to assume that its utterer was 
himself attending to the matter to which he was directing his 
attention. For both these reasons I conclude that the state- 
ment "I have such - and -such an experience ", is an attention - 
focussing sentence. For this reason it would be misleading for 
me to describe residual consciousness as something I have. If 
I say "I have a residual consciousness" and mean by this some- 
thing specific: i.e., it is this residual consciousness I have, 
then I have ipso facto objectified it, and I am talking about 
an object of attention and not my present residual consciousness. 
Now, if I am right about this, it follows that we can resist the 
objection that if I have a residual consciousness, I am some- 
thing existing independently of residual consciousness. The 
argument has shown that it is incoherent to speak of a self as 
either having, or not having a residual consciousness. 
7. In The Bounds of Sense Strawson makes some remarks 
which seem to invite the theory I am advocating, and, in conjunc- 
tion with these remarks, he makes others which seem to preclude 
the possibility of any theory such as mine succeeding. For 
this reason it is worth seeing how my theory stand in the light 
of what he says. Strawson maintains in that work that we can 
ascribe certain experiences to ourselves (presumably ones which 
we ascribe to ourselves not on the basis of observation) without 
invoking any criteria of personal-identity. As he says 
When a man (a subject of experience) ascribes a current 
or directly remembered state of consciousness to himself, 
no use whatever of any criteria of personal identity is 
required to justify his use of the pronoun "I" to refer 
to the subject of that experience.(1) 
(1) Strawson, The Bounds of Sense= p. 165. 
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He backs up this statement by drawing attention to the inconceiv- 
ability of saying for instance, "This feeling is anger; but is 
it I who am feeling it ?" Now I think Strawson is absolutely 
right when he says we engage in this criterionless self- ascrip- 
tion. It is senseless to maintain that before we can ascribe 
an experience to ourselves we have to employ a criterion of 
personal -identity to determine that we are selves. The question 
of criteria of personal- identity only arises when there is a 
question whether a particular description of a self fits a 
particular self. Thus when one's identity is in no way chall- 
enged, no question of employing criteria of personal -identity 
arises. I do not first have to identify myself before I can 
ascribe an experience to myself. On the contrary, in a self - 
ascriptive statement I identify an experience, I do not identify 
myself. Hence it would be odd if I were to invoke criteria of 
personal - identity. Now Strawson goes on to maintain that such 
ascriptions really do apply to a subject, despite the absence of 
criteria of personal - identity, and, from the foregoing, it can 
be seen that here too I support him. Thus: 
When "I" is thus used, without any need or any possibility 
of its use being justified by empirical criteria of 
subject -identity, it does not, however, lose its role of 
referring to a subject.(1) 
On the theory that the subject is residual consciousness 
the above remarks of Strawson's make perfectly good sense. When 
an experience is ascribed to a subject without invoking criteria 
of personal-identity, the experience will be related to a resid- 
ual consciousness, and it is meaningless to think of invoking 
criteria for a residual consciousness being Laz residual 
(1) Loc. cit. 
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consciousness. As I have attempted to argue, as soon as I call 
residual consciousness residual consciousness, I automa- 
tically, by attending to it, make it an object of attention, and 
then it is no longer myself. 
This leads to an important conclusion. The statement 
"I have a residual consciousness ", or the statement "This resid- 
ual consciousness is my residual consciousness" describes a 
residual consciousness objectified by attention. These state- 
ments must, therefore, themselves be examples of criterionless 
self -ascription, in Strawson's sense. Thus the assumption that 
the subject is identical with residual consciousness both 
explains how it is possible for there to be criterionless self - 
ascription, and in addition affords a positive identification 
of the subject. 
It is in connection with the next step in Strawson's 
argument that I diverge sharply from him. He maintains that it 
is only possible for me to ascribe an experience to myself 
without criteria because "The links with those criteria are not 
in practice severed." He attributes theories of the self which 
treat the self as an immaterial substance (The Pure Ego theory 
for instance), to philosophers' overlooking this crucial link. 
As he explains: 
It is easy to become intensely aware of the immediate 
character, of the purely inner basis, of such self - 
ascription while both retaining the sense of ascription 
to a subject and forgetting that immediate reports of 
experience have this character of ascriptions to a subject 
only because of the links I have mentioned with ordinary 
criteria of personal identity. Thus there arises a 
certain illusion: the illusion of a purely inner and yet 
subject -referring use for "I ". If we try to abstract 
this use, to shake off the connection with ordinary 
criteria of personal identity, to arrive at a kind of 
subject- reference which is wholly and adequately based 
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on nothing but inner experience, what we really do is 
simply to deprive our use of "I" of any referential 
force whatever. It will simply express, as Kant would 
say, "consciousness in general ". If we nevertheless 
continue to think of the "I" as having referential 
force, as referring to a subject, then, just because 
we have really nothing left but the bare form of 
reference, it will appear that the object of this 
reference must be an object of singular purity and 
simplicity - a pure, individual, immaterial substance.(1) 
In this passage Strawson describes the very programme I have 
been trying to carry out. And he says that it can end with but 
one result: that we arrive at a subject which is "A pure, 
individual, immaterial substance." But that is not the result 
we have arrived at, at all. The self we have identified in 
"inner experience" is a self of the greatest diversity and 
complexity; a self with an ever -changing content. Now in the 
above passage Strawson speaks of such a self asean illusion. 
Why? He calls it an illusion, evidently, because there is no 
evidence for the sort of self he describes (clearly, he is 
describing a Pure Ego). But if I am right, Strawson is quite 
right to reject the idea of a Pure Ego. There is, as I have 
tried to show, no evidence in inner experience of a Pure Ego. 
If, therefore, the search in inner experience of necessity led 
to an illusory result, it would be legitimate to describe the 
search itself as misconceived. This, I suggest, is what 
Strawson has done. 
It is easy to understand why Strawson should have thought 
that an attempt to identify the self in inner experience could 
have but one outcome. So many of the notable philosophers who 
have trod this path have been forced back to the Pure Ego. As 
we have seen, powerful arguments seem to drive us back to a 
Pure Ego, as though we were in the grip of some dialectical 
(1) Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, p. 
166. 
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necessity. In addition those philosophers who have suggested 
a different outcome are not sufficiently well -known for their 
views to present an automatic challenge to the assumption 
Strawson makes. The best way of challenging Strawsonts 
assumption that all attempts to find a self in inner expe- 
rience lead to a Pure Ego, is to produce a theory of the self 
based on inner experience that is not a Pure Ego Theory. 
This I have attempted to do. 
In the first chapter of this study, I remarked that 
each of us knows what we ourselves are, because we are dealing 
with the entities we ourselves are. We have first -hand knowl- 
edge, I said, of selves, and we could best understand in what 
sense we are selves by looking to our own cases, and making 
our deductions from our living experience of being selves. 
This is the course I have tried to follow, and the theory I 
have put forward is the outcome. I mentioned MacNabbts 
remark that we have an experience of the self "more internal 
than the most personal emotion we feel." I now suggest that 
this is the sort óf remark we would make were the identity 
between residual consciousness and the self proven. Residual 
consciousness has the experiential character, and the interior- 
ity, which I IacNabbts description portrays the self as' having. 
The logical features of residual consciousness also make it 
understandable that the Augustinian paradox should seem so 
applicable to the knowledge we each have of ourselves: if no 
one asks me what I am, I know; if I am asked, I know not. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
YESTERDAY'S SELF 
1. The objection was held over from the previous chapter, that a 
theory which identifies the self with residual consciousness would 
fail to account for the fact that selves are believed to endure through 
time. My primary concern in this chapter is to show that this objection 
is unfounded. This I hope to do by looking into a theory that 
specifically aims to solve the difficulty on which the objection 
is based. The theory in question is The Serial Theory of the Self, and the 
version of it I wish to deal with, is the one put foward by Grice.(1). 
One of the main reasons Grice gives in this paper for advocating 
a form of Serial Theory is that no other can, in his judgement, give 
a satisfactory explanation of the continuity of the self. It would 
be natural to suppose that the Pure Ego Theory would be strongly placed 
in this regard. A Pure Ego cannot of its very nature be subject to 
temporal change: Its experiences change, but it has permanence. 
Thus the identification of the self with a Pure Ego seems to guarantee 
the persistence of the self through time. Grice argues, however, that 
even the Pure Ego Theory fails to secure the persistence of the self. 
His argument is as follows: 
Suppose the P.E. [pure ego] theory to be true; and suppose I 
know that I had a headache yesterday, and that I had a toothache 
this morning. Now suppose that I am asked how I know that it is 
one self which had both experiences, and not two exactly similar 
selves. On the P.E. theory plus the P.N. [proper name] theory, 
I don't see that I could give any true answer, except "I just do 
know." This is, I think, rather unsatisfactory. But on a L.C.T. 
[logical construction theory] , on the other hand, if I am asked 
this question, I can answer truly "Because the experiences have 
to one another the relation R which constitutes 'belonging to the 
same self as ". For instance I should answer "Because I remember 
(1) Grice, 'Personal Identity.' 
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(or know to have occurred) both experiences, and any experiences 
I remember (or know to have occurred) must be co- personal ". This 
answer would imply, I think, that the self is a logical construction, 
and is to be defined in terms of memory.(l). 
We see, therefore, that the apparent ability of the Serial Theory 
to explain how it is that one and the same self can have had a headache 
yesterday, and a toothache this morning, is taken by Grice to be an 
important reason for preferring it. As it is this very aspect of the 
Serial Theory that I wish to challenge, it is evident that Grice's 
version is a logical one to examine. The view I shall defend is 
that the objection levelled against the theory I advance, on the ground 
that it is unable to account for the persistence of the self, is 
itself based on acceptance of the assumptions of the Serial Theory. 
I propose to answer the objection, therefore, by arguing that the 
assumptions concerned are false. In the course of the analysis, an 
alternative theory will be developed. 
Shoemaker makes a telling attack on the assumptions of the Serial 
Theory - Grice's version included - in his excellent discussion of self - 
identity and memory.(2). Although I agree with most of the arguments 
Shoemaker marshals against the Serial Theory, it will be necessary to 
examine the theory anew, from the particular perspective of the present 
enquiry. 
In order to appreciate Grice's theory it is necessary to envisage 
the situation assumed by Grice to be the one we face. I shall first 
outline the envisaged situation, and then givetextual support to my 
claim that it is indeed the situation Grice had in mind. Unless we 
accept solipsism, we each have to admit that our own experiences are 
(1) Grice, 'Personal Identity' P. 340. 
(2) Shoemaker, Self -Knowledge and Self- 
Identity, ch. 4. 
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not the only ones that occur. There must therefore be a temporal series 
of experiences, or rathr numbers of temporal series of experiences, only 
some of which belong to me. The problem, then, is to find the link 
between some of these experiences, in virtue of which that set of ex- 
periences is mine. If a set of experiences is to be ascribed to a single 
self, something must thread that set of experiences together. Grice's 
theory is an attempt to find the missing link. 
Now Grice does realise that every experience is an element in 
a wider state of consciounsess, and he avoids the mistake of identifying 
consciousness with single experiences. He maintains that every 
experience must be taken together with the state of consciousness of 
which it is an element, and as we saw in chapter four, such a whole he 
calls a "total temporary state" (t.t.s.). Given this terminology, he 
states the problem as follows: 
Now since total temporary states may be said to occur at various 
times, they may be said to form temporal series... What we want 
to do is to find something which will be true of any series of total 
temporary states all the members of which are total temporary states 
of one and the same person; but false of any series of t.t.s., not 
all the members of which are t.t.s's of one and the same -oerson.(1). 
Having set himself the problem of discovering what relates 
certain total temporary states, such that they form a series of total 
temporary states of one person, Grice, "as a preliminary shot" suggests 
the followings 
In a series of total temporary states belonging to one person, 
every t.t.s. which is a member of that series will contain as an 
element a memory of some experience which is an element in the 
temporally preceding member of the series; in a series of total 
temporary states not belonging to one person this will not be the case.(2). 
(1) Op. cit. pp. 341-2 
(2) Grice, 'Personal - Identity,' p. 342 
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That is to say, personal identity is dependent upon memory. 
But, as Grice hastens to add, it is "an unwarrantably violent 
assumption that every t.t.s. of mine (except the first) contains as 
an element a memory of some immediately preceding experience." He 
accordingly covers this objection by specifying that the memory need 
only be hypothetical. It is sufficient, maintains Grice, that "every 
member of the series would, given certain conditions, contain as an 
element a memory of some experience which is an element in the pre- 
ceding member." 
Now I do not wish to concentrate on Grice's solution - I mention 
it so that it can be seen what a very theoretical solution it is - but 
I wish, rather, to concentrate on his setting up of the problem in 
terms of total temporary states. Lr aim is to show that a proper 
analysis of total temporary states makes Grice's solution unnecessary, 
by precluding the possibility of his problem arising. The first thing 
to be noted is that Grice wishes to analyse the self in terms of the 
existence of series of total temporary states. This carries the 
implication that a single total temporary state cannot, on his view, 
be said to be the total temporary state of a self (or "someone" in his 
terminology). Grice is absolutely explicit about this. He argues 
that if it proved impossible to define "a total temporary state" except 
by means of the concept of a person, his argument would be circular. 
Clearly what he is after is a reductive analysis of the self in 
terms 
of total temporary states. He gives the following definition 
of a total 
temporary state, in the belief that it secures the logical 
priority of 
the concept of a total temporary state over the concept 
of a self (or 
"someone "): 
247. 
"A t.t.s. occurs at t" means "experiences occur at t which belong 
to the same t.t.s. "; and "experiences E and E belong to the same 
t.t.s." means "E and E would, given certain conditions, be known 
by memory or introspection, to be simultaneous ". 
It is difficult to feel happy with the claim to non -circularity 
of this definition. I shall argue shortly that Grice's definition of 
a t.t.s. commits him to the proposition that as soon as a t.t.s. gains 
an additional element, it must be a new t.t.s. According to the 
definition an experience cannot be known to be an element in a t.t.s., 
except on the basis of memory or introspection. But the memory of 
the experience, or the introspection of the experience must themselves 
be elements of t.t.s.'s. Furthermore, on the above supposition, which- 
ever one it is must belong to a different t.t.s. from the one containing 
the original experi..nce. Thus, two experiences cannot be known to 
belong to a particular t.t.s., unless it is already presupposed that that 
t.t.s. is a member of a series of t.t.s.'s. But the definition of a 
t.t.s. depends on the possibility that two or more experiences can be 
known to be co- present. Since this can only be known if it is pre- 
supposed that the t.t.s. is a member of a series, the definition is 
circular. For a t.t.s. can only be defined in terms of a series of 
t.t.s.'s, and a series of t.t.s's cannot be defined until a t.t.s. is 
defined. Grice's qualification that the memory or the introspection 
is only forthcoming "given certain conditions" does not save the position. 
It cannot be known that two experiences ever are co- present tnless the 
conditions are sometimes realised, and then the difficulty remains. 
As Grice himself admits: 
But I do not think my theory would be in the least plausible if 
memory -knowledge never did in fact occur; and if my theory is 
true it certainly would not be possible ever to know that anyone 
had an experience, unless memory -knowledge sometimes occurred. 
So I think I am really committed to maintaining that memory - 
knowledge does occur.(1). 
(1) Grice, 'Personal Identity,' p.346 
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But let us grant, for the sake of argument, that Grice's 
definition is non -circular. It then follows that a particular total 
temporary state, in isolation fr_atnany other total temporary state, is, 
by definition, not someone's total temporary state. That is, it is not 
the total temporary state of a self. If we recollect Jones's argument 
against Russell's denial of the existence of a Subject,(1), it will at 
once be recognised that his argument applies with equal force against 
Grice's position. Jones argued that we are not obliged to deny the 
existence of a subject of experiences, in order to deny the existence 
of a persisting subject. He suggested, instead, the possibility that 
each experience could be assigned a subject, without the need to assume 
that the subject "outlasted" the experience. This suggestion, if 
applied to Grice's theory, would mean that each total temporary state 
of consciousness would belong to a self, independently of any other 
total temporary state. It could then be held that the self which had 
one t.t.s. was the same self as a self which had another t.t.s., provided 
that the two t.t.s's were members of a series of t.t.s's according to the 
memory criterion laid down in Grice's theory. 
Such an emendation would, I believe, add considerable strength 
to Grice's theory. Needless to say, it is not my intention to try to 
shore up a theory which I take to be misconceived. But by attempting 
to show how Grice's theory could be made sounder, we identify one of its 
main weaknesses in the process.. If we were to make the suggested change, 
and maintained that each total temporary state of consciousness by 
itself had a subject, we would have to question Grice's assumption that 
a total temporary state was the basic unit of analysis. And it is 
precisely this assumption that I am most anxious to question. 
All Serial 
(1) See above pp. 203 -204. 
249. 
Theories of the Self have this in common, that they divide 
consciousness into a succession of basic units which are variously 
called "perceptions ", "experiences ", or [sic] "total temporary states ". 
These units are then thought of as a manifold which must somehow be 
united - the units must be threaded together - and inevitably the 
unity is thought to lie in some form of relationship, which is 
believed must exist between the succession of basic units. Grice's 
theory falls into this category. Taking his theory as representative, 
in this respect, of the Serial Theory in general, I shall try to show that 
Grice's basic unit, the total temporary state, is wrongly conceived when 
it is conceived as a unit member of a series of temporal units that 
together form the continuing consciousness of a self. 
20 What I wish to argue, is that an analysis of the sort Grice 
offers, is faced with difficulties connected with treating a temporal 
series as made up of a succession of basic units, similar to those which 
gave rise to Zeno's Paradox (Achilles and the Tortoise). A total 
temporary state is, whatever else it is, a temporal nrYit. The contin- 
uing consciousness of a person is, on this view, the product of a 
succession of such temporal units which together occupy a stretch of 
time. One is then left with the problem of explaining how such discrete 
units can form a genuine continuum. From Grice's definition of a t.t.s. 
we can deduce that t.t.s's must be occurrences of short duration that 
succeed one another in time. He defines a total temporary state in 
terms of the simultaneity of the occurrences of two or more experiences. 
Now this of itself does not entail that a t.t.s. must be of short duration, 
for of course the two experiences, although simultaneous, might have a 
prolonged existence. The implications of the notion of simultaneity, 
in this connection, need to be examined more closely. 
To make clear 
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what he means, when he says of two experiences that they are simultaneous, 
he makes the parenthetical remark, "I use 'simultaneous' to mean whatever 
would be meant in ordinary speech by 'occurring at the same time". 
With the help of a simple diagram it is possible both to bring out an 
ambiguity in the expression "occurring at the same time ", and to reveal 








t4 t5 t6 
Let A, B, C, D be four experiences, and tl - t6 different times. 
In the case of A and B, both experiences begin at the same time, but 
they end at different times. At tl and t2, it would be true to say 
that A and B occur at the same time. However, at t2 another experience 
makes its appearance, and so at t2 it can be said that A, B, and C occur 
at the same time. After experience A terminates, experience D begins 
and from t5 through t6, experiences C and D occur at the same time. 
On the other hand, at no time do A and D occur at the same time. Now 
if by referring to something occurring at the same time as something 
else, we do not specify that they occur at the same time as a given 
time, it would follow that A, B, C, and D all occur at the same time. 
For B occurs at the same time as A, C occurs at the same time as 
B, and 
D occurs at the same time as C. But this will not do, since, as we 
see, 
A and D do not occur at the same time. This means that "occurring 
at 
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the same time as" is an intransitive relation. 
We are forced back to the other possibility, which is, that two 
or more experiences occur at the same time, if and only if they occur 
at the same time as a given time. In other words, two or more 
experiences can only be said to be simultaneous, if there is some 
temporal overlap between all of them at once. If, as we must, we lay 
down this condition for "occurring at the same time ", it then follows 
that we have a different total temporary state every time an experience 
begins, and every time an experience terminates. Thus in the diagram we 
have one t.t.s. at tl, composed of experiences A and B; another t.t.s. 
at t2 composed of A, B, and C; another at t4 composed of A and C; and 
so on. In real life this would mean the existence of a great density 
of t.t.s's in a very short compass of time, in virtue of the fact that 
experiences are coming and going all the time.(1). I do not see how 
Grice could deny this. But if this is the situation, it is evident that 
the normal situation would be for juxtaposed t.t.s's to have elements in 
common: i.e., experiences which belong to more than one t.t.s. 
In view of this, it would teem to be unnecessary to say that 
what a t.t.s. has in common with an immediately preceding t.t.s., is the 
possibility of its containing as an element a memory of the immediately 
preceding t.t.s. Having a common element, is a much stronger connection 
between two t.t.s's than is the possibility of the later containing a 
memory element of the earlier. If the relationship between total 
temporary states is as I have represented it in the diagram, then the 
unity of consciousness over a period of time - from tl to t6 - is due 
(1) Deciding that a new tt.s. existed because a new experience had 
just occurred is vastly complicated by the fact that 
new ex- 
periences do not come ready classified as such. 
The question of 
what constitutes one experience and not two 
will involve yprànciples 
of classification which are likely to vary 
with the purpose of 
classification. 
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to the fact that there is no period during that time at which there is 
an absence of overlap of experiences. It should be noted that it is 
unnecessary to have a single experience enduring throughout the period. 
Continuity is preserved as long as a later experience can "take over" 
where an earlier has "left off ", by overlapping it. In the diagram, 
experiences A and C have this function, and it is these two experiences 
which unite all the t.t.sts between tl and t6, inclusively. 
Experiences B and D could not do the job. 
To get the picture of consciousness this analysis suggests, we 
may liken consciousness to a length of rope. In a length of rope none 
of the strands at one end of the rope are the same as the strands at the 
other end: It is not one length of rope in virtue of having one or more 
strands running continuously through it from end to end. The rope is 
made up of numbers of short strands overlapping each other in a 
continuous weave. This is true, too, of the composition of 
consciousness over a length of time. 
It is worth considering why Grice did not adopt the solution I 
have suggested, to his problem of what makes a series of t.t.s's the 
total temporary states of one person: viz., that all the t.t.s's with 
some elements (but not necessarily the same elements) in common, are 
t.t.sts of one and the same person. Although Grice does not actually 
consider such a solution, it is safe to say that he would have rejected 
the proposal for the reason that it is not necessarily the case that bet- 
ween two consecutive t.t.s's there will be an element(s) in common. This 
would be the case if, for instance, my diagram consisted only of experiences 
B and D. Stating this possibility, Grice says, "Such series may of 
course contain gaps: there may be times at which no member of a series 
is occurring, though members have occurred before these times and will 
occur after them." I would like to say something about this possibility. 
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It is evident that if a person never slept, and never lost consciousness, 
the series of t.t.s's of that person would contain no gaps of the sort 
Grice mentions. Sleep and loss of consciousness are, therefore, the 
obvious sources of such gaps. 
Now before considering these two circumstances, I would like to 
make a general point. The problem of personal identity is often understood 
to be the problem of finding criteria for saying that a person at one time 
is identical with a person at a previous time. Conversely, a person's 
knowledge of his continuing identity through time is understood to be 
his knowledge that he has existed for a certain length of time. 
William James epitomises this knowledge, each of us believes he has, 
of his continuing identity, in the statement "I am the same self that 
I was yesterday ".(l) Now if I needed criteria of personal identity, 
such as the criterion of bodily continuity from yesterday to today, or 
alternatively a memory criterion, it must follow that I need the same 
criterion on which to make the statement this afternoon "I am the same 
self that I was this morning." And if I need a criterion of personal 
identity for that statement, I will yet again need one for judging that 
"I am the same self that I was an hour ago." If we press the point to 
its logical conclusion, I must need a criterion for concluding that 
"I am the same self that I was a moment ago." In other words if we 
think only of the time factor, there is no difference in principle 
whether we are dealing with a very small lapse of time, or a big one. 
In theory, therefore, the problem of personal identity is solved as soon 
as it is shown that a person is the same self as he was a moment ago. 
(l) James, Principles of Psychology, I, 332. Taken literally 
the statement "I am the same self that I was yesterday" 
is a tautology, since its contradictory "I am not the same 
self that I was yesterday" makes no sense. Nevertheless 
the statement does succeed in conveying the impression 
we have of our continuing existence through time. 
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What new principle, then, is involved in putting the time back 
as far as yesterday in the question "Am I the same self that I was 
yesterday "? The only new factor that can be presumed is that I was 
asleep last night. That is, sleep has created a gap in the continuity 
of my consciousness. (To avoid further complications let us assume that 
the sleep was dreamless.) Now let us assume for the moment that there 
are special difficulties created by the fact that consciousness is subject 
to interruptions, and that we need criteria for saying that the self 
after the interruption is the same self as the self before the inter- 
ruption; the point nevertheless remains, that there is no need to suppose 
that the criteria that are laid down for establishing such an identity, 
must also be satisfied by a self during a waking period in which there 
is no interruption of consciousness. I am suggesting, in other words, 
that we might be able to explain the continuity of a self throughout 
a waking period, without introducing the criteria that might be found 
necessary to establish the continuing identity of a self after an 
interruption of consciousness. Moreover, I also suggest that it is 
gratuitous to make the assumption that the criteria we may use for 
deciding that the self that goes to sleep is the same self as the self 
that wakes up, are criteria we also use to decide that the self from 
one waking moment to the next is the same self. 
3. If it could be shown that personal identity can be established 
for but the few hours of a single period of waking consciousness, this 
would already be a considerable achievement. It would mean that we 
would have an explanation of what it meant, to say of the subject of 
a present experience that he was identical with a subject of a certain 
past experience (say one occurring an hour earlier). It would be an 
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achievement, because the basic philosophical difficulty is to understand 
how in principle it is possible for a single self to have successive 
experiences, and if this can be explained even for the limited period of 
a single period of wakefulness, the difficulty would have been solved 
in principle. Furthermore, once we had solved the problem of how it was 
possible for a self to persist over several hours, we would then be in 
a position to proceed to the further problem of how a self could persist 
through a gap in consciousness. 
Unless we have a prior knowledge of what the concept of a self 
is a concept of, we could not meaningfully raise the question "Can a 
self survive an interruption of consciousness ?" let alone look for 
criteria of sameness of self. We have to know what selves are, before 
we can talk of re- identifying selves. If I am right in this, it 
follows that Grice allowed himself to be side -tracked by the difficulty 
of the existence of gaps in consciousness. He might have arrived at 
a less academic account of the self, if he had first asked what a series 
of total temporary states had in common, in virtue of which they were 
the total temporary states of one self when there was no gap in the 
series, and, when he had settled that question (perhaps along the lines 
I have suggested), he could then have gone on to the difficulty created 
by'gappy" series. 
What I intend to do, is to work over the same ground that Grice 
has covered, with this difference: that I shall transpose his concepts 
to mine. In this way I hope to show how the results of adopting my 
theory differ from the results of adopting Grice's theory, with, I 
shall argue, the advantages going to the former. When I have done 
this, it will be agreed, I hope, that I will have completely answered 
the sceptical objection to my theory that it is unable to account for 
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the persistence of the self. My treatment of Grice's problem will differ 
from his, in that I will adopt the course, outlined above, of first 
dealing with the case of an uninterrupted consciousness, and only then 
going on to the case of an interrupted consciousness. But before I 
embark on this project, I would like to make a few observations on the 
subject of gaps in consciousness. I return then, briefly, to the 
question of sleep, and loss of consciousness. 
The gap created in consciousness by dreamless sleep, concussion, 
passing out, and anaesthesia is by no means as damaging to the continuity 
of consciousness as it may sound. A gap in consciousness can, for 
instance, never be experienced as a gap in consciousness, by the person 
whose consciousness is affected. A person may have the experience of 
losing consciousness, but that is a conscious experience. No one can 
be conscious of being unconscious. All we know is that we have the 
experience of losing consciousness immediately followed by the experience 
of regaining consciousness. It is only by inference that we know that 
we have been unconscious, or by being told of this by someone else. In 
a sense, therefore, consciousness does not record its own interruptions, 
but gives the impression of being unbroken, although it is not. 
This phenomenon can best be understood in terms of a distinction 
between objective time and subjective time. By objective time I mean 
clock time. By subjective time I mean our personal experience of the 
passage of time.(1). In subjective time, if I happen to be waiting for 
someone, even five minutes can seem a long time. On the other hand, 
if I am enjoying myself immensely, two hours can seem to pass in a flash. 
Now what I suggest is that interruptions to consciousness are only in- 
terruptions from the point of view of objective time. From the point 
(1) It is of course too large a topic to go into the relation 
between subjective time and objective time in the present 
work. 
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of view of subjective time, consciousness is uninterrupted. If I had 
been unconscious for a period, I could only find out about it inferentially, 
or from the testimony of others. The assertion that a certain period 
of time had elapsed, during which I was unconscious, must have the status 
of an hypothesis, as far as I am concerned. By contrast, the statement 
"I've had to wait ages for you," belongs to subjective time, and is not 
in any sense an hypothesis. It is a direct report of a subjective 
impression. 
Thus when from the point of view of subjective time, I say, 
"I am the same self that I was yesterday ", I think of my consciousness 
between today and yesterday as continuous. I would make no distinction 
between yesterday and, for instance, this morning, in this respect. 
There still remains the difficulty, however, that although a break in 
consciousness may not be experienced, a break does in fact occur. This 
would seem to rule out the solution I have put forward, to the effect that 
it is the overlapping of experiences which gives consciousness its 
continuity. For if a break occurs, there can of neces.:ity be no such 
overlap between the separated segments. It may therefore be necessary, 
after all, to invoke memory at such points as the factor making for 
continuity, as Grice maintains. Whether this is in fact so, we shall 
see. 
4. M,y contention against the Serial Theory has been that its 
proponents cut up consciousness into a temporal succession of units, 
which they have arrived at by abstraction, and that they then try to 
offer an explanation of how these artificial units hang together to form 
a unity. Moreover, these units are often conceived of as ultimate 
simples: the unanalysable constituents of consciousness. Now it is a 
merit of Grice's position that his units - total temporary 
states - 
258. 
are not thought of in this way as simple units. On the contrary, his 
definition of a total temporary state makes it quite clear that he 
recognises their inner complexity. Total temporary states, as Grice 
understands them, have experiences as their elements. Grice's position, 
therefore, is in this respect fully in line with the analysis of conscious- 
ness given in this work. However, the analysis I have offered goes 
beyond the one he gives in a most important respect. 
Grice takes it for granted that the elements of which total 
temporary states are composed, are experiences, and he instances such 
experiences as "thinking of Hitler ", "hearing a noise ", and "feeling 
a pain ". But specific mention of particular experiences such as these, 
signify experiences that have been singled out by attention. They are 
in fact objects of attention. But as I have argued, the existence of 
objects of attention in consciousness is only one side of the picture. 
We must also r _icognise the existence of elements in consciousness that 
have not received such articulation as a result of the action of attention. 
We must recognise the existence, in other words, of residual consciousness. 
This Grice does not do. So we see that although Grice has made an 
advance by recognising the complexity of his basic unit of analysis, 
he is still firuly in the tradition of those philosophers who take it 
for granted that there is no element in consciousness that is not at the 
time receiving attention. 
The criticism may be made of the empiricist tradition in general 
that whatever is taken by empiricists to be the basic unit of experience, 
is, without exception, an object of attention. This is true whether 
the basic unit is an impression, a sense -datum, an appearance, a sen- 
sation, a state of consciousness, or an experience. I think 
it is possible 
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to understand how empiricists come to identify their basic units 
with objects of attention, and yet not realise that this is what they are 
doing. It is incumbent on empiricists to explain how their basic units 
are arrived at. The logical method for an empiricist to employ, is to 
define his basic unit ostensively. This he does by drawing the 
attention of the reader to an item of sense experience, and then giving 
him directions on how to recognise an instantiation of the basic unit in 
the situation confronting him. It is obvious that whatever feature 
of the perceptual situation is singled out by the reader, it will at 
the time be an object of attention for him. This is clearly the case 
in the well -known analysis of "seeing a tomato," which Price gives in 
illustration of an ostensive definition of a sense datum.(1) If we 
do not actually put a tomato in front of ourselves to help us follow 
the analysis, we no doubt imagine seeing one. In either case 
the sense -datum is something which is an object of attention at the 
time of its identification. 
Serial Theorists make the problem of exi,laining the unity of the 
self insoluble on two counts. Firstly, their basic unit is by its 
very nature (as an object of attention) a discrete and independent 
particular, and as such is not of a character to combine with another 
unit. Secondly, the basic unit, gua object of attention, is, as I have 
endeavoured to establish, detached from residual consciousness and thereby 
placed over against the self in opposition to it. These basic »nits 
are from this point of view examples of the not -self. Once we realise 
this, it must strike us as odd in the extreme that it should 
be thought 
possible that the self could be a logical construction built 
up out of 
such bits of not -self, as Serial Theorists would have us 
believe. If 
(1) H.H. Price, Perception (London, 1954), P.3. 
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each basic unit is a polar op ')osite of the self, the same must be true of 
whole combinations of basic units: it is unintelligible that the units 
in combination should reverse the characteristics they have singly. 
By recognising the existence of residual consciousness, we put 
a different complexion on the problem formulated by the Serial Theorists. 
4e can at once allocate each basic unit of experience its own subject 
in the form of the residual consciousness with which that experience 
is connected. It will be remembered that I suggested that Grice's 
theory would be strengthened, had he been able to claim that each total 
temporary state was the total temporary state of a subject, or self. 
But at the time I did not suggest any means by which this result could 
be obtained on his theory. We are now in a position to see lay this 
was so. By assuming that a total temporary state was built up out of 
experiences that were objects of attention, there remained nothing ex- 
periental with which a self could be equated. Had Grice not made this 
assumption, he would have been left with something within experience, 
with which such a self could be identified. Be that as it may, there 
is an even more important respect in which recognition of the existence of 
residual consciousness might have strengthened his theory. I suggested 
that he might have taken up the idea that one total temporary state was 
connected with its predecessor, not by a possible memory element, but 
by an actual element that was common to both total temporary states. 
My contention is that this solution can be put forward with much greater 
power than otherwise, in terms of the concept of a residual consciousness. 
In the chapter on residual consciousness, I pointed out that although 
part of its content could be expected to be ceaselessly undergoing 
change, it was not possible for a person to be aware of the entire 
content of his residual consciousness. A person could not, 
on the theory, 
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make the statement that between tl and t2 the entire content of his 
residual consciousness had changed. The relevance of this is the fol- 
lowing. If a person had reason to believe that between two consecutive 
total temporary states there was not even one element of consciousness 
in common, he could never know this. For he could only know it, if 
he knew all the elements to his residual consciousness, and knew that 
none of those belonging to the first t.t.s. was present in the second 
t.t.s. But, on the theory I am advancing, it is logically impossible 
for anyone to know this about himself. Not only could he not know this, 
even assuming such a situation were to arise, but in addition the pre- 
sumption is all against its ever being the case that the residual 
consciousness in two consecutive t.t.sts had not a single element in 
common. (I am here drawing on my earlier remarks on the stable and 
invariant character of residual consciousness.) We see, therefore, 
that even if it should turn out that the continuity of consciousness 
is not preserved by the overlapping of successive experiences, owing to 
a possible absence of overlap, such experiences are not the only source 
of the continuity of consciousness. In the absence of an overlap between 
those experiences that fall under the category of objects of attention, 
we can rely on an overlap existing between the residual consciousness 
of one total temporary state and the next. Grice, by having in mind 
only those experiences that attention has singled out, would have been 
right to be wary of assuming that there were never total breaks between 
such experiences. 
If, on the other hand, he had taken residual consciousness into 
account, he would have had a much sounder base on which to put forward 
the hypothesis that successive total temporary states would be found 
that had elements in common. As we have seen, it is an implication 
of Grice's definition of a total temporary state, that total temporary 
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states follow each other at extremely short intervals of time. This 
Hakes it certain that that portion of residual consciousness identified 
as the mass of somatic feeling, will be largely unchanged (better to say, 
much of it will be unchanged) from one t. t. s to the next. On this view, 
therefore, residual consciousness must be regarded as the primary vehicle 
of the continuity of consciousness. 
Certain conclusions follow from admitting residual consciousness 
into the picture: conclusions that call in question the very way in 
which Serial Theorists - Grice among them - set up their problem of the 
self. I said earlier that their problem was misconceived, and we are 
now in a position to understand the way in which it is misconceived. 
The basic error common to Serial Theories is the assumption that we 
can meaningfully speak of a unit of consciousness at a particular instant 
in time. Once this assumption is made, it is possible to suppose that 
consciousness must consist of a series of, or a succession of, such 
units, and that in some sense they form a unity. This is the implication 
of Grice's belief that every newly discriminable element in consciousness 
heralds the arrival of a new total temporary state. Of course there is 
nothing to prevent a philosopher from defining his basic unit of 
consciousness in this way, but then we are entitled to point out what a 
procrustean technique this is. A total temporary state is an entirely 
artificial creation: a useful conceptual device for identifying certain 
aspects of a complex subject, which it would otherwise be difficult to 
refer to. It is, however, only too easy to mistake a conceptual device 
for the reality it is supposed to apply to, and to imagine that one has 
arrived by analysis at the ultimate constituents of the reality itself. 
This, I contend, is the misconception of which Serial Theorists 
are guilty. We can only correct the misconception by emphasising the 
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fact that consciousness is continuous through time. When new elements 
occur, they occur along :,ith elements that are not new, and at the same 
time that we are aware of the new elements, we are aware of the elements 
that are not near. There is therefore no reason to be impressed with 
the dissimilarity of total temporary states one with another, by concen- 
trating on the occurrence of new elements from one moment to the next, 
rather than to be impressed with the continuity of consciousness from 
one moment to the next, by concentrating on the survival of the old 
elements. The sensible course is to take both aspects of consciousness 
together, in appreciation of the fact that consciousness displays change 
amidst continuity. 
But the main point I wish to stress is that consciousness is nothing 
if not protracted. This fact has forced itself on those thinkers who 
claimed that consciousness was confined to the present. As soon as 
they tried to define the present that was thought to contain consciousness, 
they were forced to recognise that consciousness could not be so contained. 
So the concept of a "specious present" was invented to preserve the idea 
that consciousness occurred in the present. In effect this meant that 
the present had to be drawn -out in order to accommodate the drawn -out 
character of consciousness. If I am right about this, it must follow 
that any attempt to divide consciousness into units must be quite arbitrary 
and cannot be done without giving a false picture of consciousness. 
I think it is also fair to say that if, instead of being overlooked, 
residual consciousness were included in the analysis of consciousness, 
it would act as a natural check on the idea that consciousness is built 
up of a succession of temporal units. If we confine our analysis to 
those experiences that hold attention, we inevitably arrive at the idea 
of single separate experiences, complete in themselves. An experience 
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has a beginning, and an end: it is a single whole. It invites an 
atomistic conception of consciousness. Residual consciousness, on 
the other hand, resists any such analysis. If we imagine describing 
the content of consciousness at a certain instant in time, we might 
be able to list a number of experiences, but over and above that, we 
could only say "And then there is residual consciousness." That is 
to say, we could give only an indeterminate description of it, and one 
that would not differ, no matter which particular instant of time we 
r 
chose, from the description of it we would give at any other instant. 
5. We have seen reason to reject the assumption of the Serial 
Theorists that consciousness can be broken down into temporal units. 
It follows that we must also deny the need for the sort of solutions 
they offer, to show how such units are combined. An examination of 
a representative Serial Theory has thus shown that the objection to the 
theory I am putting forward, namely, that it is unable to account for 
the persistence of the self, is without foundation. If consciousness 
is continuous, and its division into temporal units an abstraction, 
then residual consciousness too must be continuous. The identification 
of the self with residual consciousness is, therefore, the identification 
of the self with something that persists through time. We are also 
at last in a position to appreciate that Jones's supoosition, that a 
self might be a phenomenon purely contemporaneous with a present ex- 
perience, which perishes when the experience perishes, is a supposition 
that we need only entertain for the sake of argument. It might be 
said that if it had come to the worst, and the problem of the persistence 
of the self had failed of a solution, the supposition would have had 
its attractions. In the event, having identified a persisting self, 
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we have no need to fall back on a momentary self. 
I shall have more to say about the continuity of consciousness 
shortly. It will then be approached quite independently of the 
assumptions of the Serial Theory. Meanwhile this is a suitable point 
at which to say something about the role of memory in self -identity. 
In the process I offer some criticisms of Shoemaker's treatment of 
this subject. As we have seen, Grice advanced the thesis that the 
self could be defined in terms of memory. This thesis has been put 
forward by many philosophers besides Grice, beginning with Locke, and 
numbering Russell and Ayer among its proponents.(l). One of the first 
of its critics was Butler, who, with Locke clearly in mind, writes: 
But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our 
personal identity to ourselves, yet to say that it makes personal 
identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say, 
that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, 
but what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon. 
And one should really think it self evident, that consciousness 
of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute 
personal identity, any more than knowledge, in any other case, 
can constitute truth, which it presupposes.(2). 
Now I wish to argue that Butler has seen the matter truly, not only 
on the negative side, which consists of his denial that memory can be the 
criterion of personal identity, but also on the positive side, when he 
suggests that memory "ascertain(s) our personal identity to ourselves." 
Let me take these two points separately. The claim that memory is 
the criterion of personal -identity is open to the charge of circularity 
on two counts. In the first place, the memory is itself an experience 
that must be someone's experience. Memory, in this sense, presupposes 
a self. In the second place, the experience remembered, might be 
remembered as an experience of one's own, in which case it is tautologous 
(1) See Shoemaker, Self- Knowledge and Self- Identity, Ch.4 
(2) J. Butler, 'Of Personal Identity', Butler's Analogy of Religion, 
ed. A. Barnes (London, 1867) p.194 
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to assert that the experience remembered is one's own. Now even if we 
concede that ways may be found of circumventing these objections,(1), 
it must be acknowledged that this is only necessary for those who believe 
that the self can be defined in terms of memory. Since I have already 
argued that such an approach is erroneous, and advocate instead a theory 
of the self that is not based on memory, I am in consistency already 
committed to agreeing with Butler on the negative point that memory 
presupposes personal identity. This brings me to the second point. 
If personal identity is not dependent on memory, what connection, if any, 
does memory have with personal identity? Shoemaker has interesting views 
on this question, and an examination of them will help us considerably. 
Shoemaker's principal thesis is that the memory statements we 
make about our own past are not statements of identity, and for this 
reason require no criteria of identity for their validation. He states 
his position in the following passage: 
What I have established so far is that if we can remember past 
events at all there are first -person statements that 
can be known without being grounded on criteria of identity, 
namely statements to the effect that the speaker was present 
when certain past events occurred. This is sufficient to refute 
the claim that all first- person past -tense statements must be 
grounded on criteria of identity if they are known to be true, and 
refuting this claim, I think, undermines the plausibility of the 
view that what appear to be first -person memory statements, e.g., 
my original statement "I broke the front window yesterday," must 
really be conclusions drawn from remembered facts in accordance 
with criteria of personal identity.(2) 
Shoemaker's main argument is that memory not only gives me knowledge 
that certain events occurred in the past, but, crucially, gives me 
knowledge that I was involved in those past events. Thus: 
Suppose, then, that the statement "I broke the front window 
yesterday" is made as a memory statement. It will not be the case 
that the speaker first knows that someone broke the front window 
yesterday and then discovers that that person was himself. If what 
he remembers is that he broke the front window, then for him the 
question. "Am I the person who broke the front window ?" cannot arise.(3) 
(1) See B.A.O. Williams, 'Personal Identity and Individuation,' 
Proc. Arist. Soc., LVII (1956 - 57). 
(2) Shoemaker, Self- Knowledge and Self -Identity, pp. 139-40. 
(3) Ibid. p. 135. 
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Shoemaker thinks that the reason criteria of identity are 
thought to be necessary, is that philosophers have made a distinction 
between a "present" self and a "past" self, and that this gives rise 
to the question whether the present self which remembers an experience 
is the same self as the past self which had the experience. Once 
this possibility arises, criteria become necessary to establish that 
the present self and a past self are identical. Although Shoemaker 
rejects this distinction between a present self and a past self, he 
offers an ingenious explanation of how philosophers have come to be per- 
suaded that the distinction needed to be made. 
He argues that it is based on the assumption, explicitly stated 
by James Mill, that the word "I" primarily refers to the self at 
the moment of utterance - the present self. This assumption is 
reinforced if the word "I" is interpreted as a logically proper name, 
in Russell's sense, since a logically proper name must refer to an 
object of present acquaintance. But in Shoemaker's judgement, perhaps 
the most important reason for the belief that "The primary reference 
of the word "I" is to something present," is the fact that the statement 
"I did not exist yesterday" is a contingent statement, whereas the 
statement, "I do not exist now," is, as he says, absurd. According to 
Shoemaker, recognition of this truth may give rise to the following 
line of reasoning: 
Clearly, anyone who makes a statement containing the word "I" must 
exist at the time at which he makes that statement. And since such 
statements are about the person who makes them, it seems that any 
such statement, whatever its tense, must assert something about a 
person who exists at the time at which the statement is made. In 
James's terminology, any such statement says something about a 
"present self." (1) 
(1) Shoemaker, Self -Knowledge and Self -Identity, p. 126 
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This means that any first -person statement making references to the past, 
of the type, "I broke the front window yesterday," seems at once to be 
making reference to my present self - "I" - and a self that existed 
yesterday - a past self - and implies that the present self and yester- 
day's self are identical. 
Whilst Shoemaker rejects this line of reasoning, by arguing that 
first -person statements about the past are not identity statements, there 
is, I contend, one respect in which the distinction between a present 
self and a past self has more weight than he allows. Shoemaker remarks, 
Such claims, i.e., first -person statements made solely on the basis 
of memory, are not judgements of personal identity at all though 
they do imply the persistence of a person through time.(1) 
Now his discussion is notable for the absence of any examination of the 
presupposition that a person persists through time. In fact, his 
examples show that when he speaks of a person's memory of his past actions 
not being based on any criteria, he takes it for granted that a person 
does persist through time. But if it is taken for granted that a person 
must be the same person whether reference is made to the present or the 
past, naturally there can no longer be any question of the identity 
of the person who remembers his past action. His identity is pre- 
supposed. Nevertheless, what has to be taken into account is, not 
merely that a person does persist through time, but that he knows that 
he does. 
If we ignore the fact that a person is aware of his continuing 
identity, we reduce the persistence of a person to the level of the 
persistence of a material object. At that level there is, it is true, 
no difference between a present self and its past self. But if we are 
dealing with a person's memory of what he did yesterday, we certainly 
(1) Shoemaker, Self -Knowledge and Self -Identity, P. 124. 
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presuppose that he is aware of himself as a person at the time of the 
memory, and also that he is aware of his .continuing identity between 
yesterday and the present. Now what I wish to suggest is that a person's 
awareness of himself is primarily rooted in the present, and that it is 
through memory that it is extended to an awareness of himself as 
persisting from yesterday to today. That is to say, a person's awareness 
of himself is first and foremost an awareness of his present self, and only 
secondarily an awareness of himself as a past self. 
My awareness of myself as a person is an awareness of myself as 
I now am. My knowledge of what it is to be a self comes from the 
experience I am now having of being a self. It is what I am currently 
living through. Contrariwise my awareness of myself as I was yesterday 
has none of this "warmth" as James happily calls it. I must rely on 
memory, and this very reliance on memory must serve to bring home to 
me the intangibility of my past self as compared with my present self. 
My awareness of my present self makes no appeal to memory, and by 
turning to memory to give me an awareness of my past self, I implicitly 
concede that my awareness of my past self is second best. Moreover, 
by its very nature, a memory carries me back to the present. It is 
the self as it is at present that remembers: the reality of the present 
self cannot be escaped. So important is this living experience of 
being a self, which must necessarily be felt in the present, that when 
I come to recollect my past self, I must invest it with all the "warmth" 
of the present self. In other words, I maintain that when I recollect 
myself as I was yesterday, I will tend to imaginatively project (more 
accurately, retroject) my present feeling of being alive - the lived 
experience of the present self - back to the self I remember yesterday. 
That is to say, there is no real yesterday's self as far as my awareness 
270. 
is concerned, there is only the situation I was in yesterday (that is 
what I remember), and my imagining myself as I now am, in that historical 
situation. 
Even if my memory is of myself in great pain, it is not yesterday's 
self in pain that I remember. It is my memory of the pain, as applied 
to myself as I now am, that constitutes the recollection. That is to 
say, I recall the pain, and imagine it as though I were now feeling it. 
On this interpretation, when I say, as James thinks we are all prepared 
to say "I am the same self that I was yesterday," it is not the case that 
I remember yesterday's self, compare it with my present self, and discover 
that the memory corresponds with the present reality. On the contrary, 
I simply attribute yesterday's experience(s), which I remember, to my 
present self. I have the conviction that these experiences happened to 
me yesterday, but I also have the conviction that the self they happened 
to, is the self that I am at present. 
It might be objected that the account I have given precludes the 
possibility of a person remembering his past self to be different from 
his present self. Moreover it seems to be at odds with the fact that 
we remember, not only what we did when children, but what we did as 
children. It seems unrealistic to suggest that we obtain our childhood 
memories by imagining our present selves doing what we remember doing 
as children. Nevertheless I do not think that these facts falsify the 
theory. In the first place I cannot judge the past self to be different 
from the present self, without also presupposing that the present self 
and the past self are the same self. From this pointof view my argument 
stands. In the second: place, if I can imaginatively retroject myself 
into the past, I can also in the process imaginatively invest my present 
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self with qualities it no longer possesses. I can imaginatively assume 
the form of a small boy. But, "under the skin," I will still be my 
present self. Lastly, and I believe, conclusively, wedo not actually 
recapture the experiences of childhood in memory. Our memories of 
childhood are the memories of an adult mind, and, for this reason, they 
are memories reinterpreted in the light of later experience. This 
is precisely what my analysis would lead us to expect. 
If my argument is sound, then, our present selves must have primacy 
in the knowledge we have of our continuing identity. Shoemaker, there- 
fore, is only able to discountenance the primacy of the present self, 
because he chose not to concern himself -,7ith the problem of our knowled.óe 
of our persistence as selves. As I have said, this knowledge is simply 
assumed in his account. But, as I have tried to show, memory not only 
gives us knowledge of what as persons we did or experienced in the past; 
it also gives us the idea of ourselves as persons with a past. This is 
the point I believe Butler to have appreciated, and it is this that I 
have called the positive side of his view. As he puts it, "Consciousness 
of what is past does thus ascertain our personal identity to ourselves." 
I propose now to explain how these ideas fit in with the theory of the 
self I have been developing. 
If the self is equated with residual consciousness as I suggest, 
it follows that the persistence of the self is assured. This I have 
already argued, by implication, when I argued that residual consciousness 
has temporal continuity. But the self could persist in this sense, 
without it having any knowledge of its persistence. The concept of 
the specious present allows us to affirm that residual consciousness is 
known to endure for a certain length of time, but such a stretch 
of time 
is necessarily very limited, and it can only be extended 
by memory. Now 
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the crucial question here is "Memory of what ?" Could it be the memory 
of earlier phases of residual counsciousness? This is not what my 
account suggests. It is true that the content of residual consciousness 
will be partially changing from moment to moment. However, in view of 
the fact that the changes within residual consciousness must, in virtue 
of its nature, pass without notice, it is unlikely that such changes will 
be remembered. In any case even if elements of an earlier phase of 
residual consciousness were remembered, the great bulk of residual conscious- 
ness cannot similarily be subject to recollection, and this likewise, 
for the reason that it cannot become the object of attention. In fact 
this point may be viewed as an instance of general principle, to the 
effect that whatever cannot be made an object of attention cannot be 
recalled either. In any event, I have already argued that we are 
unable to differentiate residual consciousness from one interval of 
time to the next. In the light of this it would be surprising if we 
could remember an earlier phase of residual consciousness as distinct 
from its present phase. The alternative possibility is that it is 
through memory of past objects of attention that we come to know of 
our own persistence through time. ( I am thinking of memory in the 
sense of past episodes recalled, and not memory in any dispositional 
sense). Thus if what I remember is EL doing something yesterday, what 
I remember is that the action was done by me. I do not need to have 
any memory of yesterday's residual consciousness to remember that. 
I do not, in other words, need to remember what it felt like to be a 
self at the time I performed the act. All I remember is myself doing 
the action, or having the experience. This is not to deny that the act 
may be remembered as having a certain experiential aura, but if it does, 
this is still not a memory of yesterday's self esr se . 
The memory is, 
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in the first place, attached to the present self as its current object 
of attention. But if it is not a memory in which a past object of 
attention is attached to a past phase of residual consciousness 
(because the past phase of residual consciousness is not itself an 
object of memory), the most plausible hypothesis is that the past 
object of attention is attached to the present self (contemporaneous 
residual consciousness), conceived as though it existed yesterday. 
In other words, the object of memory is attached to the present self 
conceived of as retrojected into the past. It is apparent, therefore, 
that the interpretation of the role of memory I have put forward, is 
consistent with my theory of the self. It is also in agreement with 
Shoemaker's claim that memory statements about one's past are not 
identity statements. If I retroject my present self into the past, 
no question arises of whether a past self coincides with a present 
self. The present self must be identical with itself in the case of 
every such retrojection, and we do not need any criteria to establish 
that something is identical with itself. One further implication of 
this view is worth bringing out. What is needed for the purpose of 
giving a person an idea of his own persistence is the existence of his 
memory claims. It is not necessary for his memories to be veridical. 
I gain a knowledge of my persistence, in my memory claim to have done 
such -and -such yesterday, even if it turns out that I mis- remembered. 
6. I proceed now to carry out my undertaking to account for the 
persistence of the self. I shall introduce a new form of argument for 
the purpose. Much of the groundwork has already been laid for the 
analysis which follows, and it will become apparent that this section 
draws together a number of threads of the work as a whole. 
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My intention is to show the importance of the perceptual senses 
for the longitudinal unity of consciousness. It will help my exposition 
if I am permitted to introduce the word "awareness" as a technical term. 
In the technical sense I propose, I call my seeing a tree, an awareness. 
Similarily, I shall call any perception an awareness. Now this use 
of "awareness" does not correspond with ordinary usage, although it is 
not all that far removed from it. Inlay say, "I see the tree," and I 
may also say, "I am aware of the tree," but in ordinary usage these two 
statements do not have the same meaning. If I see the tree I must be 
aware of it, but I can be aware of it without seeing it. It does not 
follow, either, that I must have seen the tree previously, for after all, 
a blind man can be aware of a tree. 
Mostly, a person would make a statement of the form, "I am aware 
of X," in order to convey the information that he is taking X into 
accounts that he has not overlooked it, or forgotten it. Thus if I am 
reversing my car, a friend may say, "Mind the tree," and elicit the 
reply, "I am aware of the tree:" he will be reassured that I am not 
going to bump into the tree, although he may realise that from my position 
I cannot see it. He would not be entitled to reply, "You can't be aware 
of the tree, since you can't see it." In this sort of case, my saying 
"I am aware of the tree," means that I know that there is a tree there. 
In other words, I am aware that a tree is behind me. 
When it is possible to translate a sentence of the form, 
"I am 
aware of X," as "I am aware that X is the case," without change 
of meaning, 
it is an awareness of a fact. That is to say, awareness 
that is awareness 
of facts. But it is not only facts of which we are 
aware. We are 
aware of objects, people, incidents, sensations, 
etc. We cannot, 
however, use a "that" construction of these sorts 
of awareness. Thus 
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"I was aware of his presence" cannot be rephrased as "I was aware that 
he was present," without change of meaning. The first implies that 
I was there and saw him, the second suggests that I came by this knowledge 
second -hand. The first statement also contains the nuance that his presence 
made an impact on me, and this nuance is entirely absent from the second 
statement. I suggest, therefore, that when we have an "awareness of" 
construction that cannot without change of meaning be rephrased as an 
"awareness that" construction, we are using the word "awareness" in a 
different sense from the one it has, in respect of which rephrasing is 
allowable. 
Now it is awareness of in this unequivocal sense which has most 
in common with the technical sense I am giving it. In my technical 
sense an awareness is an element of a person's present state of 
consciousness. It is, therefore, an occurrence, and it is implied 
that the awareness can only occur in the presence of the object of aware- 
ness. Thus I can only be aware of the tree, if the tree is in my 
presence and I am observing it. I do not claim that these two features 
exhaust the ordinary meaning of "awareness of," but they do exhaust the 
meaning of "awareness" in the technical sense I am specifying. It can 
thus be seen that my technical sense of "awareness" is part of the 
meaning of "awareness of," if not the whole of its meaning. All I am 
doing, therefore, is restricting the meaning of "awareness" to part of 
what "awareness of" ordinarily means. It follows that what I want to 
say about "awareness" in this technical sense will be true also of 
"awareness' of" in its ordinary sense. (When I use the word. 
"awareness" 
in the technical sense, it will be distinguished from its ordinary 
usages by appearing without accompanying prepositions). 
It is 
important to stress that awareness is an occurrence, 
or an event. 
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In this respect it may be contrasted with "awareness that" which is 
dispositional. I am aware that Elizabeth is the present Queen of 
England, but this does not mean that I must now have the thought of 
her being the present Queen of England. On the other hand, if I have 
an awareness of her, she must in some sense be present to me. 
My thesis can now be very simply stated. Sense -awareness is 
sustained by sense -organ activity, and the sense -awareness will last 
as long as the sustaining sense -organ activity lasts. This means that 
a particular awareness at a later moment may be said to be the same 
awareness as that of an earlier moment, provided that the two awarenesses 
are sustained by uninterrupted sense -organ activity. The position 
is best explained with the aid of an example. Let it be supposed that 
I see a tree, and that after a few minutes have elapsed I announce that 
I still see the tree. The question can be raised: "Have I had an 
awareness of the tree all the while ?" The answer is in the affirmative 
on the solution I propose, if I can say that I have been looking at 
the tree uninterruptedly. That is to say, my awareness of the tree 
at two different times is the same awareness, if it is sustained by a 
single continuous activity of looking. If, on the other hand, I had 
looked away, and then looked back, I would have had two different 
awarenesses, even though they may have been qualitatively indistinguishable. 
Now the relevance of this thesis is threefold. (a) It will demonstrate 
the continuity of consciousness, (b) It will reveal the connection 
between sense awareness and attention, and (c) It will throw light on 
the relation between the self and its body. These claims will, I hope, 




It is noteworthy that in the case of our two most developed 
senses we have separate concepts to describe the operation of the sense - 
organ on the one hand, and the resultant sense experience on the other. 
Thus the focussing of our eyes is described as "looking" and the resultant 
experiende is described as "seeing." Similarly, when we "focus" 
our ears we are said to be "listening," and the resultant auditory 
experience is "hearing." The lesser sense -organs do not possess this 
conceptual sophistication. Hence we feel "feels," smell smells, and 
taste tastes. Now it is true of all of the senses under consideration 
that the deliberate employment of the sense -organ demands attention. 
Moreover one would not deliberately decide to employ a sense -organ, 
if not for a purpose, and if one displays sufficient interest in the 
purpose to make such a decision, it would be inconsistent not to give 
sufficient attention the employment of the sense -organ to sure 
of_ succeeding in the purpose. In this way it comes about that we 
have "sensorial attention." 
Now my contention is that the concepts we use for the purpose 
of describing the employment of our sense -organs, are concepts which 
presuppose that the employment of the sense -organs is in some degree 
attentiv._:. If a person is described as engaged in the activity of 
looking, or listening, or tasting, &c., we rightly assume that his 
attention is engaged. Indeed one would be at a loss to know what it 
would mean for a person to look, listen or taste, if he gave no 
attention at all to those activities. For then, in the case of looking, 
we should say that he was not looking at all, but that his 
eyes were 
wandering, i.e., we would give the classical description 
of visual 
inattention - the very reverse of looking. There is, 
however, no 
correspondingly negative form of the activities of 
listening and tasting. 
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In spite of this the main point remains, that the concepts which describe 
our employment of our sense - organs presuppose attention, unless it 
is specifically made clear by the context that this is not the case. 
In order to explain this last possibility, it is necessary to go 
into the relationship between the employment of a sense -organ and the 
concomitant sense -awareness. We can soon find out this relationship, 
by enquiring whether the existence of aparticular awareness entails 
the corresponding sense -organ activity. For instance, suppose I am 
aware of a certain smell, does this entail that I must have smelled it? 
Obviously the answer is yes. But it must at once be observed that it 
does not entail my having given any attention to the activity of smelling. 
I may have simply'bome across" the smell, without deliberately having 
engaged in any activity of smelling (or sniffing). Similarly, I may 
notice a taste, without having set out to discover the taste of anything. 
Likewise, I may hear a noise, without this entailing that I had been 
listening for it. 
Seeing, however, is an exception. Ir seeing something does entail 
my looking at it. Nevertheless the concept "looking" undergoes a change 
of meaning when attention is not presupposed. I can, for instance, 
catch sight of my opponent's cards by accident, but it would be misleading, 
in that case, to say that I had had a look at them, even though I had seen 
them. The circumstances of each of these cases makes it clear that 
the awareness was not due to any deliberately chosen sense -organ activity. 
The first we know about the matter is the occurrence of the awareness. 
The other side of the coin is that those cases of awareness that are not 
due to attentive sense -organ activity, remain outside our control as 
long as we fail to inititate the required sense -organ activity. Such 
awarenesses are likely to be fleeting, as when on a walk we catch 
the 
faint scent of a flower, without letting it detain us. 
As soon as we 
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try to fix the smell of the flower by trying to smell it, we change the 
situation completely, and we find ourselves engaging in deliberate, 
attentive, sense -organ activity. Sense -organ activity takes place, 
therefore, not only in order to procure awarenesses, but also to retain 
them. THus I May at first have my eye caught by the hand of cards, 
and follow this up by really looking at them. 
IF we now look at the situation from the opposite direction, we 
again find an asymmetry between the visual sense on the one hand, and 
all except one of the other senses, on the other. IF I am looking, 
I must be seeing. (It may be remembered that I argued that a 
congenitally blind man does not look, although he may move his eyes 
about). What seems to contradict this, is the possibility of looking 
and seeing nothing, but this is not in fact a counter -example. When 
I see nothing I still see many things, but not what I am looking for. 
Alternatively I may see nothing because it is pitch dark, but then I 
still have a visual experience: I am visually aware of the darkness. 
It follows that looking entails seeing, even if what we see is not 
what we are looking for. But this entailment between the sense -organ 
activity and the corresponding awareness does not hold for most of 
the other senses. I may smell and yet smell nothing, listen and hear 
nothing, taste and taste nothing. Tactual feeling, on the other hand, 
belongs with looking. I cannot be engaged in the activity of tactually 
feeling without feeling something, unless I have lost the sense of feel 
through numbness or anaesthesia. In that casemy activity could no 
longer be described as the activity of feeling tactually.(1). 
This analysis shows that when we have a sense -awareness without 
(1) It would have to be redescribed and thereby identified as a 
different activity such as "trying to feel." 
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this resulting from an attentive activity, we avoid using the concept 
which implies that the attentive activity has taken place, or where 
that is impossible we modify the meaning of the concept, in order to cancel 
its implication of the presence of the attentive activity. On the other 
hand, it also shows that when the attentive activity is engaged in, but 
without the occurrence of the related awareness, the implication of 
attentiveness is strongly implied in the description of the activity. 
Thus, if I listen without hearing anything, it is implied that I am 
trying to hear, and this entails my listening attentively. The same 
applies to the other sense modalities, in which there is no entailment 
between the sense -organ activity and the corresponding awareness. 
In spite of this apparent untidiness in the relationship between concepts 
describing sense -organ activities on the one hand, and concepts describing 
the corresponding sense -awareness on the other, there is one constant 
in their relationship, which is of crucial importance to my analysis. 
I cannot give a particular sense -awareness my attention, without 
attentively engaging in the related sense -organ activity. I cannot, 
for instance, give my attention to what I see, without looking at it 
attentively. This logical condition of paying attention to an awareness 
applies to all the sense modalities. It emerges, therefore, that 
attention establishes for us a logical relation between the activity 
and its corresponding awareness. 
Psychologists have maintained that sense -awareness is intensified 
when the relevant sense -organ activity is attentively engaged in.(1). 
Whether this is true or not, although it is important, does not affect 
my argument, however. I am interested in the significance of a different 
point; namely that the attentive performance of the sense -organ activity 
(1) James, Principles of Psychology, I, 425 ff. 
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sustains the awareness in consciousness. The sense -organ activity 
is not, of course, a sufficient condition of the awareness, since the 
object of awareness may itself disappear quite independently of the 
activity. Nevertheless, the activity is a condition necessary to 
the retention of the awareness, given that the object of awareness does 
not disappear. It is in this way that the activity may be said to 
sustain the awareness. In other words, I keep the awareness in being 
through paying attention to it, and this I do by engaging in the 
requisite attentive sense -organ activity: i.e., I engage in sensorial 
attention.(1) It may now perhaps be recognised that a sense -awareness 
is a particular type of object of attention. In the final analysis, 
attention is responsible for an awareness lasting a certain length of 
time, and since an awareness is an element of consciousness, it is 
responsible for the continuity of consciousness through time, as well. 
If attention has this function, it can only carry it out, if it, too, 
is continuous. If attention came in flashes, or was made up of a 
series of discrete "quanta," it would be difficult to see how it could 
sustain a continuous awareness. It is necessary, therefore, to 
examine attention from this point of view. 
I have spoken of sense -organ activity, implying that it is an 
attentive activity, and I have argued that this contention is borne 
out by the concepts we use to describe these activities, which themselves 
entail the presence of attention. I shall now try to show that activities 
have precisely the logical features we are looking for. That is to say, 
an activity displays the continuousness which is necessary for the 
hypothesis that awareness is sustained by activity. Once this is 
established, it only needs to be shown that attention itself is an 
activity, or is parasitic upon activities, for the thesis to be confirmed 
(1) See p. 153 above, for the distinction 
between sensorial 
attention and sense organ- attention. 
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that the temporal continuity of consciousness is based on sustaining 
sense -organ activity. This thesis may be recognised, incidentally, as 
a formulation at the conceptual level of Ribot's contention that 
consciousness is dependent on movement (of the body). (1) In order 
to substantiate the thesis it will be necessary to analyse the concept 
of an activity in general and ascertain its logical properties. At 
the same time as I do this, I will also give an analysis of the concept 
of a state, since the contrast between an activity and a state will play 
an important róle in the argument, when the time comes to apply the results 
of this analysis to the notions of attention and awareness. 
7. The word "activity" is a very general word used to describe all 
sorts of goings on. This would lead one to expect that it did not 
possess a very strict logic of its own. However, philosophers have 
recently realised that the word is also used to describe a very specific 
kind of change, which cannot be described as precisely by means of any 
other concept.(2) It is activity in this generic sense with which I 
shall be concerned. This means that my enquiry will not take into 
account the meaning of the word "activity," when it is used in a loose 
sense to refer to patterns of behaviour, or sets of actions. I shall 
not, that is, be concerned with the use of the word "activity" in such 
sentences as the following: "The activities of the secret society are 
subversive," "Mountaineering is a challenging activity." In both these 
sentences a large variety of things people do, are all brought under the 
(1) See above, p. 75. 
(2) See Z. Vendler, 'Verbs and Times', Philosophical Review 
Vol. LXVI (1957) A. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will 
(London, 1963) Ch. 8, and T.C. Potts and C.C.W. Taylor, 
'States, Activities and Performances', Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol., 1965 
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head of "activities." (1) In contradistinction to its usage in such 
sentences as these, I hope to identify a sense of the word "activity," 
in which it is not implied that an activity is composed of a number of 
pursuits, practices, or actions, which are not themselves activities.(2) 
In the sense I am after, a definite distinction must be made between an 
activity and an act. It is with this in mind that I shall henceforth 
call such activities generic activities. (When in future I refer to 
an activity I wish it to be understood that I am referring to a generic 
activity, unless I give an explicit indication to the contrary). 
Before I am in a position to give a definition of an activity, certain 
preliminary distinctions have to be made. In the first place, I wish 
to make use of a distinction made by von Wright, between the result 
of an act and the consequence of the act.(3) The purpose of this 
distinction is to bring out two totally different ways in which an 
act may be connected with the changes effected by it. When the 
(1) The sense of"activity''that I am here ruling out is just the 
sense that Shwayder believes to be the only sense of the word, 
and which he summarizes thus: The activities of life are 
distinguished from acts one might do, possibly when engaged 
in those activities. The background field of activity 
engaged in often provides the setting against which we may 
fix units of action. Also, we may begin to analyse a field 
of activity by specifying kinds of action necessarily or 
characteristically done when engaged in that activity." 
D.S. Shwayder, The Stratification of Behaviour (London, 1965) 
p. 39 Shwayder also claims that whereas "action is a technical 
idea," "activity is a commonsense notion." My own position 
is that while I agree that activity is a commonsense notion, 
its use is not confined to the one described by Shwayder. I 
should also add that I am not considering the use of "activity" 
when it is applied to processes in nature, such as sun -spot 
activity, or volcanic activity. 
(2) The ideas that I spell be developing in this section, have been 
given more detailed treatment in an article I have written 
entitled 'States, Activities and Performances'. This article 
has been accepted for publication in The Australasian Journal 
of Philoaphy, but it is not due to appear until 1968. In it 
my views on the nature of activities, states and performances 
are contrasted with those of the philosophers mentioned in 
footnote 2, p. 282 above. 
G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action (London, 1963) D. 39 ff. (3) 
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connection between the act and the change is intrinsic, or logical, 
von Wright calls the change the result of the act. When the connection 
is extrinsic (von Wright regards this extrinsic relation as primarily 
a causal one), the change is the consequence of the act. For example, 
if the act is an act of opening the window, it is logically necessary 
for the window to be opening. The fact of the window's opening is 
the result of the act. If the window were not opening, the act could 
not be described as an act of opening the window, but would have to be 
described in some other way, such as the act of trying to open the 
window. On the other hand, if the opening of the window caused the 
door to slam, the slamming of the door would be a consequence of the 
act of opening the window and not its result. In other words, if the 
door had not slammed, it would not follow that the act was not an act 
of opening the window. Von Wright concedes that the distinction between 
result and consequence is relative to the intentions of the agent. 
If for instance the agent had meant to have the door slam, then the 
slamming of the door would be the result of his act, and not its con- 
sequence. But this qualification does not upset the validity of the 
distinction. Von Wright also notices two possible interpretations 
that may be given to his use of "result," and although he believes it 
to be a matter of indifference which interpretation we adopt, for my 
purpose the distinction is important. As von Wright explains: 
By the result of an act we can understand either the change cor- 
responding to this act or, alternatively, the end -state of this 
change. Thus, by the result of the act of opening a certain 
window we can understand either the fact that the window is opening 
(changes from closed to open) or the fact that it is open.(1) 
I shall record this distinction in the following way: when the 
term is interpreted to mean the change corresponding to the act, I shall 
(1) Ibid. p. 39. 
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identify it as " resulte," and when it is interpreted to mean the end - 
state of the change, I shall identify it as "result 
e 
." Now when an 
agent is said to be doing something, we may describe his doing as the 
bringing about of a certain result. Two possibilities present them- 
selves: the agent may either bring about resulte or resulte. We may 
at once proceed to identify an activity in terms of these possibilities. 
An agent is engaged in an activity (in the basic, or generic sense) 
when he brings about a resulte and he does not stop as soon as resulte 
comes about. A better appreciation of activity is gained by contrasting 
it with what in the literature has come to be called a "performance." 
In my terms an agent is engaged in a performance when he brings about 
a resulte and it takes time for resulte to be produced. To complete 
the picture, we may identify a third possibility, which is neither an 
activity nor a performance, but which may be called a "transitory act." 
An agent performs a transitory act when he brings about a resulte or a 
resulte, but in the first case stops as soon as result comes about, 
and in the second case resulte is produced almost instantaneously. 
The contrast between an activity and a performance comes to this. 
In the case of an activity, the result obtains from the very first 
moment the activity commences until the moment it ceases. In the 
case of a performance the result comes into being cumulatively, and 
is only fully realised at the termination of the performance. Let me 
illustrate with examples of an activity and a performance, respectively. 
If I am whistling, then it will be true that I will have whistled from 
the moment I started, until the moment I stop: the resulte that I have 
whistled will obtain right from the beginning, and will not be more 
fully realised after the activity has been going on for some time, that 
it was after the first moment. On the other hand, if I am making a 
bookcase, it will not be true that I have made a bookcase, until the 
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bookcase is produced. The result that I have made a bookcase will 
only be realised upon completion of the "performance." 
Now it will be noted that from a grammatical point of view I 
use the perfect tense to describe the results of activities and 
performances. This is important, because it enables us to distinguish 
between activities and performances on grammatical grounds. Thus, 
let the verb describing the activity or performance be represented by " fX," 
and the perfect tense of the verb be represented by "has ' ed." It 
is then possible to distinguish between activity and performance as 
follows: in the case of an activity "A is ping" entails "A has wed," 
in the case of a performance "A is Ding" entails "A had not /ed." 
We have already seen that this grammatical distinction operates in the 
case of the activity of whistling, and the performance of making a 
bookcase. It will be observed that there is a natural time limit in 
the case of a performance. The performance continues for as long as 
it is necessary for the completion of the result. It is possible, 
therefore, for a performance to be incomplete, or, for instance, half 
finished. It is for this reason meaningful, in the case of a per- 
formance, to raise the question "How long does it take ?" In the case 
of activities, there is no such natural time limit, and it does not 
make sense to ask of an activity "How long does it take ?" Performances 
are completed; activities just stop. The above analysis also supports 
Kenny's contention that performances take time, while activities go on 
for a time.(1) 
I have stressed the contrast between activities and performances, 
not because the distinction is relevant to the present enquiry per se, 
but for the purpose of making the concept of an activity stand out all 
the clearer. I now come to the contrast between an activity and a state, 
(1) Kenny, Action, Emotion, and 'All, 0.176 
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which for the present thesis is the crucial distinction. Kenny and 
others have maintained that the distinction could be made in terms of 
whether or not the verb describing the putative activity or state 
possesses a continuous present tense. If the verb has no continuous 
present tense, it describes a state; if it has a continuous present 
tense, it describes either an activity or a performance. The 
characteristic function of the continuous present tense of verbs is 
to describe what an agent is doing at the time he is doing it. It 
is perfectly reasonable to expect, therefore, that a verb which does 
not describe something an agent can do, should lack the tense which 
implies that it does describe something an agent can do. 
The fundamental distinction between an activity and a state is, 
accordingly, that an activity is a sort of doing of an agent, and a 
state is not a sort of doing at all. A state is, typically, an 
unchange. We talk of the state of a person or thing, or conversely, 
of a person or thing being in a certain state. Insofar as we speak 
of being in a state, there is a contrast with doing: a person or thing 
is passive in respect of the state it is in. The concept "state" also 
implies the idea of its persistence through time. A state which 
existed for but an instant would less misleadingly be called an event. 
States, therefore, last for a time. The important characteristic 
that activities and states have in common, is that they are both 
continuous through time, but, as we have seen, activities may be said 
to gp oh for a time,whereas states last for a time. These descriptions 
of the manner of their temporal endurance reflects the fact that an 
activity is a certain sort of doing of an agent, and a state is not. 
This is as far as we need carry the formal analysis for our purpose. 
I come now to the application of these distinctions to the concepts of 
attention and awareness. 
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8. I maintain that attention has all the logical features of 
an activity and awareness has all the logical features of a state. 
Moreover, if the above analysis is sound, we have ascertained that 
both activities and states have the required temporal continuousness 
to make it possible, in principle, for attention conceived of as an 
activity, to sustain awareness conceived of as a state. I shall 
now try to substantiate this contention. To begin with we notice 
that the verb "attend" has a continuous present tense - "am attending" - 
whereas the verb "aware" does not: there is no construction with 
"am awaring." In spite of the fact that I do not take this point 
to be logically conclusive, I do believe it to be a useful pointer. 
But to approach the problem more directly, it is meaningful to 
answer the question, "What are you doing ?" by saying, "I am attending 
(i.e. paying attention) to X." It would not be meaningful to reply 
"I am aware of X." To illustrate further that attention is a sort 
of doing, we need only consider that it is always legitimate to raise 
the question "Why are you paying attention to X ?" This invites a 
reply of the form: "I am attending to ... in order to ... " In the 
chapter on attention, I pointed out that in certain circumstances 
attention can be voluntary. When we deliberately attend, we can be 
expected to produce on request the reason for deliberately attending. 
Not all attention is deliberate, however, and it will be especially 
true of non -interrogative attention that one may have no reason for 
attending. We can therefore deny that we have any reason for 
attending; we can say "There is no reason, I just am attending." 
The point remains, however, that it is always legitimate to ask 
for the reason, even when there isn't one. The position is very 
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different in the case of awareness. "Vhy are you aware of X ?" is not 
even intelligible, unless it be interpreted elliptically. It follows 
that the sentence form "I an aware of ... in order to ... " does not 
make sense. A fortiori one does not, strictly speaking, have reasons 
for one's awarenesses. 
In sum, awareness is not itself in any sense a sort of doing. 
Nevertheless, the question "For how long were you aware of X ?" is 
meaningful, and this establishes the fact that awareness lasts a 
certain length of time. This comparison between attention and 
awareness makes it clear that to attend is to do something, whereas 
to be aware is not. What, I think, finally clinches this claim, is 
that one may be ordered to pay attention, while one cannot be ordered 
to be aware: one can be ordered to do something, but not to be 
something (except in a very roundabout sort of way). 
I have sought to show that awareness is not a sort of doing, 
and this entitles us to classify it as a state, in terms of the 
description of a state, given above. It is not without interest that 
the expression "a state of awareness," is in use. (Not that too much 
weight can be attached to such a linguistic fact, for after all we also 
have the expression "a state of inattention," and yet I would not concede 
from this that we can infer that attention is a state). By classifying 
awareness as a state we do express some of the essential features of 
awareness. The possessor of a state is passive in respect of his 
state, and a person is passive in respect of his awareness. This 
aspect of awareness has led philosophers to describe an awareness as 
that which is given, or presented. Now in spite of the fact that an 
awareness has the logical properties of a state, there are further 
reasons for declining to call it a state. These reasons will emerge 
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shortly. It is enough, for the moment, if we agree that to all 
intents and purposes awareness is a state. 
I turn now to attention. It has been argued that when we are 
attending we are doing something. It remains to be shown that the sort 
of doing involved is an activity and not a performance. If attention 
were a performance it would follow that the statement "A is attending 
to X" entailed "A has not attended to X." But this is false, so 
attending is not a performance. On the other hand, a person may have 
been attending for a length of time, so attending is not a transitory 
act either. It must therefore be an activity. And indeed attention 
satisfies the grammatical criterion for an activity in that "A is 
attending" entails "A has attended." That is to say, having attended 
is the result of attending, and this result is brought about con- 
comitantly with its sustaining activity. On this argument we would 
appear to be justified in calling attention an activity. However, 
just as in the case of awareness there is a difficulty about identifying 
awareness as a state, so too in the case of attention there is a 
difficulty about identifying attention itself as an activity. Unlike 
the case of awareness, however, there are no expository reasons to hold 
up an immediate discussion of the difficulty. 
The difficulty arises if we accept B,yle's view of the nature of 
attention. Ryle's view is neatly summed up in this statement by Place: 
There is no special activity called 'attending', there is only 
the attentive performance of an activity.(1) 
This view may be described as the "adverbial theory of attention," since 
it finds the paradigmatic examples of attention in our engaging in 
activities, carefully, or heedfully. The major implication of Ryle's 
(1) U.T. Place, 'The Concept of Heed', The British Journal of 
Psychology, XLV, 4 (1954), reprinted in Essays in Philosophical 
Psychology, Ed.DIF. Gustafson, (New York, 1964) p. 217 
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view is that attention is not itself a separate operation or activity, 
which occurs concomitantly with the act or activity that is said to be 
engaging one's attention. As Ryle himself says in this connection, 
Even where it is appropriate to speak of acts of attention, the 
word "act" carries very little of its ordinary luggage. In 
ordinary contexts we apply very multifarious criteria in determining 
what constitutes one act. Perhaps making one move in chess is 
performing one act; perhaps doing enough to warrant prosecution 
is performing one act; and perhaps getting from the beginning to 
the end of a speech without being side -tracked is one act. 
But a person who has, say, hummed a tune from beginning to end, 
not absent- mindedly.but on purpose and with some application, 
has not performed two acts or accomplished two tasks, one of 
humming plus one of giving his mind to reproducing the tune; 
or, at any rate, he has not performed two acts in that sense of 
"two acts" in which it would make sense to say that he might have 
done the second but omitted the first. Giving his mind to 
reproducing the tune is not doing something else, in the way in 
which a person sawing wood while humming is doing something else 
besides humming. We should say, rather, that a person who hums 
a tune with some concentration is humming in a different way from 
the way in which he hums automatically, for all that the difference 
might make no audible difference. It makes his humming a different 
sort of action, not a concomitance of separately performable actions.(1). 
There is at least this indisputable basis to Ryle's argument; 
namely that it is impossible to pay attention without paying attention 
to something, but it has been convincingly argued by Penelhum that the 
dependence of attention on other sorts of episodes does not rule out 
the possibility of its being an episode itself.(2) There is, besides, 
another respect in which exception may be taken to the way in which Ryle 
describes attention. In the passage quoted above, Ryle refers to 
attention as an "act ", and one of his arguments in favour of an 
adverbial view of attention consists in pointing out the logical 
embarrassment occasioned by the belief that attention is an act. For 
instance he says, 
Philosophers and psychologists sometimes speak of "acts" of attention. 
(1) G. Ryle, 'Pleasure,' Proc. Arist. Soc., suppl. vol. XXVIII, 
(1954), reprinted in Essays in Philosophical Psychology, pp. 200 -1 
(2) T. Penelhum, 'The Logic of Pleasure,' Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, XVII, (1956 -57) reprinted in 
Essays in Philosophical Psychology. 
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This idiom too is partially appropriate to certain contexts 
and quite inappropriate to others. When a person is actually 
bidden by someone else or by himself to attend, there is something 
which with some effort or reluctance he does. Where his attention 
had been wandering, it now settles; where he had been half -asleep, 
he is now wide awake; and this change he may bring about with a 
wrench. But the spectator at an exciting football match does 
not have to try to fasten or canalise his attention. To the 
question "How many acts of attention did you perform ? ", his 
proper answer would be "None." For no wrenches had occurred. 
His attention was fixed on the game but he went through no 
operations of fixing it.(1) 
Now it seems to me that the proper answer to Ryle here is to 
deny that attention is an act, and to affirm instead that attention is 
an activity. His failure to distinguish an act from an activity leads 
him to take for granted that if it is inappropriate to call something 
an act, it follows that it is not a separable episode. But one it is 
recognised that we are dealing with the different proposition that 
attention is an activity (and here it is vital to distinguish between 
activity in the generic sense and activity in the looser Schwayderian 
sense in which it is a series of acts), it at once becomes obvious why 
Ryle's question "How many acts of attention did you perform ?" is 
inappropriate: while an activity is going on, it is continuous, and 
that is why we cannot count the number of isolable occurrences of 
attention, or acts of attention. It cannot be denied that an activity 
is as much an episode while it is going on, as is an act while it is 
being performed. I conclude that what Ryle says about "acts" of 
attention tends neither to strengthen nor weaken his adverbial view 
of attention, but is simply beside the point. 
All the same, Ryle's adverbial theory makes a negative point, 
which he is quite right to insist upon. If attention itself is inter- 
preted as an activity, instead of interpreted as a manner of engaging 
in activities, we seem to imply that attention is some specific mental 
(1) Ryle, 'Pleasure', Essays in Philosophical 
Psychology, p.200 
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operation which we trigger off in conjunction with these other activities, 
and that it is a parallel process of its own. Now although it seems 
to me to be logically possible for attention to be a mental activity 
in its own right, I think Ryle is right to challenge it. The objection 
to it is that it seems practically impossible to describe this activity 
in any non -circular way: i.e., as other than simply paying attention. 
If, therefore, attention can be satisfactorily understood without 
making any such obscure claims on its behalf, so much the better. Where 
I tend to disagree with Ryle is that, from what he has written on the 
subject, he gives the impression that attending is a much simpler 
operation than it is. He maintains, for instance, that we attend 
bydoing something with care, or heedfully, or, alternatively, by 
enjoying what we are doing. In each case we are given the picture 
of an individual act or activity which is done in a certain "style" 
so to speak, and we are left with the impression that nothing else need 
be going on in the attender's head at the time. 
I do not wish to deny that this may be so in the case of 
certain forms of attention. What I do want to insist upon is that 
there are many instances in which we can be sure that there is more 
going on than the activity receiving attention. That is to say, I 
am maintaining that in order to engage in one activity attentively, 
it is sometimes necessary to engage in a further activity at the same 
time. In other words, there are times when the primary activity 
cannot engage attention unless a second activity is engaged in. What 
I have in mind is quite simply this, Often in order to give our attention 
to what we are doing, we have tothink about what we are doing, and often 
the thinking that is required is not thinking in a dispositional sense, 
neither is it thinking in the sense of "being- thought -in- action," 
but 
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rather thinking in the sense of having overt thoughts directing what one 
is doing. The thinking in this sense may be openly theoretical and pro- 
positional in nature. Now it would be a very tough -minded man indeed 
who would commit himself to the proposition that the entertaining of 
propositional thoughts is never a necessary condition of attention of 
any kind. If we are not to be unreasonable we must admit the possibility 
that on some occasions engaging in an activity attentively necessitates 
engaging in the activity of thinking - in the sense of having thoughts - 
at the same time. What is not implied by this contention, is the idea 
that such a second activity is itself a sui generis activity of 
attending. And yet this was the idea Ryle was anxious to deny. He 
could perfectly properly have denied that, without having to deny that 
the presence of some other sorts of concomitant activity might be 
detected. 
Provided that this important qualification is made to Ryle's 
adverbial theory of attention, we may agree with him that attention is 
not itself an activity. We can then accept his claim that attention 
is a "polymorphous" notion, (l), covering a variety of activities whose 
special characteristic is that they cannot be engaged in at all, unless 
they are engaged in attentively. Such activities as perceiving, thinking 
watching, and enjoying belong to this class. They are all "attention - 
laden" activities. One cannot be said to be listening, for example, 
if one gives no attention at all to what one hears. The fact that 
we 
can be said to listen attentively, does not contradict this thesis, 
in 
spite of its implication that it is possible to listen inattentively. 
Such claims are perfectly compatible with the view 
that the absence of 
a minimum degree of attention disquaJifies the activity 
from being 
(i) Ryle, 'Pleasure', Essays in Philosophical 
Psychology p.202 
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identified as listening . The same is true, mutatis mutandis of all 
other attention -presupposing activities. On this interpretation, to 
say that attention is an activity, is an elliptical way of saying 
that there are activities that entail attending. Once it is realised 
that this is what is meant, there is no harm in referring to attention 
as an activity, as a form of short -hand for this position. This I 
shall do. 
Having sided with Ryle on the question of the nature of attention, 
I must defend him, if I am to defend myself, against the refutation 
of the adverbial theory, put forward by Place. I must at once confess 
that I do not really understand Place's argument to the effect that 
Ryle's case breaks down. According to Place, 
The logical consequence of this theory is that the individual's 
own activities are the only sorts of things to which attention 
can be paid. 
His objection to this position is as follows: 
If Ryle's theory were correct it should be nonsensical to talk 
of someone paying attention to anything other than an activity 
which he himself is performing. In fact, of course, we can speak 
with perfect propriety of the paying attention to any kind of object, 
phenomenon or sensation which is visible, audible, tangible, or 
otherwise perceptible. In such cases there is no activity which 
is being performed attentively or heedfully.(l) 
Nay difficulty with Place's argument stems from the fact that I can only 
pay attention to a visible object by looking at it; an audible object 
by listening to it; and a tangible object by feeling it, and as far as 
I am concerned "looking," "listening" and "feeling" are activities. (I 
shall have more to say about this contention presently). But if this 
is true, I pay attention to such perceptible objects in virtue of 
engaging in attentive activities: it is as much activities which are 
attentive in these cases as in the cases of overt actions. 




Penelhum agrees with Place on this issue. But it is interesting 
to see that he recognises the existence of the line of defence I have 
just offered. I shall quote his remarks about this, but I must just 
point out that Penehlhum is thinking specifically about "enjoyment" 
rather than "attention" as such. Nevertheless this does not affect 
the argument, since Penelhum is in agreement with Ryle's view that 
enjoyment is itself a species of attention. We are therefore, free 
to make a mental substitution of the word "attention" for the word 
"enjoyment" in the following passage without violating its intent: 
A possible way out is to insist that what we are enjoying is 
some activity of our own, viz., that of watching or noticing 
the actor's performance. But this clearly entails the un- Rylean 
view that watching and noticing are activities, and therefore 
occurrences, and although I would not resist this, to hold it 
in the interest of a dispositional theory of enjoyment would be 
to construe one heed -concept as episodic and another as dis- 
positional, which is hardly compatible with claiming that both 
species are of the same genus. What is compatible with this is 
claiming that all heed -concepts are episodic, and that some form 
of attention is part of the meaning of the word 'enjoyment.' (1) 
In this passage Penelhum mentions the solution I proposed, and then 
argues that Ryle cannot acopt it. I believe Penelhum is right about 
this. my response is that if Ryle puts forward a theory of attention 
that does not square with his general philosophical position, so much 
the worse for his general philosophical position. All that I am 
interested in is getting it right about attention, and if I think that 
Ryle is right on this question, he has my support. I therefore accept 
Penelhum's way out. It is also evident from my general remarks about 
consciousness, that, unlike Byle, I have no wish to avoid "episodic" 
accounts of such concepts as "perceiving," "thinking" - and 
"heed- concepts" 
in general. 
(1) Penelhum, 'The Logic of Pleasure', 
Essays in Philosophical 
Psychology, pp. 243-4. The one claim in this 
passage from 
which I wish to dissociate myself 
is Penelhum's claim that 
noticing is an activity. Noticing is 
disqualified from 
being an activity because it lacks 
the verbal form of the 
continuous present tense. I can't 
say "I am noticing." 
Noticing is not something that can go 
on for a length of time. 
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9, I now wish to show that the analysis of attention I have been 
defending, squares with what I said about attention in the chapter on 
residual consciousness. bey belief is that what I said there not only 
squares witri the oresent analysis, but actually bears it out. Nothing 
that I said about the effect of attention on consciousness, sugzests that 
attention is itself some unique element in consciousness. On the contrary 
the gist of the ideas developed in that chapter is that the various forms 
of attention are but the various ways in which consciousness is structured 
in possible situations. The nature of these structures was determined 
by the nature of the relation existing between residual consciousness 
and object of attention. We found this relationship to pass from one 
of sheer disconnectedness to one of a high degree of involvement, and 
each stage in this progression was seen to represent different forms 
of attention and varying degrees of those forms. We 
"rudimentary" forms of attention such as reverie, and sense -Organ 
attention, through sensorial attention, to the highest forms of 
intellectual attention. 
This theory does not support the claim that attention is itself 
some conscious process that is sui generis. On the other hand, it does 
support my contention against Ryle, that attention may sometimes require 
the cooperation of several activities, and is not always confined to 
the mariner in which a single activity is engaged in. Interrogative 
attention is particularly relevant in this connection. In interrogative 
attention there is a meaningful relation between residual consciousness 
and the object of attention. A particular instance of this 
is the 
existence of a "master idea" in residual consciuusness, 
which directs 
and determines the sort of attention given and the type 
of object singled 
out.(1) Such a master idea itself only comes 
to be an element in 
(1) See above, p.149. 
298. 
residual consciousness, however, in virtue of some additional activity - 
whether it be thinking, or image formation - that produces it. 
Interrogative attention, therefore, provides a counter- instance to the 
simple adverbial theory of attention. A reductive analysis of 
attention in terms of performing a task in a certain manner, covers 
only some cases. In others, attention can only occur if two or more 
activities work in harness. 
Finally, it will be recalled that I placed considerable 
importance on the actuation of muscles, in relation to attention. 
The connection between the two, in the case of sensorial attention, 
needed no arguing. But I sought to show that Ribot could be supported 
on the even more radical proposition that muscle -actuation was essential 
even in purely mental activity, such as the occurrence of thoughts and 
mental images. If this contention is sound, it gives great weight 
to the claim that attention always operates through activity. For 
muscle- actuation is activity par excellence: viz., "I am actuating 
such - and -such a muscle," entails "I have actuated such -and -such a 
muscle." It should be noted that muscle - actuation can occur even 
though no bodily movement is discernible. Muscle- actuation is required 
as much to inhibit as to promote bodily movement. Thus it may be seen 
that the references I made to muscular activity in the chapter on residual 
consciousness have a new significance in the light of the logical 
analysis of activity given in the present chapter. We can now better 
appreciate the nature of the dependence of consciousness on activities 
involving the use of our bodies. 
10. In this section I apply the distinction 
between an activity 
and a state to perceptual concepts, in order to make 
explicit the form 
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of dependence of states of awareness on attentive activities. In other 
words, the time has arrived for me to show in detail how attentive 
activities sustain states of awareness, and by so doing to account for 
the continuousness of consciousness. I shall argue that in the case of 
such pairs of concepts as "looking and seeing," "listening and hearing," 
and "touching and feeling," the first member of each of these pairs of 
concepts is an activity, and the second, a state brought about through 
the activity. I shall also argue that we engage in these perceptual 
activities in order to bring into being states that until then had not 
existed, or in order to sustain in being an already existing state. 
It may be remarked that a conceptual distinction marks these 
two latter possibilities. We speak of looking for, and listening for, 
when we wish to bring a state into being; and looking at, and listening 
to, when we wish to prolong an existing state. We do not possess 
these conceptual refinements in the case of the inferior senses, but 
we can contrive to make the same distinctions there, too, using the 
notion of trying. Thus if I wish to bring about a particular olfactory 
state, I describe myself as trying to smell something. But if the 
olfactory state already exists, I sustain it by sustaining my smelling 
activity. 
The account I have just given, at once runs into a complication 
which has to be sorted out. The account seems to work quite well in the 
case of looking at an unchanging object such as a building, or listening 
to an unvarying noise. We can freely think of these cases as states of 
awareness. The difficulty occurs rrhen what one sees is changing instead 
of constant, and when what one hears is a succession of different 
sounds 
and not one continuous sound. Are we to say in the latter possibility 
of each of the two cases that a new state arises with 
each change, or are 
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we to say that the same state endures in spite of changing elements 
within it? It seems to me that we could adopt two different points 
of view. (a) We could describe a visual field as a state in the one 
case, and an auditory field as a state in the other, and maintain that 
the states are prolonged for as long as they are sustained by a single 
episode of continuous activity - of looking, in the one case, and of 
listening, in the other. This would mean drawing a distinction 
between the fact that one was seeing, from what one was seeing: form 
from content. (b) We could hold that the state lasted for as long as 
some element in the sense field could be identified as the same, 
provided that the sense field was sustained by a single episode of 
sense -organ activity. I suggest that (b) is the less artificial 
position of the two. For this reason it is the one I shall adopt. 
My argument is considerably helped by the fact that Barnes 
has arrived at conclusions very similar to my own, in a paper "On 
Seeing and Hearing." (1). I shall, therefore, base the discussion on 
that paper, both for the support it gives to my own position, and for 
the opportunity it affords me to define my position more precisely 
by showing the respects in which it diverges from Barnes's position. 
Moreover, it is Barnes who expresses the reservation about classifying 
a perceptual awareness as a state, which I mentioned on page 489, and it 
will be convenient to include that matter in the present discussion. 
Although Barnes does not attempt, as I have done, to make explicit 
the logical characteristics that distinguish activities from states, 
to all intents and purposes he offers the same analysis of looking and 
seeing, and, by implication, of listening and hearing, that I 
(1) W.H.F. Barnes, 'On Seeing and Hearing', 
Contemporary British 
PhilospphY, ed. H.D. Lewis, (London, 1956) 
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have given. In the passage that follows he eliminates one possibility 
by rejecting the idea that seeing and hearing are activities. 
I think there can be little doubt that seeing a tree, hearing 
a bell, etc., are neither activities nor processes and are 
only in a partial way states. That they are not activities can 
be seen from the fact that we do not normally answer questions 
such as 'What are you doing ?' or 'What did you do ?' with 'I am 
seeing the moon rise' and 'I saw the moon rise.' The normal 
answers would be 'I am watching the moon rise,' and 'I watched 
the moon rise.' The absence of the continuous present tense 
seems also to prove that seeing and hearing are not processes.(i) 
The remaining possibility would seem to be that seeing and hearing 
are states, and Barnes shows himself to be well aware that they share 
with states the feature that they have duration, or last for a time. 
This is clear from a passage in which looking and seeing are compared 
with searching and finding. 
While looking for something is like searching for something in 
referring to an activity, seeing has a dual role, (a) like finding, 
which refers to the end of an activity and th beginning of a state 
of affairs, and (b) like possessing, which refers not to an activity 
but to a state of affairs. In sense (a) I mu- exclaim '9hi I 
see it now.' In this case it is plausible to say that seeing is 
'detecting' or 'spotting.' But if someone asks 'Do you see that 
tree outside the window ?' and I say 'Yes, I see it: I've been 
looking at it for some time,' I am using see in sense (b) and it 
does not mean detect her:;. 'I still see it' and 'I still have it 
in my sight' are like 'I still have it' and 'I still have it in my 
possession.' Now although we do not use the continuous tenses of 
a verb such as Possess, this does not mean that the state of possession 
cannot have any duration. We say 'I had it all the time': and 
similarly 'I saw you all the time' or 'I could see you all the time'. 
The state, though it has duration, is complete at each moment of its 
duration.(2) 
We see, therefore, that Barnes agrees with us in finding "seeing" - and 
by implication "hearing," etc. - to have all the logical features which 
my analysis has shown a state to have. In spite of this he is unhappy 
about calling seeing and hearing "states," and his reasons are as follows: 
(1) Barnes, 'On Seeing and Hearing,' p. 70. 
(2) Ibid. pp. 74 -5. 
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Are seeing and hearing states? They would have to be states in 
which people and animals could be. Now I can, of course, be in 
a certain physical state, e.g., filthy, sick, or in a mental state, 
e.g. depressed, hilarious, or in a state which it is difficult to 
classify as exclusively physical or mental, e.g. tense, exhausted. 
And there is also a looser use of 'state' in which when I have 
something wrong with a part of me L.can be said to be in a certain 
state, e.g. when I have a headache or nausea. Seeing something 
is not very much like being in a state in any of these uses. But 
there is a class of verbs which refer not so much to a state in 
which I am as to a state of affairs in which I am central, e.g. 
have, possess, own. The activity or process of buying is followed 
by the state of having. There seems to be a certain parallel 
between this sort of verb and verbs such as seeing and hearing. 
We do not normally use the continuous tense of verbs referring 
to this kind of state; we do not normally say 'I am having the 
pencil in my hand.' And these verbs of ownership further resemble 
verbs such as seeing and hearing in referring not so much to my 
state as to my situation vis -a -vis something else. But granting 
these resemblances we should not normally refer to seeing and hearing 
as states. If they are not activities, processes or states, what 
are they? The answer, I think, is that they are experiences. (1) 
Now these are no doubt solid reasons for refusing to call 
seeing and hearing states. Moreover, Barnes could have added a further 
reason making the same point. We tend to think of a thing being in one 
state at a time, and not in several different states at once. The state 
of a thing seems to encompass the whole being of the thing, and it is 
this idea which makes it seem implausible for a thing to be in two or 
more states at the same time. But we see, hear, feel, etc., at the same 
time, and if each of these concepts describes a state, we must be in as 
many states at once as we have awarenesses. 
It would seem that this conclusion can only be avoided if we 
follow Barnes and deny that awarenesses are states. We may concede 
that it is misleading so to classify them. And yet it cannot be said 
that Barnes's answer, suggesting that they are experiences, is a happy 
one. For one thing, his answer can be looked upon as a category mistake. 
It would be logically objectionable to say, "There are activities, processes, 
performances, transitory acts, states, events, and experiences." 
(1) Barnes, 'On Seeing and Hearing,' pp. 70 
-1. It is worth 
remarking how well what Barnes says 
about the concept "having" 
fits in with the analysis of "having," 
given in ch. 4, sec.6 above. 
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Experiences do not belong in such a categorial list. Experiences are, 
rather, one of the sorts of thing of which we might ask, "Are they 
activities, performances, states, etc. ?" We must either say that 
experiences do fall under one of these heads, or that the list of 
categories is incomplete, and that experiences must fall under some 
further concept not yet identified. The latter possibility can at 
once be ruled out, since the as yet undiscovered category would have 
to possess precisely the logical features possessed by a state. 
Unless it did, it would not fit Barnes's "experiences," which, as we 
have seen, have the logical features of states. 
Now it seems to me that the answer to this conundrum is to 
boldly accept the proposition that forms of awareness such as seeing, 
hearing and feeling, are states. The objections Barnes has raised, 
and to which I have added, can then be overcome as follows. We can 
insist that we are using the word "state" as an analytical concept, 
and that by calling "X" a state we are making a logical distinction 
between the status of X and the status of something else: for instance, 
an activity. We do not need to claim that MS. identification of 
awareness as a state needs to correspond with what are called "states" 
in ordinary language. We could suggest that the reason seeing, hearing, 
etc., are not usually called states, is the simple one that we have more 
exact concepts already in use, with which to refer to such states, without 
calling them states. We could instance Barnes's "experiences," my 
"awarenesses," and indeed the particular concepts "seeing," "hearing," 
and "feeling" themselves, to substantiate this point. 
Barnes's objections only arise on the assumption that when the 
word "state" is used in ordinary language, it is being used to make the 
logical distinctions with which we have been concerned, but I see no 
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reason to make that assumption. It is true that when making the 
logical distinction we look for a word in common usage that seems to 
come most close to refledting the logical features we have in mind, 
and the word "state" unquestionably does that. Nevertheless we are 
not entitled to assume that the word "state" has this one fixed 
meaning in ordinary usage, such that it always reflects the philosophical 
distinction we have identified. Neither are we entitled to assume 
that every time we come across a concept describing a state: e.g., 
seeing; we ought to be able to rephrase a sentence using that concept, 
with one that leaves it out, and substitutes a phrase using the word 
"state." And yet much of what Barnes says seems to imply that we 
ought to be able to do this. Barnes's mistake, it seems to me, is 
the one of identifying philosophical distinctions with ordinary usage, 
and without going any further, it can safely be said that the relation 
between them is not as simple as that. I conclude, therefore, that 
seeing, hearing, feeling, etc., are states from a philosophical point 
of view, even though it would not be proper in ordinary usage to call 
them states. Having said that, let us proceed to Barnes's analysis 
of looking and listening. 
In this connection Barnes has this to say: 
Corresponding to the experience verbs see, hear, taste, smell, feel 
are the activity verbs look, listen, taste, sniff or smell , and 
feel. The relationship between the two corresponding verbs is 
not in all cases the same. 
He proceeds to list the differences, but as he makes essentially the same 
points about their relationships as I had occasion to make earlier in 
this section, there is no need to repeat them. Barnes does not explicitly 
make the point, although it is certainly implied in his analysis, that 
his list of activity verbs identifies activities, because in each case it 
is true of them that "A is ding" entails "A has /ed." That is, if I am 
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looking, I must have already looked, and similarly for the remaining 
cases of perceiving. In other words, the result of each of these 
activities comes into being as soon as the activity commences, lasts 
for as long as the activity goes on, and perishes the moment the 
activity ceases. As a matter of fact, Barnes has a concept, which 
corresponds with my concept of a resulte, (l), and this concept he 
calls an "upshot." He criticises Ryle for not distinguishing between 
the concept of an achievement, and the concept of an upshot. Every 
action has, according to Barnes, an upshot, but not every action 
results in an achievement. Now Barnes does suggest that every 
activity also has an upshot. Dealing with the activity of walking, 
he points out that at each moment the walker reaches a certain point, 
and adds: 
It would be inappropriate, as we have already seen, to refer to 
this as an achievement. It is a result or upshot. With any 
kind of movement there is a continuous upshot, consisting in 
the fact that at every moment what is moving is at a different point 
in space.(2) 
However, Barnes's analysis is bound to result in inconsistency, because 
in his example of the activity of walking, the "upshot" is of a different 
sort to the "upshot" produced by an action. In other words, Barnes 
fails to distinguish two senses of upshot, corresponding to the 
distinction I have made between a result and a resulte. The incon- 
sistency will emerge shortly. 
We come now to the crucial question of the relationship between 
perceptual activity and perceptual state. Barnes has this to say in 
connection with the particular case of looking and seeing: 
Looking about is a thing that I can do and it has as its continuous 
upshot seeing first one thing and then another. Looking at some 
(l) See above, p. 283. 
(2) Barnes, 'Seeing and Hearing,' p. 73. 
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particular thing has as its continuous upshot seeing first one 
feature of it and then another. Looking for some particular 
thing, e.g., a gentian, in so far as it involves looking about 
has as its continuous upshot seeing first one thing and then 
another: it is crowned by achievement only in so far as it has Gs 
an upshot seeing a gentian.(1) 
In this passage Barnes gives us an excellent example of an activity 
sustaining a state. For it is evident that his description of a 
"continuous upshot" is a description of a state that is dependent on 
a sustaining activity. A continuous upshot must last as long as the 
activity of which it is the upshot, itself goes on. This means that 
the continuousness of the activity is reflected in the continuousness 
of the state supervening upon: the activity. 
The significance of this example is that it provides evidence 
of an activity sustaining a state, in one concrete case. This confirms 
the thesis for which I have been arguing, in as much as a general thesis 
is confirmed through its instantiations. Moreover, the example in 
question is not merely a confirming instance of the thesis. It may 
be regarded as a paradigm case of an attentive activity sustaining a 
perceptual state. It is thus a demonstration of the thesis that the 
continuousness of consciousness is brought about by the continuousness 
of a sustaining activity. 
This conclusion is easily seen to follow, when it is remembered 
that "looking" has been found, on analysis, to be an attentive activity, 
and "seeing" has been shown to be a state of awareness. Now since an 
awareness is an element of consciousness, and an awareness has been 
shown to be continuous, it can be inferred that the consciousness of 
which it is an element, must itself be continuous.:. 
11. The argument has come full circle to the position I adopted 
(1) Loc. cit. 
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vis -a- vis.the analysis of consciousness given by Serial Theorists. 
I objected to their analysis of consciousness into units, such as Grice's 
total temporary states, on the ground that this destroyed the continuity 
of consciousness. I suggested instead that we could resist the 
assumption that consciousness could be broken up into temporal units, 
if we realised that the elements of consciousness were experiences (aware - 
nesses) which themselves endured through time. On this basis I maintained 
that consciousness gained its continuity from the overlap of such 
experiences, much as a rope is made up of the intertwining of a number 
of shorter strands. This thesis rested on the assumption that experiences 
themselves possessed the required temporal duration and sameness of 
identity, without which they could not perform the function allotted 
to them. In the extended examination of perceptual activities and 
perceptual awareness, which has just been completed, I attempted to make 
good this assumption. Although the last details have yet to be added 
to the thesis, its main burden is now clear. 
Its impact can, perhaps, best be appreciated if we return once 
again to the example I gave when I outlined the thesis initially. I 
took the example of seeing a tree. (1) If we think of the sight of a 
tree as the "continuous upshot" - to use Barnes's phrase - of the 
activity of looking, then we can appreciate that it makes no sense to 
ask how many "sightings" of the tree the perceiver registers, after, 
say, half an hour of solidly looking at the tree. We can only ask the 
perceiver how many times he has seen the tree, if we suppose him to 
have taken his eyes off it one or more times. He can then reply, 
for instance, "I've seen it three times now" - having looked at it 
thrice. But if the hypothesis is adopted that consciousness is 
(1) See above, p. 276. 
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composed of a succession of temporal units, we would have every right 
to expect an answer to the question "How many visual experiences have 
you had of the tree since you started looking at it five minutes ago ?" 
This question is not only manifestly absurd, but, more importantly, we 
can explain why it is absurd. Given that we are describing a con- 
tinuous upshot - or a results on my analysis - we see that we are 
dealing with something continuous and not with distinct episodes. 
We cannot, therefore, break up such a continuous upshot into units, 
without seriously misrepresenting its character. 
Certain details remain to be filled in, before this view stands 
a chance of withstanding criticism. I begin by dealing with what I 
asserted to be an inconsistency which Barnes's position runs into. 
It will have been noticed that he instances the relationship between 
looking and seeing, as an example of the relationship between an 
activity and a state. He had, however, previously acknowledged that 
this particular pair of perceptual concepts was atypical, in that 
looking always entailed seeing, whereas other pairs of perceptual 
concepts followed the pattern of listening and hearing: i.e., listening 
does not entail hearing. The difficulty arises for Barnes as soon as 
he claims that all activities have a continuous upshot, or result: 
a claim we noticed him to make. If seeing is taken to be the result 
of looking, it follows that hearing must be the result of listening, 
smelling the result of stiffing, and so forth. But in the case of 
listening, and smelling, the activity can occur without the result 
occurring. It follows that not all perceptual activity has an upshot, 
or result. But this is ex bypothesi false: hence the inconsistency. 
The way in which this inconsistency can be avoided is, I suggest, 
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the following. We must recognise that the sense in which every 
perceptual activity has a result, or continuous upshot, cannot be 
the sense in which perceptual awareness is a result or continuous upshot. 
In other words we are constrained to distinguish two kinds of continuous 
upshot; one of which is intrinsic to the occurrence of the activity, 
and the other which is not. Now, on my analysis, every activity 
brings about a resulte, and this result is described by a statement 
in which the activity -verb appears in the perfect tense. Thus the 
result of my listening, is that I have listened; the result of my 
looking, is that I have looked; and the resulte of my sniffing, is 
that I have sniffed. It is in this sense of result, that every activity 
has a result, and it is plainly of this sense of result that Barnes's 
remark (quoted on page 305 ) is true: namely that "With any kind of 
movement there is a continuous upshot." What Barnes is plainly not 
entitled to do, is to identify resulte in this sense, with the sense 
in which "seeing ", "hearing, "'smelling," etc. are results. Now it 
would be conceptually very neat if I were able to claim that Barnes 
had simply overlooked my distinction between resulte and resulte, and 
that perceptual states were results of the latter sort. But this 
simple way out would be incorrect. A resulte is an end -state, which 
only comes into being upon completion of a task, and seeing, hearing, 
etc., are not states of that sort. We have no option but to recognise 
that seeing, hearing, etc., are a second type of resulte which is not 
analytically tied to the activity, but is its rationale. Thus, in 
the case of sensorial attention, we look in order to see, listen in 
order to hear, sniff in order to smell, and so forth. When our activity 
is successful the appropriate state of awareness supervenes, and when 
this happens we have a second type of resulte coming on top of the first 
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type of resultc: another type of continuous upshot altogether. 
We can now, finally, understand the circumstances in which a 
perceptual activity will be responsible for sustaining a state of 
awareness. I maintained in section 6 that attention establishes 
a logical link between perceptual activity and its corresponding 
perceptual state. This it does when the perceiver gives attention 
to his awareness. It is then a necessary condition of his doing so, 
that it should be the results of his perceptual activity. In this 
circumstance the state of awareness is of necessity sustained by the 
perceptual activity, and the continuousness of the seeing, hearing, 
or feeling, is proven. 
I shall bring this chapter to an end with a summary of its 
findings. my objective was to show that the theory I am advocating 
could successfully account for the persistence of the self through 
time. To this end I first tried to show that the special problems 
that the Serial Theory of the Self was designed to solve, only arise 
on an improper understanding of consciousness. I suggested that the 
idea that consciousness could be conceived to be composed of a succession 
of temporal units, such as Grice's total temporary states, received 
what plausibility it had, from the fact that their analysis of con- 
sciousness failed to take the existence of residual consciousness into 
account. I argued that it was meaningless to conceive of residual 
consciousness as made up of a series of temporal units, and concluded 
that a self equated with residual consciousness would avoid the 
difficulties confronting the Serial Theory. Finally, leaving aside 
residual consciousness, I sought to show by a more positive approach 
that there are circumstances in which we have no option but 
to under- 
stand consciousness as continuous, even when we confine ourselves 
to 
311. 
objects of attention (in this case perceptual awarenesses). 
On page 276 I claimed three consequences for this examination 
of perceptual consciousness. (a) That it would demonstrate the 
continuity of consciousness. If my argument is successful this 
undertaking has been fulfilled. (b) That it would reveal the connection 
between sense awareness and attention. Here too it will I hope be 
agreed that my promise has been fulfilled. (c) That it would throw 
light on the relation between the self and its body. This under- 
taking is still unaccomplished. Although the discussion may have 
Produced certain hints, the implications of the analysis for this 
particular issue have not been brought out. This I endeavour to do 
in the remaining chapter. 




1. In the preceding chapters I have endeavoured to set 
out a theory of the self that escapes the objections that 
beset both the Pure Ego Theory and the Serial Theory, and 
yet one that locates the self within experience. I was 
concerned to discover the sense in which each person is a 
self to himself as distinct from the sense in which other 
selves are taken by us to be selves. In other words my aim 
was to advance a theory of the self that had as its founda- 
tion the fact that our knowledge of selves is a knowledge 
of what we ourselves are. I have suggested that the self 
disclosed in inner experience is none other than an aspect 
of consciousness itself. I have argued that all consciousness 
is polarized by attention into two distinct spheres and that 
the sphere I have called residual consciousness possesses 
uniquely those characteristics we attribute to the "felt" 
self. 
I now wish to consider the equation of the self with 
residual consciousness in the wider context of the mind -body 
problem. The theory has this implication, at least at the 
purely formal level, that the identity of the self would 
remain intact even if it should transpire that the relation 
between mind and body was a purely contingent one. That is to 
say, the idea of the self as residual consciousness would be 
313. 
feasible even if the self were disembodied. This conclusion 
follows from the fact that consciousness is common to an 
embodied self and a disembodied self, and a self located in 
consciousness would survive loss of its body provided that 
consciousness survived detachment from its former body. 
This consequence of my theory is significant, because philos- 
ophers such as Strawson (1), and Quinton (2), who are against 
the idea of the duality of mind and body, nevertheless concede 
that the idea of survival after death is at least logically 
conceivable. They refuse, in other words, to be driven to 
the point of maintaining that the idea of a disembodied self 
is self- contradictory.(3) The theory I am advocating, 
therefore, would not be falsified if it were conclusively 
shown that it was logically possible for a self to exist in a 
disembodied form. I said, however, that it was only in a 
formal sense that my theory was compatible with the proposi- 
tion that the relation between self and body was purely 
contingent. By this I mean that much of the substance of my 
analysis of consciousness is in line with the conclusion that 
we are essentially embodied selves, and consequently that the 
logical possibility of disembodied existence (if such it is) 
(1) Strawson, Individuals, p. 115. 
(2) A. Quinton, 'The Idea of the Soul', 
Philosophical 
Studies, vol. LXIX, (1960). 
(3) Of course survival after death need not 
necessarily 
be disembodied survival, but if it is 
not, the 
claim of logical independence of a person 
and his 
body is weakened, if not withdrawn. 
314. 
is never realized. I shall explain the considerations which 
lend weight to this conclusion, and by so doing I hope to 
discharge my commitment to explain the relation between the 
self and its body, which I left over from chapter five. 
The most radical form of contingency between a self 
and its body is the one that allows complete separation 
between a self and its body such that both could exist indepen- 
dently. This is the condition demanded if the self is to be 
capable of a disembodied existence. A lesser form of contin- 
gency is the one in which the connection between a self and 
a particular body is contingent, although the connection 
between a self and some body remains a necessary connection. 
In the latter case I can conceive of waking up tomorrow morn- 
ing and discovering that I had a completely different body. 
This would be very different from the former possibility, 
according to which I could wake up tomorrow morning and 
discover that I had no body at all. What I have to say 
against the claim to contingency in the relation between a 
self and his body will apply to the radical form of contin- 
gency and not to the lesser form. 
Nothing that I have to say will be found to be incompat- 
ible with the idea that we might exchange bodies. But I 
should point out that my position is incompatible with the 
theory that would make bodily continuity a sufficient condi- 
tion of self -identity. For on the bodily criterion of self- 
identity, if I awoke to find I had a different body, my 
identity would consist in the identity other people 
ascribed 
to the body I now had. But that would entail that 
all my 
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memories would be delusive. This state of affairs might be 
thought to present a logical impasse. For whereas I claim 
that I have someone else's body, everyone else will claim 
that the person whom they have identified through the body 
had become schizophrenic and claimed to be someone else. It 
might even appear that it would be difficult to resist the 
identification made by other people on the basis of bodily 
continuity, since it would be a more reasonable hypothesis 
that I was having hallucinations about my identity, than that 
everyone else was in error. However the position is not by 
any means as simple as that. For suppose my claim not to be 
the person whose body I had, were to be taken seriously. It 
could then be investigated. Suppose now that my memories of 
being the person I claim to be were checked and found by 
relatives of the person I claim to bey to be memories that 
only the authentic person I claim to be could have had. In 
that case if my claim is rejected the new problem is created 
of having to explain how I come to have delusive memories that 
in fact tally miraculously with the memories the person I 
claim to be might have been expected to have had, and which 
contain information that only he could have had. 
Faced with this problem it could easily come to seem 
more credible to agree that I had indeed changed my body and 
was the person I claim to bey than to insist that I was the 
person whose body I had, but who had inexplicably acquired 
memories belonging to someone else's biography. Of course we 
should be reluctant to take this course if the 
person I 
claimed to be was discovered alive, had 
not thought that he 
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had suffered bodily change, and also had precisely the same 
set of memories I claim to have. If I were introduced to 
such a person, and it had meanwhile been agreed that I was 
the person I claimed to be, then I would be being introduced 
to myself. But this is absurd. I, being one man with one 
body, cannot shake hands with another man and at the same 
time claim that I am he. 
Quite clearly it would be impossible to lay down criteria 
for self -identity which would work successfully in every 
logically possible situation. A criterion that ruled out no 
possibilities would be quite useless to help us reach a 
decision as between possibilities. That is to say unless a 
criterion of self -identity supplies us with a rule for saying 
that this man is not the same man as that man, it is ipso 
facto in no sense a criterion of anything. Nevertheless if 
it did happen that two or more men often seemed.to share the 
same biographical memory, the simplest course for us might be 
to give up our present ideas about the numerical identity of 
selves, and concede the possibility of one person becoming 
two people. 
But it is not my aim to countenance such far -fetched 
possibilities as these. I have restricted myself to identify- 
ing the selves we ourselves are in the known conditions of 
human life. Once we move beyond the reach of ordinary expe- 
rience to consider such imaginary cases, we at the 
same time 
forsake the selves we are trying to give 
an account of. We 
have no experience of such imaginary 
selves, and are thus 
unable to speak authoratitively - because 
first -hand - about 
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them. Indeed such imaginary selves are only conceivable by 
us to the extent that they preserve some links with selves 
under human conditions. In other words our understanding of 
imaginary selves is derivative and presupposes our under- 
standing of selves in human conditions.(1) We are entitled, 
therefore, to offer an account of the selves we ourselves 
are without feeling that our account is in any way compromised 
if it does not cover such imaginary selves. On the contrary, 
we could argue that the onus is on those who think up imag- 
inary selves to show that their conceptions are intelligible, 
and their intelligibility must of necessity be measured 
against what is explicable as possibly happening to the selves 
we ourselves are. Having said this, let me proceed to draw 
out the implications of the theory of the self I have put 
forward, on the question of the relation between the self and 
its body. 
As I pointed out, when any theory of the self locates 
the self within experience, the presumption is that such a 
self has no essential dependence upon a body. This presumption . 
may be attributed to the belief in the epistemological 
autonomy of consciousness. By this I mean the belief that no 
connection except a contingent one can be established between 
consciousness and the body (bodily processes). Two types of 
connection are the ones that largely figure in this belief. 
(a) It could be held that the connection between consciousness 
(1) Strawson stresses this point when he 
says that 
an individual can only think of himself 
as a dis- 
embodied being by thinking of himself 
as dis- 
embodied, as a former person. Individuals, 
p. 116. 
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and associated body is a causal one.(1) On the orthodox 
Humean view of causality it immediately follows that a 
causal connection between consciousness and bodily processes 
is contingent. (b) It could be held that states of con- 
sciousness are identical with certain bodily processes. How- 
ever, those philosophers exploring the Identity Theory explic- 
itly state that the identity they have in mind is only 
"contingent identity ". That is to say, the hypothesis could 
be either true or false, and it is not implied that by a state 
of consciousness we mean a brain process.(2) Now the main 
point I wish to make in connection with such views as these, 
which assume a contingent relation between consciousness and 
a body, is that the body is conceived in an overly physical 
way. It is not in any way distinguished from a straightforward 
material object, or from an aggregate of purely physical 
events. In particular it is not conceived of as a body for 
consciousness. As selves with bodies, we do not think of our 
bodies as physical objects except when we lose control over 
them, and even less do we think of them as physical processes 
or events. Even Strawson, who I am sure would repudiate the 
(1) See A.J. Ayer, The Concept of a Person, (London, 
1963) p. 116, where he says "I amp however, 
inclined to think that personal identity depends 
upon the identity of the body, and that a person's 
ownership of states of consciousness consists in 
their standing in a special causal relation to the 
body by which he is identified." 
(2) See U.T. Place, 'Is Consciousness a Brain 
Process ?' 
and J.J.C. Smart, 'Sensations and 
Brain Processes' 
both of which are printed in The Philosophy 
of 
Mind, ed. V.C. Chappell, (Prentice 
Hall, 1962). 
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suggestion that one's body was merely a material object, does 
not give an unequivocal lead on this question. By placing 
such accent on the body's function as an identificatory 
tag of a person, the central function of the body on 
Strawson's account is one it can fulfil qua material object. 
It is my belief that Strawson gives pride of place to the 
body as a means.of identification because for him the problem 
of personal identity is primarily a question of other 
people's identity, not one's own. It is. notable that although 
Strawson allows that we have knowledge of certain of our 
states of consciousness not on the basis of observation,(1), 
he makes no comparable allowance for the possibility of our 
knowing our own identity not on the basis of observation (of 
our bodies). In contra -distinction to these approaches, 
which downgrade the body to the level of a material object, I 
intend to stress the significance of the body as it is for 
consciousness. In other words I want to stress the importance 
of viewing the body as alive and active. In short I wish to 
stress the agency of the body.(2) 
2. My central contention in support of the claim that the 
body should be viewed as having a much closer relation to con- 
sciousness than Strawson's account suggests, is based on the 
idea that perceptual activities are themselves 
purposive 
(1) Strawson, Individuals, Ch. 3. 
(2) The word "body" has in many 
contexts a passive 
sense, and this inclines us to 
think of it as 
akin to an ordinary physical 
object. 
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bodily activities.(1) Looking, listening, sniffing, feeling 
tactually, and tasting, are each and every one activities in 
which muscular operations of the body essentially enter. 
They are all things we do through the agency of our bodies. 
If I were to say that we use our bodies as instruments for 
such perceptual activities I would be misrepresenting the 
position. If one uses something as an instrument it is 
usually possible to find some other instrument which one 
could use in its place. But in the case of perceptual activ- 
ities we could not replace our bodily instrumentality in a 
similar way. It is not, therefore, that we use our bodies, 
as a means, in the case of perceptual activities. Perceptual 
activities are irrevocably bodily. That is, the concepts. 
"looking ", "listening ", "tasting ", etc., are concepts that 
we can only understand as signifying bodily activities. 
This point cán best be substantiated by demonstrating 
the failure of a counter -argument. It might be objected that 
we can look without knowing that it is with our eyes that we 
look, sniff without knowing that it is with our nose we sniff, 
and so forth. In fact this information may be something we 
learn long after we have learned to look, or sniff, etc. It 
follows, so the objection runs, that it can be no part of 
knowing what it is to engage in these activities, that we 
should know what part of the body they are accomplished with. 
Now I think this objection can be conceded, and it can be 
(1) When I call perceptual activities bodily activities 
it must not be thought that they are 
being assim- 
ilated with bodily processes. For this 
distinction 
see p.160 above. 
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agreed that we are able to look without knowing that the eye 
is the organ of sight, the ear the organ of hearing, and so 
on. But this does not mean that we must also be ignorant of 
the fact that these activities are bodily. Knowing how to 
look involves knowing how to make certain movements with our 
bodies. We cannot be ignorant of that fact and still claim 
to understand what looking is. I conclude, therefore, that 
the bodily involvement in perceptual activities can only be 
made to seem contingent if the nature of the bodily involve- 
ment is wrongly described. 
An additional consideration is the fact that all these 
perceptual bodily activities are accompanied by kinaesthetic 
sensations. Now kinaesthetic sensations are technically so- 
called, but to the non -expert, kinaesthetic sensations are 
nothing other than his experiences of moving or controlling 
certain movements of his body. They are not separated in 
his mind and treated as signs of bodily activity. The 
kinaesthetic sensations are what bodily movements are for 
consciousness. We can appreciate this fact by thinking of 
forming a mental image of kinaesthetic sensations. We would 
think of them as sensations as of moving the arm, leg, head 
or toe, not as disembodied sensations. The experience of 
amputees bears out my assertion. A man without a leg will 
claim that he can feel the leg moving: he does not deduce 
the movement from the sensation. Since, however, he knows_ 
that he has no leg, he knows that the experience is delusive, 
and after a time he will cease to be deceived by it. 
But 
the point remains that his mind takes quite 
a bit of 
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disabusing, thus revealing how difficult it is to avoid 
thinking of kinaesthetic sensations as awareness of bodily 
activity. The importance of this is that it means that we 
come to think of our kinaesthetic sensations as those elements 
of consciousness we produce by our bodily activity. It is 
difficult, as a result, to envisage the connection between 
kinaesthetic sensations and our bodies as contingent, such 
that the sensations could occur even though there were no body 
to be responsible for them. 
I have stressed the point that perceptual activities 
essentially involve the body, not in a passive causal sense, 
but in an active operational sense. The significance of this 
is as follows. I have already described what I take to be 
the connection between perceptual activities such as looking, 
listening and feeling, and states of awareness such as see- 
ing, hearing, and feeling. By now attempting to establish 
the intrinsic connection between looking, listening and 
feeling, on the one hand, and bodily activities on the other, 
it follows that if both these attempts are successful a nec- 
essary connection has been established between certain states 
of awareness (perceptions) and certain sorts of bodily activ- 
ity. It must be appreciated that I am not suggesting that 
there is a necessary connection between all perceptual aware- 
ness and bodily activity. It might be possible to envisage 
cases of perceptual awareness that are not dependent on bodily 
activity. I am making the lesser claim that there is a nec- 
essary connection between perceptual awareness and bodily 
activity in the special case in which the awareness 
holds the 
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attention of the percipient. I am maintaining, in other 
words, that there are cases of seeing, hearing, feeling, etc., 
in which it does not make sense to say that one was not con- 
scious of looking, listening, or feeling. If I have delib- 
erately chosen to look in order to see an object, and I 
achieve my intention by seeing the object, it would be self - 
contradictory for me to claim that I did not know that I was 
looking. This is true, mutatis mutandis of listening and 
feeling. 
If my argument is sound, therefore, sense perception of 
this order would not be intelligible for a disembodied being, 
since a disembodied being would not even know what constituted 
"looking ", "listening ", or "feeling ", and would in consequence 
be unable to enjoy the resultant state of awareness. It may 
be gathered that I am not ruling out the possibility of seeing 
without being conscious of looking, hearing without being con- 
scious of listening, and so forth. I therefore do not rule 
out the possibility of a disembodied being seeing without look- 
ing, hearing without listening, and so forth. My argument is 
that even if we accept such a possibility, we cannot accept 
the further possibility that a disembodied being is in the 
position to enjoy that form of perceptual awareness that is 
the result of engaging in the corresponding perceptual activ- 
ities. But such awareness forms a very large part of the 
experience of the selves we are. It follows that a large part 
of our experience is only meaningful'for selves with bodies. 
We cannot therefore accept the proposition that the connection 
between ourselves and our bodies is contingent without at the 
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same time being prepared to concede a radical reduction in 
the range of experience open to us. In short we cannot admit 
that our bodies are in a contingent relation to ourselves, 
without ceasing to refer to the selves we ourselves are. 
The emphasis I have placed on looking, listening, etc., 
as bodily activities in which selves engage is worth contrast- 
ing with some points Strawson makes on the relation between 
perceptual experience and the body. He writes: 
Consider merely some of the ways in which the character 
of a person's perceptual experience is dependent on 
facts about his own body. Let us take his visual expe- 
rience. The dependence is more complicated and many- 
sided than may at first be obvious. First, there is 
that group of empirical facts of which the most familiar 
is that if the eyelids of that body are closed, the 
person sees nothing. To this group belong all the 
facts known to ophthalmic surgeons. Second, there is 
the fact that what falls within his field of vision at 
any moment depends in part on the orientation of his 
eyes, i.e. on the direction his head is turned in, and 
on the orientation of his eyeballs in their sockets. 
And, third, there is the fact that where he sees from - 
or what his possible field of vision at any moment is - 
depends on where his body, and in particular his head, 
is located.(1) 
Strawson goes on to argue, on the basis of these three facts, 
that although they demand that perceptual experience be 
dependent on a body, they do not logically demand that it be 
the same body for each of the three facts. But that argument 
is not my immediate concern. What I wish to draw attention to 
is Strawson's assumption that it is facts about a body that 
are relevant to the dependence of perceptual experience on 
bodies. He mentions such things as the eyes being 
open, the 
direction of the head, the orientation of the 
eyeballs.., and 
the position seen from. The picture 
this conjures up is one 
(1) Strawson, Individuals, p. 
90. 
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of an inert body, "set up" to face in the appropriate direction. 
The body is treated as though it were a piece of optical equip- 
ment. Given this assumption it makes sense when he goes on to 
consider the possibility that a perceiver may be dependent on 
three different bodies, A, B, and C, such that S (the perceiver) 
sees when As eyes are open, but whether B and C's eyes are 
open is irrelevant; sees from the position of C, but not from 
A and B; sees when B's head and eyes are turned in a certain 
direction, but not A's and B's. 
Now my objection to Strawson's argument is that he makes 
no mention of seeing as a result of looking, and in particular 
he makes no mention of seeing as a result of deliberately 
actuating one's body in the activity of looking. The facts_ 
Strawson mentions., about the eyes being open, the head facing 
a certain direction, etc., are necessary conditions of delib- 
erately looking, but they are not sufficient conditions of the 
same. A person can have his eyes open, have his head orientated 
in a certain direction, and so forth, and yet not be looking at 
anything, or looking in any sense at all. He could be in a 
hypnotic trance in which he reports that he sees nothing. It 
is evident that Strawson leaves out of account the idea of the 
body as active in a more central sense than causally effective. 
Once we bring in the idea of "looking ", and the bodily actua- 
tion it involves_, Strawson's whole argument collapses. 
Let us return to Strawson's example of the perceiver 
S 
whose visual perception depends on the cooperation 
of three 
bodies. We can at once ask "Which of the 
three bodies is the 
percipient S ?" The answer must be that 
whatever choice we 
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make will be arbitrary. But if we ask "Which of the three is 
looking ?" the position is immediately different. We can find . 
out which of the three is willing the looking: i.e., trying 
to look at this rather than that, taking steps to prevent an 
object from being lost sight of, and so forth. The one of 
which this is true, will be S. Therefore one body will still 
be uniquely the perceiver's body. If, however, S could 
directly will the movements of all three bodies, so that if S 
desired to look at an object, he could do so by willing A's 
eyes to be open and properly focussed, willing B's appropriate 
head movements, and willing C's body to be in the right place, 
then Strawson would have to admit that the whole idea of one 
person -one body would have to be abandoned. It is evident 
that Strawson has failed to establish that the "facts" of 
perception cannot themselves guarantee the uniqueness of a 
single body for each percipient. His mistake is, I maintain, 
thinking of the body as material object, instead of the body 
as perceiver. 
I think my argument shows that it is wrong to concentrate 
on the physical facts if one is to establish a non- contingent 
connection between sense -experience and the body. To do so 
presupposes altogether too mechanical a conception of the rela- 
tionship between the two. I hope I have succeeded in showing 
that the line I have adopted, of making the connection between 
sense -experience and the body depend on the connection between 
sense awareness and bodily activities, is a sounder one. 
3. I argued in the chapter on residual consciousness that 
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not only was sense awareness dependent on bodily activities, 
but that mental imagery was also dependent on bodily activ- 
ities. In addition to this I argued that our thoughts 
receive expression in symbols that are drawn from observable 
objects or mental images. It follows that thoughts too, on 
this reasoning, must depend on the bodily activities that 
bring about the perception of objects, or the mental imagery. 
If this is indeed the case, all of consciousness might be 
claimed to be dependent upon bodily activities, and the notion 
of the contingency of the relation between consciousness and 
the body would be radically in doubt. 
Needless to say the extension of my thesis to mental 
imagery and thoughts cannot be defended with as much confidence 
as it is possible to defend the narrower thesis for which I 
have been arguing in the previous section. I tried to show 
in the chapter on residual consciousness how such a broadening 
of the theory might be undertaken, and gave some arguments 
which pointed in that direction. If the broader thesis could 
be conclusively established, it would follow that there would 
be a complete logical dependence of consciousness on bodily 
activity. All I am in fact asserting is the more modest 
proposition of a partial logical dependence of some forms of 
consciousness on bodily activity. 
What must not be lost sight of, however, is that on both 
the narrower and the broader interpretation of the theory, the 
content of residual consciousness will in large measure 
consist 
of elements of consciousness that only exist in 
virtue of the 
fact that the selves we are, have bodies. 
Divorce the self 
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from the body, and the resulting residual consciousness would 
be radically altered. On my theory this would mean a radical 
alteration in the self that experienced such a severing of 
self from body. Such a self would of necessity be very 
different from the selves wt know first -hand. We would be 
able to assert with confidence "We are not such selves as.. 
that." 
It may now be realized that the argument of chapter 
three to the effect that residual consciousness was partly the 
result of the existence of sensorial attention, has_ a signif- 
icance that I have not until now been ready to bring out: 
namely the implication that residual consciousness, as there 
conceived, was based on the existence of the body -as- agency. 
The equation of residual consciousness and the self thus had 
the significance that the self was conceived as necessarily 
having a body. Thus, although in a purely formal sense resid- 
ual consciousness is not logically dependent on a body, in the 
material sense implied by our referring to the residual con- 
sciousness of human selves, it is logically dependent on our 
having bodies. That is to say, if we did not have. bodies, we 
would not have the type of residual consciousness we do have: 
without bodies we would not be the sort of selves that we are 
with bodies. I am not suggesting that the whole character of 
residual consciousness is to be attributed to its connection 
with a body. The dynamic aspect of residual consciousness that 
is revealed in its function in interrogative attention, remains 
unaffected by my present argument. However, the conclusions 
I reached about the significance of kinaesthetic 
sensation in 
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the attentive process, are reinforced by the present argument. 
In retrospect it can be seen that the view of residual con- 
sciousness presented in chapter three prepared the way for the 
position I have been arguing'for here, to the effect that we 
are essentially embodied selves (to use Stout's phrase), and 
in opposition to the thesis that the self is only contingently 
related to a body. It should not be forgotten, either, that 
my attempt to demonstrate the continuity of consciousness, and 
by implication the persistence of the self, rested on the 
contention that a necessary connection existed between the 
body and consciousness via the notion of bodily activities. 
I wish to consider one further imaginary self in order to 
make a final point about the dependence of the self on a body. 
I have dealt with the case of disembodied survival after death. 
Now another possibility is some sort of corporeal survival 
after death. Such would be the Christian conception of the 
resurrection of the body in a spiritualized form. A similar 
conception to this is that of the ghost of a dead person. The 
significance of these conceptions is that they make it perfectly 
conceivable that such beings should have normal sense percep- 
tion. We could think of the bodies possessed by such beings 
as quasi -bodies. It is evident that beings with such quasi - 
bodies would be able to engage in perceptual activities such as 
looking, listening, sniffing and so on. This means that my 
argument establishing the connection between the body and 
sense experience would apply equally to beings with quasi - 
bodies. 
The lesson we learn from this is that my argument does 
not assume that the body involved in perception need be a 
330. 
physical body, or a flesh and blood. body. On my aróment s 
therefore, the fact that our bodies are made of flesh and blood 
is a truly contingent fact, and it is consequently perfectly 
conceivable that our bodies should be me of some different 
stuff; perhaps of a more ghostly stuff, perhaps of 
more mechanical stuff - such as the components of con--.z.. 
That quasi- bodies satisfy the requi_etents of theory .. 
out quite unambiguously one of its aspects I wish to stress;. 
It is that I am dealing with the body 
psychological point of view, or, to _ í _ from 
a phenomenological point of view. 
From this point of view, - - --- about the 
body, is not the matter of which it is co sed= but the 
ability it gives us to realize our human potentiality, ï 
the phenomenological point of view the inzortsnce 3 f the 'may 
is precisely that with it we are to, Toy__ Ii yen, feel, 
etc., as well as act, register emotion, and ï 71th 
one another - not to mention its use for the puLcuose of per- 
sonal identification, on E-:aawson Las irsist-s,d with suCh 
effect. Because a quasi-body could answer = p- _ _ -s; just 
as well, the notion of a quasi-body is e -- cc 7;t:1e 
with the position I have been ar u1irg: for. The 41 II . 
whether there are beings with quasi-bodies is or tbis vï,T- a 
purely empirical question. The significance of the cc - = 
of a self with a quasi -body is that it does make it ci 
the dependence of experience on the body is oat a ca- I 
dependence: at least not when the body is conceived. p.h-eno- 
enologically. 
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4. I have from time to time in the course of this work 
contrasted my views with those of Strawson. In this section 
I argue that his position and mine are basically complementary. 
I begin by stating the point of greatest divergence between the 
two positions, and work back to their more fundamental harmony. 
The one crucial point on which the two positions seem to come 
into head -on conflict is this. Whereas on Strawson's theory 
the concept of a person is "logically primitive ", on my theory 
it could be said with equal justice that the concept of con- 
sciousness is "logically primitive ". The two views seem 
manifestly to contradict each other. 
From a formal point of view the opposition between 
Strawson and myself reflects the opposition explained in the 
first chapter between Hamilton and Ferrier on the one hand, 
and Hodgson and James on the other. But the basis of 
Strawson's position is, of course, fundamentally different 
from that of Hamilton and Ferrier. For Strawson, but not for 
Hamilton or Ferrier, the concept of a person is presupposed, 
not for ontological reasons, but because the concept is a 
presupposition of the conceptr.al scheme we employ. In spite 
of this I hope to show that when properly viewed, there is no 
conflict between Strawson's position and my own. For the sake 
of arguing this point I shall take it for granted that Strawson 
is correct about the logical primitiveness of persons, and 
attempt to show that even so there is no inconsistency between 
us.(1) 
(1) Strawson's theory has of course not gone unchall- 
enged. See Ayer, The Concept of a Person, and 
R.L. Philips, 'Descriptive versus Revisionary 
Metaphysics, &c.' Philosophy, vol. XLII (1967). 
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Strawson argues that it is a condition of a person being 
able to ascribe states of consciousness to himself that he 
should, or should be prepared to, ascribe states of con- 
sciousness to other persons. The implication of this condition 
is that before I can ascribe states of consciousness to myself 
I must be able to identify other selves. This opens the way 
for Strawson's thesis that unless other selves had bodies they 
could not be identified. It follows that in ascribing states_ 
of consciousness to others we must be ascribing states of con- 
sciousness to individuals possessing both states of con- 
sciousness and corporeal characteristics.(1) Strawson takes it 
to be evident on his view that since states of consciousness 
are ascribed to persons in the case of other -ascriptions, when 
I ascribe a state of consciousness to myself I must also be 
ascribing it to a person. This means that I too must be an 
individual possessing both states of consciousness and corporeal 
characteristics. That is to say, I understand that ascribing 
a state of consciousness to myself is just a particular instance 
of ascribing states of consciousness to persons. This proposi- 
tion seems to me to be the most questionable one of the whole 
argument, but that is by the way. 
Central to Strawson's position is the notion of a self as 
an ascriber of states of consciousness both to himself and to 
others. But for a self to ascribe a state of consciousness to 
himself he must be self -conscious. That is, "self -conscious" 
in the sense that he has a notion of himself. This is 
a 
different sense of "self- conscious" from the one I 
have some- 
(1) Strawson, Individuals, p. 104. 
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times described as "self- objectification ". Now it is obvious 
that self -objectification of the sort I have been investigat- 
ing, presupposes that a self has some notion of himself. A 
self could not attempt to make of himself his object of atten- 
tion, unless he had a notion of himself in the first place. 
It can be seen, therefore, that Strawson's. attempt to lay down 
the logical conditions for self- ascription, which are at the 
same time the logical conditions that have to be satisfied if 
a self is to have a notion of himself, is something that has 
to be done, if we are to understand how self-objectification 
is to be possible (even i± only partially possible). 
Nevertheless the theory of the self I have advanced 
does not depend on the assumption that selves are self - 
ascribers. Only my remarks about self -objectification do so, 
and it is not a requirement of the theory that self- objectifica- 
tion be attainable. In fact, the theory identifying the self 
with residual consciousness has been developed without ref- 
erence to self -ascription. It can now be seen how my theory 
stands, in. relation to Strawson's. I have attempted to make 
an identification of the self, or, to put it differently, I 
have tried to discover what selves are. Strawson has concerned 
himself with what must be true of selves if they are to be 
capable (as they are) of self- ascription. That is to say, my 
concern has been to understand what the self is, of which 
Strawson says that it possesses both states of consciousness 
and corporeal characteristics. 
There is clear evidence that Strawson 
himself would not 
wish to rule out the sort of enterprise I 
have undertaken. At 
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one point he asks the question "How is the concept of a person 
possible ? ", and, in elaboration, part of what he has to say 
about the question is this: 
For when we have acknowledged the primitiveness of the 
concept of a person, and, with it, the unique character 
of P- predicates., we may still want to ask what it is_ 
in the natural facts that makes it intelligible that we 
should have this concept, and to ask this in the hope 
of a non -trivial answer, i.e., in the hope of an answer 
which does not merely say: "Well, there are people in 
the world." I do not pretend to be able to satisfy this 
demand at all fully. But I may mention two very different 
things which might count as beginnings or fragments of an 
answer. 
First, I think a beginning can be made by moving a 
certain class of P- predicates to a central position in 
the picture. They are predicates, roughly, which involve 
doing something, which clearly imply intention or a state 
of mind or at least consciousness in general, and which 
indicate a characteristic pattern, or range of patterns 
of bodily movement, while not indicating at all precisely 
any very definite sensation or experience.(1) 
It would not be claiming too much, I submit, to describe 
the enquiry I have undertaken as one of discovering what there 
is "in the natural facts" in virtue of which we are selves, 
and accordingly, which makes it intelligible that we should 
have the concept of a person. It is interesting, too, to see 
what Strawson takes to be a first step in this direction. He 
suggests moving a certain form of consciousness "to a central 
position in the picture ": namely the consciousness exhibited 
in action. There are two points of significance here. 
(a) Strawson is unable to escape according primacy to con- 
sciousness, and (b) he selects those forms of consciousness 
that are connected with bodily movement, as being the most 
likely to make the concept of a person intelligible. It can 
thus be seen that the direction in which Strawson looks to an 
(1) Individuals, p. 111. 
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answer is remarkably close to the one I have taken. We, agree 
on the position of "consciousness in general ", and we agree on 
the importance of bodily movement. Where we disagree is on 
the type of bodily movement involved. Strawson has in mind 
the type found in certain kinds of action. He lists "going 
for a walk ", "coiling a rope", "playing ball ", "writing a 
letter ". By contrast I turn to the bodily activities 
displayed in sense perception. Once again the contrast 
between action and activity is in evidence. 
5. The relation I have sought to establish between bodily 
activity and state of awareness has relevance in a wider 
philosophical setting than I have yet considered. I shall 
this study by touching on some of these wider issues. 
In the Philosophy of I,iind there is a tradition, which 
goes back to Brentano at least, according to which there exist 
mental acts or acts of awareness. Brentano himself tells us, 
Every presentation (Vorstellung) of sensation or imagina- 
tion offers an example of the mental phenomenon; and here 
I understand by presentation not that which is presented, 
but the act of presentation. Thus, hearing a sol,nri, 
seeing a colored object, sensing warm or cold, and the 
comparable states of imagination as well, are examples 
of what I mean.(1) 
We find the same view put forward by Moore: 
To begin with, then: I see, I hear, I smell, I taste, 
etc.; I sometimes feel pains; I sometimes observe my 
own mental acts; I sometimes remember entities which I 
have formerly seen or heard, etc.... All these things 
I do; and there is nothing more certain to me than that 
(1) F. Brentano, 'The Distinction between Mental and 
Physical Phenomena', Psychologie vom empirischen 
Standpunkt, vol. I, bk. II, ch. i. Reprinted in 
Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, ed. 
R.M. Chisholm, (Illinois, 1960), p. 41. 
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I do them all. And because, in a wide sense, they are 
all of them things which I do, I propose to call them 
all 'mental acts'. By calling them 'acts' I do not 
wish to imply that I am always particularily active 
when I do them. No doubt, I must be active in a 
sense, whenever I do any of them. But certainly, 
when I do some of them, I am sometimes very passive.(1) 
This view finds adherents right down to the present day. It 
is a central tenet in the writings of Bergmann.(2) Grossman, 
too, in a recent book, defends the proposition that there are 
mental acts. As an example of a mental act he cites "seeing 
a tree ": viz., 
Consider, for example, the sentence "I see a tree "... 
The ... sentence seems to mention three things - namely, 
a person, a tree, and a mental act of seeing.(3) 
Russell was one of the early opponents of the doctrine 
of mental acts. He stated the objection which many philos- 
ophers would now bring against it: 
The first criticism I have to make is that the act seems 
unnecessary and fictitious. The occurrence of the 
content of a thought constitutes the occurrence of the 
thought. Empirically, I cannot discover anything 
corresponding to the supposed act: and theoretically 
I cannot see that it is indispensable.(4) 
While I am in agreement with Russell about this, I think my 
own analysis both explains why those philosophers in the 
Brentano tradition came to believe that there had to be such 
mental acts, and enables us to replace their analysis with a 
(1) G.E. Moore, 'The Subject -Matter of Psychology', 
Proc. Arist. Soc., 1909 -10. Reprinted in Body 
and Mind, ed. G.N.A. Vesey. (London, 1964), 
p. 237. 
(2) Cf. G. Bergmann, Meaning and Existence (Madison, 
1960), p. 27 ff., and Logic and Reality (Madison, 
1964). 
(3) R. Grossmann, The Structure of Mind (Madison & 
Milwaukee, 1965), p. 39. 
(4) B. Russell, The Analysis of Mind (London, 1921), 
pp. 17 -18. 
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more satisfactory one. It must be obvious that I would deny 
that seeing, hearing, etc., are in any sense acts. I have 
classified them as states of awareness, and offered my 
reasons for so classifying them. I maintain quite categor- 
ically that Brentano, Moore, and Grossmann are wrong when 
they assert that seeing, hearing, etc., are acts. But Moore 
at least is right when he says that we do do something when 
we see, hear, or taste. Where he is wrong is in jumping to 
the conclusion that what we do is perform acts of seeing, 
hearing, or tasting. What we quite incontrovertibly are 
normally doing when seeing, hearing, or tasting, is looking, 
listening, or tasting. It is only when a philosopher con- 
centrates all his attention on consciousness itself that he 
is led to believe that what he is doing must be found within 
consciousness itself. The truth of the matter is that what I 
do when I claim to be doing something when perceiving, is 
engage in the related bodily activity. 
Thus it is true to say that I am doing something when 
for instance I see a tree: what I am doing is looking at it. 
However it is not the case either, that these philosophers 
have simply made the mistake of believing they had found a 
mental act, when in reality what they had found was a physical 
act. As I have argued, looking, listening, etc., are not acts 
but activities.(1) We may well wonder why the obvious source 
of the sense of agency we have as perceivers, should have been 
(1) It must not be forgotten that although physical 
activities, they are of necessity activities of 
a conscious self. 
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missed by these writers. I can only put it down to the fact 
that it was their chief concern to distinguish the mental 
from the physical. If the perceiver experienced a sense of 
agency, therefore, the agency had to be in the category of 
the mental, if the distinction between the mental and the 
physical was to be upheld. 
Of the passages quoted from Brentano, Moore, and 
Grossmann, Moore's is the most instructive because he finds 
himself in some embarrassment over the fact that he cannot 
say that he is particularly active when he performs these 
putative mental acts. As he remarks, 'When I do some of them, 
I am sometimes very passive." This admission is most reveal- 
ing. If Moore's "mental acts" are in reality mental states, 
they would of necessity appear to be passive. 
Now this alleged passivity of the mind in sense percep- 
tion has been at the centre of the controversy between 
Idealism and Realism. According to Realism, in perception 
the mind is in a state of receptivity in which sense impres- 
sions are "given" to it. The mind itself is supposed to make 
one aware of what is given without in any way interfering 
with the given, or altering it. Idealism on the other hand 
denies these assertions, and maintains that the idea of a 
given element in perception which survives the conceptualizing 
activity of mind is a pure abstraction. Hampshire, in his 
book Thought and Action, makes an accusation against classical 
empiricism which Idealists would be only too happy to endorse, 
when he says, 
The deepest mistake in empiricist theories of perception, 
descending from Berkeley and Hume, has been the 
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representation of human beings as passive observers 
receiving impressions from 'outside' of the mind, 
where the 'outside' includes their own bodies.(1) 
There is certainly something in this criticism, and this 
I will discuss shortly. But what I first wish to point out 
is that empiricists are right in one respect when they 
stress the passivity of the mind in perception. According to 
the theory I am advancing, the perceptions themselves have 
the logical status of states. And, as I have already pointed 
out, states are just the sort of thing of which we should say 
that the thing in the state is passive in respect of the 
state.(2) From this point of view it is quite correct to 
call perceptual awareness "the given ", or "sense- data ", or 
even, "presentations ". (We might also mention Kant's 
"representations".) States awareness in no sense possess 
the quality of seeming "mind- made ". Realism is right insofar 
as it is based on this fact that perceptual awarenesses are 
states of awareness, and in respect of his states of awareness 
(experiences) the perceiver is passive. But Idealism too is 
right in maintaining that the perceiver is active in percep- 
tion. At the same time the Idealist is wrong in believing 
that the sense in which the perceiver is active is incompat- 
ible with the his being passive in the sense I have just 
explained. Perhaps the Idealists have been misled by the 
Empiricists. If we follow Hampshire and accept his contention 
that Empiricists represent perceivers as passive observers, we 
may excuse Idealists for thinking that they had to deny that 
(1) S. Hampshire, Thought and Action (London, 1959) 
P. 47. 
(2) See above, P. 2117f. 
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observers are passive. Idealists are of course right when 
they state that observers are active and not passive. But 
from the fact that observers are active it by no means follows 
that their perceptual awareness itself is not passively given. 
Hampshire's own position is that observers 9 bodies 
are active in the sense that their bodies physically impinge 
on surrounding objects. "In fact" says Hampshire, 
I find myself from the beginning able to act upon 
objects around me. In this context to act is to move 
at will my own body, that persisting physical thing, 
and thereby to bring about perceived movements of 
other physical things. I not only perceive my body, 
I also control it; I not only perceive external 
objects, I also manipulate them.(1) 
As I indicated at the end of the last section I would not 
wish to minimize the importance of the facts Hampshire 
stresses in this passage, but I would claim that the picture 
he gives is incomplete. A perceiver may be active in a more 
fundamental sense than the one described by Hampshire; namely 
in the sense that he actuates his sense -organs in perceiving. 
According to Hampshire "I find myself from the beginning 
able to act upon objects around me." But this may be disputed. 
If he means that as a self- conscious being I find myself able 
to act upon objects, then of course he is right. But if he 
means that human beings are in fact able to act upon objects 
from the beginning, he is certainly wrong. An infant is to 
begin with only able to engage in certain activities, not 
perform acts, and high on the list of the bodily activities 
it can engage in, is the activity of looking. In fact one of 
the earliest things a child learns to do, is to attend to 
what it sees, hears, feels, etc. Thus a human being is an 
(1) Hampshire, op. cit., p. 47. 
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active observer in virtue of his power of sense -organ atten- 
tion long before he has the manipulative skill of which 
Hampshire speaks. 
The importance of this point is missed by Hampshire. 
It is that even if the Empiricists were right to think of 
perceivers as passive observers, in the sense in which 
Hampshire understands this phrase (i.e., as the antithesis 
of agents actively manipulating their environment), they would 
still be active in the more fundamental sense that as 
perceivers they would of necessity have to engage in bodily 
activities. In other words, from a logical point of view, 
the question whether observers are active or passive is quite 
independent of the question whether observers are or are not 
agents impinging on their environment. Nevertheless 
Hampshire is right to attack the assumption, which he attrib- 
utes to the Empiricists, that observers are identified with 
minds and their bodies are taken to be "outside" of the mind. 
My argument all along has been directed against the idea that 
a body is extrinsic to an observer. The idea arises, I 
believe, because Empiricists have paid exclusive attention to 
the actual experience of seeing, hearing, feeling, etc., and 
neglected the connection between such experiences and the 
related activities of looking, listening, feeling, etc. 
Only by ignoring this connection can the observer himself 
be "internalized" in the manner alleged by Hampshire. 
To put their position in a favourable light, it could 
be said that although the Empiricists rightly sought to draw 
attention to the passivity of states of awareness, they 
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wrongly thought that this could only be done by asserting 
that it was the observer who was passive. After all what 
better way is there of ensuring the passivity of the observer, 
than that of shutting him up inside the mind? The true posi- 
tion, I maintain, is that the passivity of states of aware- 
ness is a logical feature of awareness, which could not be 
jeopardized by even the most active of observers. 
I believe that the theory that the self is at one and 
the same time active qua attender, and passive qua subject of 
awareness, offers a middle course between Idealism and 
Realism, which does justice to the logical basis of both. I 
have explained wherein lies the strength of the Realist 
position. It remains to be seen how the Idealist case is 
accommodated by the theory I have put forward. In the first 
place it must be made clear that the Idealist's attempted 
refutation of the Realist position on the "givenness" of 
states of awareness, is unacceptable. Idealist suggestions 
that states of awareness are somehow only products of the 
mind1s own making, receive no support from the analysis I 
have given. On the other hand the Realist contention that we 
perceive the world just as it is, has also to be rejected. 
It is evident that my theory substantiates the Idealist view 
of an active perceiver, and that the nature of the activity 
plays its part in determining what we take to be "there" to 
be perceived. 
To put it in general terms my contention is that the 
activity in question is the activity of attention. If we 
confine ourselves to sense perception, it is sensorial atten- 
tion. We not only engage in bodily activities of looking, 
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listening, feeling, and so forth, but we engage in these 
activities in different sorts of ways. The difference between 
looking for and looking at, has already been mentioned, and 
both may be distinguished from "just looking ". Similar 
sorts of distinction exist in the cases of some of the other 
sense -organ activities. Now the manner in which we engage 
our sense -organ activity will have a vital bearing on the 
resultant state of awareness. What we are aware of, given 
a "perceptual field ", will differ greatly depending, for 
instance, on whether the attention involved is interrogative 
or non -interrogative. In this connection I would refer to 
the discussion in chapter three where I sought to establish 
that residual consciousness played an essential role in 
determining what becomes for the percipient a perceptual 
object. The implication of the position I have developed is 
that as far as sense perception is concerned the bodily activ- 
ity involved is directed and controlled by residual con- 
sciousness. As a result we determine what our perceptual 
states will be by choosing what to look at, listen to, 
taste, and so on for the remaining sense modalities. 
We must, therefore, agree with the Idealists concerning 
the significance of the active involvement of the perceiver 
in determining what is perceived. But the last word must go 
to the Realists. Our perceptions are states of awareness 
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